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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This study, for the first time, brings together the detached understanding that facilitates 
coherent analysis of the emerging legal and regulatory issues that mobile payments 
introduce after financial inclusion in Kenya. To pursue these arguments firstly the thesis 
finds that the law on payments systems is incomplete as it does not address the specific 
issues necessary for an effective payments systems. It also puts forward the argument that 
the current regulatory regime is weak and largely unfelt due to its nascent state of 
development. Furthermore the current legal instruments are dispersed, and not uniformly 
applied among and across all payments systems and instruments as there exists an 
ambiguity in the legal definition of ‘mobile money’ and ‘deposits’ that present legal 
challenges in the enforcement of new regulations. Secondly, the cross-roads between the 
telecommunications industry and the financial industry that introduces non-banks into 
the retail payments market, presents a challenge in its effective regulation. As policy 
objectives are blurred when firms which are traditionally separated have to find 
appropriate regulatory frameworks in convergence. Thirdly this thesis examines the 
approach taken by Kenya in regulating mobile payments juxtaposing the realities that 
combine to blunt the impact of innovation and access to finance. This thesis serves as a 
foundational discussion on the regulatory capacity for the adoption and development of 
mobile payments within a regulatory vacuum and proposes that an appropriate regulatory 
framework is needed to addresses all these issues.  
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CHAPTER 1 
SETTING OUT THE PROBLEM AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY. 
Introduction  
 
‘A country's payment system is what makes it real and financial markets work ... when commodities are 
exchanged for cash, cheque, giro, credit card, or debit card payments rather than other commodities, trade 
expands as transaction costs fall and production specialisation increases.’1  
1.1. Background 
 
In 2008, Kenya enjoyed stable growth within its banking sector and it appeared 
to have avoided most of the ripple effects from the Global Financial Crisis.2 However, 
despite the resilience of the leading local retail banks in the preceding years, only 19 per 
cent of Kenya’s 40 million people had bank accounts in 2009.3 As is the case in many 
developing economies, banking is still widely considered to be the exclusive preserve of 
the rich who can afford the regular and costly fees charged by banks whose branches 
were, and continue to be, few and far between.4 Until recently, there had been  very little 
incentive for banks to serve the ‘unbanked’ and ‘under banked’5 members of society, 
principally, due to the significant costs entailed in establishing a network of regional 
branches and the minimal margins associated with providing banking services to the 
                                                 
1 David B Humphrey, Lawrence B Pulley and Jukka M Vesala, ‘Cash, Paper, and Electronic Payments: a 
Cross-country Analysis’ (1996) 28(4) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 914. 
2 The Global Financial Crisis in 2007/2008 as defined in John Raymond LaBrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-
Caminal and Dalvinder Singh, Financial Crisis Containment and Government Guarantees (Edward Elgar 2013). 
3 Mark Pickens, David Porteous and Sarah Rotman, ‘Banking the Poor via G2P Payments’ (2009) 58 Focus 
Note. 
4 Growth Commission, Post-Crisis Growth in Developing Countries: A Special Report of the Commission 
on Growth and Development on the Implications of the 2008 Financial Crisis (Washington DC: The World 
Bank (2010). 
5 The terms ‘unbanked’ and ‘under banked’ will be used in this paper to refer to persons who do not have 
a bank account or who rely on alternative financial services. See, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), ‘Tapping the Unbanked Market’ (Symposium) 
<http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/TUM_bio.html> accessed 3 September 2013. 
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‘poor’.6 Consequently, the adoption of mobile financial services, and in particular mobile 
payments, has become an effective step in the evolution of payment schemes. 7 This has 
enabled the gap created by the lack of a broad financial infrastructure in Kenya to be 
narrowed.8   
As a result, mobile payment systems have become commonplace in Kenya over 
the last 7 years9 through the introduction of M-Pesa10 by the leading Mobile Network 
Operator (MNO) Safaricom Ltd.11 M-Pesa, a new financial services model, has 
transformed the banking and financial services industry in Kenya. It has done so by giving 
the unbanked majority access to the financial services market, and in the process it has 
attracted over 18 million subscribers.12 This is remarkable given that fewer than 4 million 
people in Kenya have bank accounts. It has succeeded in transferring people from the 
cash economy to modern book entry systems. The annual deposit value stands at KSh. 
93,273,000,000 billion ($932,730,000); withdrawals at KSh. 79,917,000,000 billion; 
transfers at KSh. 84,882,000,000 billion, including  KSh. 25,610,000,000 billion, from 
                                                 
6 Ignacio Mas and Daniel Radcliffe, ‘Mobile Payments go Viral: M-PESA in Kenya’ (2011) 32 Journal of 
Financial Transformation 169; See Alliance for Financial Inclusion, ‘Enabling Mobile Money Transfer’ 
(Youtube, 24 May 2012) ‘Enabling Mobile Money Transfer’ 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LFXAX42WA6Q> accessed 3 September 2014.  
7 Olga Morawczynski, ‘Examining the Adoption, Usage and Outcomes of Mobile Money Services: the Case 
of M-PESA in Kenya’ (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh 2011). This uptake will be explored in Chapter 
2 when the thesis examines the enabling environment for mobile payments.  
8 Stamatis Karnouskos and Fraunhofer Fokus, ‘Mobile Payment: A Journey through Existing Procedures 
and Standardization Initiatives’ (2004) 6(4) IEEE Communications Surveys 24. ‘Financial Infrastructures’ 
is the set of institutions that enable effective operation of financial intermediaries. This includes such 
elements as payment systems, credit information bureaus and collateral registries. More broadly, financial 
infrastructure encompasses the existing legal and regulatory framework for financial sector operations. 
9 This period is from 2008–2014.  
10 M-Pesa (M for mobile, Pesa is Swahili for money) is a mobile phone-based money transfer and micro 
financing service for Safaricom and Vodacom, the largest mobile network operators in Kenya and, 
currently, the most developed mobile payment system in the world. M-Pesa allows users with a national ID 
card or passport to deposit, withdraw and transfer money easily with a mobile device. See Safaricom, 
<http://www.safaricom.co.ke/?id=257> accessed 3 September 2014.  
11 Safaricom Ltd is a leading mobile network operator in Kenya. It was formed in 1997 as a fully owned 
subsidiary of Telkom Kenya. In May 2000, Vodafone Group Plc of the United Kingdom acquired a 40 per 
cent stake and management responsibility for the company. 
12 Safaricom, ‘MPESA Timeline’ <http://www.safaricom.co.ke/mpesa_timeline/timeline.html#> 
accessed 3 September 2014.  
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airtime values of KSh. 3,551,000,000 billion.13 Therefore, its significance to the Kenyan 
economy cannot be underestimated.  
Simple payment and settlement functions have been made even more convenient 
and accessible by this technological innovation in the payments system.  Mobile payments 
have to a large extent achieved the policy objectives of financial access and inclusion 
which have been part of the overall landscape of financial services and delivery in 
developing countries such as Kenya. Therefore, in order to understand the importance 
of this new financial service, this thesis aims to address some of the legal regulatory issues 
that arise out of this innovation as it pertains to Kenya, post-financial inclusion. Financial 
inclusion or inclusive financing is the delivery of financial services at affordable costs to 
disadvantaged and low-income segments of society. This is in contrast to financial 
exclusion where those services are not available or affordable. The term ‘post-financial 
inclusion’ in this thesis will be used to describe the subsequent phase when financial 
inclusion has been achieved, a period through which a large portion of the population 
has access to finance and financial services and the rate of inclusion as begun to plateau.    
1.2. Problem Statement 
 
Innovation and technology present an intersection between growth and 
development, which is also an intermediary between the innovators on the one hand and 
those that use the innovations on the other. Innovation has also been seen as both 
transformative and catalytic for the way that a country’s most productive economic 
sectors develop. Innovation in this context will refer to both innovation in technology 
and in the financial products and services introduced. It should be clear that the concept 
of ‘innovation’ encompasses not only ‘technological innovation’, i.e., the diffusion of new 
                                                 
13 Ibid.  
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products and services of a technological nature into the economy. However, equally it 
includes non-technological forms of innovation, such as ‘organisation’ innovations. It 
may be used interchangeably with the term ‘technology’ although clarification will be 
given as and when needed and in context. 
This is particularly true in a developing country such as Kenya, a sub-Saharan 
African country whose private sector is still under-capitalised and under-developed.14 
Innovation is needed and should be encouraged as the private sector is the main driver 
of economic growth,15 a position adopted in development literature16 as well as in Kenya’s 
ambitious economic development plans which seek to transform it into a middle-income 
economy by the year 2030.17   
Furthermore, this thesis addresses the interaction between regulation and 
technological innovation from Kenya’s perspective, with a particular focus on the 
regulatory tools, institutional arrangements and government decisional processes through 
the examination as a whole of its regulatory capacity. This is done with a view to 
understanding the regulatory capacity of Kenya in addressing the vulnerabilities presented 
by technological innovation in the financial industry for consumers after financial 
inclusion. It also examines the way that mobile payments have been regulated by 
criticising the piecemeal approach that the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) has taken in 
addressing the legal and regulatory issues presented by mobile payments. This focus is 
used because many of the major obstacles to technological innovations in developing 
                                                 
14 Richard Kitchen, ‘Venture Capital: Is it Appropriate for Developing Countries?’ (1992) Contributions in 
Economics and Economic History 15.  Klaus Fischer and George Papaioannou (eds), Hofstra University. 
15 Yochanan Shachmurove, ‘An Introduction to the Special Issues on Financial Markets of the Middle East’ 
(2004) 9(3) International Journal of Business 213. 
16 Department for International Development (DfID), ‘The Engine of Development: The Private Sector 
and Prosperity for Poor People’ (DfID, 2011) 
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/Private-sector-approach-paper-May2011.pdf> 
accessed 3 September 2014. See also, Asian Development Bank, ‘Overview’ (ADB, 2011) 
<http://www.adb.org/themes/private-sector-development/overview> accessed 3 September 2013. 
17 Government of Kenya, ‘Vision 2030’ <http://www.vision2030.go.ke/index.php/vision> accessed 3 
September 2014. 
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countries are related to the institutional and regulatory environment.18 Such obstacles are 
not fundamentally different from those experienced in the developed countries, however 
they are exacerbated in developing countries and are more challenging to address, 
particularly because of the absence of a coherent regulatory system.19  
1.3. Purpose 
 
An effective payment system in which transferability of claims is effected in full 
and on time is a prerequisite for any economy. Similarly, disruptions in the payment 
system result in disruptions in aggregate economic activity.20 In general, payment systems 
can preserve or undermine the public trust and confidence in financial systems and thus 
are under close public policy scrutiny with a view to safeguarding financial stability and 
ensuring financial integrity.  
 Therefore, the purpose of this study is also to discuss the legal and regulatory 
issues that underpin mobile payments in Kenya by postulating that the protection of 
consumers and the stability of the financial system should be the main justification for 
government intervention by way of regulation. This is in response to the rapid adoption, 
speculation and optimism regarding the effects of mobile payments on economic 
development in Africa, where policy-makers have rightly touted the poverty eradicating 
potential of mobile payments due to their financial inclusivity.21  
Since there is currently an increased focus on payments systems issues which 
reflect the political changes and economic development occurring around the world, this 
                                                 
18 ‘Institutional environment’ will be used here to mean the infrastructure in Kenya.  
19 Jean Eric–Aurbert, ‘Promoting Innovation in Developing Countries:  A Conceptual Framework 2005’ 
<http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/137729/0-3097AubertPaper%5B1%5D.pdf.> World 
Bank Publications. Accessed 29th September 2013. 
20 George J Benston and George G Kaufman, ‘Is the Banking and Payments System Fragile?’ (1995) 9 
Journal of Financial Services Research 209. 
21 Sara Corbett, ‘Can the Cell Phone Help End Global Poverty?’ New York Times (New York, 13 April 2008). 
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study aims to examine the legal and regulatory issues that mobile payments present.22 
Despite the existence of other payments systems such as electronic payments,23  there had 
not been any other advances in Kenya’s payments system as it had largely remained a cash 
dominant society and any other forms of payments systems had primarily been cheques, 
electronic funds transfer, ATM cards, debit and credit cards until the introduction of 
mobile payments. 24  
A number of unique and country specific factors have contributed to the success 
and acceptance of mobile payments and these will be discussed in Chapter 2.25 Among 
these are the wide availability and heavy use of mobile phones26 because the 
telecommunications regulatory environment enabled faster adoption of mobile phone 
usage. In 1997, over 75 per cent of countries in sub-Saharan Africa had no mobile phone 
network. By 2009, a mobile phone network existed in every country, with 49 per cent of 
markets fully liberalised, 25 per cent partially deregulated and 26 per cent as monopolies.27 
The most common reason given for this increase is the technology in the market and the 
willingness of consumers to embrace new payment systems via mobile devices. In Kenya, 
many people are completely unbanked and so have no access to traditional bank accounts 
and financial services because they lack a sufficient income to qualify for such services.28  
                                                 
22 The Payments System Regulator (PSR) under the Financial Conduct Authority UK was recently created 
on 1 of April 2014 with a view to addressing the promotion of effective competition in the markets for 
payment systems, promoting innovation, and ensuring that they are developed with the interests of its users 
in mind.  
23 Joyce Wangui Gikandi and Chris Bloor, ‘Adoption and Effectiveness of Electronic Banking in Kenya’ 
(2010) 9(4) Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 277.  
24 Kevin P Donovan, ‘Mobile Money, More Freedom? The Impact of M-PESA’s Network Power on 
Development as Freedom’ (2012) 6 International Journal of Communication 2647. Other means of 
payment, though somewhat narrower in scope, include POS, microfinance institutions and SACCOs.  
25 See Chapter 2 Section.2.4. The Enabling Environment for Mobile Payments pg 47. 
26 Olga Morawczynski, ‘Exploring the Usage and Impact of “transformational” Mobile Financial Services: 
the Case of M-PESA in Kenya’ (2009) 3(3) Journal of Eastern African Studies 509. 
27 Jenny Aker and Isaac Mbiti, Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa (Center for Global 
Development Working Paper 211, 2010). 
28 AJM Shafiul and Alam Bhuiyan, ‘Peripheral View: Conceptualizing the Information Society as a 
Postcolonial Subject’ (2008) 70(2) International Communication Gazette 99. 
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Establishing an efficient payment system is essential for the efficient functioning 
of competitive money and capital markets as well as monetary control. These are the 
prerequisites for the creation of a well-developed market-based financial system. Hence, 
the stability and efficient working of the banking system is tied to the integrity and the 
resilience of the payments system and disruptions in the payments system result in 
disruptions in aggregate economic activity.29 Additionally, instability that manifests itself 
in the payments system can be seen to be more alarming than instability in deposits.30 
This fear is manifest in the larger volume of daily payments within the mobile financial 
services and the speedy movement of the funds as well as the unfamiliarity with the 
clearing process.31 Therefore, the payments system is one of the first places where 
financial stress is manifested, through the Herstatt Risk,32 as firms in financial difficulty 
fail to meet their payment obligations.33 Moreover, there  are very few theoretical and 
even fewer empirical studies which look at the fragility and risks of mobile payments 
systems, much less the payments systems as a whole in developing countries, especially 
in those countries that are trying to restructure their banking and monetary systems.  
The theoretical framework that underpins this thesis is that, since innovation in 
financial services always outpaces regulation,34 developing countries that adopt innovative 
                                                 
29 Hans J Blommestein and Michael George Spencer, The Role of Financial Institutions in the Transition to a 
Market Economy (International Monetary Fund 1993) 
30 International Competition Network (Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Sectors Subgroup 1), ‘An 
increasing role for competition in the regulation of banks’ (June 2005) 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc382.pdf> accessed 3 September 
2014. 
31 George J Benston and George G Kaufman, ‘Is the Banking and Payments System Fragile?’ (1995) 9(3–
4) Journal of Financial Services Research 209. 
32 Herstatt risk, also known as cross-currency settlement risk or foreign exchange risk, is the risk that a party 
to a trade fails to make payment even though it has been paid by its counterparty. See, George G Kaufman 
and Kenneth E Scott, ‘What is Systemic Risk, and do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to it?’ (2003) 
7(3) Independent Review 371. Similarly, systemic risk has taken centre stage following the GFC and 
regulators are now re-examining their approach to financial system stability in the context of their 
interconnectivity See, David Bholat and Joanna Gray, 'Organizational Form as a Source of Systemic Risk' 
(2013) 7 Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal. 
33 Bruce J Summers, The Payment System: Design, Management, And Supervision (International Monetary Fund 
1994).  
34 It is suggested that complex financial markets innovate more quickly than regulators can adapt as was 
discussed in Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, (manuscript at 40-41) Cf. Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation 
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products and services should have the regulatory capacity to do so.  In order to advance 
governments’ financial inclusion agendas, regulators should have the capacity to regulate 
these innovative products and services in a way that protects those who might otherwise 
be left vulnerable in times of financial crises. This regulatory capacity35 should be 
commensurate with their economic development, regulatory development and their 
regulatory objectives as a whole. This thesis asserts that regulatory authorities in Kenya 
should be equipped to provide appropriate and adequate regulation of technological 
innovation that takes into account the best approach that would justify and balance 
regulatory or state intervention. Further, this thesis will aim to discuss this adequate and 
appropriate approach by focusing on a risk-based and prudential approach to regulation. 
Such an approach focuses on the stability and integrity of the payments system and the 
financial system as a whole, and the conduct of the business approach to regulation which 
encompasses consumer protection issues and accountability of the regulators in their 
mandate of regulating mobile payments.  
1.4. Research Questions 
1.4.1. Main Questions 
 
The general reflections in the preceding part suggest the existence of a 
dependence between the state of a country’s economic development and the effectiveness 
of its payments system. Mobile payments systems have offered a viable, partial solution 
to a nation’s ability to provide financial access to drive economic growth. A fundamental 
policy question is, therefore, how can a country then protect those who were previously 
                                                 
Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity and Systemic Risk 82 (14 December 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining why market observers and regulators failed to 
observe the ‘most pernicious forms of complexity’ leading to the recent financial collapse). Additionally 
due to the emergence of various payments systems and options that are enabled through advanced 
technology such as RFID, NFC, Bluetooth.  
35 Regulatory capacity is defined as the combination of individual competence, organisational capabilities, 
assets and relationships that enable a political entity to formulate, monitor and enforce regulation. For 
further discussion on regulatory capacity see Chapter 5, The Appropriate Regulatory Approach for Mobile 
Payments Systems.  
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excluded against the risks that new technology poses, or the previously unbanked through 
adequate and appropriate regulation36 that does not stifle innovation? In essence, what 
legal and regulatory considerations must Kenya secure  in order to ensure  a robust and 
economically significant payments system that is financially inclusive and that eventually 
leads to growth and better infrastructure in its financial system? Further, what would 
those considerations mean for a country’s law and institutional development process? All 
these reflect the aim of this study which highlights the weak implementation of previous 
regulatory frameworks for payments and the lack of enforcement action which have 
raised deficiencies in the regulatory capacity. 
1.4.2. Secondary Questions  
 
In order to fully explore the main research question outlined above, the following 
secondary questions are pertinent.  
1. Why is a study of mobile payments important to Kenya? 
The success of mobile payments in Kenya has offered an opportunity for 
discourse amongst developing countries in their efforts to modernise their payments 
systems. Kenya’s economic policies have not always matched the policy recognition of 
the importance of financial inclusion, through innovative payment systems, to economic 
growth with commensurate public policy measures that translate such recognition into 
market practice. Development research illustrates that the historical mismatch between 
academic and policy recognition of that role is increasingly being bridged, as governments 
across the world pay closer attention to the determinants of financial inclusion. Further, 
Kenyan public policy since 2003, through the Vision 2030, has been to increase and 
                                                 
36 The adequate and appropriate regulatory approach to mobile payments will be extensively discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
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emphasise the instrumental role of Kenya’s private sector in driving sustainable economic 
development, employment-led growth and wealth creation.37  
These important documents are: the Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) of 
2003–2007, Vision 2030 of 2007 (Vision 2030),38 the Private Sector Development Strategy 
(PSDS) 2006–2012,39 and the Master Plan Study for Kenya’s Industrial Development 
(MAPSKID) 2007.40 This recognition mirrors global practice which has been reinforced 
by recent and ongoing governmental reactions to the ‘Great Recession’ or the banking 
crisis of 2007–2008.41 This saw governments around the world directly channelling huge 
amounts of public funds into private businesses to stem a drawn-out recession.42 While 
laudable, the persisting fragmentation of the current regulatory regime exposes 
fundamental deficiencies in the institutional arrangements for regulating payments 
systems. Therefore, this thesis attempts to draw out the correlation between having an 
efficient regulatory framework that safeguards these governmental goals and one that 
enables financial inclusion.  
 
2. Are laws and legal institutions really relevant to the growth of mobile payments in a 
developing country like Kenya? If so, what are the key emerging legal and regulatory issues? 
                                                 
37 See Government of Kenya Budget Statement for Fiscal Year 2011–2012 focusing on tax and business 
regulatory reforms: Government of Kenya, ‘Budget Statement for Fiscal Year 2011-2012’ (Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta, Minister for Finance & Deputy Prime Minister, 8 June 2011) paras 10, 19, 22, 35 
<http://statehousekenya.go.ke/publications/07-06-2011-12-BudgetSpeech-
Distribution%20Final%20_MF.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. 
38 Government of Kenya (n 18).  
39 Government of Kenya, ‘The State of Kenya’s Private Sector’ (African Development Bank Group, 29 
October 2013) <http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/the-state-of-kenyas-private-sector-
34093/> accessed 3 September 2014.  
40 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Industrialisation (2011), 
<http://www.industrialization.go.ke/index.php/downloads> accessed 3 September 2014.  
41 The Global Financial Crises, between the periods of 2007–2008 (n 2). 
42 Masaaki Shirakawa, ‘The International Policy Response to Financial Crises’ (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City Symposium, 2009) 22 
<http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2009/papers/Shirakawa.08.24.09.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
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This thesis argues that in a developing country context, legal and regulatory issues 
are likely to be more influential than macro-economic factors in nurturing fortuitous 
environments for a prudential mobile payments system. In adopting this proposition, this 
thesis examines the regulatory framework that currently deals with mobile payments and 
whether this environment is equipped to regulate mobile payments. Therefore, the 
presence rather than the absence of law should be viewed here as an adequate ‘enabler’, 
hence the question of what can Kenya do to enable an adequate and appropriate 
regulatory framework that supports mobile payments is apposite. As discussed in detail 
in chapter 2,43 Kenya has a nascent payments system industry and this suggests that it is 
still a new form of financial innovation.44 
3. What are the risks created by mobile payments to the financial system in Kenya and, 
consequently, what are the specific risks to consumers as a result of a lack of an adequate 
regulatory framework?  
This second part of the question seeks to explore whether mobile payments have 
now become systemically important payment systems that need specific regulatory 
oversight. This thesis will argue that there should be a regulatory framework that 
considers the consumer protection mandate specific to mobile payments due to the 
systemic importance of MNOs in the payments system in Kenya. Additionally, it needs 
to be considered whether this specific oversight should be anchored in the law. It will 
also examine the extent to which the legal and regulatory issues raised by mobile payments 
are effectively resolved within the current regulatory framework.  
                                                 
43 Chapter 2 will discuss the proliferation of mobile payments system with an analysis of its success, brought 
about by an enabling environment.  
44 A financial innovation here is defined as running a new process that reduces costs, reduces risks, or 
provides an improved product/service/instrument that better satisfies financial system participants' 
demands. In this case the cost to reaching out to unbanked markets is reduced through mobile payments.  
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4. What reforms should be implemented in the current regulatory framework to adequately 
oversee mobile payments? 
A discernible theme that arises from the literature as far as developing countries 
and payments systems are concerned, is the notion that socio-economic environments, 
with particular emphasis on legal and regulatory conditions, are especially crucial to 
financial inclusion. This line of thinking argues that the drivers of economic and financial 
growth, including employment-led growth, are determined by the relative sophistication 
of regulatory and legal systems that seek to provide both a conducive, enabling 
environment and one that protects consumers. This line of inquiry will be used in 
presenting an appropriate regulatory framework for mobile payments systems. This study 
will propose an appropriate approach to regulating mobile payments.  
1.5. Originality and Contribution to Knowledge  
 
  Originality in this thesis can be found in the discussion chapters: chapters 3 
through to 5. This thesis is also original in the sense that it is the first comprehensive 
study of the regulatory issues surrounding mobile payments in Kenya post-financial 
inclusion. As a contribution to knowledge, therefore, this thesis extends the frontiers of 
what we know about the challenges of regulators in adapting new financial services after 
the initial objectives have been met. It brings together the regulatory and statutory 
experience of mobile payments in Kenya, and this will allow for an understanding of how 
the various pieces of regulation and the regulators fit together; where inconsistencies in 
the law exist; where practice is incongruent with the law; where the law is vague or silent; 
and how mobile payments stakeholders have related to the laws and institutions 
supporting their businesses. As such, this study serves as a baseline for future academic 
endeavour and offers future studies a coherent basis upon which to extrapolate. 
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1.6. Literature Review 
 
The literature review in this study is based on a wide examination of primary 
sources, regulation and case studies of the law in action; as well as secondary sources, 
scholarly literature and policy documents. It includes a preliminary bibliography for both 
primary and secondary sources. It is important to note that, although the examination of 
the regulation of mobile payments is still growing, there has not yet been a thorough 
review of existing work.45 Moreover, research so far seems fragmented and lacks a 
roadmap or an agenda that discusses post-financial inclusion issues. The pertinent issues 
that were noted in the literature review for mobile payments are that the literature tends 
to classify mobile financial services into three main categories: mobile banking, mobile 
transfers and mobile payments. However, in this thesis ‘mobile payments’ will be used as 
an all-encompassing term for these three categories. Much of the literature on mobile 
payments is still in development; the literature has focused on ‘mobile payments’ in the 
developing world. This thesis has adopted the classical tools of legal inquiry. However, 
even this approach does not yield adequate results when the law is linked to development. 
Thus, from a methodological framework, the central line of inquiry will employ the 
following three alternative questions: 
i. Do laws cause strong mobile financial services to develop? 
ii.  Does the development of mobile financial services serve as a catalyst for the 
emergence of strong payments systems law? 
iii. Would a developing economy that does not boast either strong laws or strong 
financial markets create both? 
                                                 
45 Jane Webster and Richard T Watson, ‘Analyzing  the Past to Prepare for the Future: Writing a Literature 
Review’ (2002) 26(2) MIS Quarterly xiii–xxiii. 
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A practical evaluation may be useful when conducting value judgements using 
this methodology. A nascent financial market, it could be hypothesised, would demand 
supporting legal structures and, as these structures are operationalised, the markets 
expand and mature. With maturing markets and an enlightened set of market participants, 
the demand for even better law is made. This cyclical process between strengthened law 
and strengthened financial markets appears to be a continuous one.46 This interpretation 
sits particularly well with the theoretical stance in this thesis: that the law and legal 
institutions are likely to play stronger roles vis-à-vis macroeconomic factors in the 
emergence of mobile payments systems in a developing or emerging market context 
which other developing and emerging states can adopt. 
In addition, there is an important theoretical gap related to the central legal 
themes of mobile payments. An expansive portion of them focuses on issues such as 
adoption or market analysis, neglecting other relevant themes such as regulation and 
effective socio-economic impacts. Thus, it is clear that there is a gap because although 
there are emerging mobile payments systems worldwide, academic research is still in its 
infancy. However, there are limitations in the existing literature, both in discussing mobile 
payments in general and discussing their regulatory issues in Kenya specifically. Much of 
the available literature examined has quite rightly only discussed payments systems and 
electronic payments generally. The paucity of the existing literature on mobile payments 
omits any comparative and legal analysis; it is not particularly domestic-focused and has 
mostly been prepared in isolation by the various institutional stakeholders involved.47 This 
has often skewed the critical examination of the risks to consumers brought about by 
                                                 
46 Mark J Roe, ‘Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets’ (2006) 120 Harvard Law Review 460. 
47 Most of the literature produced on mobile payments has been by donor agencies, such as the World 
Bank, the CGAP and the DfID. 
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mobile payments as the focus has tended to be on the system’s successes and how it has 
brought the financially excluded into the financial realm.   
The emerging dominance of the mobile payments system in Kenya and 
internationally requires an extended contemporary approach to the discussion and 
evaluation of regulatory issues and options as part of the quest for a more effective 
regulatory system. Therefore, there has been some disagreement over how a regulatory 
atmosphere should be approached which would enable mobile payments to attain their 
full potential.48 This is a gap in the current research which this thesis aims to address. In 
doing so, this thesis contributes with a critical analysis of consumer protection in mobile 
payments and a proposal for an adequate approach to regulation. This thesis has the 
potential to benefit stakeholders, policy-makers and research organisations that have a 
need for such legal analysis. 
 However, it is clear that, while the legal and regulatory structures are also 
important, they are not investigated enough. In addition, this thesis will expand to take 
into account the complicated institutional and policy environment within which major 
payments system decisions take place.49 These will constitute the analytical framework 
used by this study in making a case for better financial consumer protection legislation. 
This vacuum in the literature helps to explain why a service with such a large potential 
has not been disseminated worldwide.50 The reasons for these failures include the fact 
that successful cases are not clearly understood and as a result are not being replicated in 
other developing countries In terms of particular sources, major works by authors have 
                                                 
48 Simone Di Castri, ‘Mobile Money: Enabling Regulatory Solutions’ (GSMA, Mobile Money for the 
Unbanked)  8. 
49 Meiling Pope and others, ‘Mobile Payments: The Reality on the Ground in Selected Asian Countries and 
the United States’ (2011) 6(2) International Journal of Mobile Marketing 88. 
50 Eduardo Henrique Diniz, Joao Porto de Albuquerque and Adrian Kemmer Cernev, 'Mobile Money And 
Payment: A Literature Review Based On Academic And Practitioner-Oriented Publications (2001-2011)' 
3rd December 2011. 
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been taken into consideration, such as the work by Julia Black, John Braithwaite, Anthony 
Ogus, Michelle Yeung and Bronwen Morgan.51 This study references a number of journal 
articles written by specialists in mobile payments markets, such as Olga, Morawczynski52 
discussion on the adoption, the convergence of financial services and 
telecommunications from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor.53 
Changes in the legal and regulatory environment deal with evolving jurisdiction, 
regulations and other norms with requirements to comply. Mobile payments research on 
these issues should examine the impact of regulations on the development and success 
of mobile payments services markets.54 However, current research on legislation 
regarding mobile payments provides an informative description of the complexities and 
problems surrounding these topics, yet it does not provide adequate solutions to solve 
these issues. However, the importance of the literature cannot be underestimated as it not 
only leads to a better understanding of the state of the research in the ﬁeld, but it also 
discerns patterns in the development of the ﬁeld itself. This thesis aims to address these 
issues. Mobile payments research, like the technology itself, is very new and research on 
its adoption across several countries is currently very limited. By providing a better 
understanding of some of the macro level factors, such as governmental regulation, 
multiple regulator coordination, competition policy and multi-stakeholder interests, this 
thesis offers some insights that can be utilised by stakeholders to advance mobile 
payments discourse in other developing countries or emerging markets that hope to adopt 
mobile payments into their payments systems infrastructure.  
                                                 
51 Tomi Dahlberg, Niina Mallat, Jan Ondrus and Agneiszka Zmijewska, ‘Mobile payment market and 
research – past, present and future’ (Presentation at Helsinki Mobility Roundtable, Helsinki, Finland, 1–2 
June 2006) <http://sprouts.aisnet.org/483/1/Mobile_Applications_3_1.pdf> accessed 3 September 
2014.  
52 Olga Morawczynski, ‘Exploring the Usage and Impact of “Transformational” Mobile Financial Services: 
the Case of M-PESA in Kenya’ (2009) 3(3) Journal of Eastern African Studies 509–525. 
53 CGAP is an independent policy and research centre dedicated to advancing financial access to the world's 
poor <www.cgap.org> accessed 3 September 2014.  
54 Ibid at 54 
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1.7.  Outline of the Thesis   
 
The regulation of mobile payments is an important one, especially for a country 
like Kenya that is in continual need of more innovative ways to encourage and sustain 
access to finance while maintaining resilience in the financial system. The tensions 
between economists and lawyers over the regulatory determinants of mobile payments in 
the developing world are explored, yielding the proposition that underlies the main 
research question and which is summed up in the thesis statement. As it is a contested 
claim, this chapter lays the framework for an evaluation of the reality of the Kenyan 
mobile payments experience, enabling lessons to be learned that can inform future efforts 
to strengthen the framework for regulating mobile payments.       
This thesis is divided into 6 chapters including this chapter. Chapter 1 introduces 
the thesis by providing the background and the conceptual framework through which the 
legal and regulatory challenges of mobile payments can be tackled. It clarifies the 
contribution of the thesis and discusses the research questions. Having clarified the 
research problem and contextualised it within a specified legal context for investigation, 
and having explored various underlying concepts and issues, including an exposition of 
the varied terminology employed in describing the problem at hand, the rest of this thesis 
is organised as follows.  
Chapter 2 is titled: ‘Kenya’s Payments System: An Exploratory and Explanatory 
Analysis’, and it offers background information on the development of Kenya’s payments 
system. This chapter will start by setting out the historical context of the payments system 
in Kenya. It will discuss the efforts of Kenya to modernise its payments system as a useful 
segue into a discussion on its regulatory capacity. It will then explore the introduction of 
mobile payments as part of Kenya’s payments system framework. This will be done by 
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discussing the ‘telecommunications revolution’55 in Kenya, which provided an 
environment that allowed the success of mobile payments and has consequently led to 
financial inclusion. It is hoped that examining the importance of a country’s payments 
system in its economy and financial system will demonstrate the increased focus on 
mobile payments system issues that reflect both political changes and economic 
development in Kenya. This chapter also highlights the importance of a stable and 
resilient56 payments system as this allowed for the emergence of mobile payments as a 
preferred payment method in Kenya. It discusses the enabling environment, but more 
specifically the enabling legal environment for the successful uptake of mobile payments 
as proof of its ubiquitous success in Kenya. This chapter is a preamble to a discussion on 
the risks that the payments system poses to consumers.  
Chapter 3 titled ‘Financial Stability and Integrity Post Financial Inclusion through 
Mobile Payments’ explores the risks inherent in payments systems and then highlights the 
unique risks introduced by a mobile payments system to a post-financially inclusive 
Kenya. It will offer this discussion through the assertion that the use of mobile payments 
has resulted in the increase of public involvement in the formal financial system.  Through 
this involvement, the expansion of savings accounts in the regulated financial 
intermediaries has converted widely distributed consumer risk, from the use of mobile 
payments,  into a ‘concentrated systemic risk’, where the value of the ‘items’ in transit on 
‘deposit’ through trustee accounts is no longer insignificant.  These issues will be put 
forward as those that should be of great concern to regulators in Kenya, who are 
ultimately responsible for finding a balance between an enabling environment that is 
conducive to innovation and economic development, and one that addresses consumer 
protection concerns. The chapter begins with the observation that failure in the payments 
                                                 
55 This is the period during which telecommunications received great acceptance and uptake in Kenya. 
56 Joanna Gray, ‘Toward a More Resilient Financial System’ (2012–2013) 36 Seattle U.l.Rev.799 
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system can produce a domino effect that is damaging to financial stability and integrity. 
This not only provides the main justification for regulatory intervention but also raises 
the question as to whether the central bank can perform better in its mandate to regulate 
and mitigate market failure as a result of a weak regulatory implementation of its 
prescribed payments system regulation. This chapter also discusses the legal, operational, 
security, and liquidity risks created by mobile payments as a justification for the 
reformation of the current regulatory framework and the implementation of an 
appropriate regulation.  
Following the examination of the risks and regulatory challenges, chapter 4 
discusses the current regulatory framework for mobile payments. This chapter will 
consider how Kenya has dealt with the regulatory challenges that the mobile payments 
system has presented. It will highlight the fragmented, incomplete, ambiguous and often 
conflicting regulatory environment that mobile payments currently operate under. This 
chapter hopes to discuss the gaps in the current regulatory framework in an attempt to 
explore the regulatory capacity that the CBK has in its mandate. The focus in this chapter 
is to explore some of the main regulatory challenges that mobile payments present; for 
instance, the legal definition of ‘mobile money’ and ‘deposit’ in the context of mobile 
payments, and whether pre-existing paper-based common law and contractual principles, 
such as those between a banker and a customer, have relevance and application to mobile 
payments. This chapter will also challenge the approach that the CBK has taken in 
prudentially regulating mobile payments as well as examining the adverse trend prevalent 
in the monitoring and enforcement capabilities established by the CBK’s National 
Payments Act.57 It is hoped that this critical analysis will uncover the gaps and 
complexities it presents for consumers and their protection.  
                                                 
57 National Payment System Act (No 39 of 2011). 
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Chapter 4 titled, ‘The Legal and Regulatory Challenges’ discusses the 
consequences of the application of the current regulatory framework on the regulation of 
mobile payments and as it affects consumers. This chapter considers the justification for 
consumer protection by arguing that an appropriate regulatory framework for mobile 
payments should be established which ensures that consumers are adequately protected 
while still balancing the objectives of regulating mobile payments. The discussion in this 
chapter concerns the difficult and perhaps impossible role of the CBK as the principal 
adjudicator of mobile payments disputes between financial institutions and consumers. 
The Banking Act CAP 488, is also briefly reviewed to the extent that it relates, in small 
part, to the National Payment System Act 2011 and is also a self-regulating instrument. 
This chapter also examines the role and relevance of the legislative force of the Consumer 
Protection Act 2012 and its omission of payments systems from its content. Finally, it 
proposes the establishment of a separate consumer agency to deal with conduct of 
business requirements for consumer needs.  
Chapter 5 describes what an adequate and appropriate regulatory framework 
should look like by stressing the accountability and the functions of the CBK in its 
mandate as the sole regulatory authority for the financial system in Kenya. This chapter 
offers a criticism of the current regulatory framework for mobile payments. It further 
argues that while the stability and integrity of payments systems are important, mobile 
payments deserve special attention because of their specific system design and, because 
through their creation of a systemically important institution in the MNO, this poses 
further systemic risk to the economic and financial system as a whole. This chapter also 
calls for a reform in the current regulatory framework taking into account the objectives 
as stated throughout the thesis of stability, integrity and consumer protection.   
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Chapter 6 is the conclusion to this thesis. It draws on the summaries and 
conclusions made in the 4 analytical chapters and revisits the mobile payments system 
problems and debate in order to assess the contribution of the research. It offers possible 
regulatory solutions to the mobile payments system challenges in Kenya and offers areas 
for future research and exploration.  
 
22 
 
 
CHAPTER 2:  
INTRODUCTION TO THE MOBILE PAYMENTS SYSTEM IN KENYA:  
BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
“Banks are dinosaurs we shall by pass them.” Bill Gates 1 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The CBK has overall responsibility for maintaining financial stability in the 
financial sector, since Central Banks have to ensure that the payment systems are vital for 
the proper functioning of financial markets.2 A well-functioning payment system is 
essential for both the growth of an efficient financial sector and confidence in the banking 
sector.3 In this regard, the CBK is aware of the numerous benefits of an efficient 
payments system, especially in fulfilling its role in the effective implementation of the 
monetary policy operations and financial stability.4 Efforts to modernise the payments 
system first began in 19935 when the CBK and the Kenya Bankers Association6 began a 
collaboration. However, this modernisation was centred on addressing short-term 
challenges. This was a flaw in its approach as the CBK mainly focused on the need to 
                                                 
1 A Newsweek Interview on July 1994 published in The American Banker, 9 January  1995: The American 
Banker, (9 January 1995) <http://www.highbeam.com/publications/american-banker-p392958/january-
1995/3> accessed 3 September 2014.  
2 David Marston, ‘Financial system standards and financial stability: the case of Basel core principles’ (2001) 
IMF Working Papers 1/62 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1446185> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
3 Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Kenya Payments System (Framework and Strategy)’ (September 2004) 
<https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/2012-09-21-11-44-41> accessed 3 September 2014.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Payment System in Kenya’ (September 2003) 1 
<https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/kepss> accessed 3 September 2014.  
6 The Kenya Bankers Association (KBA) was registered as an industry association on 16 July 1962 by the 
Registrar of Trade Unions. In its formative years, the main aim of the Association was to cater for the 
interests of the member banks in negotiating terms and conditions of service of its union, its employees 
and, as far as possible, standardise management practices so as to ensure harmony in the industry. Kenya 
Bankers Association, <http://www.kba.co.ke/> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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improve the system for clearing cheques; at the time, this was the only and most important 
non-cash payment instrument in use. This meant that much of the Kenyan population 
remained principally cash dominant.7 Furthermore, much of the Kenyan population still 
lacked a practical substitute to the cash economy and informal financial services.8  
Financial inclusion9 and access to finance10 were never thought possible through 
payments systems, as old models that provided access to finance were minimal at best11 
and were still being explored, such as microfinance,12 bank branches and Automated 
Teller Machine (ATM) distribution in rural areas. All this changed with the introduction 
of mobile payments.13 Over 80 per cent of the adult population in sub-Saharan Africa, 
lacked a bank account in the early 2000s, which was above the world average of 50 per 
cent.14 These were the key hindrances to financial development: lack of access by the 
                                                 
7 Di Castri (n 46) Chapter 1. See also Sheri M Markose and Yiing Jia Loke, 'Changing Trends in Payment 
Systems for Selected G10 and EU Countries 1990-1998' (2000) Economic Discussion Papers 508; Michelle 
Baddeley, ‘Using e-cash in the New Economy: An Economic Analysis of Micro-payment Systems’ (2004) 
5 Journal of Electronic Commerce Research 239. 
8 Ibid. See also Mobile for Development, ‘MMU Policy and Regulation’, 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programmes/mobile-money-for-the-
unbanked/regulation> accessed 18 September 2014. 
9 Financial inclusion is defined as the ability of an individual, household, or group to access appropriate 
financial services or products. Without this ability, people are often referred to as financially excluded. 
Various financial services and products have brought about financial inclusion. This thesis proposes mobile 
payments as one of the main drivers of financial inclusivity in Kenya. See, Peter Dittus and Michael U 
Klein, ‘On harnessing the potential of financial inclusion’ (BIS Working Paper 247, 2011) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1859412> accessed 3 September 2014.  
10 Mwangi Kimenyi and Njuguna Ndung’u, ‘Expanding the Financial Services Frontier: Lessons from 
Mobile Phone Banking in Kenya’ (October 2009) Brookings Paper.  
11 FDS Kenya, ‘FinAccess 2009: Mapping the financial sector in Kenya’ [2009]; Richard Duncombe and 
Richard Boateng, ‘Mobile Phones and Financial Services in Developing Countries: a Review of Concepts, 
Methods, Issues, Evidence and Future Research Directions’ (2009) 30(7) Third World Quarterly 1237. 
12 Aleke Dondo, ‘The Status of Microfinance in Kenya’ (K-Rep Occasional Paper 34); Susan Johnson, 
Markku Malkamaki and Kuria Wanjau, ‘Tackling the "Frontiers" of Microfinance in Kenya: the Role for 
Decentralized Services’ (2006) 17(3) Small Enterprise Development 41. See also Dean Karlan, Jonathan 
Morduch and Sendhil Mullainathan, ‘Take-Up: Why Microfinance Take-Up Rates Are Low & Why It 
Matters’ (Financial Access Initiative Research Framing Note, June 2010) 
<http://www.financialaccess.org/sites/default/files/blog/RFN11_Why_microfinance_takeup_rates_are
_low(6-17-10).pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
13 Outreach for financial inclusion in Kenya was not considered seriously. The unbanked were not 
considered a viable segment of the population.  
14 Franklin Allen and others, 'Improving Access to Banking: Evidence from Kenya' [2014] CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. DP9840. See also, Alberto Chaia and others, 'Half the World is Unbanked' (Financial 
Access Initiative Research Brief, November 2010). See also, Patrick Honohan, ‘Cross-country Variation in 
Household Access to Financial Services’ (2008) 32(11) Journal of Banking & Finance 2493.  
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disadvantaged to finance as such access promotes economic growth at the broadest 
levels.15  
A financial inclusion agenda16 by governments, much less by the Kenyan 
government prior to mobile payments, did not include an examination of payments 
systems as an effective means of achieving inclusion.17 This study will highlight this 
oversight. This chapter begins by tracing significant changes in the national payments 
system in Kenya as a way of providing background to the introduction of mobile 
payments. Mobile payments will be introduced by considering their metamorphosis from 
a microfinance instrument to their present-day highly visible, if sometimes controversial, 
market standing.18 It will discuss the CBK’s efforts to modernise the payments system as 
an important segue into its regulatory capacity.19 It will further explore the introduction 
of mobile payments, in particular, Safaricom’s20 M-Pesa,21 as part of Kenya’s payments 
system framework by describing the telecommunications revolution in Kenya22 and 
providing a brief background and analysis of the development of mobile phone usage, 
further answering the question of how mobile payments developed and emerged in the 
Kenyan context.  
                                                 
15 Ibid [Franklin]. 
16 ‘Financial Inclusion Agenda’ will be used to describe the push to include the financially excluded through 
government directives and policies. Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, ‘Access to Finance: An 
Unfinished Agenda’ (2008) 22(3) The World Bank Economic Review 383. 
17 Massimo Russo and Piero Ugolini, 'Financial Sector Challenges in Africa's Emerging Markets' (2008) 
EMF paper series.  
18 Isaac Mbiti and David N Weil, 'Mobile Banking: The Impact of M-Pesa in Kenya' (2011) NBER Working 
Paper No 17129  <http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/62662/1/668481188.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
19 Regulatory capacity in this context is defined as the combination of individual competence, organisational 
capabilities, assets and relationships that enable a political entity to formulate, monitor and enforce 
regulation. Investment Climate Advisory Services (World Bank Group), ‘Regulatory Capacity Review of 
Kenya’ (2010) <https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/uploads/Kenya.pdf> accessed 3 September 
2013. Regulatory capacity will be discussed in Chapter 5: The Regulatory Approach to Mobile Payments.  
20 Safaricom, the leading MNO which first deployed M-Pesa.  
21 As described in the first chapter, M-Pesa was the first mobile payment system deployed in Kenya.  
22 Sebastiana Etzo and Guy Collender, ‘The Mobile Phone Revolution in Africa: Rhetoric or Reality? (2010) 
109(437) African Affairs 659. See also, Gabriel Demombynes and Aaron Thegeya, ‘Kenya's Mobile 
Revolution and the Promise of Mobile Savings’ (2012) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5988 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.com/bitstream/handle/10986/3275/WPS5988.txt?sequence=2>  
accessed 3 September 2014.  
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Furthermore, it highlights the role of public policy in shaping the growth of 
mobile payments in Kenya and the central role that the main regulator, the CBK, had in 
its advancement.23 Through a review of its history and eventual success in Kenya, it is 
also possible to acquire an appreciation of why these public policy responses to its 
emergence have increasingly gained impetus around the world.  This will be done by 
explaining how M-Pesa shifted from a microfinance product24 to a national payments 
system and by highlighting the country specific factors that have remained unique to 
Kenya and have hampered the same success in other countries.25 The enabling 
environment that ensured the success of mobile payments will also be discussed. Finally, 
financial inclusion will be shown as the resultant success.26 It is hoped that examining the 
importance of a country’s payments system in its economy and financial system will 
demonstrate the increased focus of mobile payments system issues which reflect both 
regulatory changes and economic development in Kenya.  
This chapter also highlights the importance of a stable and efficient payments 
system as the central focus of the emergence of mobile payments as a preferred payment 
method in Kenya. It will present this discussion as a preamble to the risks that it poses to 
consumers who are included, as mobile payments have changed the face of banking 
through inadvertently seeking new markets through innovative financial services. It will 
also aim to show the impetus M-Pesa has placed on local financial institutions to become 
                                                 
23 Christian Johnson and Robert Steigerwald, ‘The Central Bank’s Role in the Payment System: Legal and 
Policy Aspects’ in Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, vol 5 (International Monetary Fund, 
2008) 445. 
24 William Jack and Tavneet Suri, 'Mobile Money: the Economics of M-PESA' (2011) NBER Working 
Paper No 16721   <http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/wgj/papers/Jack_Suri-Economics-of-M-
PESA.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. 
25 Jan Ondrus, Kalle Lyytinen and Yves Pigneur, 'Why Mobile Payments Fail? Towards a Dynamic and 
Multi-Perspective Explanation' (42nd Hawaii International Conference on IEEE 2009) System Sciences 1. 
See also, World Economic Forum, ‘The Mobile Financial Services Development Report’ (2011) 4 
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_MFSD_Report_2011.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. 
Afghanistan Argentina Bangladesh and others Mobile Financial Services Development Report’.  
26 Ubiquitous success is used to imply the fact that Kenya leads the world in mobile payments deployment 
and this success has not been replicated elsewhere in Africa. 
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innovative in the same way banks conduct their business. This chapter therefore and in 
general, offers a contextual background to the adoption, usage and scaling up of mobile 
payments into the Kenyan market in order to analyse its ubiquity and its success.  
2.2. The Development of a Payments System in Kenya  
   2.2.1. Payments System Definition  
At its most basic level, a payments system is merely an agreed-upon way to 
transfer value between buyers and sellers in a transaction.27 When coupled with rules and 
procedures, a payments system provides the infrastructure for transferring money from 
one entity in the economy to another. The goal of an efficient payments system is to allow 
instant confirmation of a transaction and to allow the buyer and the seller to directly 
exchange the necessary information. It gives value to completing a transaction without a 
third party confirmation, and does so within a secure environment.28 A payments system 
is notable for the ‘things’29 that are used as money to transfer value in an economic 
exchange of goods or services.30 As the economy develops, so too do these ‘things’: 
commodities, money, currency, cheques and finally to the use of electronic means to 
transfer value.  
In an advanced payments system, various procedures, rules, standards and 
instruments are used to exchange monetary value between parties in order to discharge 
an obligation.31 With good and clear procedures, rules and standards, the payment 
instrument will be able to function efficiently and will allow mobilisation of financial 
resources at lower transaction costs, both of which promote economic growth.32 Other 
                                                 
27 David B Humphrey, Payment Systems: Principles, Practice, And Improvements, vol 23 (World Bank Publications 
1995). 
28 Randall W Sifers, ‘Regulating Electronic Money in Small-Value Payment Systems: Telecommunications 
Law as a Regulatory Model’ (1996 ) 49 Fed Comm LJ 701.   
29 Whether that is electronic value or stored value. 
30 Humphrey (n 27). 
31 Electronic payments are instructions passed between banks without reliance on paper processing. This 
also includes card payments such as Automated Teller Machine (ATM), credit and debit.  
32 Ibid. 
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features that are important for a payments system are the functions of clearing33 and 
settlement.34 All payments systems involve clearing and settlement functions in order to 
finalise the value transferred. The clearing function, which is composed of processing and 
collection, can be paper-based or electronic. Settlement finality can take place at the time 
of transaction or after a period of delay. Payments can carry immediate settlement when 
the funding can be validated before the transaction.35    
Settlement after a period of delay usually occurs when some time is required to 
ensure the availability of funds.36 Since an efficient and strong financial sector is one of 
the key requirements for a safe and sound financial system,37 it would be right to say that 
payments systems are one of the crucial factors that determine this. Until recently, the 
issue of the development of payments systems has often been of secondary importance 
to financial sector reform. This is due to the view that a payment system is only a 
mechanical process and nothing more than a mechanization mechanisation of 
commercial banks' back-office function.38 However, a different approach is now being 
taken as it has become clear that payments systems have operated on technological 
development in the last 20 years. These technological developments have created risks 
                                                 
33 Clearing or clearance is the process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming payment 
orders or security transfer instructions prior to settlement, possibly including the netting of instruction and 
the establishment of final positions for settlement. See, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
Secretariat, 'A Glossary of Terms Used in Payments and Settlement Systems' (2000) 
<http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d00b.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
34 Ibid at 33 Settlement is an act of discharging obligations in respect of funds or securities transfers between 
two or more parties. 
35 A credit transaction such as a direct deposit transaction is an example of immediate payments settlement. 
This is where the payment instrument flows from the paying corporation to the paying bank to the payee's 
bank and to the payee. The flow of funds follows the same path. See David B Humphreys and Setsuya 
Sato, Modernizing Payment Systems in Emerging Economies (The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 1995). 
36 Ibid at 35 A debit transaction, such as a payment by cheque, is an example of settlement at a delayed 
period. 
Cheques flow through the banking system from the payee to the payee's bank to the payer. The flow of 
funds moves in the opposite direction from the transaction. 
37 David B Humphrey, Transforming Payment Systems: Meeting the Needs of Emerging Market Economies, vol 291 
(The Internastional Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1995).  
38 Ibid. 
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capable of affecting the global economy.39 It is also recognised that payments systems are 
an important element of financial stability for all countries and the failure of payments 
systems may affect financial and economic stability.40 
  The World Bank holds the view that a payments system plays an important role 
in the process of developing a sound financial market.41 It acknowledges that market 
economies rely on payments systems to enable trade and exchange among enterprises and 
consumers in product markets.42 Concurrently, the payments system is also used to 
convert domestic and international savings into productive investments through financial 
markets.43 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) hosts the Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and has carried out much work on retail payments 
systems.44 While development of new technology affects retail payments systems and their 
instruments, the application of modern technology has facilitated innovations in their 
instruments and services.45 The CPSS acknowledges that new technologies not only lead 
to the emergence of new retail payments instruments, such as electronic money and 
mobile payments, but also to the development of new electronic payments delivery and 
processing, such as internet payments methods.46 A payments system is hence a 
composite ‘network of instruments, institutions and services that facilitate the transfer of 
                                                 
39 Sergio G Garcia, ‘The Contribution of Payment Systems to Financial Stability’ (2000) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss41.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
40 Ibid. See also Chapter 3 where issues of risk are extensively discussed.   
41 David B Humphrey, Transforming Payment Systems: Meeting the Needs of Emerging Market Economies, vol 291 
(The Internastional Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1995).  
42 Ibid.  
43 Anton Allahar, Ethnicity, Class, And Nationalism (1st edn, Lexington Books 2005). 
44 Specific reports on retail payment systems, which include retail payment instruments such as electronic 
money, have been published. All reports on electronic money are under the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS) Publications section. The latest report by BIS on electronic money has also 
included electronic money.  
45 Carlo Tresoldi, ‘Report on the Activity of the CPSS Working Group on Retail Payment Systems’ in ‘The 
Contribution of Payment Systems to Financial Stability’ (CEMELA Mexico City May 2000) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss41.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
46 Massimo Cirasino, ‘The Role of the Central Banks in Supervising the Financial System: The Case of the 
Oversight of Payment Systems’ (2003)  
<http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/155862/paymentsystems2003/pdf/Cirasino_Oversight
_Coop.doc> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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value between parties in a transaction’.47 Similarly in many areas of economic activity, the 
organisational structure and the operations of payments systems are shaped by 
government policies and regulatory environments as well as by market forces.48  
Payments systems enable the financial sector to serve the needs of the real 
economy. Their improvement is a priority in the transformation of wealth, development 
of banking systems and emerging money markets.49 The development of the payments 
system has significant implications for the accounting and legal framework of any 
financial system. The telecommunications infrastructure, the institutional capacity of the 
central banks and the commercial banks that are major providers and users of the 
payments systems, and the   monetary instruments and management are also impacted by 
the payments system.50 The characteristics of the payments systems depend on the 
payments services that are being offered in a particular country. Therefore, to date, mobile 
payments are becoming an increasingly important factor that affect the strategic 
competitiveness and future profitability of both the private service providers in the system 
and business users. This is mainly due to the fact that new payments technologies have 
offered both lower costs and greater convenience to consumers who are the end users of 
these retail payments services. 
Payments systems can therefore be broadly defined as the means of conducting 
transactions in an economy.51 These transactions are a set of instruments, banking 
procedures and, typically,52 interbank funds transfer systems that facilitate the circulation 
                                                 
47 ‘The Canadian Payment System: Public Policy Objectives and Approaches’  May 1997.< 14h September 
2014 
48 See Humphrey (1995) n 41. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Paul W Bauer and Gary D Ferrier, ‘Scale Economies, Cost Efficiencies, and Technological Change in 
Federal Reserve Payments Processing’ (1996) 28(4) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 1004. 
52 Tanai Khiaonarong and Jonathan Liebena, ‘The Analysis of Payment Systems Efficiency’ in Banking on 
Innovation (Springer  2009). 
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of money.53 More precisely, a payments system is a mechanism, or a set of mechanisms 
which, coupled with rules and procedures, provide ‘an infrastructure for transferring 
money from one entity in the economy to another’.54 That infrastructure links together 
different banks, giro organisations and other financial institutions, payers and payees with 
banks, as well as a national bank with commercial banks. A simple payments system 
mechanism, that of exchanging currency for goods, represents direct real-time payment 
which, in the light of its straightforwardness and legal clarity, sets a standard of efficiency 
against which other payments systems may be compared.55 Most of the other major 
payment mechanisms involve the transfer of deposits56 or claims, which can be done in 
paper form or electronically.57 Notwithstanding the technical variations that differentiate 
paper-based and electronic payment systems for transferring where a similar outcome is 
expected money, the financial claim of the payer is reduced and the claim of the payee is 
increased.58  
Therefore, the term ‘payments system’ has been used fairly widely to cover both 
clearing and settlement of payments. Clearing in a payments system involves the 
transmission of payment information between the payer and payee through 
intermediaries, that is, the transmission and recording of the instructions to make a 
payment.59 Settlement, on the other hand, is the actual transfer of money to a payee's 
account based on payment instructions, that is, the actual transfer of some medium 
generally acceptable in fulfilment of the payment instruction. The act of settlement, 
                                                 
53 Benjamin J Cohen, The Geography of Money (Cornell University Press 1998). 
54 Randall W Sifers, ‘Regulating Electronic Money in Small-Value. Payment Systems: Telecommunications 
Law as a. Regulatory Model’ (1996) 49 Fed. Comm. LJ 701;  Alan Greenspan, ‘Remarks on Evolving 
Payment System Issues’ (1996) 28(4) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 689.  
55 Ibid at 54. 
56 Maxwell J Fry, Payment Systems in Global perspective (Routledge 2012). 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 David Cronin, 'Large-Value Payment System Design and Risk Management' [2011] Quarterly Bulletin 
01/January 11. 
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therefore, discharges an obligation in respect of funds or securities, between two or more 
parties.   
 2.2.2. The Modernisation of the Payments System Prior To Mobile Payments 
The modernisation of Kenya’s payments system began with the automation of 
the Nairobi Clearing House in 1998. It began with the specific aim of improvement and 
‘the clearing of cheques between banks using Magnetic Ink Character Recognition 
(MICR) technology and electronic funds transfer (EFT) payments.’60 This policy shift 
resulted in the reduction of the clearing time from a high of 14 days to the current three 
days.61 Kenya also successfully launched The Kenya National Payments System 
Framework and Strategy Document in September 2004 and The Kenya Electronic 
Payments and Settlement System (KEPSS) in July 2005. KEPSS’s implementation helped 
post-date and phase out the preceding paper-based interbank settlement system 
completely transforming the management of liquidity in the banking industry.62 During 
2008, the CBK in conjunction with Kenya Bankers Association, as previously stated, 
initiated other modernisation programmes which are expected to come to fruition. These 
include value capping, cheque truncation, GPay project, and the failure to settle 
mechanism.63 
All of these were aimed at mitigating various risks64 and augmenting the efficiency 
and effectiveness of Kenya’s payments system. While the introduction of the Real Time 
Gross Settlement (RTGS) system was anticipated to reduce the systemic implication of 
                                                 
60 Role of National Payment Systems – Central Bank of Kenya 
(https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.ph/2012-09-21-11-44-41/overview> accessed 23 September 2014. 
61 Central Bank of Kenya, ‘NPS Modernization’ <https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/upcoming-
events/29-payment-systems?start=6> accessed 3 September 2014. 
62 Ibid. 
63 GPay stands for Government Pay where the Kenyan government pays suppliers electronically instead of 
by cheque. 
64 Risks shall be discussed in Chapter 3 in Section 3.4.1. Taxonomy of Risks 97 
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the Automated Clearing House (ACH) and increase the stability and soundness of the 
payments system, there had been no major change in the volumes and values of payment 
instruments going through the ACH. Therefore, the ACH still remains a Systemically 
Important Payment System (SIPS) as opposed to being a low risk retail payments system, 
this changed upon the introduction of mobile payments. The modernisation process did 
not focus on alternative payments systems until the ‘technology revolution’,65 when the 
convergence of the telecoms industry and the financial services industry began. 
The ‘technology revolution’66 began in 1994 when Africa launched its first mobile 
phone network.67 In the last two decades, Kenya has undergone a transformation in 
information communications and technology (ICT) which has also had an important 
impact on Kenya’s social and economic structures.68 As mobile phones were quickly being 
adapted  and increasing in their sophistication in much of the developed world, Africa 
still had very limited access to basic mobile phones due to their cost and a lack of mobile 
networks.69 However, there are now close to 500 million70 mobile phone users, 
                                                 
65 Sebastiana Etzo and Guy Collender, ‘The Mobile Phone “revolution’’ (2010) Africa: Rhetoric or 
Reality? 659–668. 
 See also Ken Banks, ‘Mobile Telephony and the Entrepreneur: an African Perspective’ (2008) 8 
Microfinance Insights <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/51/41789311.pdf> accessed 3 September 
2014.  
66 The term revolution, see also Banks (n 125); Vodafone, ‘Africa: the Impact of Mobile Phones’ Vodafone 
Policy Paper Series, 2 March 2005 
<http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodafone/about/public_policy/policy_papers/public_polic
y_series_2.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014 3; Thomas Kalil, ‘Harnessing the Mobile Revolution’ (Winter 
2009) Innovations 4, 1 
<http://econpapers.repec.org/scripts/redir.pf?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mitpressjournals.org%2Fdoi 
2Fpdfplus%2F10.1162%2Fitgg.2009.4.1.9;h=repec:tpr:inntgg:v:4:y:2009:i:1:p:9-23> accessed 3 September 
2014.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Africa Region (World Bank), ‘Kenya at the Tipping 
Point? With a special focus on the ICT Revolution and Mobile Money’ (3rd edn, Kenya Economic Update, 
December 2010).  
69 Kas Kalba, ‘The Adoption of Mobile Phones in Emerging Markets: Global Diffusion and the Rural 
Challenge’ (2008) 2 International Journal of Communication 31. 
70 James Goodman, ‘Linking Mobile Phone Ownership and Use to Social Capital in Rural South Africa and 
Tanzania’ in Vodafone, ‘Africa: the Impact of Mobile Phones’ Vodafone Policy Paper Series, 2 March 2005 
<http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodafone/about/public_policy/policy_papers/public_polic
y_series_2.pdf> 3 accessed 3 September 2014.  
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approximately half of Africa’s total population.71 The mobile penetration rate has grown, 
with four out of five new mobile connections in the world being made in the developing 
world.72 In Kenya, the Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (KPTC) 
provided all telecommunication services up until 1998.73 The KPTC was established after 
the East African Community (EAC) was dissolved in 1977.74 Consequently, Kenya’s 
Parliament enacted the Kenya Communications Act (KCA)75 to regulate the 
communications sector76 and to liberalise telecommunications. Founded on the KCA, 
five companies were created. 77 
Established under the Postal Corporation Act of Kenya 1998,78 the Postal 
Corporation of Kenya (PCK) emerged. Similarly, Telkom Kenya Ltd (Telkom),79 was 
incorporated in April 1999 under the Companies Act80 with its original intention to 
liberalise telecommunications in Kenya. Although the KCA did not allow a monopoly or 
even a duopoly in telecommunication operations, Telkom was granted a special licence 
                                                 
71 Jenny C Aker and Isaac M Mbiti, ‘Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa’ (2010) 24 (3) 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 207–232 <http://www.jstor.org/stable20799163> accessed 3 
September 2014. 
72 GSM Association Development Fund website <http://www.gsma.com/developmentfund/> accessed 
3 September 2014.  
73 In 1999, the KPTC was divided into three separate entities: Telekoms Kenya, Kenya Postal Corporation 
and the Communication Commission of Kenya (CCK) the licensing and regulatory authority of the 
government. ‘Kenya Telecom Corporation Winds Up’ Africa News Service (29 June 1999).  
74 East African Community, ‘History of the EAC’ 
<http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&id=44&Itemid=54> accessed 3 September 2014.   
75 The Kenya Communications Act (2009) found at  <http://www.ca.go.ke/>. The Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK), an independent regulator of all communications services in the country, the 
National Communications Secretariat (NCS), a communications policy advisory think-tank within the 
Ministry of Information and Communications responsible for communications services. In September 
2007, Telkom was also granted a mobile licence and began offering those services using code division 
multiple access (CDMA) 2000 technology. 
76 Tonny Omwansa, 'M-PESA: Progress and Prospects' (2009) <http://www.strathmore.edu/pdf/innov-
gsma-omwansa.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.   
77 Ibid  
78 Postal Corporation of Kenya Act 1998 (Cap 411). 
79 Telkom Kenya is the sole provider of landline phone services in Kenya. It was previously a part of the 
Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (KPTC) which was the sole provider of both postal 
and telecommunication services.  
80 The Companies Act 1978 (Cap 486). 
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spanning five years up to June 2004,81 to permit Telkom to adjust to a competitive 
telecoms environment.82 Telkom was the authority for all local access, national telephone 
services, internet mainstay networks, and Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs); 
additionally they were responsible for the international gateway services. To this day, it is 
still the only nationally fixed telecommunications services operator.83 
 Mobile phone adoption has seen tremendous growth: ‘from 17,000 mobile 
subscribers in 1999 to 11.3 million by December 2007’.84 Mobile phone services in Kenya 
had been operated as a duopoly, with Safaricom and Celtel85 taking the lead since 2000, 
but now rebranded as Airtel. France Telecom acquired 50 per cent of Telkom Kenya in 
December 2007 and proceeded to launch its Orange86 brand in Kenya in September 2008. 
Since then it is referred to as  Telkom Orange, having been issued out and fervently 
marketed its mobile services which run on Global System for Mobile Communication 
(GSM) technology. In November 2008 Econet87 was launched, bringing the total number 
of operators to four.88  
Furthermore, mobile subscription almost tripled from 7.34 million subscribers in 
June 2006 to 24.96 million subscribers in December 2010; whilst the penetration rate 
more than doubled from 21.6 per cent of inhabitants to 55.9 per cent over the same 
                                                 
81 Omwansa (n 76). See also, Elizabeth Martha Bakibinga, ‘Regulating Market Entry in the 
Telecommunications Sector in an Integrated East Africa: Towards a Common Licensing Framework’ 
(Masters Thesis, University of Oslo 2004). 
82 Ibid.  
83 Omwansa (n 76). 
84 Omwansa (n 76). 
85 At the time of inception, Celtel was a telecommunications company that operated in several African 
countries. Originally known as ‘MSI Cellular Investments’, the company began operating in 1998. In 
January 2004, the company name was changed to ‘Celtel International’. In April 2005, the company was 
acquired by and became a subsidiary of Zain (formerly the Mobile Telecommunications Company). At the 
time it was purchased by Zain in April 2005, Celtel had about 24 million subscribers in 14 African countries. 
On 8 June 2010 the company was purchased by Bharti Airtel. On 22 November 2010, it was rebranded as 
‘Airtel’. 
86 Orange is a mobile network operator and internet service provider in the United Kingdom which 
launched in 1993.  
87 Cellular News, ‘Econet Finally Launches its Network in Kenya Published’ (25 November 2008) 
<http://www.cellular-news.com/story/34832.php> accessed 3 September 2014.  
88 Omwansa (n 76).  
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period.89 The number of minutes of local calls (mobile traffic) made on mobile networks 
increased by about 34 per cent, from 4.96 billion to 6.63 billion over the same period.90 
The reduced cost of mobile phones, innovation in the use of handsets (money transfer, 
internet access or payment services) and, in particular, the reduced tariff plans resulting 
from increased competition, have contributed to an increase in subscriptions, especially 
the escalation witnessed in the most recent period.91 It can be argued that the state 
monopoly of the KPTC has shifted from the government to a private sector oligopoly.92   
The government of Kenya in the Kenya Information and Communications 
Amendment Act of 2009,93 vests the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) 
with, ‘adjudicative powers in the discharge of its statutory mandate of licensing and 
regulating telecommunications, broadcasting and postal services within the country’. 94 
Under section 23 of the Act, the CCK exercises its mandate to ensure provision of ‘quality 
communication services to consumers and to promoting effective competition in the 
provision of such services.’95  
The more detailed strategic plan of the regulator aims to provide access to 
communication services for all by 2030.96 The previous policy, from 2001, aimed to 
                                                 
89 Ibid 85.   
90 Alexander Shih, ‘The Contribution Of Mobile Telecommunication Technology To Sustainable 
Development In Selected Countries In Africa’ (PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2011). 
91 Ibid. 
92 Monica Kerretts, ‘ICT Regulation and Policy at a Crossroads: A Case Study of the Licensing Process in 
Kenya’ (2005) 5 [this differs from Biblio please check] Southern African Journal of Information and 
Communication 49, 50. 
93 Kenya Information and Communications Amendment Act 2009 (Cap 411a), s 5.  
94 Ibid. 
95Simphiwe Nojiyez and Jocelyn Muthoka, ‘Barriers to Entry of Kenya’s Telecommunication Industry: Is 
there a Market Slice for New Entrants?’ 
<http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/jomad/jomad_v11_n1_a7.pdf> 
accessed 3 September 2014.  
96 Communications Commission of Kenya, ‘Strategic Plan: 2008–2013’ (2008) 
<http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/documents/documents/11806/> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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improve network access.97 It also reduced Kenyan ownership in any operator or service 
provider to a minimum of 30 per cent.98 
 
2.3. Introduction of Mobile Payments in Kenya 
2.3.1. Definition of Mobile Payments 
The definition of mobile payments as a payment instrument has been 
problematic.  Mobile payments can be described as a payment instrument where each 
payment transaction requires a mobile device to execute the transaction. Each payment 
instrument should meet physical, legal and regulatory standards.99 This payment 
instrument requires the use of one or more banks to complete a transaction. These 
payments are not accomplished simply by exchanging the payment instrument between a 
payer and a payee, but by transferring money between the payer’s bank and the payee’s 
bank.100 The term ‘mobile financial services’ refers to several financial services accessible 
through mobile phones. As yet, there is no unanimity globally, let alone at national levels, 
on the characterization of mobile financial services and the term ‘electronic payments 
through mobile devices’ is often used in place of mobile payments, thus adding to 
confusion over what actually transpires in the payment.  
However, according to Boyd and Jacob, the term  ‘mobile financial services’ is 
widely accepted and used to suggest ‘a comprehensive array of financial activities that  
                                                 
97 Government of Kenya, ‘Telecommunications and Postal Sector Statement’ (2001) The Kenya Gazette 
CIII (77) 2675. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Robert Listfield and Fernando Montes-Negret, 'Modernizing Payment Systems In Emerging Economies’' 
Policy Research Working Paper (1994). 
100, Robert Listfield and Fernando Montes-Negret, ‘Modernizing Payment Systems In Emerging 
Economies’ (1994) Policy Research Working Paper 1336 
<http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=B5b7vjuymYcC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=Listfield,+Rober
t%3B+Montes-Negret,+Fernando,+ %E2%98Modernizing+Payment+Systems+In 
+Emerging+Economies%E2%80%99&ots=BQZESNBMYS&sig=MxNMWPVWyWLFXR3dGDHzq
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consumers partake in or access using their mobile devices’.101 These services can be 
classified into three groups: mobile banking, mobile money transfer, and mobile 
payments.102 Mobile banking suggests web-based banking services accessible through a 
mobile phone, such as balance enquiries, interbank transfers, and payments,103 which has 
allowed for seamless transactions for consumers remotely.104 
 2.3.2. Introduction of M-Pesa to Kenya  
M-Pesa, the first mobile payments product, has its origins in Vodafone’s efforts 
to ‘understand its role in addressing international development issues’ such as the 
Millennium Development Goals.105 The inception of M-Pesa focused on enabling micro-
loan receipt and repayment in partnership with a microfinance institution called Faulu 
Deposit Taking Micro-Finance Ltd (Faulu).106 Moreover, Faulu customers realised that 
the service use had an unintended benefit of transferring payments from person to person 
rather than simply the repayment of their loans. This precipitated the need for the 
company to focus solely on launching the product on just three essential services: 
‘deposits’ at the agents and ‘withdrawals’, money transfers and prepaid airtime 
                                                 
101 Caroline Boyd and Katy Jacob, ‘Mobile Financial Services and the Under-banked: Opportunities and 
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104 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Kenya School of Monetary Studies, 
‘Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix’ (United States Agency for International Development,  2010). 
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purchase.107 Through the facilitation of financial services through mobile phones, this 
provided an entrepreneurial avenue and the creation of jobs and trade. Therefore through 
this investment, Faulu’s borrowers were able to pay a small amount each week instead of 
meeting with their treasurers. This was seen as a viable solution as it reduced the risk of 
experimentation with new business models.  Sending the treasurer with an appropriate 
contingent of group members for protection in order to deposit their funds in a local 
bank108 was ultimately seen by Vodafone as an expensive process for borrowers, as it 
necessitated their removal from their business activities to deal with bank matters which 
was deemed unproductive.109  
This also highlighted the costly process involved in traditional bank methods 
when used as payment instruments. Consequently, M-Pesa illustrated a more useful 
system at the time for its customers than the microfinance institution Faulu. This was 
because Faulu’s operating procedures and systems were not as integrative for users as 
they would have hoped. Hence, M-Pesa, the mobile money, was debuted in 2007 by 
Safaricom, Kenya’s largest mobile network operator, with the aim of providing basic 
financial services. The product facilitates a variety of financial transactions through 
mobile phones.110 These functions include the checking of account balances, the ability 
to make ‘deposits’ and ‘withdraw’ funds, making bill and merchant payments, being able 
to purchase airtime and, most importantly the ability to transfer money through person 
to person payments.111 The growth of the application was impressive. M-Pesa was able to 
scale to 50 per cent of Kenyan adults in less than two years.112 This resulted in a unique 
                                                 
107 William J Kramer, Beth Jenkins and Robert S Katz, 'The Role of the Information and Communications 
Technology Sector in Expanding Economic Opportunity' (Harvard University 2007) 
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adoption rate through having 10,000 new users registering for the service daily.113 By July 
2007, there were just over 268,000 registered users. Two years later, the number had 
increased to 7.5 million, or 34 per cent of the adult population. Seven years114 on, mobile 
money is widespread in Kenya but is yet to achieve the scale seen in other countries. M-
Pesa was introduced as part of a medium term business strategy with the aim of building 
brand loyalty rather than short term financial reward. More than one in two mobile money 
transactions worldwide are carried out in Kenya.115 M-Pesa has emerged as a powerful 
and innovative tool in financial inclusion and the economic development of the 
country.116 
 The value of transactions increased by 4600 per cent initially and 3700 per cent 
later.117  A value of over US $535 million has been transferred through the system since 
its launch. These figures, compared to commercial bank deposits and the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) figures, showed how significant mobile payments had become. The value 
of the M-Pesa transactions continued to increase to 0.2 per cent against bank deposits 
and in two years, and further increased to 4.4 per cent. By the following year, 2008, 
Kenya’s GDP was estimated at US $30 billion and eventually increased to US $535 
million, or 2 per cent of the year’s GDP.118 Mobile technology has thus enabled residents 
of remote villages and towns to secure access to financial services previously beyond 
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them.119 Unlike other mobile transaction schemes120 which add a new channel to existing 
banking services, M-Pesa offered an alternative solution and was therefore described and 
understood by the Kenyan regulators as a mobile payments system. This thesis will 
henceforth use the term ‘mobile payments system’ to describe all mobile financial services 
and products and will refer to M-Pesa interchangeably.  
 At the centre of M-Pesa is a float within which customers have a unique account 
to hold their balances; and which is entirely separate to the pre-pay airtime credit.121 The 
whole M-Pesa float is then banked with a commercial bank. In the case of M-Pesa, the 
Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) has a banking contract for the M-Pesa float which 
creates a new entity, a trust company, formed by Vodafone.122 It is through the trust 
company and service level agreements123 with Safaricom that the account relationships 
are managed, bypassing banks and going directly to the individual M-Pesa customers. To 
open an M-Pesa account, a subscriber requires a Kenyan national identity card.124 The 
mobile operator, Safaricom, provides the new account holder with a subscriber identity 
module (SIM) card that enables transactions using an application running in the SIM Tool 
Kit (STK) environment. Through specific M-Pesa agents,125 the customers can carry out 
mobile payments, pay cash into their accounts and make cash withdrawals. 
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 At present126 M-Pesa’s services are available only to M-Pesa account holders and 
certified agents, and they are not linked to the clearing system.127 The mobile phone in 
use in the M-Pesa service acts as a ‘virtual’ bankcard.128 A bankcard is fundamentally a 
memory or storage device in the customer’s possession that serves two uses: the first is 
in the identification of the user and the other in the institution or account in which the 
user’s funds are held. 129    
This was beneficial as all this information could be stored within the mobile 
device, thus alleviating costly ventures that include the distribution of cards to the entire 
banked population which worked in the same way a smartcard would.130  Additionally, 
the SIM card is able to store the user’s PIN and account details, so in essence acts as a 
virtual card.131  While Safaricom may not have had a fully articulated marketing plan, it 
nonetheless took a series of decisions which helped it to overcome these daunting 
challenges when it first introduced M-Pesa to the market. Possibly their most important 
achievement was that the management recognised the potential impact of M-Pesa, and 
committed the company to heavy investments in marketing before the proposition could 
be proven. Safaricom managed to develop a strong service brand for M-Pesa, which some 
market research has shown is even stronger than Safaricom’s corporate brand – itself 
already a powerful brand in Kenya with a dominant share of the mobile phone market.132 
                                                 
126As early as 2014.  
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 M-Pesa easily surpassed its first-year forecasts. This quickly turned the network 
effects in their favour, thus changing M-Pesa into a lucrative business for many agents 
and retail outlets. It was then decided that for the maximum chance of acceptability in an 
unprepared market, Safaricom should go for a widespread national launch, and be 
deliberate in its messaging and marketing mix.133  Safaricom was able to leverage the 
public goodwill which existed for the corporate brand, and which treated M-Pesa stores 
as valuable brand outposts. All this was supported by a service that was designed to be 
simple and easy to use. The growth in mobile financial services was fundamentally a result 
of the enabling regulatory environment that the KCA created in 1998.134 An argument 
put forward by Gary Collins is that M-Pesa came into existence in a ‘regulatory vacuum’,135 
and that the service started operations without the need for a banking licence. This 
allowed Safaricom to diligently spread its services through its existing network of agents 
for airtime services,136 making banks unable to compete.137 However, KCA only regulates 
communications services, leaving electronic commerce and mobile financial services 
without a regulatory framework.138   
Despite the fact that, in 2006, the Kenya Information Communication and 
Technology (ICT) Policy was made available to promote electronic commerce it was the 
first of many fragmented regulatory tools that encompassed the regulation of mobile 
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financial services at that initial stage. 139 At the time, Kenya lacked a framework for 
electronic transactions, something it needed in order to participate effectively in the new 
internet economy. Hence the reason for the digital divide in the progression of e-
commerce. The Electronic Transactions Bill of 2007 was drafted to oversee electronic 
commerce issues, such as recognition of electronic transactions and electronic 
signatures.140 However, Kenya needed an appropriate and comprehensive information 
legislation to address the specific details of electronic transactions, including the critical 
laws that should govern this particular fast growing sector; the Kenya Information and 
Communications Bill of 2007 had not been enacted and was still at its draft stage.  
There are many stakeholders, mobile operators, merchants, banks, entrepreneurs 
and consumers that want to see an accurate and inclusive ICT Act enacted soon, which 
would enhance trust in electronic transactions and, more specifically, mobile payments. 
There is willingness to deal with change in partnership with commercial banks and 
microfinance, which have different cultures, operating environments and incentives. The 
CBK did not have a pre-existing regulatory framework for mobile payments; however, 
the national payments system regulations were under review. Therefore, the 
implementation of mobile payments and their regulation became increasingly important 
after the introduction of M-Pesa. 
2.3.4. The System Design of M-Pesa 
The mobile payments system in Kenya uses an MNO-led model. Mobile Network 
Operator Led Models requires that the MNO converts its wireless network messaging 
functionality into a SIM141 based platform in order to provide mobile payments as value 
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added services (VAS) under its telecommunications licence.142 This SIM card enables 
subscribers of Safaricom to either transfer their funds or make payments from person to 
person, which are settled via MNO’s established agent network.143  
The transactions, both transfers and payments, are effected completely within the 
MNO’s network using its platform, thus not requiring the subscriber to have a bank 
account.144 Safaricom, and other MNOs,145 have adopted this model as a means of 
bypassing the regulatory requirements for banking under the Banking Act of 1969,146 the 
CBK Prudential Guidelines and other regulations.147 The funds paid in by the payer, 
which are also said to be in transit,148 but which have not been withdrawn by the recipient, 
are referred to in principle as being in deposit in a separate ‘trust account’ with several 
banks and are hence not deposits in the context of banking business as defined in the 
Central Bank Act Cap 491 1966.149  
MNOs make use of banking privileges, by way of the trust accounts. This 
requirement is part of the authorisation and licensing conditions spelt out by the CBK.150 
Through short messaging services (SMS) technology, M-Pesa lets users make four basic 
types of transactions: person to person transfers; person to bank transfers; cash deposits 
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and withdrawals from agents who act as the designated outlets;151 they also can perform  
loan receipts or repayments. Customers have to register using an official form of 
identification.152 Cash deposits are converted into a commodity called e-float153 that is 
denominated in the same units as the domestic currency.  
The MNO only effects its subscriber’s payment instructions through its platform, 
but does not perform the credit assessment that banks usually do.154 This consequently 
highlights the contrasts to the bank led models where cash exchanged for electronic value 
is not repaid but rather remains with the customer. Agents must always have a float in a 
bank account so that they may offer the equivalent through M-Pesa Services and the lack 
of such float may precipitate liquidity risk as opposed to a credit risk to either the 
customer or the MNO.155 It is unclear as to whether the customer funds in the trust 
account attract interest.156 Although this pooled trust account cannot be accessed by the 
MNO, practice suggests that all interest earned on the pooled funds are used by the 
MNOs for charitable causes. This shows that there is no intermediation, a key part of the 
‘deposit taking’ definition.157 It is also unclear as to whether the customer deposits 
received by the MNO earn interest.  
This uncertainty does not clarify whether the e-value created is or is not in fact a 
deposit.158 Whether mobile payments constitute ‘banking business’ as defined in Section 
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2 of the Banking Act 2009,159 which consequently suggests that they do not require or 
enjoy the scope of regulatory oversight expected for deposits that are used in banking.160 
While the bank in which the pooled funds are held, does not have prudential oversight 
or responsibility or involvement in the payments through the MNO system, this is set 
against to the convenience of mobile payments, where there are no minimum balances or 
services charges.  This has heralded the arrival of mobile payments in the financial 
inclusion agenda, and the shift from informal financial systems to formally include cash 
in the formal financial system in this mostly cash dominant society.161  
MNOs increased the competition for banks in Kenya through the introduction 
of mobile payments especially by MNOs.162 This has resulted in the innovative integration 
of banking and transfers through mobile payments services which has greatly increased 
the access and services offered by banks to their customers as well as MNOs to their 
subscribers. This integration, led by the MNO model, where payments are via Safaricom, 
also led to the development of other products, such as M-Kopa and M-Shwari,163 and 
insurance.164 These hybrid models were in conjunction with regulated financial 
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institutions165 pooling strengths from both industries– the financial platform of the banks 
on one hand and the technological platform of the telecoms industry on the other – and 
hence M-Pesa thrived within the MNO-led model as opposed to other bank-led 
models.166 
These hybrid models have resulted in increased transactions where data from the 
CBK shows that Kshs. 1.117 trillion was transacted through mobile payments as a result 
of the integration with commercial banks; and by 2013, the increase was positively seen 
as a result of consumers transferring their funds through their mobile phones.167 The 
MNO-led models and mobile financial services that have since launched following the 
successful premier of M-Pesa, include M-Kesho, Mobicash, Yu-cash Orange Telkom’s 
Orange money, Pesa-Pap Essar Telecom’s, Elma, and Pesa-Connect.168 
2.4. The Enabling Environment for Mobile Payments 
 
This part of the chapter will discuss the enabling environment for mobile 
payments in Kenya. An enabling environment is defined as the set of conditions which 
promote a sustainable curve of market development for mobile payments.169 Of particular 
interest are the settings in which prevalent access is likely, or in essence, conditions in 
which mobile payments are more likely to succeed.170 New markets require enablement 
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in the form of a combination of legal and regulatory openness,171 which creates the 
opportunity to start up and experiment with sufficient legal and regulatory certainty172  
promising that there will not be indiscriminate or negative changes to the regulatory 
framework.173 This gives providers the confidence to invest the necessary resources. 
Countries that lack the regulatory capacity may prove to have no certainty, primarily since 
their regulatory discretion may lead to arbitrary action.174 Equally, countries with greater 
certainty such as those with better regulatory capacity, may not have the adequate 
flexibility that would allow for an enabling environment and may be far more restrictive. 
This is especially the case in a new market sector like mobile payments where business 
models are not yet stabilised. An enabling environment ensures a gradient towards better 
certainty and openness.175 
This part will first discuss the infrastructure of the financial services in Kenya as 
a precursor to the payment options gaps that mobile payments eventually filled. It will 
then move on to highlight the quality of the alternative financial services that impeded 
financial access to the large unbanked and under-banked population. A discussion will 
follow on the dominance and market share of the leading MNO, Safaricom. The 
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conclusion will highlight other country specific attributes that led to the adoption of 
mobile payments and, as a consequence, financial inclusion.  
  2.4.1. Infrastructure and the Quality of the Pre-Existing Financial Services  
The penetration rate of financial services has been established as a key influence 
on the rate of adoption for mobile payments. On the one hand, the poor quality of 
existing traditional financial services, such as banks, promoted the adoption of mobile 
money services which, in comparison, offered efficiency, greater accessibility, and more 
convenience. On the other hand, very poor financial services infrastructure could also 
slow the adoption of mobile payments and services by making it more challenging for 
service providers and agents to adequately manage their liquidity.176 Kenya was being 
served by 400 bank branches and slightly over 600 ATMs, resulting in one bank branch 
per 100,000 inhabitants, a ratio of 1.38.177 About 17 per cent of the population used 
formal financial services and 38 per cent of people were excluded.178 It can be noted that 
in other jurisdictions, such as Tanzania, the inadequate number of bank branches 
inadvertently affected the ability of Vodacom179 to effectively manage agent liquidity 
(cash) to meet user demand, thus resulting in the slower uptake of M-Pesa.180 Inadequate 
liquidity has a two-fold effect on the adoption rate of mobile payments. Firstly, it limits 
the provider’s ability to effectively roll out mobile money schemes and services because 
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the geographic coverage of the agents is limited by the access to the banks that aid 
liquidity.181 
  Secondly, inadequate liquidity affects the quality of service provided by the agents. 
Due to unreliable liquidity, the agents may not be able to offer cash withdrawal services, 
forcing a customer to move from one agent to another in order to find one that can offer 
the service. This affects the quality of service provision which reduces the user’s 
perception of the value, trust and credibility of the service provider and the services 
offered.182 Kenya, on the other hand, had a relatively more developed financial system, 
and this was essential to Safaricom’s ability to manage the agent network liquidity needs. 
The level of bank branches’ penetration rate was just right for the uptake of M-Pesa: 
neither too high to impede the demand for the mobile payments services nor too low to 
hinder the ability of the agents to meet their liquidity needs. Hence, agents need to convert 
cash deposits to e-float for customers, and the rapidity and capability to rebalance their 
liquidity is of importance.  This may be hampered if the bank branch network is very low, 
which creates cash in transit risks as agents transport their cash to deposit to banks.183 
Prior to M-Pesa, alternative remittance channels, such as payment cards and bank 
branches, were not as popular.184 The common ways of sending money in Kenya were 
through the post office, bus companies, sending relatives or friends, or personally 
travelling to make the delivery.185 The post office money remittance services were 
perceived by many Kenyans as expensive and inconvenient due to their limited locations 
                                                 
181 International Finance Corporation, ‘M-Money Channel Distribution Case – Tanzania’s (IFC Report, 
2010) 
<http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/3aa8588049586050a27ab719583b6d16/Tool%2B6.8.%2BCas
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and higher user fees.186 Moreover, the other methods of transporting cash were unsafe as 
one could easily be mugged. These methods were also unreliable because there was no 
guarantee that the money would reach the intended destination or be received within the 
intended timeframe. In addition, it was time-consuming as it was necessary to make plans 
and take time off work in order to travel to rural areas to deliver the money. These 
conditions facilitated the quick uptake of mobile payments in Kenya as it offered a 
superior service to the alternative methods.187 
Providing financial services to those in rural areas was not appealing to banks, 
mainly due to the fact that they were only interested in providing additional banking 
services to their existing client base, and mobile payments are simply an additional and 
more convenient access channel. Until now, transformational mobile money services — 
the use of ICTs and non-bank retail channels to extend financial services to clients who 
cannot be reached profitably with traditional branch-based financial services — have not 
given banks the right incentives to invest in these customers long term.188 In fact, potential 
business at the bottom of the pyramid requires the traditional banking business model to 
be radically reworked, while the burgeoning middle classes in developing countries are 
presenting a tremendous business opportunity which is both easier and fits within the 
current business model. Moreover, banks have traditionally obtained very little benefit 
commercially from selling their most profitable products to low income markets. This is 
because customer acquisition, channel development, and compliance are all costly for 
banks, yet projected returns are not encouraging.189 
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As discussed, traditional categorisations whereby companies could be resolutely 
classified into compartments that broadly represented their core financial business190 are 
becoming blurred. It may be noted that the nimbleness of MNOs in transforming into 
entities that provide transactional equivalents of bank services is such that ‘branchless 
banking’ in Africa is currently dominated by MNO-based models, using retail agents for 
their so-called cash-in/cash-out activities.191 This, states Mas, reflects the low levels of 
banking dispersion and the poor state of fixed communications infrastructures, and 
further explains the rate of acceptance of MNO-led financial services over banking 
services.   
2.4.2. Mobile Phone Rate Penetration  
The degree of mobile phone penetration in Kenya provided an enabling 
environment for mobile payments. This penetration rate indicated the level of familiarity 
of the customers with the use of a mobile phone and the potential market reach of the 
service.192 Individuals with prior experience of using mobile phones were more likely to 
adopt mobile payments because they believed that they had the ability to use the service, 
compared to individuals without prior knowledge of using it.193 Twenty-seven per cent of 
the Kenyan adult population owned a mobile phone and a further 28 per cent had access 
to someone else’s phone.194 This provided a key platform for making the service available. 
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Safaricom was able to reach a wider population and, as of June 2012, the mobile phone 
penetration in Kenya stood at 75 per cent.195 This growth of mobile phones, particularly 
in Kenya, according to Mbiti and Weil,196 is where a tectonic and unexpected change in 
communications has occurred.197 From being virtually unconnected in the 1990s, over 60 
per cent of Africa now has mobile phone coverage and there are now over ten times as 
many mobiles as landline phones in use. In 1999, only 11 per cent of the African 
population had mobile phone coverage, primarily in Northern (Egypt, Algeria, Libya, 
Morocco, and Tunisia) and Southern (Kenya and South Africa) Africa. By 2008, 60 per 
cent of the population (477 million) could get a signal and an area of 11.2 million square 
kilometres had mobile phone coverage — equivalent to the United States and Argentina 
combined.198 By the end of 2012, it was projected that most villages in Africa would have 
coverage with only a handful of countries relatively unconnected. Kenya has therefore 
undergone a remarkable ICT revolution.  
The above information illustrates the potential of mobile phone technology to 
support the extension of access to financial services in developing countries. Developing 
regions in Africa mobile subscription levels have doubled every two years.199 There were 
3.3 billion mobile phone subscriptions in the world in 2007.200 About one billion people 
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in developing countries did not have a bank account but had a mobile phone,201 and that 
number grew to 1.7 billion in 2012. This suggests that there is still a significant 
opportunity to expand financial access via mobile phones.  
2.4.3. Market Share and Dominance of Safaricom 
The popularity of a product influences its adoption. This is done by promoting 
awareness about the usefulness of the service to potential users. Safaricom was and 
continues to be the dominant MNO in Kenya and at the time of M-Pesa’s launch202 
Safaricom had a market share of 80 per cent.203 This dominance enabled it to 
advantageously position itself against its competitors when it launched M-Pesa, mainly 
due to its existing subscribed users which provided a ready market for the company to 
quickly reach and capture a wider market base for its service.204  
Safaricom holds the largest market share, which in the voice sector of the 
telecoms market and based on its subscriber base and 81 per cent205 by revenue, was 
above the threshold for presumption of dominance.206 Safaricom had at the outset, and 
continues to have, an enduring significant market power in both mobile voice and SMS 
services which has enabled it to behave, to a significant extent, independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately consumers. Safaricom’s hegemony and associated 
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competitiveness, superior tangible and intangible assets and managerial competencies,207 
first mover advantage and provision of cross-network effects for commercial users, all 
contributed to its dominance.208  
Sutherland argues that this monopoly and dominance in Kenya is a result of 
corruption in the telecommunications industry.209 Although problems of corruption in 
telecommunications are an established global phenomenon,210 concerns have been 
expressed over the unprecedented success of Safaricom as the various other 
telecommunications companies have lagged behind in their entry and market penetration.  
Part of its success is because Safaricom was formed to boost mobile telephony by 
bringing in foreign expertise and capital.211 Telkom Kenya212 acquired a 60 per cent 
interest in Safaricom by contributing its Electronic Technical Assistance Centre (ETAC), 
its GSM network and its subscriber base, which was valued at US $30 million. It then lent 
Safaricom US $33 million as its portion of the US $55 million fee that Safaricom paid for 
its Kenyan cellular licence. Vodafone Kenya Limited acquired a 40 per cent interest in 
Safaricom by contributing US $20 million in cash.  
It later lent Safaricom US $22 million as its portion of the fee paid by the company 
for its initial licence.213 Other operators did not experience such a smooth entry into the 
Kenyan market. This means that Safaricom is not likely to be dislodged from its dominant 
position for many years. Efforts to reduce its market share have been unsuccessful due 
to there being no suggestion of creating a competitive market. The complexities of issuing 
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operating licences214 to other players and the sagas behind the privatisations and their 
related investments, which ought to have eroded the position of Safaricom, have not yet 
done so.215 Safaricom dominates the market share amongst the other four operators in 
Kenya’s telecommunications industry.216 Investigations into claims of unfair advantage 
and its dealings in the issuing of licences to its rivals appear to have been sidestepped as 
a result of the culture of impunity and lack of accountability. 217 
Safaricom’s competitors in the banking sector had offered, at the beginning in 
2007, their services only in the country’s major centre. However, compared to M-Pesa 
the services were not as efficient.  Safaricom had invested heavily in its mobile service 
provision and had proven itself to be reliable in its service delivery, which in turn 
customers had to adjust to and adopt with the three elements that their mobile services 
offered.218 As the telecommunications industry is a public utility, public ownership 
requires strong government controls, which form a component of the industry’s 
operations. After the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector in Kenya, the state 
monopoly of the KPTC shifted from the government to a private sector oligopoly. This 
shows that there was a shift from structuralism to neo-liberalism.219  
 Despite privatisation and the introduction of competition policies and laws, 
Safaricom, the incumbent, is still able to dominate the telecommunications markets while 
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enjoying significant advantages through skewed competition and unfair business 
practices.220 This highlights the fact that after a seven-year oligopoly, market liberalisation, 
market distortions and the competitive environment continue to be skewed in favour of 
Safaricom compared to other entrants.221 This fact goes beyond the scope of the thesis 
but is pertinent to mention.  
2.4.4. The Regulatory Environment  
A regulatory environment guarantees the laws, rules, and regulations instituted by 
states or governments and civil organisations in favour of business activities.222 The 
regulatory structure for telecoms, and thereby MNOs, is regulated by the 
Communications Commission of Kenya (herein CCK). This falls under the Ministry of 
Information and Communications of the Government of Kenya and is headed by the 
Cabinet Secretary for Information and Communication. International bodies also regulate 
telecommunications at a regional and global level. These bodies include the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU); the African Telecommunications Union (ATU), which 
is a branch of the ITU that specifically deals with Africa; the Groupe Speciale Mobile 
Association (GSMA), which is an association of mobile operators and affiliate companies 
committed to supporting the standardisation, deployment and promotion of the GSM 
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mobile telephone system; and the Commonwealth Telecommunications Organization 
(CTO). 223 
When M-Pesa was launched there were no specific laws governing electronic or 
mobile payments. The applicable banking laws were antiquated or transplanted.224 
However, the banking sector paid no heed to that legislative vacuum. Instead, the CBK 
provided tremendous support to the operation of mobile payments. Safaricom was 
allowed to operate independently of the existing financial services regulatory 
environment, thereby enabling MNOs to provide financial services alongside the 
traditional banking sector.225 Furthermore, the CBK quickly recognised the broad 
economic benefits associated with M-Pesa’s introduction and played a supporting role 
from the beginning.226 This effectively lowered the legal hurdles. The approach of the 
CBK was that regulation set out to govern mobile payments operation had the ability to 
either promote or constrain the deployment of a mobile money service in two key ways. 
First, the regulations may have influenced the structure of the business model, and this 
determines the ability of a mobile money provider to quickly reach a wider base of clients 
or to scale up and increase the number of agents.227 For instance, in Nigeria the mobile 
money service regulators mandated three mobile money business models that excluded 
MNOs, which had expertise with agent network management, from being lead providers 
of mobile money services.228 This has greatly hampered the speed of mobile money roll-
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out in the country because non-MNOs have to form alliances with MNOs or build up an 
agent network – a process that can be complex and time consuming.229  
Secondly, the regulations set out may encourage or undermine the nature of the 
user experience in, for instance, opening a mobile money account and transacting with 
retail agents.230 This is best illustrated by the regulatory environment in Tanzania where 
the requirement to comply with the Know Your Customer (KYC) protocol has made the 
M-Pesa user experience more cumbersome.231 The protocol mandates that agents must 
identify their clients with a picture ID during the registration process and in subsequent 
transactions. However, Tanzania does not have a national ID system and this has forced 
people to look for other documents that can fulfil this requirement.232 However, Kenya 
has a long established national ID system which most people hold. This system was 
instituted by the colonial government whose aim was to radically restrict the mobility of 
Africans. The main intention of the policy was supposedly to keep track of the labour 
pool efficiently.233 This is not the case in other developing countries that have attempted 
to adopt mobile payments as users are subject to a more cumbersome registration 
process.  
This affects the ease of opening an account and transacting with clients, thus 
derailing the adoption rate of the service. The regulators also set various conditions. The 
value of an individual transaction was limited in order to prevent money laundering, and 
Safaricom was also required to integrate a system to prevent money laundering, including 
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the monitoring of suspicious transactions. Regular audits in association with the Treasury 
Department;234 inquiries relating to fraud and system downtimes235 of the use of the 
technology or the robustness of the system; end to end inspection of encryption; SIM 
card function business processes; hardware security, organisational security backup 
control; and monitoring of all processes was met with a positive response by the Kenyan 
population.  
Banks were initially apprehensive about the proliferation of mobile payments and 
the competition it posed for them.236 It wasn’t long before the banks grew nervous and a 
year later the CBK was lobbied to investigate M-Pesa.237 Kenyan banks were apprehensive 
about the ability of M-Pesa to meet the risk management requirements, due to the large 
payment system network.238 This raised concerns over the ability for such an institution 
to operate outside of the regulatory scope.  
The CBK was seen by banks to have had a light touch approach to the way it 
handled the entry of MNOs in providing mobile payments. This was in contrast to the 
regulatory burden that is imposed on the banking industry.  Initially the regulatory 
environment did not allow for the discharging of financial services by agents, whilst 
MNOs extended their services through agents, both through the withdrawal of cash and 
depositing of cash for the e-float value.  
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Mobile payment agents239 have to obtain their float from a bank, which increased 
the need for providing liquidity in remote branches to facilitate agents.240 This increased 
the perception that mobile payments where in direct competition with retail banks in the 
remittance market. Ironically, the CBK contributed to further trust within the mobile 
financial services and uptake of mobile payments, through its initial response that secured 
trust. This response further solidified the regulatory approach which was deemed as 
enabling.241 Since, M-Pesa was launched without industry regulation it provided a 
regulatory vacuum as its structure did not put it under the purview of the CBK, albeit 
submitting itself for voluntary audit and ‘slight’ supervision.242  
The market regulatory environment held challenges to new entrants and small 
MNOs who were frustrated by the dominance of Safaricom. This further highlights the 
lack of analysis across sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the developing world on the 
social, political and institutional debates on ICT regulation. The focus has largely been on 
the inclusivity of mobile payments without looking at the social, political, institutional and 
legal issues that it has brought. 
2.4.5. Urbanisation  
The market size for domestic remittances is facilitated when rural–urban 
migration results in relatively high migration flows to urban areas without compromising 
the economic development in rural areas.243 Therefore, urbanisation ratios affect the 
demand for potential domestic remittances and these depend on rural–urban migration 
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patterns. About 41 per cent of Kenyans live in urban areas.244 This pattern of urbanisation 
was inherited from the British colonial institutions following independence.245 The term 
‘dual system’ describes the persistent connection that urban migrants or citizens maintain 
with their rural dwellings where their relatives still reside, nevertheless spending a 
significant amount of time living and working in urban towns.246
  
There are several reasons for these sustained connections which aid the ability to 
‘ease the transition to urban life’.247
 
Nevertheless, the clarification for these strong urban–
rural links that most concerns this study is the financial one. Due to the stark disparity 
between urban and rural wages, many labourers and household breadwinners migrate 
from rural centres to urban areas leaving behind their families, in search of more 
profitable employment opportunities. As a consequence, many rural households rely on 
remittances from their relatives in urban centres for survival; the two societies thus 
become linked as a matter of economic necessity.248 Kenya provides a particularly 
convincing case for this ‘dual system’.249 
 In Kenya, ‘30% of households depend on remittances for their survival’,250 and 
over 78 per cent of Kenya’s population lives in rural households. As such, Kenya’s 
consumer market had articulated a significant demand for urban-to-rural remittance 
services prior to the implementation of M-Pesa. In fact, the urban-to-rural population 
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ratio in Kenya struck an imbalance in the residency of those in the rural areas and those 
in urban areas. This imbalance generated a large demand for the domestic remittance 
services offered by M-Pesa.251  This shows that the potential market size for domestic 
remittances is directly related to urbanisation ratios. Furthermore, these market segments, 
that hold domestic remittances where large rural–urban migration is adequately 
embedded to provide large migration flows, are not however so advanced that rural 
communities are left out.252 This demonstrates that both the history and culture coupled 
with public policy have worked together to establish and maintain this demand-producing 
urban-to-rural population ratio.253 
During Kenya’s colonial period,254 policies255 were implemented in the hope of 
preventing the establishment of permanent urban centres. For example, in urban areas, 
labour was only recruited for temporary periods, wages were kept low, and only small 
accommodation not suitable for family living was available. As a result, ‘migrant workers 
would oscillate between … urban and rural areas throughout their working life’.256 
Kenya’s post-colonial government reversed these policies and sought to jumpstart 
economic development through a nation-wide programme of urbanisation. Subsequently, 
urban wages and the number of permanent residents in urban areas significantly 
increased. However, the impact of these policies was muted due to the significant and 
sustaining links maintained by urban workers to their rural homes and rural communities. 
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This was enhanced by Kenya’s migrants’ ties with their rural homes which are especially 
strong due to an ethnic conception of citizenship.257  
Such ties are often expressed through burial, inheritance, cross-generational 
dependencies and social insurance, even in cases where migrants reside more or less 
permanently in cities.258 Despite government policies seeking to increase urbanisation, 
there has not been an unsustainable drain of workers from rural areas to urban centres in 
Kenya. Naturally, those workers who migrated to urban centres in search of work 
continue to send remittances to their rural homes in order to support their relatives who 
still continue to dwell in the villages. This singularity is not only apparent in Kenya, as 
strong ties to rural homes is commonplace in many African cultures. However, what 
Kenya shows is that there still exists a strong demand for domestic remittance services in 
Kenya due to its history, culture and pattern of population growth. Additionally, this fact 
contributes to the financial inclusion of the Kenyan population. This is evident as a result 
of mobile payments due to the demographic character of Kenya’s consumer population, 
especially now due to the mobile phone revolution and penetration rates as discussed.259 
Consequently, the poverty levels in Kenya remain relatively high, and as a result, for any 
financial service to be successful, it should take into consideration the need for any service 
not to be prohibitively expensive.260 
The high urbanisation rate in Kenya promoted stronger urban–rural ties which 
favoured higher remittances.261 This higher rate of urbanisation is attributed to Kenya’s 
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capitalism development ideology, and policies that encouraged urbanisation through 
modernising the urban areas and leaving the rural areas largely underdeveloped.262 This 
influenced people in the rural areas, especially the males who were predominantly the 
heads of households, to move to urban areas to seek work opportunities. However, the 
existing cultural practices, such as ancestral land inheritance, created the need for urban 
migrants to maintain ties with their rural homes, and these were reinforced and 
maintained through sending remittances.263 This resulted in the development of a 
dominant urban–rural remittance corridor that influenced the greater adoption of mobile 
payments in Kenya.  
2.4.6. Other Country Specific Factors  
Developing countries have been plagued by political instability and this has often 
impeded the ability of foreign investors to invest in Kenya.264 Kenya’s political and 
investment climate has been very important for the success of Safaricom’s M-Pesa. 
Usually, poor political and economic certainty discourages investment in additional 
services; and as aforementioned, mobile payments do particularly well in extreme 
environments where the quality of alternatives is low.265 However, M-Pesa experienced a 
big surge in usage during the post-election violence266 in Kenya during January 2008, 
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partly because it remained available and partly because customers believed that M-Pesa 
was less susceptible than banks to political manipulation.267  
Countries experiencing high levels of conflict tend to have sizable diaspora 
creating strong remittance opportunities.268 The use of financial services increases with 
the level of education in a country.269 Generally, literacy is important in the provision of 
mobile money services because the product delivery platform, a mobile device, requires 
an individual to have the basic knowledge of how to read the mobile device screen. 
However, the need for financial literacy is even more important because it improves 
access to and utilisation of financial services. As a result, users are equipped with the 
capacity to gauge the value of a service and to demand other value added mobile money 
services. Regulation should facilitate innovation by removing barriers and ensuring a level 
playing field, which holds that legal standards should be equal especially for diverse 
stakeholders who are involved in the same activity.  Through the continued introduction 
of innovative products, an enabling environment would turn to mitigating various risks 
such as operational risk and improving consumer protection. This would in turn 
precipitate appropriate regulation as other risks become apparent.270 It is evident that the 
proliferation of mobile payments hinges greatly on the effective association between a 
strategic, business model, especially the one that Safaricom had, and an enabling 
environment that takes into account specific factors in the country in which it will be 
launched.271 
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2.5. Success of Mobile Payments: Financial Inclusion  
In this part of the chapter, the discussion will focus on financial inclusion. This 
has been the main success of mobile payments in Kenya, although it is also recognised 
that there have been several other benefits that the nexus of telecommunications and 
financial services (mobile financial services) has brought, such as mobile agriculture,272 
mobile health273 and mobile education programmes274 which have expanded socio-
economic development. A definition of financial inclusion in the Kenyan context will be 
given, and the benefits of financial inclusion and the challenges it presents will be 
considered. This will be done because much of the discussions on mobile payments have 
tended to focus on the overall benefits of financial inclusion. Although this cannot be 
denied, there has been no focus on post-inclusion issues. This part will then show how 
mobile payments have been instrumental in including the financially excluded and will do 
so by explaining the shift from a microfinance perspective that focused on pro-poor 
financial service provision to a broader agenda of financial inclusion that reaches not only 
those who are on low incomes but also those who are unbanked.275 It will discuss why 
financial inclusion is important in the context of access to finance through the expansion 
of a mobile payments network as an instrument for financial inclusion.  
It will then conclude by showing that policy emphasis on financial sector 
development has indeed shifted away from microfinance and towards the development 
of inclusive financial markets through the proliferation of mobile payments systems. As 
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such, regulatory frameworks must now be adjusted to accommodate this new function 
that mobile payments have presented both for regulators and for consumers. Most 
importantly, this part discusses the overall success of mobile payments as an instrument 
for financial inclusion, which in turn makes it systemically important to Kenya’s financial 
system.  
2.5.1. Definition of Financial Inclusion 
The definition of financial inclusion at its broadest is the ability of an individual, 
household or group to access apposite financial services or products.276 Without this 
ability, people are often referred to as financially excluded.277 The proper definition of the 
financially excluded includes households that are denied credit in spite of their demand 
for it. Credit is usually a key need for those excluded, however the scope of financial 
inclusion covers various other financial services, such as savings, insurance payments and 
remittance facilities by the formal financial system to those who tend to be excluded.278 It 
also refers to access to, availability and usage of the formal financial system for all 
members of an economy.279 Financial inclusion today is about financial markets that serve 
more people with more products at lower costs.280 Few people would dispute that mobile 
money can be an engine of financial inclusion, and that it has the potential to reach 
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millions of customers, including those at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid.281 
Other international development organisations, as well as policy-makers in developing 
countries, have increasingly emphasised the need to build more inclusive financial systems 
as an essential part of their development agendas.282    
Therefore, this part discusses the prevalence and the over-emphasis on the 
importance of financial inclusion. As access to finance is fundamental to the sustainable 
development of any economy, the limited penetration and usage of the formal banking 
sector might therefore help in the understanding of the limited economic development 
of sub-Saharan Africa.283 This thesis argues that any debate centred on the importance of 
financial inclusion cannot exclude innovation in the industry and the examination of 
financial stability and integrity, coupled with the need for consumer protection, as it is 
with these tenets that the full realisation of financial inclusion can be sustainable. Even 
so, there is a lot of debate about its definition, which has had a varied meaning depending 
on the national context and the stakeholders involved.284 With regard to Kenya, especially 
most recently, financial inclusion has come to mean ‘banking the unbanked’ or 
‘branchless banking’.285 Financial inclusion brings those from an informal economy to a 
more formal economy. Low income inequality countries tend to have relatively high levels 
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of financial inclusion.286 This isolation of poor people from formal banking means that 
they do not have the opportunity to understand how banks operate.287  
 
2.5.2. Mobile Payments as an Instrument for Financial Inclusion 
Financial exclusion provides that formal financial services are not accessible to a 
population, particularly in developing countries. For example, Bilodeaeau estimates that 
more than 2.5 billion people do not have access to formal financial services.288 They 
attribute this to a ‘lack of infrastructure, information and inadequate customer service’ 
associated with traditional banking models.289 This is particularly seen in developing 
countries such as Kenya where the majority of the population resides in rural areas.290  
A well-functioning financial sector and its economic development have clear 
linkages.291 Financial services that function well, are essential for economic development 
and the access dimension of financial development has often been overlooked.292 Prior 
to M-Pesa’s launch, the average amount required to open a current bank account was US 
$105, while the average cost for operating the same was US $19 per month. This suggests 
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that by the end of a year, the minimum one would owe a bank in fee charges would be 
US $123. This can be compared with the M-Pesa service where there are no fees charged 
for deposits or withdrawals, or monthly ledger fees.293 M-Pesa has helped to expand local 
economies, enhance security, help people to accumulate capital, and make transactions 
easier.294 Mobile payments have reduced the dependency on cash because its use has 
indirect costs and policy ramifications such as expending a large amount of energy and 
resources managing it, keeping it safe and transporting it.295  
Thirdly, existing financial institutions required a minimum amount of money to 
remain in the account at all times, and also charged exorbitantly high monthly fees for 
going below the minimum requirement.296 Closure of the accounts for non-performance 
was also a common practice by Kenyan banks. These issues made the idea of operating 
and maintaining banking accounts unattractive and expensive for most people.297                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Mobile payments through M-Pesa have proven to be a viable business, and the 
government and civil society have been able to influence the market rate of adoption by 
changing how they conduct transactions and pay salaries.298 In addition, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), development banks, and bilateral development 
partners have been instrumental in introducing mobile payments as part of their relief 
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initiatives.299 The systemic coordination with private sector participants has also been 
instrumental in developing a receptive market, which has obscured the usual barriers to 
financial inclusion, such as market disruptions caused by armed conflict, extreme poverty 
and natural disasters.300  
Policy-makers in this context have begun to pay closer attention to financial 
inclusion, as well as practitioners and academics who increasingly emphasise financial 
inclusion as a policy objective.301 The perception of building inclusive financial systems 
recognises not only the goal of incorporating as many poor and previously-excluded302  
people as possible into the formal financial system but also assigns to mainstream 
financial institutions the role of reaching out to the unbanked.303 
It cannot be disputed that mobile payments are financially inclusive and offer the 
potential for financial integration by reaching millions more customers, including those 
at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid.304 Mobile payments have resulted in the 
increased need for accounts and this data has been instrumental in record keeping which 
dispels the anonymity often associated with integrity concerns.  Fraudulent and criminal 
activities have been difficult to ascertain if they are in cash, ‘which is anonymous, fungible 
and largely invisible’.305 This provides an adequate monitoring system as the volume of 
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cash-based transactions are shifted into electronic-based transactions equipping those 
charged with monitoring.  
M-Pesa has seemingly allowed for a safer cash-in-transit mechanism and storage 
for money especially for Kenyans in rural areas. M-Pesa has minimised the long trips to 
banks for the payments of their utility bills.306 This has considerably reduced the time 
taken out of productive activities and consequently the costs associated with this 
movement.307 Mobile payments potentially increase net household savings  through the 
facilitation of person-to-person transactions, which improve the distribution of savings 
within households and businesses by improving not only the person to person credit 
market but by increasing the average return to capital in the market producing a feedback 
to the level of saving.308  
Some mobile payments users use their mobile phones as a savings device despite 
it not being the safest method to store money.309 In 2009, the average savings balance of 
an M-Pesa account was around US $3.310 Moreover, M-Pesa enables rural households to 
effectively spread risk. If a ‘risk-related effect arises’, M-Pesa facilitates a quick transfer of 
funds.311
 
Instead of waiting for conditions to worsen to levels that cause long-term 
damage, mobile payments have enabled support networks to keep negative shocks such 
as medical emergencies and political instabilities manageable.312  
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Through financial inclusion, mobile payments have increased the bargaining 
power of weaker family members, in many cases women.313 This further enables 
remittance receivers or family members to gain financial independence previously 
unavailable to them.314 Customers of mobile payments are able to confirm their 
statements through the application in their mobile devices and are able to deposit or 
withdraw cash at any agent. This has created trust through consistency; this design is 
paramount in the successful implementation of mobile payments as it hinges on a well 
distributed agent network.315  
Studies from the World Bank have demonstrated that once money, production 
and investment are looked at in an integrated manner, banks and non-financial 
intermediaries can be seen as performing complementary functions essential to the 
economy.316 This could be why non-financial institutions become more important, if not 
equivalent, to banks in providing retail payment services as the systems develop. The issue 
of the ‘blurring’ distinction between banks and non-banks, and the importance of non-
banks has long been recognised.317 The participation of non-financial institutions in 
providing payment services can be a threat to financial institutions. Mobile payments have 
fundamentally transformed the way financial services are delivered in Kenya. As a 
consequence, MNOs have increased their products through diversifying their services 
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and not only providing voice and data but now financial services.318  For example, 
Safaricom’s M-Pesa has become integral to the network operator’s entire business model 
given that the revenue from its mobile payments services accounts for up to 13 per cent 
of its annual revenue.319 The increasing profitability of mobile payments to the entire 
enterprise has prompted MNOs to increase their resources in efforts to develop their 
market share and dominance. 320  This fundamental service has become so integral in the 
Kenyan payment system that MNOs have now become systemically important.  
2.6. Conclusion      
 The success of M-Pesa has become a key driver in lifting people out of poverty, 
and therefore it has become an important feature in Kenya’s financial system. This 
potential has been recognised by governments, experts and donor organisations.321 
Central Banks in emerging economies322 have recognised the potential economic benefit 
of financial inclusion and have included it in their developmental agendas.323 However, 
after integration and inclusion the challenge is how to harness this success while ensuring 
that the stability of the financial system is not affected.324 In addition, now that the large 
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(2014) <http://www.slideshare.net/JeremmyOkonjo/1-chapter-one-nature-and-impact-of-mobile-
financial-services-on-the-telecoms-sector-in-kenya> accessed 3 September 2014 
321 BIS Working Papers – Bank for International Settlements, <http://www.bis.org/publ/work347.pdf> 
(accessed 18 September 2014). It has even received special attention from the G20. In Seoul, in late 2010, 
the G20 launched the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, which among others things, has been 
tasked to implement the action plan for Financial Inclusion Principles (Access through Innovation Sub-
Group of the G20 Financial Inclusion Experts Group (2010).  
322 Subir Gokarn, ‘Dr Subir Gokarn takes over as RBI Deputy Governor’ (April 2011) 
<http://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=21700>  accessed 3 September 2014. 
323 Penelope Hawkins, ‘Financial Access and Financial Stability’ (2006) (BIS 2006) 
<www.bis.org/press/p060619.htm> 3 September 2014.  
324 Ibid n 316, See also, Alfred Hannig and Stefan Jansen, ‘Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability: 
Current Policy Issues’ (2010) ADBI Working Paper 259 (Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute) 
<http://www.adbi.org/workingpaper/2010/12/21/4272.financial.inclusion.stability.policy.issues/> 
accessed 3 September 2014. 
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unbanked population has been included, regulation should consider who safeguards their 
interests. Therefore, this thesis will determine how regulation should be applied to newly-
emerging financial services, such as mobile payments, that include the financially 
excluded. It will also attempt to determine the trade-off between financial innovation and 
regulation. While the academic literature has adequately discussed the relation between 
financial development and economic growth,325 there has been little discussion on 
whether financial development implies financial inclusion.  
The success of mobile payments has evidenced that through technological 
innovation in financial services, it has been possible to expect growth in the financial 
sector. Mobile payments have also changed the links between the telecoms industry and 
financial regulation, particularly in developing countries such as Kenya where both 
industries are developing.  The examination of Kenya in this study is consequently 
important as it offers the best example of how regulators and policy-makers alike can or 
have the opportunity to reach a consensus on the appropriate regulatory approach that 
would enable further development of this new innovative payment service. The regulatory 
challenges shall therefore be discussed in light of financial inclusion which presents 
unique challenges.326 
                                                 
325 Mark Gertler, 'Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: an Overview' (1988) NBER 
Working Paper No 2559 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w2559.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
326 See Alliance for Financial Inclusion (n 5 Chapter 1). At the inception of M-Pesa in Kenya in 2007, 
Safaricom lobbied the CBK and the CCK for authorisation to provide mobile money transfer services 
without a regulatory framework. The CCK’s reluctance to step in as a primary regulator was probably due 
to its unfamiliarity with the new converged product. The CBK has used its macroprudential regulatory 
mandate under Section 3 of the Central Bank of Kenya Act to issue negative authorisation to the provision 
of mobile financial services by mobile network operators. This is by way of issuance of letters of No 
Objection. These issues shall be discussed in Chapter 3 and 4.  
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CHAPTER 3 
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND INTEGRITY AFTER FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION THROUGH MOBILE PAYMENTS 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Chapter 2 set out the broader context of the introduction of mobile payments 
into Kenya’s national payments system, emphasising the enabling environment and the 
inclusive nature that mobile payments has accorded to Kenya. This chapter considers the 
ramifications of financial inclusion through mobile payments, by highlighting not only 
the inherent risks in payments systems but the unique risks that mobile payments now 
introduce.  
The manner in which the payment system works has importance for the financial 
sector as a whole, for it influences the speed, financial risk, efficiency, and reliability of 
domestic and international transactions.1 It also acts as a conduit through which financial 
and non-financial firms, as well as other agents, affect the overall stability of financial 
systems.2  Moreover, it influences the effectiveness of monetary policy, because of its 
impact on ‘the transmission process in monetary management, the pace of financial 
deepening, and the efficiency of financial intermediation.’3 Banking is one of the most 
                                                 
1 Roger Ferguson, ‘Should Financial Stability Be an Explicit Central Bank Objective?’ (Presentation at the 
policy panel of BIS Conference on ‘Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the Business Cycle’, (2003) 
18 BIS Papers 7–15.   
2 Wilhelmina C Mañalac, Agnes M Yap and Magno Torreja, Jr., ‘Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) 
System and Its Implications’ (2003) 
<http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/publications/2003/BSR2003_03.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. 
See generally, Andrew Crockett, ‘The Theory And Practice Of Financial Stability’ (1997) 144 De Economist 
531; Garry J Schinasi, 'Defining Financial Stability' (EPub) (International Monetary Fund 2004) which states 
that there is no analytical framework for defining financial stability, but that financial stability can be 
assessed through the safety and soundness of a financial system.  
3 Ibid, Wilhelmina Mañalac, at 25; See also,  Omotunde EG Johnson, Payment Systems, Monetary Policy and the Role 
of the Central Bank (International Monetary fund 1998). However, this study does not discuss the impact of 
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regulated and supervised economic sectors4 and the strength of the global financial system 
is such that most, if not all, financial institutions are connected, and systemic events in 
other countries or other sectors of the financial world buffet virtually all such institutions.5 
States have therefore imposed elaborate sets of interconnected regulations on many 
components of the financial system, including payments systems, in recognition of the 
fact that the ability to pay efficiently, reliably, and securely is one of the guarantees of the 
development of modern economies.6 
Payments and settlement systems therefore play an important role in improving 
the overall economic efficiency of developed and developing nations.7 Kenya continues 
to rely heavily on cash payments in most transactions,8 as the country’s high percentage 
of cash holdings as a proportion of the money supply reflects,9 in spite of the risk and 
expense of cash.10 However, the introduction of mobile payments has changed the 
landscape for payments systems considerably, as a shift from cash to mobile payments, 
while reducing the risks inherent in cash, brings new risks. Using ubiquitous electronic 
                                                 
the payment system on monetary policy; rather it will highlight its effects and the need for a stable payment 
system for a stable financial system in general.   
4 Many states review banking balance sheets as often as daily, which is internationally recognised by banking 
principles such as those put forward by the Bank of International Settlement.   
5 Daniel C Hardy, 'Regulatory Capture in Banking' (2006) 34 International Monetary Fund ), 
6 Leon Perlman, ‘Mobile Money and Financial Inclusion’ (2012) <http://www.cellular.co.za/042012-
mmoney-inclusion.htm> accessed 3 September 2014.  
7Although neither the United Nations nor any other authority provides an established convention for the 
designation of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries or areas. ‘Composition of Macro Geographical 
(Continental) Region’ <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#ftnc> accessed 3 
September 2014. I also use the words ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ for statistical convenience although they 
do not necessarily express a judgment about the stage reached by a particular country or area in the 
development process. Also see, ‘United Nations Statistics Division – Standard Country and Area Codes 
Classifications (M49)’. <Unstats.un.org> accessed 15 January 2014.' However, the examination of Gross 
Domestic Product offers a universally accepted requirement for this definition.  
8  Cash dominance refers to the preference of people to use cash as the main instrument of payment rather 
than other non-cash forms of payments such as cheques or bank cards. See generally, Simone Di Castri, 
‘Mobile Money: Enabling Regulatory Solutions’ GSMA, London, United Kingdom available at 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/MMU-Enabling-
Regulatory-Solutions-di-Castri-2013.pdf> accessed 14 August 2014.  
9 Central Bank of Kenya Publication, ‘Kenya Payments System (Framework and Strategy)’ (2004) 
<http://www.docin.com/p-433903551.html> accessed 3 September 2014.  
10 Cash in transit concerns where money may be stolen at the points of sale, or in transit to the bank. 
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channels, instead of currency or paper instruments, brings Kenya’s payments system 
significant efficiency.11  
The lack of access to financial services can exaggerate inequalities around the 
world, as a large proportion of poorer customers in developing nations12 lack the ability 
to take advantage of some crucial financial instruments,13 but mobile financial services, 
particularly mobile payments, are financially inclusive.14 The success15 of the integration 
of mobile payments into Kenya’s national payment systems’ infrastructure reflects this.16 
This case suggests that addressing the link between financially inclusive payment systems 
and stable, integrated markets through an appropriate regulatory framework has strong 
potential to support financial inclusion.  
Financial inclusion17 aims at drawing the ‘unbanked’ and ‘under banked’18 
population into the formal19 financial system, thereby giving them20 the opportunity to 
                                                 
11 Leon Perlman, ‘Mobile Money and Financial Inclusion’ (2012) <http://cellular.co.za/042012-mmoney-
inclusion.htm> accessed 3 September 2014.  
12 Ibid.  
13 These can include seamless and efficient savings facilities and payments networks that are some of the 
hallmarks of developed nations. Ibid. See also, Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the 
World (2008) 16  
14 See Chapter 2 on Financial Inclusion A Resultant Success Of Mobile Payments.65  
15 See Section 3.3.1. Relevance to Stability and Development.  
16 Mobile financial services is the collective term for financial services provided through mobile phones or 
mobile phone networks as a platform for delivery. Mobile payments are now part of the varied payments 
instruments provided first mentioned in 2007. <https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/retail-
payment-statistics/mobile-payments?yr=2014> accessed 3 September 2014.   
17 Chapter 2 Section 2.6 provides a detailed definition of Financial Inclusion.  66 
18 The ‘unbanked’ and the ‘under banked’ will be used in this study  to refer to persons who do not have a 
bank  account or those who rely on alternative financial services. See, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), ‘Tapping the Unbanked Market Symposium’ 
<http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/TUM_bio.html> accessed 3 September 2013. 
19 Though I use formal financial system in this case, there are informal financial systems that exist in 
developing countries which unbanked and under banked persons in these countries use and trust over the 
formal financial systems. See generally, Meghana Ayyagari and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, ‘Formal Versus 
Informal Finance: Evidence from China’ (2007) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/Formal_verus_Informal_Finance_Evidence_fr
om_China.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014; Mukwanason Hyuha, Mo Ndanshau and Jonas Paul Kipokola, 
Scope, Structure and Policy Implications of Informal Financial Markets in Tanzania (African Economic Research 
Consortium 1993).  
20 Alfred Hannig, Stefan Jansen, ‘Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability’ (2010) ADBI Working Paper 
Series, No 259 
<http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.12.21.wp259.financial.inclusion.stability.policy.issues.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014. The financially excluded which this thesis will not delve into include, those who cannot 
access formal financial services. As elaborated in:  Amitabh Saxena, ‘Accelerating Financial Inclusion 
through Innovative Channels: 10 Obstacles for MFIs Launching Alternative Channels – and What Can Be 
Done About Them’ (2009) 27 <http://goo.gl/BwmHj>; Ahmed Dermish and others, ‘Branchless and 
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access financial services ranging from savings,21 payments,22 and transfers to credit and 
insurance. The 2011 white paper prepared on behalf of the GPFI ‘Global  Standard-
Setting Bodies and Financial Inclusion for the Poor: Toward Proportionate Standards 
and Guidance’ defines financial inclusion as ‘a state in which all working age adults have 
effective access to credit savings,  payments, and insurance from formal service providers. 
Effective access involves convenient and responsible service delivery, at a cost affordable 
to the customer and sustainable for the provider, with the result that financially excluded 
customers use formal financial services rather than existing informal options. 23 
Financial inclusion does not require that everybody should make use of the 
supply, The supply of financial services, in this case either financial institutions or banks 
or any other financial intermediaries available, although financial exclusion suggests that 
those who are excluded are typically excluded from the formal financial system, they may 
be financially included in an informal financial system, for instance in the case of 
subsistence farmers in villages who do not trust banks and therefore ‘bank’ underneath 
their mattresses. Neither does it require that providers should disregard risks24 and other 
                                                 
Mobile Banking Solutions for the Poor: A Survey of the Literature’ (2011) 6 Innovations 81; KPMG Study, 
‘“Underserved” Market Represents Opportunity for Banks,’ <http://goo.gl/FHzAj> accessed 3 
September 2014; Oya P Ardic, Maximilien Heimann and Nataliya Mylenko, ‘Access to Financial Services 
and the Financial Inclusion Agenda around the World: A Cross-Country Analysis with a New Data Set’ 
(2011) (The World Bank, Financial and Private Sector Development, Financial Access Team of the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor) Policy Research Working Paper No 5537, 1–55 
<http://goo.gl/8EZS3> accessed 3 September 2014;  Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross 
Levine, ‘Finance, Inequality, and the Poor’ (2007) 12(1) Journal of Economic Growth 27–49 
<http://goo.gl/0Pkyi;> accessed 3 September 2014; Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Maria M 
Peria, ‘Reaching Out: Access to and Use of Banking Services Across Countries’ (2007) 85(1) Journal of 
Financial Economics 234–266, available at 
<http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/docs/Reaching_Out_Sept9.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. 
21 For instance through M-Kesho which is a bank account enabling the user to send money/transfer funds 
between the bank account (M-KESHO) & M-PESA system (Deposit & Withdrawal) 
<http://www.equitybank.co.ke/index.php/self-service/mobile-banking/m-kesho> accessed 3 September 
2014. 
22 For instance through M-Pesa.  
23 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion. See also, Alfred Hannig and Stefan Jansen, ‘Financial 
Inclusion and Financial Stability: Current Policy Issues’ 
<http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/53699/1/654899762.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
24 The inherent payment systems risks, which Section 3.3. Pre-Conditions to a Safe and Sound Payment 
System: The Need for an Appropriate Regulatory Approach will discuss.  The likelihood of the dispersion 
of problems derived from system participants to the financial system as a whole via payment systems has 
increased the importance of payment systems risks. Risks emerging from payment systems can be mainly 
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costs25 when deciding to offer inclusive services.26 Therefore regulation and policy 
initiatives, through an appropriate regulatory framework, should intervene to correct 
market failures27 through ensuring financial stability28 and financial integrity through such 
measures as consumer protection, and regulation for mobile payments should reflect 
these objectives.29   
 
Financial integrity, financial stability, and financial inclusion have varying 
definitions depending on their context.30 Financial stability has a multidimensional 
latitude that depends on the relationship of key elements of the ‘financial system and 
requires that the key institutions and markets in the financial system remain stable.’31 
Financial inclusion through mobile payments, the focus of this thesis, changes the 
                                                 
classified as credit risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk. Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/psr_policy.htm?> accessed 3 September 2014.   
25 Costs any financial provider incurs in order to scale up their services such as the cost of setting up 
branches or a branch network in remote areas.  
26 Financially inclusive services, see, Mark Pickens, David Porteous and Sarah Rotman, ‘Banking the Poor 
via G2P payments’ 58 Focus Note and also Tilman Ehrbeck, Mark Pickens and Michael Tarazi, ‘Financially 
Inclusive Ecosystems: The Roles Of Government Today’ (2012) 76 Focus Note  
27 The causes of market failure occur due to inefficiency in the allocation of goods and services. Although 
markets are imperfect, government intervention through regulation may seek to correct distortions from 
mobile financial services markets to improve efficiency. See Tyler Cowen, The Theory Of Market Failure: A 
Critical Examination (George Mason University Press 1988). 
28 Garry Schinasi, Safeguarding Financial Stability: Theory and Practice (International Monetary Fund 2005)  
29 Mwangi Kimenyi and Njuguna Ndung’u, ‘Expanding the Financial Services Frontier: Lessons from 
Mobile Phone Banking in Kenya’ (Brookings Institution, October. RW Ferguson, ‘Should Financial 
Stability be an Explicit Central Bank Objective’ Challenges to Central Banking from Globalized Financial 
Systems, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC 2008.  
30 As Chatain and others have documented, this exposure typically had not existed before. Financial 
inclusion, financial stability, financial integrity and financial consumer protection can have varying 
definitions depending on the context.  The 2011 white paper prepared on behalf of the Global Standard-
Setting Bodies and Financial Inclusion for the Poor.:  ‘Toward Proportionate Standards and Guidance’,  
defines financial inclusion as ‘a state in which all working age adults have effective access to credit, savings, 
payments, and insurance from formal service providers. Effective access involves convenient and 
responsible service delivery, at a cost affordable to the customer and sustainable for the provider, with the 
result that financially excluded customers use formal financial services rather than existing informal 
options.’ 
31 Alfred Hannig and Stefan Jansen, ‘Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability: Current Policy Issues’ 
(2010) ADBI working paper series, No 259 
<http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.12.21.wp259.financial.inclusion.stability.policy.issues.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014;  Andrew Crockett, ‘Market Discipline and Financial Stability’ (2002) 26 Journal of Banking 
& Finance 977. 
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transactions that take place,32 the consumers that use the various services,33 the risks they 
encounter, and the institutions that they operate in.34 While financial inclusion is a 
lynchpin for financial integrity,35 as mobile money reduces the dependency on cash,36 it 
creates integrity risks37 through the generation of data that is useful in tracing 
transactions.38  The question then arises, how do regulators promote financial inclusion 
while protecting the financial integrity and stability of the financial system, and how do 
these measures manifest in other regulatory domains relating to telecommunications, 
consumer protection, and anti-money laundering regulation? At the same time, who 
safeguards the payment system?   
This chapter highlights some of these issues in relation to the introduction and 
regulation of mobile payments in Kenya and presents them as a post-financial inclusion 
issue. It argues that regulators need to reform their regulatory approach in developing 
countries, as stakeholders should not have to sacrifice financial stability and integrity to 
access financial services. While inclusion creates better record-keeping mechanisms that 
                                                 
32 Where the transactions have been steadily increasing since the inception of M-Pesa in 2007.  In 2007 the 
transactions totalled 1.5 billion Kenya shillings; in 2014, the figure was 351 billion Kenya Shillings, 
<https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/retail-payment-statistics/mobile-payments?yr=2014>   
accessed 3 September 2014.  
33 Ibid at 3. 
34 Both financial institutions and non-financial institutions, stakeholders, MNOS, and mobile payments 
agents, through the convergence of the telecoms and the financial industries.  
35 Claire Alexandre And Lynn Chang Eisenhart, ‘Mobile Money In Developing Countries: Financial 
Inclusion And Financial Integrity: Mobile Money As An Engine Of Financial Inclusion And Lynchpin Of 
Financial Integrity’ (2013) 8 Wash JL Tech & Arts 285. 
36 Roger Ballard, ‘Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial Integrity within Informal 
Value Transmission Systems: The Operational Dynamics of Contemporary Hawala Networks’ (2005) 6 
Journal of Banking Regulation 4; also, Global Financial Integrity, ‘Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: 
Hidden Resource for Development’  
<http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/gfi_africareport_web.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014. 
37 Valerie Dias, ‘Evaluating the Integrity of Consumer Payment Systems’ 
<http://www.visaeurope.com/idoc.ashx?docid=ee00fe8c-ca32-4d75-bf90-de1ff5e7d5ae&version=-1> 
accessed 3 September 2014; Pierre-Laurent Chatain et al, Protecting Mobile Money Against Financial Crimes: 
Global Policy Challenges and Solutions (World Bank Publications 2011);  Dev Kar and Devon Cartwright-Smith, 
‘Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002–2006’ (GFI 2006)  
<http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/executive%20-%20final%20version%201-5-09.pdf> accessed 
3 September 2014.   
38 Simone Di Castri, ‘Mobile Money: Enabling Regulatory Solutions’ (2013)  
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/MMU-Enabling-
Regulatory-Solutions-di-Castri-2013.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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allow for states to enforce Know Your Customer (KYC) rules, it also exposes mobile 
payments agents, banks, and consumers, to money laundering and other financial 
crimes.39  The continued use and adoption of changing business models within the mobile 
financial services framework calls for a reconceptualization40 of the borders within which 
mobile payments exist and the importance of a safe and sound payments system.41  
Although mobile payments constitute low value payments,42 the exposure of 
financial institutions to risk from low income markets depends on the share of the 
revenues that they present, rather than the size of each payment,43 and in Kenya, the share 
of mobile payments is quite significant for many businesses.44 Many Kenyans, who 
previously paid for everything in cash, have adopted mobile payments as a safer way to 
transact.45 Specialised microfinance institutions and large public banks with a significant 
impression in low-income segments in Kenya have particularly high risk exposure.46 I 
challenge the view that large numbers of consumers ‘that frequently transact small 
                                                 
39 See,  James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
40 This term refers to the redefining of conventional or traditional views or approaches to how financial 
services, especially innovative financial services, have been defined.  
41 Claudio E Borio and Renato Filosa, ‘The Changing Borders of Banking: Trends and Implications’ (1994) 
BIS Working Paper No 23 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID868431_code543654.pdf?abstractid=868431&mir
id=1> accessed 3 September 2014. This paper explores the analytical questions concerned with the case 
for and against closer integration between different financial activities and the implications for prudential 
regulation and supervision. Their intention was to provide a general framework and cross-country 
background against which the interrelations between the various policy issues can be highlighted. This is 
juxtaposed against the interrelationship between the various regulatory authorities and the complexities in 
prudential regulation. 
42  Michael Klein and Ignacio Mas, ‘A Note on Macro-financial Implications of Mobile Money Schemes’ 
(2012) Frankfurt School Working Paper No 188 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2033816_code829576.pdf?abstractid=2033816&
mirid=1> accessed 3 September 2014. See also Amir Herzberg, ‘Payments and Banking with Mobile 
Personal Devices’ (2003) 46 Communications of the ACM 53. 
43 Dale F Gray, Robert C Merton and Zvi Bodie, A New Framework for Analyzing and Managing 
Macrofinancial Risks of an Economy (2006) Working Paper No 07-026 
<http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/download.aspx?name=07-026.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
44 Ibid, at 39. 31 per cent of Kenya’s GDP is spent through mobile phones; MNOs are clearly ‘Too 
Important To Fail’.  
45 Financial Stability Report, ‘Kenya 2012’ (2012) 47 
<https://www.centralbank.go.ke/images/docs/kfs/financial%20stability%20report%202012.pdf> 
accessed 3 September 2014.  
46 Equity Bank is one such bank that has developed this impression on the low income segments of 
Kenya’s population. 
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amounts put substantial strain on supervisory resources but pose limited systemic risk.’ 
The proliferation of mobile payments not only imposes supervisory and oversight 
challenges47 due to the large population now entering the formal financial system, but 
issues such as consumer protection arise due to the lack of sophistication among low 
income consumers, whose perception of risk is low combined with  the lack of a system 
wide financial consumer protection safety net.48   
The lessons of the Global Financial Crisis (2007–2009) apply here.49 The crisis 
brought to light the changes and reforms any financial system requires for stability50 in 
the face of rapid financial innovation51 or technological advancements. Prolonged 
macroeconomic stability had resulted in highly complex and interconnected systems that 
regulators inadequately understood. Therefore, as payments systems expose the financial 
systems to risks, they warrant an appropriate regulatory approach such that they are able 
to reduce vulnerabilities in the banking and financial systems.52 The existing regulatory 
                                                 
47 Chapter 4 discusses these challenges.  
48 Consumer Understanding of Financial Risk (FSA Consumer Reach 2004)33. Information asymmetries 
contribute to the justification for consumer protection. See Olga Morawczynski and Mark Pickens, ‘Poor 
People using Mobile Financial Services: Observations on Customer Usage and Impact from M-PESA.’ 
(2009) <http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/09/11/000333037_2009091
1001822/Rendered/PDF/503060BRI0Box31MPESA1Brief01PUBLIC1.pdf> accessed 3 September 
2014.  
49 This is the period between 2007 and 2009, as defined in John Raymond LaBrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-
Caminal and Dalvinder Singh, Financial Crisis Containment and government Guarantees (Edward Elgar 2013). See 
also Anup Shah, ‘Global Financial Crisis’ (2013) 25 Global IssuesKevin Rudd, ‘The Global Financial Crisis’ 
(2009) The Monthly <http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2009/february/1319602475/kevin-
rudd/global-financial-crisis> accessed 3 September 2014.  
50 Prassana Gai,  Systemic Risk The Dynamics Of Modern Financial Systems (OUP 2013); also, Prasanna Gai and 
Sujit Kapadia, ‘Contagion in Financial Networks’ (2007) 
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/miller/esrcproffellows/summer2007
/programme2/prasanna_gai_-_contagioninfinancialnetworks.pdf>  accessed 3 September 2014.  
51 Dan Awrey 'Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets' (2012) 2(2) 
Harvard Business Law Review 235; Dan Awrey, 'Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-based 
Alternative?' (2011) 5(2) Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law 273, although this 
term is open to interpretation, however; see William Silber, Towards a Theory of Financial Innovation (Lexington 
Books 1975). 
52 Piet Clement, ‘The Term “Macroprudential”: Origins And Evolution’ (2010) 6 BIS Quarterly Review 59; 
Claudio Borio And Christopher J Green, ‘Implementing The Macroprudential Approach To Financial 
Regulation And Supervision’ Ben Bernanke, 'Implementing A Macroprudential Approach To Supervision 
And Regulation' (2011) <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.pdf> 
accessed 3 September 2014.  
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framework cannot characterise the abrupt non-linear adjustments and systemic effects 
that may exist at the payments systems level,53 as the research on new macroprudential 
frameworks that screens instruments,54 markets, and institutions,55 reflects.  
It should recognise the potential for instability arising from the financial system, 
whether from what Claudio (2009) calls ‘excessiveness in cycles’56 or from spill overs 
through interconnectedness.  Additionally, in accordance with a study from the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), two types of externalities drive systemic risk: joint failures 
of institutions and the fact that the undercurrents of the financial system and of the real 
economy are mutually reinforcing. The former reflects institutions’ common exposures 
at a single point in time, either through, for example, the mobile payments agents, or 
through procyclicality.57 The latter increases the amplitude of booms and busts and 
undermines stability in both the financial sector and the real economy. The research also 
shows that each financial institution’s marginal contribution to systemic risk correlates 
                                                 
53 IMF, ‘Singapore: Financial System Stability Assessment,  including Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes on  the following topics: Banking Supervision, Insurance Regulation,  Securities 
Regulation, Payment and Settlement Systems,  Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency,  and Anti-
Money Laundering’ (2004) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04104.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014; ‘Trade-offs and Synergies between Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability’ (7 Aug. 
2014) 
<http://www.adbi.org/workingpaper/2010/12/21/4272.financial.inclusion.stability.policy.issues/tradeof
fs.and.synergies.between.financial.inclusion stability/> accessed 3 September 2014.  
54 Alfred Hannig and Stefan Jansen, ‘Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability: Current Policy Issues’ 
(2010) ADBI Working Paper Series, No 259 
<http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.12.21.wp259.financial.inclusion.stability.policy.issues.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
55 Stijn Claessens, Swati R Ghosh and Roxana Mihet, ‘Macro Prudential Policies to Mitigate Financial 
Vulnerabilities in Emerging Markets’ (2014) 155 
<http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Poverty%20documents/EMERGIN
G_WB_CH05_155-178.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
56 Claudio E Borio and Mathias Drehmann, 'Towards An Operational Framework For Financial Stability: 
"Fuzzy" Measurement And Its Consequences' (2009) Working Paper No 284 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/work284.htm> accessed 3 September 2014.  
57 Procyclicality refers to the tendency of financial variables to fluctuate around a trend during the economic 
cycle. Increased procyclicality, thus, simply means fluctuations with broader amplitude such as the 
fluctuation of gross domestic products. Jean-Pierre Landau, Procyclicality: What It Means And What Could 
Be Done (2009) Also see, Claudio Borio, Craig Furfine and Philip Lowe, ‘Procyclicality of the Financial 
System and Financial Stability: Issues and Policy Options’ BIS papers 1 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap01a.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014, which explains that 
procyclicality refers to the tendency of financial variables to fluctuate around a trend during the economic 
cycle. 
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with its size in a nonlinear way. Therefore, smaller institutions contribute 
disproportionately less risk than larger institutions.58 Since no regulatory body oversees 
or supervises small institutions’ activities, especially in Kenya as a result of a fragmented 
regulatory authority, the effects are offset causing small institutions to pose certain unique 
risks that make consumers vulnerable. 
To illuminate these points, I will first construct a contextual framework for the 
placement of payments systems in the overall financial infrastructure in Kenya and then 
examine the inherent risks59 that they present to the financial system, which the regulatory 
approach and framework that Kenya has adopted since the inception of mobile payments 
does not adequately address. I will discuss the preconditions of a safe and sound payment 
system, which a financial regulator should safeguard, exploring the unique risks that 
mobile payments systems present through a multi-layered analysis of the risk exposures 
at every level of the mobile payment from the MNOs to the banks to the agents to the 
consumers, where these risks impinge on the financial stability and integrity60 of Kenya’s 
financial system.  An appropriate regulatory framework for mobile payments will involve 
balancing different objectives such as stability and financial integrity and the protection 
of consumers.  
3.2. Kenya’s Payment System Structure: An Overview 
 
Kenya has a large wholesale and retail value payment system, where value is 
transferred via the Real Time Gross Settlement System (hereafter RTGS). The Kenya 
                                                 
58 Alfred Hannig and Stefan Jansen, ‘Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability: Current Policy Issues’ 
(2010) ADBI Working Paper Series, No 259 
<http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.12.21.wp259.financial.inclusion.stability.policy.issues.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
59 The probability of a loss arising out of circumstances or existing in an environment in the absence of any 
action to control or modify the circumstances.  
60 This thesis uses market integrity narrowly, to encompass anti-money laundering initiatives and efforts to 
counter the financing of terrorism where a broader concept would also cover transparency and government 
elements.  
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Electronic Payment and Settlement System (hereafter KEPSS) was launched in July 2005 
and the Government Domestic Debt Central Securities Depository, where the operation 
of other securities settlement systems occurs.61 All these are under the greater ambit of 
the Automated Clearing House (ACH) which handles retail-based payments. 
Under the RTGS system, both the processing and the final settlement of funds 
transfers’ instructions take place continuously (i.e. in real time) from one bank to another, 
on a transaction-by-transaction basis, assuming the sending participant has sufficient 
covering balance or credit (settlement limit). The payment is taken as final and 
irrevocable. This mitigates systemic settlement risk inherent in large value net 
settlements,62  but a bank’s obligations can accumulate during the day if it doesn’t have 
the funds or credit capacity to make its payments instantly. Therefore if a large number 
and value of transfers are delayed, the initial impact could resemble that of a settlement 
failure.  
No statutory power regulates mobile payments,63 but the Central Bank Act (CBK 
Act)64 as amended in 1996 gave the National Payment System Division (NSPD) of the 
CBK certain implicit powers to oversee and regulate the payments systems to safeguard 
the integrity, effectiveness, efficiency, and security of the payments system. NPSD 
conducts periodic examinations relating to system integrity and the technical and risk 
                                                 
61 Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Presentation to the Board of Directors of Domestic Regulators July 2009’ (2009) 
<http://goo.gl/6cK6D> accessed 3 September 2014.  
62 Kenya Electronic Payment and Settlement System (KEPSS) 
<https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/2012-09-21-11-44-41/kepss> accessed 3 September 2014.   
63 The National Payments System Act was enacted in 2013, but the Act is not fully operational as of this 
writing. Payment Systems in Kenya 2003 page 1Central Bank Publication, although the CBK published a 
framework and strategy document on the payment system in 2013 that mooted a draft National Payment 
System Bill. In the absence of any payment laws, the Payment Systems Division has the authority to ask for 
information from non-bank payment service providers, but it does not have the power to inspect them. 
The National Payments System Act was enacted in 2013, but the Act is not fully operational as of this 
writing.  
64 The CBK considers oversight of payment systems to be one of its core functions. CBK (2009c) Section 
(4). 
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management infrastructure (including back-up facilities) of payment systems.65 This 
covers both large value (wholesale) and retail value payment systems including the bank’s 
own internal systems.66 It therefore subscribes to the BIS’ Core Principles for Systemically 
Important Payment Systems (hereafter CPSIPS) and deals with system registrations; 
system assessments; regulations and incentives; policy dialogue; monitoring; analysis and 
surveys; as well as contact with market players.  
 
3.3. The Need for an Appropriate Regulatory Approach through the Examination 
of the Pre-Conditions to a Safe And Sound Payment System 
 
 
A sound payment system requires sound and effective regulation and supervision. As it 
protects and maintains the confidence of the stakeholders – the MNOs, the agents, and 
the consumers – and therefore plays an effective role in the overall economic 
development.  The safeguarding and stability of the financial system should be the focus 
of Kenya’s regulatory authorities. This includes the market infrastructure, which would 
strengthen the resilience of individual financial institutions. This would sustain the ability 
of Central Banks to regulate and supervise financial institutions in a periodic manner 
through the promotion of responsible fair dealings in the interest of consumers all in 
regard to financial stability. 67 
                                                 
65 National Payments Systems Framework (August 2004) 
<http://www.docstoc.com/docs/83536188/nps_framework> accessed 3 September 2014. This involves 
requisitioning selected information from system participants or through regular off-site data reporting by 
participants and system operators and onsite inspections or online monitoring of real time payment and 
settlement flows and of risk levels across the payment systems.  
66 The Kenyan Payment System consists of Electronic Payment Systems, ATM networks (maintained by 
large banks), KenSwitch (maintained by some small and medium banks), PESA point (maintained by a 
private provider linked to one commercial bank), Remittances (commercial banks licensed to send/receive 
domestic/foreign remittances), the Post Office Savings Bank (receives foreign remittances), Western Union 
(uses agents) sends and receives. 
67 ‘Safeguarding the Stability of the Financial System’ 
<http://www.bnm.gov.my/files/publication/fsbp/en/06_Safeguarding_the_Stability_Financial_System.
pdf> accessed 18 September 2014. 
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This requires taking key trends affecting the financial landscape into consideration, 
including the inherent risks in the payments system and the particular risks of a mobile 
payments system.  The increasing size and complexity of the institutions involved in the 
mobile payment systems in Kenya, particularly MNOs, where there are higher levels of 
financial services innovation, complicates the task.  
  
As mobile financial services in general continue to evolve and develop towards even more 
convergence, the legal standing and accountability of MNOs must be enshrined in law. 
Kenya must establish a competitive and vibrant operating environment that protects the 
interests of consumers, who are the most vulnerable stakeholders, through 
reconceptualising the greater role of development financial institutions (DFIs) in financial 
inclusion.68 Furthermore, addressing potential risks to financial stability and market 
integrity through timely and appropriate regulatory measures will protect the entire 
system. Whether this calls for raising the standards of corporate governance, risk 
management, and control functions or through imposing certain requirements on MNOs, 
a safe and sound payment system will eventually lead to a safe and sound financial system.  
 
3.3.1. Relevance to Stability and Development: Financial Inclusion, Stability and 
Integrity A Nexus.   
 
 
Financial inclusion aims at drawing the unbanked population into the formal 
financial system, giving those who are excluded the opportunity to access financial 
                                                 
68 Ibid.  
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services ranging from savings, payments, and transfers to credit and insurance.69 While 
finance contributes to economic development and poverty reduction,70 financial sector 
policies in developing countries have now evolved over the past decades to encourage 
the offering of financial services to the poor, and microfinance institutions, credit unions, 
and savings cooperatives have made considerable progress in the last two decades.71 This 
has caused the absolute number of savings accounts worldwide to exceed the global 
population. However, half of the world’s adult population—2.5 billion people—has no 
access to savings accounts or other formal financial services.72 Both voluntary exclusion 
and unfavourable risk-return characteristics may preclude a household or a small firm, 
despite unrestrained access, from using one or more of the services.73  
                                                 
69 Alfred Hannig and Stefan Jansen, ‘Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability: Current Policy Issues’ 
(2010) ADBI Working Paper Series, No 259 
<http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.12.21.wp259.financial.inclusion.stability.policy.issues.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014; Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Maria S Martinez Peria, ‘Banking Services for 
Everyone? Barriers to Bank Access and Use Around the World’ (2008) 22(3) World Bank Economic Review 
397–430 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1318112> accessed 3 September 2014; 
John Caskey, Clemente Duran and Tova M Solo, ‘The Urban Unbanked in Mexico and the United States’ 
(2006) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 3835 <http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/01/26/000016406_2006012
6162730/Rendered/PDF/wps3835.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. 
70 Alberto Chaia et al, ‘Half the World is Unbanked’ (2011) 
<http://financialaccess.org/sites/default/files/110109%20HalfUnbanked_0.pdf> accessed 3 September 
2014;   Also, Tushar K Das, ‘Financial Inclusion and Regulation in India’ (2012) 
<http://eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/Document/1306/FIRI2.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
71 Stijn Claessens, ‘Access to Financial Services: A Review of the Issues and Public Policy Objectives’ (2006) 
21(2) World Bank Research Observer 207–240 <http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/05/15/000090341_20050515132903/
Rendered/INDEX/wps3589.txt> accessed 3 September 2014 ; Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Thorsten Beck and 
Patrick Honohan, Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access (World Book Publications 2008) 
<http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Finance_for_All.html?id=GYMP9miaK5cC> accessed 3 
September 2014; Gary Dymski and Pamela Friedman, ‘Banking the Unbanked: Helping Low-Income 
Families Build Financial Assets’ (2005) <http://text.123doc.vn/document/1148313-banking-the-
unbanked-helping-low-income-families-build-financial-assets-pptx.htm> accessed 3 September 2014; 
Deon Glajchen, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Mobile Phone-Based Payment Services in the United States 
and South Africa’ (PhD Dissertation, Northcentral University, 2011). 
72 Alberto Alberto Chaia et al, ‘Half the World is Unbanked’ (2011) 
<http://financialaccess.org/sites/default/files/110109%20HalfUnbanked_0.pdf> accessed 3 September 
2014.   
73 Alfred Hannig, and Jansen Stefan (n 1 Chapter 1); Gary Dymski, ‘Banking Strategy and Financial 
Exclusion: Tracing the Pathways of Globalization’ (2005) 31 Revista de Economia, 1–29, 107–143 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=901834> accessed 3 September 2014. FDIC, 
‘FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households December 2009’ (2009) 
<http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2009/executive_summary.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014; 
FDIC, ‘FDIC Advisory Committee on Economic Inclusion: Strategic Plan’ (2010) 
<http://www.fdic.gov/about/comein/finalPlan.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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This exclusion does not necessarily warrant policy intervention, but policy 
initiatives should aim to correct market failures and to eliminate non-market barriers that 
smaller actors encounter.74  
As a policy objective, financial services to the unbanked has piqued the interests 
of academics, governments, practitioners and policy-makers alike. Building inclusive 
financial systems identifies the need to integrate the unbanked and financially excluded 
into formal financial systems, but also requires that financial institutions should reach out 
to those who are excluded.75 As a result, countries like Kenya have embraced financial 
inclusion ‘as an important policy goal that complements the traditional pillars of monetary 
and financial stability, as well as other regulatory objectives such as consumer protection 
and financial integrity.’ 76 
Not all policy reflects scholars’ changing views on household behaviour with 
respect to financial services. Low-income households rely on various financial 
instruments in their daily management of cash flows and risks, and in their efforts to build 
assets through saving.77 Studies that ask poor households to keep financial diaries78 show 
that a key challenge faced by low-income household is the irregularity of their cash flows.79 
                                                 
74 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Thorsten Beck and Patrick Honohan, Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding 
Access (World Book Publications 2008) 
<http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Finance_for_All.html?id=GYMP9miaK5cC> accessed 3 
September 2014; Gary Dymski and Pamela Friedman, ‘Banking the Unbanked: Helping Low-Income 
Families Build Financial Assets’ (2005) <http://text.123doc.vn/document/1148313-banking-the-
unbanked-helping-low-income-families-build-financial-assets-pptx.htm> accessed 3 September 2014; 
Deon Glajchen, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Mobile Phone-Based Payment Services in the United States 
and South Africa’ (PhD Dissertation, Northcentral University, 2011); Alfred Hannig and Stefan Jansen, 
‘Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability: Current Policy Issues’ (2010) ADBI Working Paper Series, No 
259 <http://www.adbi.org/files/2010.12.21.wp259.financial.inclusion.stability.policy.issues.pdf> 
accessed 3 September 2014. 
75 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Thorsten Beck and Patrick Honohan, Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding 
Access (World Book Publications 2008. 
76 What Is Financial Inclusion? – Asian Development Bank Institute, <http://www.adbi.org/working-
paper/2010/12/21/4272.financial.inclusion.stability.policy.issues/what.is.financial.inclusion/> (accessed 
September 24, 2014. 
77 Tushar K Das, ‘Financial Inclusion and Regulation in India’ (2012) 
<http://eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/Document/1306/FIRI2.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
78 Ibid.  
79 ‘The Financial Diaries project is a year-long household survey that examines financial management in 
poor households’ in South Africa. Data are ‘captured into a specially designed Access Database that 
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The international poverty line of $2 a day, which is an average, demonstrates a highly 
variable flow that requires dynamic management to smooth consumption and reduce 
vulnerability to various shocks, such as health crises, political instability, as well as the 
ability to cope with major life cycle events.80 Due to the influence of asymmetric 
information between financial institutions and consumers, shocks to the system that 
dramatically worsen information problems cause financial instability because financial 
intermediation between savings and productive investment opportunities breaks down.81 
A deteriorating financial sector or non-financial balance sheets in particular, threaten 
financial inclusion.82 Consequently, specialised microfinance institutions are most prone 
to these risks, as are large public banks that have developed a significant footprint in the 
low-income segments.83 
Regulators have paid more attention to issues of consumer protection, especially 
with respect to low-income clients, and to reputational risks as a result of the large number 
of customers who are involved if a particular institution fails, rather than the overall 
macroeconomic effects that this proliferation of mobile payments have on the whole 
financial system.  In Kenya’s context, the mobile payments system increases the risk as 
large numbers of clients that frequently transact small amounts represent an under 
managed source of risk. While others point out that these groups represent a nominal 
share of overall financial sector resources, in Kenya, as information technology 
                                                 
produces customised diary questionnaires for each household, as well as a system of reports that allows for 
continuous data surveillance.’ Asian Development Bank. The overall aim of the project, which is funded 
by the Fin Mark Trust, the Ford Foundation, and the Micro Finance Regulatory Council, is to improve 
understanding of how poor people manage their finances. See <www.financialdiaries.com>.   
80 Tushar K Das, ‘Financial Inclusion and Regulation in India’ (2012) 
<http://eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/Document/1306/FIRI2.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. 
81 Andrew Crockett, ‘Market Discipline and Financial Stability’ (2002) 26 Journal of Banking & Finance 
977. General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements and Chairman of the Financial Stability 
Forum, at the Banks and Systemic Risk Conference, Bank of England, London, 23–25 May 
2001<http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp010523.htm> accessed 3 September 2014. 
82 Andrew Crockett, ‘Market Discipline and Financial Stability’ (2002) 26 Journal of Banking & Finance 
977. 
83 UN Capital Development Fund (2006). 
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proliferates, the supervisory challenges of large numbers of transactions become 
unmanageable. These challenges strain governments’ resources; in addition the share of 
the revenue of the mobile payments market has increased over time.  
The BIS, for example, emphasises the importance of joint failures of institutions 
and the reinforcing nature of the financial system and the real economy. They also argue 
that small financial institutions contribute a disproportionately small risk to the overall 
system, and that since mobile payments only involve small institutions, the system cannot 
pose a large risk to Kenya’s economy. However, Safaricom, Kenya’s largest MNO, cannot 
be regarded as a small institution given its dominance of the mobile payments market84 
as its importance to the mobile payments system makes it ‘too-important-to fail’.85 This 
chapter uses the term ‘too important to fail’ instead of ‘too big to fail’ to emphasise that 
the size of a bank, typically measured by the value of its assets, does not capture other 
important reasons why its failure might create havoc. Those reasons include its 
connections with other financial institutions (interconnectedness), the difficulty of its 
resolution (complexity), and a lack of substitutes for the services it provides.Like a large 
bank, it poses systemic risk exposure.   
Values that are transferred through mobile payments, which may be in transit on 
deposit86 through trustee accounts,87 have shifted the dynamics of distributed risk. This is 
through conversion of consumer risk into a concentrated systemic risk.88  This has caused 
regulators globally to react in disparate ways to this risk, leading to inconsistent operating 
                                                 
84 See Chapter 2 Section Enabling Environment for Mobile Money adoption. Pg 46 
85 See FSB (2010). <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2014/01/pdf/c3.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014. The size, interconnectedness, complexity, and no substitutability of SIBs are by 
themselves sources of externalities in the absence of any government protection, as the risks imposed by 
SIBs to the economy are not well reflected in the equity or bond prices of those institutions. 
86 The characterization of deposits has been expounded in Chapter 4.4.5.4. The Definition and Placement 
of Agents 184. 
87 Trustee accounts have been explained in the context of mobile payments in Chapter 4. 
88 Mobile-Financial.com, ‘Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix’ (2010) <http://mobile-
financial.com/blog/mobile-financial-services-risk-matrix> accessed 3 September 2014. 
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environments for MNOs. This is not to say that a global standard should be applied, since 
the success of mobile payments varies from country to country as has been evidenced. 
However, a lack of standardisation means that inconsistencies in the operating 
environment place limits on the range of services that can be provided, which are not 
predicated on underlying risks.89 The increasing number of customers who use mobile 
payments and transact small values creates risks at institutional levels; though small, their 
volumes are ever increasing which requires action by the CBK to implement consumer 
protection issues.  
Although as mentioned, financial inclusion is a lynchpin for financial integrity,90 
financial inclusion also raises concerns about market integrity. The implementation of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards in relation to Kenya’s mobile payments 
system requires a risk-based approach similar to that employed by regulators of 
institutions serving low-income clients, because of the direct correlation between financial 
inclusion and financial integrity. However, these strict requirements, such as customer 
due diligence through restrictive Know Your Customer (KYC) rules may limit the 
outreach potential.  National regulations could either exclude people who cannot provide 
certain proofs of identity or impose restrictive costs of compliance on financial 
institutions.91 In Kenya, KYC rules have not presented any real challenge, at least at the 
adoption level,92 but mobile payments have created an accessible avenue for money 
laundering and other financial crimes. They provide a convenient and swift means to 
transfer illicit funds that law enforcement cannot contain and regulators cannot mitigate.  
                                                 
89 Ibid.  
90 Claire Alexandre and Lynn Chang Eisenhart, ‘Mobile Money as an Engine of Financial Inclusion and 
Lynchpin of Financial Integrity’ (2013) 8 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 285 
<http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/1200> accessed 3 September 2014. 
91 Financial Action Task Force, Annual Report (2008) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2008%202009%20ENG.pdf> accessed 10 September 2014.  
92 Chapter 2 discusses the enabling environment for mobile payments where the National Identification 
Cards issued by the government encouraged the adoption of mobile payments and ensure KYC rules were 
observed.  
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Financial inclusion through mobile payments is an ideal goal for developing 
countries.  The imposition of unique risks threatens the development of a more inclusive 
financial service as this indicates one of the post-financial inclusion issues. Furthermore, 
stability and integrity as a broad concept encompasses different aspects of finance and 
the financial system infrastructure, institutions and markets, where all actors, private and 
public, contribute optimal components of the financial system which includes the legal 
frameworks for financial regulation, supervision and surveillance.93  Ensuring stability, 
integrity, and a safe and sound payment system requires an understanding of these 
inherent payment system risks. 
 
3.4. Inherent Payments System Risks: A Taxonomy of Risks 
Payments systems are coming under increased regulation,94 reflecting governments’ 
Increasing recognition of the stability risks95 inherent in payment systems,96 through the 
acknowledgement that markets fail to protect consumer participants in the payment 
system97 and the need to facilitate access to payments in the interests of increased 
competition, particularly in retail payments.98 All payments systems raise a similar set of 
risks, and regulatory agencies tend to address them in particular ways.99  The payments 
                                                 
93IMF, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (2004) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04187.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. 
94 The Financial Conduct Authority calls for inputs on payments systems regulation 
<http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/psr-call-for-inputs.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. Also see 
the FCA Thematic review ‘Mobile Banking and Payments.’ FCA, ‘TR13/6 – Mobile Banking and Payments’ 
(2013) <http://www.fca.org.uk/news/tr13-6-mobile-banking-and-payments> accessed 3 September 
2014. 
95 Olivier De Bandt and Philipp Hartmann, 'Systemic Risk: A Survey' (2000) ECB Working Paper No 35 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=258430> accessed 3 September 2014.  
96 Dirk Schoenmaker, Peter M Garber and David Folkerts-Landau, ‘The Reform of Wholesale Payment 
Systems and its Impact on Financial Markets’ (1996) IMF Working Papers 96/37 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=882937> accessed 3 September 2014; David 
Folkerts-Landau, ‘Systemic Financial Risk in Payment Systems’ (1990) IMF Working Paper No 90/65 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=884911> accessed 3 September 2014. 
97 Andrew Crockett, ‘Market Discipline and Financial Stability’ (2002) 26 Journal of Banking & Finance 
977. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Benjamin Geva, Collections and Payment Transactions: Comparative Study of Legal Aspects (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2001). 
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system is one of the first places where financial stress is manifested, when firms in 
financial difficulty fail to meet their payment obligations.100 Similarly, disruptions in the 
payments system result in disruptions in aggregate economic activity. Instability in the 
payments system is more threatening than instability in deposits, because the large volume 
of mobile payments occurring daily, the speedy movement of the funds, and the 
unfamiliarity with the clearing process causes concern.101 
 
 
Payment systems, due to their nature, involve limited possible legal and regulatory 
approaches.102 Any form of payment involves some risk to one or more of the participants 
in the payment.103 Risks come about primarily because many payments involve implicit or 
explicit extension of credit,  where a lag occurs between the occurrence of a transaction 
and the time that settlement occurs104 and because multiple parties105  handle the payment 
instruments,106 any of whom could fail to perform their function and execute funds 
delivery.107 In other words, the risks in the payment system arise from institutional inter-
dependency in the payment process that creates different risks among parties in the 
payments system and from timing delays between the transaction and the final settlement 
of the associated payment. The central bank has consequently assumed these roles for 
the relevant currency, which transfers funds between accounts held within it by the 
                                                 
100 Bruce J Summers, The Payment System: Design, Management, And Supervision (International Monetary Fund 
1994). 
101 Darryl Biggar, ‘An Increasing Role for Competition in the Regulation of Banks’ (2005) 
<http://123doc.vn/document/1257133-an-increasing-role-for-competition-in-the-regulation-of-banks-
doc.htm> accessed 3 September 2014.  
102 Rhys Bollen, ‘Best Practice In The Regulation Of Payment Services’ (2010) 
<http://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/eserv/rmit:7919/RhysBollen.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
103 Ibid.  
104 Allen N Berger, Diana Hancock and Jeffrey C Marquardt, ‘A Framework for Analyzing Efficiency, Risks, 
Costs, and Innovations in the Payments System’ (1996) 28(4) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 696.  
105 In this case, the various mobile payments system stakeholders and actors.  
106 In this case, mobile phone devices are payment instruments.  
107 Jeffrey C Marquardt, ‘Payment System Policy Issues and Analysis’ The Payment System: Design, 
Management, and Supervision. 
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commercial banks, known as ‘settlement in central bank money’ which guarantees 
unconditional and irrevocable settlement. Therefore, the payment lag and involvement of 
multiple parties distinguishes between the risks borne in the payment process itself and 
other underlying risks in the financial system. A payment system will provide 
unsatisfactory risk protection if it is deficient in security, reliability, timeliness, certainty 
of value, or accuracy. Increasing the values and volumes of payment transactions tests 
these measures of the robustness of a payment system, as do long payment lags.108  
Inappropriate design may be exacerbating risk in the system. The volume of 
transactions per period, the average transaction value, the length of the payment cycles, 
and the payment system design constitute the main factors influencing the gravity of risks 
in payments and settlement transactions.109 Financial institutions in Kenya have 
increasingly argued that the payment system presents risk in one or more of these 
dimensions.110 The governor proudly reported that on 23 November 2011, Parliament 
had ‘finally’ passed the National Payments System Bill 2011. The bill is designed to 
regulate and supervise the payment systems and payment service providers in Kenya. 
In efforts to address the challenges, debates have centred on how financial 
institutions can ensure that risks are mitigated.111 They have also tended to focus on the 
role of the CBK as the sole regulator. Therefore regulations have not adequately 
addressed the new mobile payments system as a creator of risk; in this system there is 
often a lag between the time of a transaction and the settlement.112 Kenyans who have 
                                                 
108 Settlement periods or intraday delays.  
109 Maxwell J Fry, Payment Systems In Global Perspective (Routledge 2003) 13. 
110. ‘The bill will enable Kenya's payment system to comply with the Bank for International Settlement core 
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come to rely on this new payment system for their basic financial needs and for business 
purposes are at risk will be handled securely and efficiently.  
M-Pesa is a telecom-led113 model that offers full liquidity and security outside of 
the banking system, which demonstrates that a payments system can operate 
independently of a banking system,114 and offer liquidity and maturity transformation, 
which makes banks less critical for the financial system as a whole.115 Splitting off this 
public good aspect of banking—the payments and safe custody functions116—strengthens 
the system. However, M-Pesa still places its trust account in a bank. This highlights the 
interconnectedness between the MNOs and the banks. It further clarifies the nature of 
financial regulation in developing countries and sheds important light on the real sources 
of market failure and regulatory requirements in developed countries as well. Most 
economic transactions in market economies involve an exchange of goods, services, or 
securities for money where money largely consists of bank liabilities and, hence, the role 
of payments systems is to effect the transfer of bank liabilities among those who 
transact.117   
Economies depend on the systemic stability of the payments system,118 which in 
turn fuels the whole economy. As Kenya has modernised its payments systems,119 
                                                 
113 Where the telecommunications operator owns the customer.  
114 Michael Klein and Colin Mayer, ‘Mobile Banking and Financial Inclusion – The Regulatory Lesson’ 
(2011) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.5664 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1846305> accessed 3 September 2014.   
115 Douglas W Diamond and Raghuram G Rajan, 'Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: 
A Theory of Banking' (1999) NBER Working Paper No w7430 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=227588> accessed 3 September 2014.  
116 Klein and Mayer Supra note 115.  
117 The evolution of modern banking systems received strong impetus from the demand for an efficient 
mechanism to facilitate the payments flows needed to sustain a growing economy through the transfer of 
securities among buyers and sellers.  Ian Kessler and John Purcell, ‘Performance Related Pay: Objectives 
and Application’ (1988) 2 Human Resource Management Journal 16. 
118 Elisabeth Wentworth, ‘Direct Debits, Consumer Protection and Payment System Regulation – Issues of 
Policy and Reform’ (2002) 13 JBFLP 77 at 77; cf Jane Winn, ‘Symposium: Clash Of The Titans: Regulating 
The Competition Between Established And Emerging Electronic Payment Systems’ (1999) 14 Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 675 at 678 where the author breaks up the four risks into liquidity, finality, 
transaction risk and systemic risk. 
119 As discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.2.  
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economic activity and trade have increased in response to increased industry 
competition,120 and the convergence of the telecommunications industry with the 
financial system has spurred innovation to create inclusive retail payments systems such 
as mobile payments. The sheer size of the average daily values of the transactions of 
mobile payments121  has induced policy-makers, central banks, and researchers to give 
more attention to mobile payments system risks as well as to look at the ways in which 
their costs can be reduced and efficiency increased. The advent of new non-financial 
industry stakeholders,122 like MNOs and mobile payment agents, through other mobile 
financial services,123 has produced new threats and new opportunities for banking and 
monetary systems.  
Mobile payments systems have positioned developing countries to compete 
globally through their now inclusive nature; as a result the need for their analysis has 
increased.  This is particularly because overall economic performance hinges on the 
completion of transferred funds.124 This effectiveness establishes trust in the financial 
systems, particularly banking systems in developing countries where a lack of trust 
impedes access to financial services. These efforts face a potential trade-off between the 
safety and efficiency of a payment system125 as well as a trade-off between risk on the one 
hand and speed and cost on the other.  Therefore risk is defined by the BIS as ‘the 
possibility of something bad happening at some time in the future; a situation that could 
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2014.  
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be dangerous or have a bad result’. For payment systems it identifies ‘credit risk, liquidity 
risk, operational risk and systemic risk’.126  The failure of one participant in a financial 
market to settle its required obligation could potentially cause a chain reaction of 
settlement failures, which could have serious ramifications for the financial system. 
3.4.1. Taxonomy of Risks  
3.4.1.1. Systemic Risk 
 
Monetary authorities consider the prevention of systemic risk as their raison d’etre 
since systemic crises impose real costs.127 Payment systems do not use legal tender;128 
rather they use a complex fabric of claims on private organisations which usually 
distribute in the same manner as legal tender.  Regulators emphasise the safety and 
soundness of participants in the payment system due to the large amount of payments 
made, especially on the reliance of the creditworthiness of third parties. Contagion would 
occur through the failure at one point in the payment system, which would cause 
disruption throughout the economy, causing unforeseen losses for those parties who are 
not prepared.  If liquidity is affected, a contraction in the level of economic activity would 
occur.129 
Consequently, regulators should evaluate not just the degree to which participants 
in the payment system observe the system rules, but also the likelihood that a party will 
fail to meet its obligations to other parties. Further, regulators should require systems to 
have the ability to withstand the failure of a major participant; in this case, if an MNO, 
the platform and services provider winds up, or fails as an institution, the real costs would 
                                                 
126 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, ‘A Glossary of Terms used in Payments and Settlement 
Systems’ (2003) <https://www.bis.org/publ/cpss00b.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
127 Claudio EV Borio and Paul Van den Bergh, The Nature And Management Of Payment System Risks: An 
International Perspective (Bank For International Settlements Basle 1993) 30. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Jane Kaufman Winn, ‘Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition between established and emerging 
Electronic Payment Systems’ (1999) 14 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 675. 
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be to the economy through the ripple effects within the payment system itself.130 
Payments systems within banking systems, such as cheque clearing systems and fund 
transfers systems, have been subject to higher level of government oversight than 
payments systems outside the banking systems; as reliance on mobile payments systems 
increases, this poses a threat to the safety and soundness of a financial system.131 The pace 
of financial innovation has intensified with banks such as Equity Bank developing their 
own mobile payment system, the first bank-led mobile payment system of its kind in 
Kenya. This increases the interconnectedness of the payment system and therefore 
creates the risk of contagion in case of financial instability.132 
Central banks therefore have a particular interest in limiting systemic risk in 
Large-Value Funds Transfer Systems (LVTS), with a significantly higher aggregate value 
of transactions and exposures than those in retail funds transfer systems.133 However, 
various stakeholders in Kenya and institutions increasingly rely on retail funds transfers, 
increasing their systemic risk. The debate about regulation of and intervention in banking 
and payment systems has typically disregarded the presence of non-financial institutions 
such as MNOs in the system.134 
Similarly, strategic interaction between members of the payments system presents 
systemic risk. Agents operating within the system make strategic decisions in an 
environment of uncertainty. For instance, facing concerns over the solvency of another 
participant, a bank may withhold payments to that participant. This may, in turn, affect 
                                                 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid at 131. Also banks face similar risk in foreign currency markets; obligations denominated in different 
currencies will not be settled at the end of the trading day if there are significant differences between 
operating times of the payment systems. 
132 Borio and Van den Bergh (n 130).  
133 Yoris A Au and Robert J Kauffman, ‘The Economics of Mobile Payments: Understanding Stakeholder 
Issues for an Emerging Financial Technology Application’ (2008) 7 Electronic Commerce Research and 
Applications 141. ‘An Overview Real Time Gross Settlement Systems’ 
<http://www.sbp.org.pk/rtgs/ArticleRTGSGeneral.pdf> accessed 18 September 2014. 
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the participant’s bank’s capacity to settle its own obligations. The overall flow of liquidity 
within the system breaks down, imposing settlement delays and liquidity costs on other 
participants. If the whole payment system or a substantial part of it ceases to function, it 
poses a threat to the whole payment system, in which case the operability of the entire 
financial system and real economy could be at risk. 
Technology, bank, or market may cause systemic risk in a payment system—a 
major participant bank might experience an information systems insolvency, or the 
settlement of transactions might cause a crash in a market. As system volumes and degrees 
of integration increase, payment transactions become more centralised and international 
linkages increase, systemic risks pose an increasing threat.  The failure of the settlement 
institution itself also poses a systemic risk.135  The cost of a systemic disruption can be 
high. The domino effect can expand into an overall systemic crisis and endanger the 
operation of the entire financial system. Central banks have sought to limit systemic risk 
in Finland, Denmark, and Canada through such measures as the Core Principles for 
Systemically Important Payment Systems,136 and these measures have made the possibility 
of contagion caused by exposures in these systems relatively low.137 A study of Sweden 
                                                 
135Ágnes Lublo, ‘Topology of the Hungarian Large-value Transfer System’ (2006) MNB Occasional Papers 
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also finds these regulations effective, but points out that foreign exchange exposures 
nonetheless present systemic risk.138 
 3.4.1.2. Integrity Risk 
 
The contemporary convergence of mobile technology and financial services setting gives 
safeguarding the integrity of the payment system particular significance;139market 
participants and relevant regulatory authorities (such as central banks) should increase 
risk management procedures. Moreover, the spectacular growth of mobile payment 
transactions, which brings unbanked consumers in large numbers into the financial 
system, has highlighted the importance of regulation. Payments systems pose integrity 
risks; these channels permit money laundering, the financing of terrorism, and other 
financial risks, and risks grow as payments grow. Therefore regulation should promote 
accessible, efficient, and secure payment flows 
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has set international anti-money 
laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) standards to address financial 
crime, and an increasing number of countries have adopted them. Conversely, 
interpretations of these standards were negating initiatives to provide practical and 
appropriate financial services to consumers;140 for instance, due diligence requirements 
and the application of Know Your Customer (KYC) rules did not include the 
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unbanked.141 This therefore became an important developmental issue, as the impact of 
stringent AML/CTF requirements on financial inclusion strategies in developing 
countries became increasingly clear.142 The FATF responded with published reports on 
applying its Risk-Based Approach to new payment methods including mobile money,143 
and issued guidance on financial inclusion policies generally.144 Equally, the challenges 
posed by AML/CFT requirements for financial inclusion compelled the FATF Guidance 
to suggest that there exists a need to ‘take account of the nexus between financial integrity 
and financial inclusion and the cross-reinforcement between these two objectives’.145 
3.4.1.3. Liquidity Risk 
 
Liquidity is the ease with which an asset can be bought or sold for money. The ease of 
making a payment at a given time determines a payment system’s liquidity. Liquidity risk 
is a risk of a settlement not being realised at the desired time but at an unspecified time 
in the future, and the risk that such a failure will adversely affect the liquidity of the 
intended recipient. The providers of payment services absorb liquidity pressures by 
committing themselves to effect payments through particular channels,146 thereby 
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liquidity risk from the system by standing ready to supply the settlement medium without limit. This 
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concentrating liquidity risk. In the process they normally take on credit risks their 
customers would otherwise have absorbed—the risk that participants will not be paid in 
full for an outstanding claim. The difference between a credit and liquidity risk is that 
credit risk refers directly to the possibility of a loss, while liquidity risk refers to a cash-
flow shortfall.147 While the payer enters into a transaction with the intention of paying, 
insolvency or liquidity problems prevent the payment. Concentrating this risk, payment 
systems incur sizable intra-sectoral exposures, which raise the potential for chain defaults 
among payment intermediaries.  
 
A well-designed Large-Value Payment System (LVPS) usually allows users to access their 
funds when necessary and upon demand through intraday credit.148 Rapidity hinges on 
liquidity of the system. This is evident in liquid payment systems where payments can be 
made at any time, at the convenience of the payee, despite the payee’s current balance 
and the central bank.149  Unlimited intraday borrowing at little to no cost would eventually 
create a completely liquid system; it would also increase risk of credit default150 as users 
at one point may not be able to meet their obligations from the credit issuing institution 
causing a liquidity risk. This shows that the risk is highly dependent on how likely users 
are to default on their obligations.  Hence a compromise exists between liquidity and 
settlement risk, where default would not occur if there were no risks in the system.151 This 
would only occur if only risk-free transactions were enabled which is entirely impractical.  
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Liquidity is hence linked to the costs of payment delays and the cost of liquidity.152 These 
delays could be due to various reasons, such as banks delaying payments until adequate 
funds to settle have been received.153 Liquidity ensures that other users are able to receive 
their payments early, issue them late in order to save liquidity, while increasing costs to 
other users due to the delay.154 Where there are delays due to liquidity shortfalls, users 
would have to seek substitute and expensive payment options. Virtually every payments 
system involves liquidity risk, whether as a precipitating risk or the outcome of one of the 
other risks. Consequently, lack of liquidity always appears to be one of the principal 
precursors to and consequences of the inability of a participant to settle. However, 
settlement risk includes both credit and liquidity risks. One of the best ways of mitigating 
settlement risk is a safe and efficient payments system, based on internationally accepted 
law, standards and practices combined with the financial health (i.e., assets) of 
participating financial institutions.  
 
3.4.1.4. Operational Risk 
 
 
Operational risk is the ‘risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes’, peoples or systems and from external events.155 This refers to 
the possibility of costly errors in the information system, administration or organisation 
of a payment transfer system, or when outsiders misuse or access such a system without 
authorisation. Operational risk arises from the potential loss due to significant deficiencies 
                                                 
152 Ibid 
153 Ibid.  
154 Ibid. 
155 This definition of operational risk (BIS 1997a) seems too narrowly focused. The operational risk can 
also relate to human error, natural disasters, or system design flaws (Bank of Canada 1997a). Therefore, it 
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in the payment system’s reliability or integrity. According to the BIS, operational risks 
relate to computers and telecommunications systems break-downs;156 they may arise from 
attacks on the system or the payment instrument and from consumers’ misuse. 
Inadequate design or inadequate implementation can also be the reason for this risk,157 as 
can deficiencies in the information system, from internal control or from human error.158 
Even the most modern system incurs risk from human error.159 Failing to manage 
operational risk may create loss to the consumer, damages confidence in the financial 
system, and makes the system susceptible to financial crime.160 Operational risk can 
increase with new technology designed for faster payment services, increasing in 
complexity; and using open networks such as the internet, makes security and system 
design less stable.161  
Operational risk such as security risk, access risk, and authentication problems are 
potentially tremendous. The security of a payment system can be compromised externally 
or internally. An outsider, such as a hacker,162 operating through the internet to gain 
access, might retrieve and use the information on the system. Employees might also abuse 
the system to commit fraud. The system’s design, implementation, and maintenance also 
have a great impact on users as technology develops. As complexity and sophistication 
increase, users’ expectations increase. When interruptions and breakdowns occur in the 
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system, they can erode public confidence. With the rapid development in technology, 
retail payment service providers, be they financial institutions or non-financial 
institutions, may rely on external parties to implement, operate, or support their systems. 
While outsourcing can be beneficial in terms of expertise and cost, it can also increase 
operational risk.163 There are also concerns of inadequacy of due diligence, poor 
documentation of rights and responsibilities and weak ongoing management practices 
employed in conjunction with outsourcing activities. Some banks or industries have 
underestimated the cost savings from outsourcing and have unrealistic timetables and 
potential disruption of operations in association with outsourcing of system 
breakdowns.164 Because outsourcing depends on drafting quality contracts for work, it 
can also lead to impaired quality of performance of outsourced activities.165  
Prior to the ‘Basel II’166 reforms to banking supervision, operational risk was 
principally an enduring category for risks and uncertainties. These were seen as 
challenging to quantify, insure, and manage in orthodox ways.167  ICT systems and their 
manual support operations, as well as manual payment transfer processes, incur 
information system risks. As the use of cash declines in Kenya, information transfers 
come to dominate payment transfers. The heavy dependence on ICT systems in Kenya 
underlines the importance of these risks.  
Awareness of operational risk has increased sharply in recent years, partly due to 
the sizable losses a number of large ﬁnancial institutions have suffered over the past 
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decade as a result of weaknesses in internal controls. The ﬁnancial consequences of these 
rare events are extremely damaging. Further, a severe operational problem within a single 
financial institution can create problems for important parts of the ﬁnancial system 
architecture. When the Bank of New York (BONY) suffered a 28-hour computer 
malfunction that prevented it from carrying out its securities-related activities BONY had 
to borrow more than $20 billion from the Federal Reserve’s discount window. Due to 
BONY’s key role in clearing US dollar securities, other financial institutions were left with 
a corresponding excess of cash. Their efforts to dispose of this surplus temporarily drove 
the federal funds rate down by about 300 basis points.168 A similar situation arose 
following 11 September 2001 as problems contributed to liquidity disruptions and 
problems in securities markets in the United States. In another example, a fire in New 
York left the Federal Reserve Bank of New York without power for six days in 1990, 
which placed severe demands on operations and backup facilities.169 
Operational risk in the ﬁnancial infrastructure can also spill over into international 
markets. In April 2000, a software problem caused trading on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) to stop for almost eight hours. The London International Futures 
Exchange, which uses spot prices obtained from the LSE to value futures contracts, was 
also affected. A number of investors sold European shares, and prices on European 
exchanges fell, in response.170 
Nor were the events of 11 September 2001 restricted to US securities markets. 
The terrorist attacks ultimately affected the entire financial infrastructure in the United 
States and parts of the infrastructure in Canada and other countries. LVPS around the 
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world remained open during that period and the financial architecture functioned 
remarkably well under the circumstances, but the settlement of bond transactions in the 
United States was severely disrupted and dislocations in US payment systems contributed 
to severe liquidity problems at some institutions. Major stock exchanges in the United 
States and Canada closed. The two largest electronic interbank trading systems for foreign 
exchange transactions, Reuters and EBS, also closed for a short time due to an overload 
of backup systems. In Canada, domestic financial institutions’ concern that disruptions 
in US payment systems would prevent timely payments altered the flow of payments in 
the LVPS. On a smaller scale, operational problems of these types occur in Kenya when 
the payment system becomes unavailable. Customers lose access to their funds and 
payments cease. Network outage is very common in Kenya, either through the system 
breaking down or sabotage of the platform through which MNOs provide their services.  
As well as a problem that damages the ability of a stakeholder to  operate its 
business, or a direct or indirect loss from failed internal processes, persons, systems or 
external events, operational risk can also result from human error, natural disasters or 
system design flaws, which are not impossible.171 Therefore, operational risk refers to the 
reliability and integrity of the payment system with respect to the processing of payments. 
Any system malfunction because of information technology or mechanical failure, 
including unreliable electricity supply, or failures in the national communications 
infrastructure, presents operational risk. Mobile payments for instance, have the 
possibility of developing failures for various reasons, such as malware, privacy violations, 
and malicious applications, all of which present operational risks.172 
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Any system reliant on technology may experience technology failure. Reliable and 
safe payment systems depend on a legal framework and basic social infrastructure to ease 
these operational risks, and regulators and consumers alike should be concerned about 
operational risk.  
On 28 October 2012, Safaricom’s servers collapsed. This led to the suspension of 
M-PESA services. Coinciding with the end of the month, this crash caused disruption to 
the millions of Kenyans who operate outside of the normal banking system who 
depended on the service to pay bills at the end of the month. This crucial role in the lives 
of those at the bottom of the sector pyramid of Kenya’s financial services market calls 
for internal procedures or governmental intervention to mitigate operational risks.173 This 
risk is not limited to the unbanked. Retail stores such as supermarkets have seen a 
significant increase in transaction volumes because they allow customers to use 
Safaricom. Equity Bank174 is the second largest M-Pesa agent after Uchumi Supermarket,  
which, was the first Kenyan supermarket to include mobile payments in its point of sale 
solution.  The growth significantly since it became the leading M-Pesa agent in Kenya in 
terms of transaction volumes.  Additionally, suspension of the service hit both entities. 
These impacts call for better protection of Safaricom’s servers, or a more robust back-up 
server for the firm’s money transfer business. 
Regulators should also address operational risk related to human error, or 
problems with hardware, software, or communications systems that are crucial to 
settlement. A cash position manager’s mismanagement can cause a bank to face a shortage 
of funds. A bank’s computer system can break down, preventing a bank from sending 
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receiving payment orders to and from the payment system, and financial crimes, illicit 
activities, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks can all cause operational risk.  
Managing operational risk is intimately linked to security and business continuity. 
Reducing risk in these areas demands the implementation of coordinated and harmonised 
end-to-end procedures. Security and availability must therefore extend to all components, 
staff procedures, IT hardware and software, telecommunications, power, and cooling 
supply at the central system, at subcontractors, and at each participant in the system. Most 
systems insist on technical and process qualification tests before a participant can operate 
live.175 
The increased data collection associated with this transparency also poses a 
different species of operational risk. Mobile money users in Kenya are vulnerable to 
governmental or corporate abuse of the data generated by mobile transactions, as well as 
to cyber security attacks from outside. Privacy breaches and malware could completely 
erode users’ trust in the payment system, reversing adoption trends and eliminating 
potential gains.176  
Here again outsourcing poses a threat as unregulated third parties without clear 
lines of accountability and oversight undermine operational risk management. For 
instance Safaricom’s servers, are located abroad, through the UK-based company 
Vodafone, which operates the servers that support the MNO’s platform, and they are not 
subject to regulation in Kenya.177  
                                                 
175 Dominique Rambure and Alec Nacamuli, Payment Systems: From The Salt Mines To The Board  (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2008) 58. 
176 Uganda Law Commission Cautions on Mobile Money Regulation, <http://www.africa-uganda-
business-travel-guide.com/uganda-law-commission-cautions-on-mobile-money-regulation.html> 
accessed 3 September 2014. 
177 Nikolaos Zacharopoulos, ‘Money to go’ (2012) Financial Director Feature 
<http://www.financialdirector.co.uk/financial-director/feature/2140175/money> accessed 3 September 
2014.  
113 
 
Stakeholders, processes and technologies would have to be cautiously developed 
to make security an intrinsic element of all mobile payment systems.178 New laws will have 
to protect the system from financial crime by authorised users. Regulation should require 
each organisation involved in the chain of the transaction data to protect the data while 
in its custody. Two-factor authentication is one measure to provide effective identity 
protection for the consumer and higher identity assurance to the agent. Similarly, the 
merchant side should offer the same type of assurance to the consumer. 
These issues characterise a larger set of issues regarding reliability of identities and 
credentials for mobile payments. This shared transaction system is conducive to abuse by  
fraudsters using both technological and criminal attacks if regulators fail to establish the 
appropriate protection mechanisms and accountability controls throughout the mobile 
payment system. 
However, few mobile financial services are reaching scale as internal and external 
factors, which range from the level of ventures, business strategies and organisational 
structures and the level of mobile phone penetration and competition and other 
regulatory architecture, usually impinge the uptake of mobile payments.179 These factors 
though are determinate of a successful mobile payment system; regulation appears to 
impose the biggest challenge.180 
Operational risks, as I use the term, also include technology risk, security risk, and 
legal risk. Technology risk occurs when technological investments do not produce the 
                                                 
178 Ibid. 
179 Mobile Money – GSMA <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/MMU-Enabling-Regulatory-Solutions-di-Castri-2013.pdf> accessed 18 
September  2014. 
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expected cost savings in economies of scale and scope.181 Measures to increase payment 
system design and efficiency incur this risk. Security risk refers to illegal access to payment 
information or funds by a third party.182 Breaches can create financial loss, risks to privacy, 
fraud, or negligence. Legal risk exists when uncertainties or gaps in the legal framework 
for payments or payment systems impose liquidity or credit risk on participants.183 These 
uncertainties or misinterpretations have implications for legal enforceability of parties’ 
rights and obligations with regard to the payments.184 
 
3.4.1.5. Reputational Risk 
  
 
Public opinion is critical in ensuring that trust is maintained in any payment system. 
Reputational risk is the risk of significant negative public opinion.185 These opinions are 
a result of lasting negative public image or the loss of confidence in the overall operations 
of a financial institution or a non-bank that provides retail payments.  Although difficult 
to quantify, the loss of confidence in a system may exceed the direct associated financial 
loss. Reputational risk can arise for instance through unwanted publicity from a cyber-
attack on a financial institution’s online banking network, thus affecting the confidence 
of users of the financial institution’s payment system.186 Institutions have become 
                                                 
181 Anthony Saunders, ‘Banking and Commerce: An Overview of the Public Policy Issues’ (1994) 18 Journal 
of Banking & Finance 231. 
182 Mobile Money GSMA, <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
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September 2014.  
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<http://www.ruralfinance.org/fileadmin/templates/rflc/documents/1126266387218_A_risk_managem
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184 Canadian Payments Association, ‘A Guide to Risk in Payment Systems Owned and Operated by the 
CPA’ (2005) <http://www.cdnpay.ca/imis15/pdf/pdfs_publications/Risk_Guide.pdf> accessed 3 
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progressively aware of the significance of reputational risk.  For instance, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) ranked reputational risk as the largest risk they face, 
preceding both credit and operational risk.  However, almost two-thirds of those 
institutions surveyed failed to appreciate the existence of an appropriately resourced 
compliance function as a key mitigator of operational risk.187 
 
 
3.4.2 Summary of Risks 
 
In summation, payments systems present inherent risks, and the specific design 
of mobile payments have particular risks due to the use of mobile devices to access bank 
accounts, access stored value or prepaid products, and to buy products. This complex 
design presents new dimensions to the landscape of non-cash payments, where the 
MNO’s position in the payment arena has now shifted from being simply third party 
service providers to the lead, in direct contract with their users.  As such, they increasingly 
seek to provide payment services on their own.   
This complex design introduced an array of regulatory and legal issues, especially 
risks, as a result of the unorthodox roles played by the parties and the complexity of the 
legal relations in the market place. This would first require a proper understanding of the 
issues before a resolution is arrived at. The mobile payment mechanism operates and the 
actual role of each participant. Mobile payments do not represent a single system;188 rather 
multiple players and providers operate to make mobile payments possible.189 These 
                                                 
187 PriceWaterhouseCoopers in conjunction with the Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Compliance: A Gap in 
the Heart of Risk Management’ (2003) 
<http://www.sum2.us/images/PWCcompliancenadriskmgmt.pdf> 8. 
188 Chapter 2 discusses the mobile payment system stakeholders in detail.    
189 Multiple providers would come in if the Kenyan mobile payments scheme made interoperability 
possible. At present interoperability has been stalled due to the competitive market for MNOs.  
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players include MNOs, banks (which effect the payment on behalf of the debtor and 
remit the funds to the creditor), and a settlement agent that discharges the obligation. 
There are also various designs to the execution of mobile payments. For instance a 
payment failure using a messaging-based approach may not necessarily cast doubt upon 
a proximity provider.190 However, this separation of mobile payment failure from the 
larger financial system of the country presents distinctive risks.  Therefore, while other 
governments provide some level of insurance on bank deposits, in Kenya no standard 
exists requiring insurance for ‘deposits’ in mobile payment systems.191  
 
 
3.5. Unique Risks In Mobile Payment Systems: A Multi-layered Analysis  
 
 
This part of the chapter aims to identify the areas in which risks may arise in the 
mobile payments system. It aims to show the risks at the most basic, yet fundamental 
parts of the mobile money system, which, if left ignored, could lead to systemic, liquidity, 
and integrity risks.192 These risks affect all participants in the mobile payment system—
the MNOs, the banks, the agents, and the consumers. Examining Anti-Money 
Laundering (AML) issues and fraud reveals integrity risk, while examining technological 
standards that would be applicable to the MNOs either through standardisation or 
industry self-regulation reveals operational risk;193 and examining trust in the lower 
segment users of mobile payments, a result of either operational risk or integrity risk, 
                                                 
190 Jarkko Vesa, Mobile Services In The Networked Economy (IGI Global 2005). 
191 Paul Golding, Next Generation Wireless Applications: Creating Mobile Applications In A Web 2.0 And Mobile 
2.0 World (John Wiley & Sons 2008); Stijn Claessens, Thomas Glaessner and Daniela Klingebiel, ‘Electronic 
Finance: Reshaping the Financial Landscape Around the World’ (2002) 22 Journal of Financial Services 
Research 29. 
192 CGAP, ‘Agent Networks’ <http://www.cgap.org/topics/agent-networks> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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reveals reputational risk. Legal risk and integrity risks may be the most important risk 
categories for mobile payments.194  
The impact of each type of risk differs, especially in the context of new financial 
services. The actors in a given mobile payment transaction alter the degree of a particular 
risk; the type of electronic retail payment instrument used and the payment scheme also 
affects the degree of risk.195 This section will use a multi-layered approach to analyse the 
risk exposure at the different levels of the mobile payment system. It will critically assess 
these risks as presented by the Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix,196 a study carried 
out by the Kenya School of Monetary Studies, that contributed to the clarity of the 
systemic and consumer risks involved in mobile payments and the choices most usually 
obtainable for addressing those risks. The interconnection between the participants197 in 
mobile payments and their inherent risk exposures198 and obligations to each other is an 
important area to be examined. I highlight the risks at every level to reveal a cumulative 
effect of a precipitous loss of value of aggregate mobile wallet holdings, which is due not 
only to the complexity of mobile payments within the financial system but also to the 
cross-border context and the speed of these transactions.  
 This study, (Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix)199 identifies several 
transaction stages, any one of which, if compromised, could halt a transaction.200 This 
                                                 
194 These risks are identified as most important and even though these risks result from a single problem, 
several methods of remedy may be required to address each of the risks. 
195 For example, even if the payment instrument is electronic money, different degrees of risk exist, 
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196 This section is based on GSMA, ‘Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix’ (2010) <http://mobile-
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197 Ibid. 
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199 Mobile-Financial.com, ‘Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix’ (2010) 71 <http://mobile-
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Mobile 
 Financial Services Expansion’ (2010)  
<http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/ftc-host-workshop-mobile-
payments-and-their-impact-consumers-project-no.124808-561018-00012%C2%A0/561018-00012-
82712.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014; Mobile-Financial.com, ‘Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix’ 
118 
 
multi-layered analysis of the mobile payments system’s risks identifies how regulators can 
establish an appropriate regulatory framework while protecting the financial system as a 
whole and, more importantly, protect consumers. I identify these levels as the MNO level, 
bank level, agent level and the consumer level.  
 
3.5.1. Risks at the Mobile Network Operator Level 
 
An MNO is a telecommunications company that provides and extends the 
wireless network messaging functionality to provide payment services that enable 
customers to remit funds that are settled through its own established agent network.201 
Individual payment transactions occur entirely within the MNO and do not require the 
service user to have a bank account.202 The funds in transit—paid in by the remitter but 
not yet withdrawn by the recipient—are in principle on deposit 203 in a segregated account 
with one or more banks (Trust Account in Kenya), and so are within the formal financial 
system.204 Since the service provider is only executing client payment instructions and is 
not performing the credit evaluation and risk management function of a bank, these 
services do not, according to the Banking Act CAP 488,205  constitute ‘banking’. The Act 
describes ‘banking’ as accepting money from members of the public on deposit repayable 
on demand or at the expiry of a fixed period or after notice. It also describes it as accepting 
                                                 
(2010) 71 <http://mobile-financial.com/blog/mobile-financial-services-risk-matrix> accessed 3 
September 2014. 
201 Joy Malala, ‘Consumer Protection For Mobile Payments In Kenya : An Examination Of The Fragmented 
Legislation And The Complexities It Presents For Mobile Payments’ (2014) Kenya Bankers Association , 
Centre For Research On Financial Markets And Policy Working Paper Series No 7  
<http://www.kba.co.ke/workingpaperseries/img/pdf/Working%20Paper%20WPS-07-13.pdf> accessed 
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202 Mobile-Financial.com, ‘Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix’ (2010) 71 <http://mobile-
financial.com/blog/mobile-financial-services-risk-matrix> accessed 3 September 2014. The M-Pesa can 
operate with the mobile device serving as a store of value. Chapter 4 Part II.  
203 Joy Malala (2014) (n 208) 16. 
204 Joy Malala (2014) (n 208) 20. 
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money from members of the public on current account and payment on and acceptance 
of cheques; and the employing of money held on deposit or on current account, or any 
part of the money, by lending, investment, or in any other manner for the account and at 
the risk of the person so employing the money. Therefore, the MNOs in principle, seem 
to have avoided the level of regulatory oversight needed for the ‘deposits’ held in banks. 
The depository bank, then, has no involvement in or responsibility for payments through 
the MNO’s system. The MNOs provide the infrastructure and communications service, 
while providing agent oversight and quality control. However, this thesis questions 
whether this oversight and control is sufficient for mobile payments.  
Kenya’s best known MNO is Safaricom which, although it provides 
telecommunication services, is also a de facto mobile money issuer. As no law or regulation 
in Kenya establishes206 MNO as a distinct type of institution that provides financial 
services, Although the National Payment System Act 2011, describes non-financial 
institutions that provide payment services as ‘payment providers’ it still does not offer 
clarification as to their functions and the CBK’s mandate in their oversight. 
Safaricom could begin operating pursuant to a ‘No Objection’ letter agreement 
with the Central Bank of Kenya;207 it enjoys freedoms other financial services providers 
do not.208 Through M-Pesa, Safaricom operates under an MNO-led209 payment model, 
with the MNOs offering mobile payment services as a means to add value to their core 
                                                 
206  Joy Malala (2014) (n 208) 23.  
207 This refers to the Letter issued to Safaricom by the Central Bank of Kenya authorising its operations 
after a risk assessment was conducted in February 2007. Alliance for Financial Inclusion, ‘Enabling Mobile 
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communications services.210 This presents legal challenges that this study highlights in 
Chapter 4, and imposes risks to stakeholders.  The MNO incurs both operational risk and 
technological risks through its own system as a private institution, and through the 
introduction of funds that are not properly screened.  
For instance, the MNO or a subsidiary holds customer funds in a prepaid account. 
In some jurisdictions, even if the MNO assumes the bulk of the financial risk and 
operational responsibility of offering the service, a partner bank formally holds the 
licence. If the funds are post-paid, the MNO has effectively provided short-term credit 
or payment service to its customers, in the same way as some third-party payment card 
schemes.211 
Agents are generally not employees of the MNO and thus are related only through 
contractual arrangements.212 If an MNO fails to adequately train and supervise agents and 
super agents who act on its behalf, these agents may damage the MNO’s business 
reputation with both the public and regulators. For instance, if agents fail to meet the 
required regulatory AML responsibilities, depending on the division of responsibilities 
where AML procedures may be carried out by agents. If roles are not clearly stipulated 
and enforced, the CBK will impose capacity challenges.213  MNO-led models concentrate 
transaction activities in the hands of one or only a few large telecommunications 
institutions, which is not only a function of the ‘first mover’ establishing market 
dominance, but also of the telecom industry players’ already well-established and 
                                                 
210 This means that aside from providing data and voice functions in their capacity they provide mobile 
financial services.  
211 Joy Malala (2014) (n 208) 25. Also in this model, the issuer (having the relationship with the cardholder) 
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expansive mobile phone user networks; this concentration introduces systemic risk. 
Moreover, MNOs tend to concentrate trust accounts in one, or a few, large commercial 
banks, leading to a concentration risk of the account.214  
Safaricom, the dominant MNO, for instance, holds its customer funds in 
Commercial Bank of Africa.215 Furthermore, Safaricom’s dominant position in Kenya 
means that it creates a  large institution in itself by virtue of the nature of the transactions, 
being low value, high volume transactions, and those undertaking the transactions, who 
are a large population of previously unbanked and under banked, which increases the 
inherent risks of the transactions themselves.216 MNOs should train and supervise 
through policies and procedures that are acceptable to regulators, which should be 
standardised to avoid the flagrancy of their misconduct, but this has not yet occurred. 
Moreover, high concentration of risk leads to systemic risk within the broader economic 
context in which the mobile financial services take place. Figures reported by Safaricom 
as of January 2014 include US $320 million per month in person-to-person transfers.217 
On an annualised basis, this is equivalent to roughly 10 per cent of Kenyan Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).218 Furthermore, 27219 companies are using M-Pesa for bulk 
distribution of payments. Since the launch of the ‘bill pay’ function in 2009, hundreds of 
companies are using M-Pesa to collect payments from their customers. Utility companies 
such as the electric and water companies have more than 20 per cent of their millions of 
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customers pay through M-Pesa.220 These figures point to the systemic importance of 
payment institutions,221 which have served as the transactional channel through which a 
significant portion of Kenya’s GDP-associated financial and economic funding flows.222 
I estimate M-Pesa’s role in relation to Kenya’s overall GDP will only increase.223   
 
However, the unravelling or forced unwinding of large numbers of illegitimate mobile 
payment transactions could have the opposite effect on economic growth and financial 
stability.224  To the extent that M-Pesa has captured the global imagination as a successful 
MNO-led model, its hypothetical fall could lead to a negative effect for many MNO-led 
models, causing a domino effect if several MNOs’ business strategies and operations are 
intertwined.225 In summary, MNOs should pose no greater risk than banks. MNOs do 
not necessarily face inherent higher Money Laundering/Finance of Terrorism (ML/FT) 
risks than banks through mobile payments, nor do they pose inherently higher ML/FT 
threats than banks. The risks and threats are largely influenced by the risk mitigation 
measures, namely effective risk-based regulations and supervision. So if MNOs are not 
appropriately regulated, the risk of illicit flows through these MNOs increases, 
independent of the risk that is inherent to payments. The lack of appropriate regulation 
has highlighted that risks are not related to the types of transactions but to the weakness 
in the supervisory regimes and supervision applicable to MNOs. Those wishing to hide 
illicit financial flows are likely to seek unsupervised entities to reduce their chance of 
detection.226 
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 3.5.2. Risk Exposure at the Bank Level 
 
In the mobile payment context, banks offer banking services via the mobile 
device.227 They hold the e-float228 on behalf of the MNOs and handle cross-border 
transactions while managing foreign exchange risk.229 Foreign exchange risk is that which 
exists when a financial transaction is denominated in a currency other than that of the 
base currency of the company. Foreign exchange risk also exists when the foreign 
subsidiary of a firm maintains financial statements in a currency other than the reporting 
currency of the consolidated entity. The risk is that there may be an adverse movement 
in the exchange rate of the denomination currency in relation to the base currency before 
the date when the transaction is completed. In Kenya, banks whose primary function is 
to take deposits for distribution in loans and other permitted investments dominate retail 
payments.230 These banks are well-positioned to employ risk management programmes 
that ensure regulatory compliance, and they have an important role as the mobile payment 
system deposits funds in bank accounts held by the mobile network operator in exchange 
for e-float. 
To diversify their risk, MNOs hold such deposits in different banks. These 
accounts impose no restrictions of access on MNOs, and the banks face no special reserve 
requirements with regard to the MNOs’ deposits. Similarly, no regulation compels the 
MNO to give notice of their purpose to withdraw large quantities of cash at whatever 
time, since the Central Bank treats these trusts like current account deposit in terms of 
regulatory policy. This absence of particular regulation makes the framework within 
                                                 
227 See Chapter 2 System Design of Mobile Payments.  
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which mobile payments currently operate vulnerable, as the MNOs and the banks have 
no legal obligation to fulfil expectations.231 
The bank imposes the most identifiable risks that mobile payments systems incur, 
since the bank holds all deposits from the mobile money chain, including consumer 
funds. This forms a concentration of risk as the trust account expands; this may have a 
material impact on the trustee bank’s balance sheet, particularly for those trust funds on 
deposit with the trustee bank.232  Most MNOs use a single bank to hold the trust fund, 
for instance Safaricom uses one bank, Commercial Bank of Africa.233 Therefore a 
successful MNO’s trust fund could become significant to the point of representing a 
funding concentration risk for the trustee bank, which would therefore be vulnerable to 
systemic risk. The trust account would also be vulnerable to liquidity risk, should the 
volume of items in transit through the MNO’s system suddenly reduce, for example 
because of losing market share to other MNOs, changes in regulations, an MNO’s 
decision to diversify its own risks, or through civil disturbances that cause a flight to 
cash.234  
The Central Bank of Kenya typically limits risk concentrations as a normal part of its 
supervisory activities, but it is unclear presently in the regulation whether this process 
includes funds held in trust.235 Regulators typically impose this key prudential requirement 
to ensure that a customer’s funds are available on demand. This means that funds held in 
trust would require the MNO, according to Brian Muthiora, ‘to maintain liquid assets 
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equal in value to the amount of money issued electronically.’236 One common approach 
is to require entities to ring-fence assets237 and hold them in a bank account in several 
prudentially regulated banks. All funds are then backed in the pooled accounts.  These 
requirements would be more stringent than those imposed on deposit-taking financial 
institutions, which typically mandate only small amounts to be deposited to guarantee 
potential depositor claims.238 
The trust account in a prudential bank imposes legal uncertainty and risks, 
especially in the event of bank insolvency. The stored value in the funds is usually 
matched to the float in the bank account.239 The money on deposit is the float held against 
customers’ mobile money accounts.240 The MNO should ring-fence this money from the 
custodial bank’s other assets to protect it from bankruptcy and shareholder claims. 
However, only minimal legal guidance dictates how capital reserves and/or deposit 
insurance should and can protect the trust account contents, how banks in distress would 
handle insolvency or how such proceedings would evolve.241 This lack of legal clarity 
leaves many stakeholders within the mobile money transfer ecosystem exposed.  
Concerns with managing risk concentrations may restrict bank’s interests in 
providing trust services. The financial institution which holds the trust account for the 
MNO takes on reputational risk in the event of the MNO’s mismanagement of the trust 
account or mismanagement of its payment system.242 Although the MNOs claim that the 
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funds held in trust are not invested, if this claim is false and the trust funds are invested 
in instruments that do not conserve their value, the liability coverage provided by the 
trust assets may become inadequate, potentially leading to a crisis in confidence in the 
service.  
 3.5.3. Risks at the Agent Level 
 
Mobile payment agents243 introduce risks at various levels. Their use can trigger 
integrity, operational, reputational, and legal risks. Agents are engaged in a large variety 
of activities including, in particular, cash-in and cash-out services. Their principal role is 
to accept and distribute cash,244 in principle providing cash-in and cash-out services from 
the customer’s mobile device. In this role, the agents serve as branches245 for the MNOs 
and act as the point of sale for the customer relationship.246 As the conduit between the 
MNO and the consumer, the agent holds responsibility for account opening, customer 
due diligence, and KYC compliance.247  
Mobile payment agents are non-bank entities such as retailers (either the MNO’s 
own retail centre or retailer such as a small store) that manage customer registration and 
liquidity requirements for the mobile money users, on behalf of the MNOs.248 They offer 
services such as disbursements of loans or micro-loans approved by banks or by a 
microfinance institution. Agents also effect bill payments and transfers; take deposits and 
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<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Scenarios-for-
Branchless-Banking-in-2020.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
246 Joy Malala, (2014) (n 208) 30.    
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loan payments; allow inquiries on account balances or recent movements of funds; and 
open savings accounts, loans, and debit cards (all with approvals from the bank). MNOs 
may contract them as well to do additional outsourcing functions. In all then, the agent 
may offer frontline customer service; facilitate bank transactions through its balance 
sheet; transform cash in-the-till into money-in-the-bank and vice versa; and may need to go 
to the bank from time to time to rebalance its cash in the till versus its money249in a 
collateral or trust bank account.250  
 In many areas agents’ primary business is separate from their agent function, as 
pharmacies, mobile airtime sale kiosks, lottery kiosks, post offices or grocery stores. 
Stores providing services to illiterate customers who require assistance are likely to benefit 
from repeat business. However, the agent may not always act in the best interests of the 
consumer, for example, insisting that a moderate sum of money be sent in one or two 
tranches, each of which costs the same set commission.  Agents already selling prepaid 
airtime vouchers may be ideally suited, in terms of technical proficiency and financial 
literacy, to transition to providing more comprehensive mobile financial services using 
the same basic infrastructure.  Although agents conduct customer due diligence, this 
action is limited to requiring a postal address and is insufficient to protect the system. All 
agents go through a vetting process for AML purposes. Agents also bear responsibility 
for reporting suspicious transactions in accordance with AML and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorist on behalf of the MNO they represent;251 the agent is the MNOs’ 
interface between the cash flow and the consumer.252 To facilitate purchases and sales of 
e-float, mobile network operators maintain and operate an extensive network of over 
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96,000 agents across Kenya.253 Registered mobile payment users are able to make deposits 
and withdrawals of cash (i.e., make purchases and sales of e-float) at an agent outlet, which 
receives a commission on a sliding scale for both deposits and withdrawals.254 
This network of local agents enlarges the MNOs’ reach to rural areas in order to 
achieve a higher level of penetration in those markets255 that lack a physical bank or 
branch network. This financially inclusive element of the mobile payment system is one 
of its main advantages; it essentially enables a branchless payment system, which is outside 
the traditional bank-led business model. 
The number of mobile payments agents in Kenya has grown in response to 
demand. While Safaricom store revenues depend on the number of transactions they 
facilitate,256  and they have been careful to control the number of M-Pesa retail agents, as 
of 30 December 2013, 96,000 M-Pesa agents operated in such diverse sectors as 
supermarkets, fuel stations, and Safaricom dealers.257 As a report from the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation describes, there are ‘over five times the number of M-Pesa 
outlets in Kenya than the total number of bank branches, post offices, and automated 
teller machines (ATMs).’258 
The agents hold e-float balances on their own mobile phones, purchased either 
from the MNOs or obtained from customers, and they maintain cash on their premises.  
Agents consequently face an inventory management challenge as they have to forecast 
                                                 
253 According to 2013 figures from Safaricom <www.safaricom.co.ke> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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customer needs through various assessments, particularly for their net e-float needs, all 
of which usually require the maintenance of security for their operations.259 Their function 
is to provide cash-in and cash-out transactions which hinge on the sufficient liquidity of 
the float at the agent outlets.260 Mobile money liquidity and cash liquidity therefore pose 
key risks in mobile money deployment and in their examination of risks.261  Various 
models exist through which agent networks operate. MNOs have evolved into two-tier 
structures with master agents who manage liquidity as the liaison between themselves and 
the individual stores, or sub-agents under their management framework. The master agent 
buys and sells cash from the MNO, makes it available to the sub-agents, and distributes 
agent commissions.262 ‘Super Agents’ who now characterise a new model, perform the 
functions of the aggregator of the second model which allows for the integration of the 
MNO with banks without it being a bank-led model. Other developments in this vein 
include users with accounts at certain commercial banks being able to transfer funds 
between those accounts and their mobile payment accounts. The agent network 
positioning exposes the payment system’s agents to some risks; they occupy a sensitive 
position in the payment cycle of mobile services: the loading of cash payments, the point 
of redemption or pay-out, and also the sellers of the handsets themselves, which can be 
used to make payments.263 
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Agents are therefore in a position to falsify records or ignore suspicions of 
financial crime; they may also be a point of weakness if they do not perform their roles 
in a diligent manner.264 In particular, agents present systemic, integrity, liquidity, and 
operational risks if not properly supervised as their use often triggers various risks. 
Among them include operational, technological, legal and reputational risks. Agents 
engaged in limited activities such as those registering users present fewer risks in 
comparison to those who are engaged in a larger variety of activities such as the 
disbursement of funds.265  
Agents earn money on customer registration, and their agreements with the MNO 
or bank usually give them additional bonuses for securing customers who regularly use 
the service. They may also receive a payment for each transaction. In spite of the range 
and complexity of services agents provide, regulators have not typically given agents 
significant attention.266 Rather, they require MNOs to oversee agents by assigning to 
MNOs ultimate liability for the actions of their agents.267 As both MNOs and banks 
continue to extend the reach of their services through the use of these agents to expand 
branchless banking, this may represent a significant vulnerability.268 
Liquidity for mobile payments transactions are provided by the agents269 who 
typically provide liquidity with revenues from other business activities, which include 
                                                 
264 Business Daily, ‘Banks lose Sh1.7 Billion to fraudsters in 3 Months’ Business Daily (25 November 2010) 
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268 Louis De Koker, ‘Client Identification And Money Laundering Control: Perspectives On The Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001’ 4 Journal Of South African Law 715–746.  
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selling airtime. They receive commissions for transactions from withdrawals, much like 
ATMs,270 and hold balances on their own mobile phones. The agent’s liquidity 
management system contains airtime balances and cash on premises. 271  
The system allows agents to take cash that will prove to be counterfeit from 
customers. Customers may use the agent network to pass counterfeit notes into the 
money supply, and agents may use this money for payments. With no oversight by any 
regulatory authority to provide a mechanism for reporting, retrieval, and criminal 
investigation of suspected counterfeit notes obtained from a mobile payment agent, 
agents represent a risk to the system. Mobile payment agents currently cannot guarantee 
the same integrity assurance that bank branches have in assessing the authenticity and 
integrity of the currency they receive.   
Given that agent networks are meant to act as bank branches, regulation should 
set parameters for training material for use by both MNOs and their agents.272 The 
training should also be modelled on bank teller training and provided commensurate to 
the perceived risk.273 However currently, MNOs do not offer this training for their 
subscribed agents.274 Additionally, MNOs such as Safaricom claim to provide 
AML/CFT/Fraud training programmes, to institute and monitor agent compliance 
commensurate with perceived risk. Although these programmes may lead to reporting, 
no verification mechanism exists. Since these counterfeit currencies would be rejected if 
deposited in the agent’s bank account, reporting would lead to a financial loss to the agent. 
Passing counterfeit currency, whether as cash outs to e-payments or as change on trade 
                                                 
270  Joy Malala (2014) (n 208).   
 
272 GSMA, ‘Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix’ (2010) <http://mobile-financial.com/blog/mobile-
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purchases, is a criminal issue for the police, not a regulatory issue.275 However, MNOs 
should provide agent training to facilitate identification of issues, investigation, and 
apprehension of counterfeiters.276 Agents have not been offered any form of assistance 
to mitigate counterfeiting risks.   
The risk of passing counterfeit currency represents an agent using access to a 
financial system to manipulate balances for their own financial gain. Although MNOs are 
responsible for their own internal security as a cost of doing business, which may threaten 
the financial viability of the service, agents’ malfeasance may pose a systemic impact 
which could affect customers. Requiring MNOs to obtain fraud insurance to protect 
against insider threats and maintain 1:1 e-money reserve requirement in their trust 
account would significant mitigate the risk.277 In addition, regulators should have the 
authority to arrest and prosecute agents who have committed fraud. Any required fraud 
insurance may not be available or may price MNOs out of entrance into the market.   
Risks at the agent level occur at various levels; firstly the agent is vulnerable to 
theft, due to the nature of dealing with cash;278 most agents in Kenya hold their cash at 
their business premises and have no safety measures, such as safes or strong rooms, to 
store their cash, which leaves them vulnerable to thefts.  If an agent is robbed, as they 
hold large sums of cash within their point of sale, they do not have the same security 
protocols that bank branches have, yet they perform financial services in much the same 
way as cashiers. This risk may be heightened if the volume of cash/e-money required 
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follows a predictable remittance cycle, requiring a higher than normal cash-in-hand 
position.279   
The agent may be forced to transfer all or part of its e-money inventory to the 
robber or other party.280 While agents that are also merchants may find that accepting e-
money as payment for goods and services reduces the need for cash in hand, and 
therefore the risk of robbery, agents’ contracts with MNOs do not clearly outline the 
responsibility for cash security,281 and where the agent is ‘deposit’ collecting, the cash in 
the till may be the customers’, which imposes the need for greater security measures. No 
regulatory requirement calls for agents to have insurance or for MNOs to insure them 
against theft. While an insurance requirement may constitute a barrier to entry for agents, 
this failure poses risks to the system. Regulation might also require MNOs to provide or 
reimburse agents if sufficient evidence is given for robberies. This liability for the safety 
of their cash also poses a barrier to entry for agents, while at the same time creates a moral 
hazard for thieves.  
Agents also pose slight but significant liquidity risks if they become unable to 
perform cash-out transactions and individuals or larger groups protest. KYC/CDD 
policies, insufficient cash in hand to meet occasional heightened demand, or system or 
network outages,282 which can prevent KYC/CDD and transaction verification, all might 
result in such barriers.283 This verification only requires that customers show their 
National Identification to the agent which may not be a sufficient form of identification. 
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Such events pose a reputation risk to MNOs. In 2007 during Kenya’s post-election 
violence, when agents were unable to receive the necessary float from banks, and many 
agents in Kenya became unable to make cash-out payments, customers could not retrieve 
their funds in remote areas; this created a widespread panic, supporting the need for 
regulation.  Failure of receipt of funds from an agent (if, e.g., an agent has a credit line to 
help manage its liquidity) due to robbery of the agent or agent theft, poses a credit risk. 
All agents have an account with a contracting bank, but if cash in the till does not allow 
the agent to provide the cash customers require, panic can ensue. 
In sum, MNOs do not have guidelines for the operations of their agents. Kenya’s 
2010 agent regulations284 take a different approach, specifying that the bank is responsible 
for determining, based on an assessment of risk, the services that any particular agent 
should provide. However, MNOs have not made the necessary clarifications. The 
situation calls for an account agreement or regulatory requirement that stipulates access 
requirements and service level agreements for agents, similar to having capital 
requirements for banks; however this creates an added barrier to entry for agents, 
considering the nature and characteristics of those who become agents.285 
The M-Pesa system, for example, has complex contractual relationships across 
the entire system. These include the agent agreement between Safaricom and the agent, 
which contains a declaration of trust that favours all M-Pesa account holders. It also 
includes a management agreement; commercial bank agreement; a customer terms and 
conditions agreement; and an agent network manager agreement.286 Again, depending on 
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the regulatory regime, users would obtain these services directly from an MNO without 
any direct contractual relationship with a prudentially licensed and supervised financial 
institution.287 Their contractual relationship would be with the MNO who in turn may 
have contractual relationships with the cash-in/cash-out agents who accept and pay out 
cash on the MNO’s behalf. 
The reputational risks described above may precipitate negative perceptions if and 
when there are system failures. This would reverse all trust previously fostered amongst 
consumers.288 Agent-related AML/CFT lapses that result in either the banks or the agents 
themselves being used for financial crimes may result in the public associating the bank 
with criminals.289 Although the Kenyan public has undoubtedly become accustomed to 
such system failures,290 regulators should address Safaricom’s accountability and whether 
insulation of dominant MNOs such as Safaricom from reputational risk would be 
worthwhile, although this may create a moral hazard within MNOs as they are 
systemically important payment providers.  
 3.5.4. Risks at the Consumer Level 
 
The ‘consumer’ is the mobile payment user. Mobile payment users have generated 
robust demand in Kenya, and the system’s success reflects their adoption of and trust in 
the system, whereas payment instruments that were introduced to the market without an 
expressed demand from the consumers in the past have failed to grow the way mobile 
payment systems have, and the market environment in Africa and other developing 
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countries is generally not consumer oriented.291 Research on consumer protection and 
dissatisfaction for less sophisticated consumer segments in developing countries is 
sparse.292 It is even sparser in mobile payments and retail banking service issues.293 This 
part of the chapter discusses the risks identified at the consumer level; Chapter 4 will 
further expound on the complexities these risks impose on consumers due to a 
fragmented regulatory framework.  
Consumers bear more risks in mobile payments systems than in other payments systems, 
which typically place more risk on the financial institution.294 Kenyans access mobile 
payments by presenting their National Identification295 cards, which all adult citizens in 
Kenya receive. This offers universality,296 but in turn exposes consumers to account fraud, 
if for instance their National Identity card is stolen and used to open a mobile payment 
account.297 This creates further challenges as this risk has multiple implications: their 
identity could be used to access other services, and the account could also be used for 
fraudulent transactions made in their name. Consumers may be unable to access mobile 
services because an account using their identity has already been established fraudulently. 
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These risks are ‘actual’ because Kenyan National Identification records do not provide 
verifiable details of an individual that can be used to trace or track them in the event of a 
fraudulent event.298 They do not contain a physical address, or biometric documentation 
that could be used to dispel any fraudulent activity; they only contain fingerprints and the 
name of the holder.299  
 
This creates a challenge in ensuring KYC/CDD are maintained to an international 
standard,300 as different biometric options have varying associated costs, (e.g., voice 
recognition tends to be inexpensive as it can occur over the phone, whereas fingerprinting 
and retinal scans are expensive in both technical capacity and infrastructure). This remains 
the remit of the Kenyan state, rather than the MNOs or the CBK; consumers who cannot 
prove their identity will have difficulty accessing mobile payment services.301  This risk 
became prominent in May 2012, when it emerged that employees of Telco MTN Uganda 
had stolen around US $3.5 million from an account used to store cash which had been 
incorrectly sent through its e-money service.302  
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Consumers incur liquidity risks because, for instance, an agent who owes funds is 
unable to meet its payment obligation on time, which potentially adversely affects the 
liquidity position of the recipient of funds at the time the funds are due, and when their 
agents have insufficient e-float.303 High cash-out requests due to special events, including 
public events, and disturbances such as the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya,304 or 
loss of public confidence, precipitate these events.305 Consumers seeking to avoid this risk 
may decide to use super agents,306 usually banks or larger institutions or companies such 
as supermarkets with the capacity to have large reserves of e-float, as opposed to 
individual agents. This further highlights the importance of account providers, in this case 
agents who are responsible to customers for providing cash-out services in a timely 
manner, having contingency plans to deal with liquidity crises, which may be subject to 
regulatory review. 
Loss of funds due to bank or MNO failure remains a critical risk for consumers. 
Because regulation does not require MNOs or banks to legally segregate307 trust accounts 
from the general pool of bank assets available to satisfy creditors, the bankruptcy process 
may raid these accounts.308 Even if an institution technically segregates the trust 
account,309 there may not be a rapid procedure for transferring funds held in trust to 
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another trustee, preventing access to the funds.310 This creates by far the greatest risk to 
consumers as these funds receive no legal protection. Trust funds holding the value of 
items in transit are legally segregated from the trustee’s own assets in bankruptcy, but no 
legislation enforces this segregation. The trust accounts should be divisible so that the 
risks are spread and transferable in case of a failure or insolvency.  
Furthermore, pooled deposits within a trust account can create a funding 
concentration risk which would not protect individual customers if trust is impaired,311 
which Chapter 4 discusses in further detail. This concentration of risk suggests that if the 
deposits are not fully protected under bank closing or insolvency or deposit guarantee 
rules, consumers, who are often unaware of their risks, are particularly vulnerable.  For 
example, the only deposit insurance available in Kenya is at the account level, and if the 
trust account is viewed as a single account, rather than many, the cap would be 
insignificant compared to the size of the trust account.312  Since no law clarifies the status 
of the funds held in the bank, the value of trust funds invested may be reduced by a 
decline in market value of the investments, as significant and unusual outflows could 
present the trust with liquidity difficulties if investments cannot be unwound.313 
Consumers are at risk of not being able to seek redress, especially when they are 
unable to dispute a transaction or account charge efficiently. Consumers are not able to 
resolve disputes with an MNO or to seek recourse to the regulatory authority to arbitrate 
a dispute because of the weak and/or non-existent measures available,314  if they initiate 
a transaction on their own phones, or if an agent makes a transaction on behalf of a 
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customer.315 A lack of financial literacy by the unbanked and the under banked means 
that users are able to ask others to use this service.316 While MNOs can provide an 
efficient dispute resolution process and clearly publish their service standards to minimise 
the cause of disputes, the regulator has not been able to define consumer protection for 
error resolution, in terms of responsibilities, time frames, and liabilities, all of which leaves 
consumers vulnerable.  
A lack of consumer protection raises the cost for consumers, which would in turn 
create a barrier to adoption; however, this would only be the case for those consumers 
who are aware of the problem, which many payment users are not.317 Additionally, the 
CBK may not have the capacity to handle complaints or disputes, which puts additional 
burden on the regulator. The only incentive for resolving customer disputes will be 
customer retention and reputation, which will be stronger in competitive environments. 
Another, more minimal, risk that consumers face is government taxation. The 
Kenyan government may decide to tax transactions to raise funds and meet its financial 
obligations, which would increase the marginal cost of each transaction. The high volume 
of transactions in the mobile payment system presents an opportunity for government. 
If governments decide to institute a transaction tax on mobile payment system 
transactions, they will raise the marginal cost of each transaction to consumers (as MNOs 
would pass this cost along), thus pricing out many of the consumers that the system most 
benefits.318 Low cost largely drives the high adoption rate of mobile payments in most 
communities, and the benefits of expanding access to financial services. Any transaction 
                                                 
315 This is because in many rural areas in Kenya many consumers do not have their own phones. 
316 John Tatom and David Godstead, ‘Targeting the Unbanked-Financial Literacy’s Magic Bullet?’ (2006) 
University Library of Munich, MPRA Paper 4266 <http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/4266/1/MPRA_paper_4266.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
317 Ibid. 
318 The East African, ‘Safaricom Raises M-Pesa Tariffs as Kenya Slaps Telcos with New Tax’  
<http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Safaricom-raises-MPesa-tariffs/-/2558/1681810/-
/view/printVersion/-/gvug2l/-/index.html> accessed 3 September 2014.   
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tax will reduce the system’s volume, and the consumers that leave the system will be the 
poorest, as they are the most price-sensitive.319 
Lastly, the lack of network interoperability320 prevents consumers from 
transacting with desired parties. Although this hindrance is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it is worthwhile to mention that dominant players have closed loop networks with 
no capability to transfer funds between account holders with different MNOs’ payment 
networks due to lack of interoperability. Since the first MNO to enter, Safaricom, has 
limited competition amongst other providers, this creates a pricing issue for those less 
able to afford other means of payments.321 
3.6. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have shown that disturbances that disrupt the payment system can have 
profound ramifications across the economy. Payments systems represent the connective 
tissue of all financial and real economic activity, as the ability to settle transactions and 
the confidence that the counterparties will do likewise, underpins it. Therefore payments 
systems can be a key channel for the transmission of shocks across institutions and 
markets even when they are not the original source. From this perspective, payment 
systems, and particularly mobile payment systems, deserve particular attention, given that 
they lie at the heart of the settlement process.322 Furthermore, this lack of clarity in the 
legal framework can be a source of risk in its own right, to the extent that it creates 
uncertainty about or leads to incorrect perceptions of exposures to potential losses.323 
Therefore regulators, particularly the Central Banks, must take an active interest in 
                                                 
319 Ibid. 
320 See Chapter 4 for a further analysis of this challenge.  
321 Ibid.  
322 Borio and Van den Bergh (1994) supra. p 29.  
323 Ibid. 
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payment systems to safeguard the soundness and smooth functioning of the financial 
system.324  
Regulators need to examine the risks in mobile payment systems in order to 
ensure an effective financial system, protect consumers, and establish an appropriate 
regulatory framework for mobile payments. The extensive growth325 of mobile payments 
in Kenya makes this imperative. Given the unintended326 benefit of increasing public 
involvement327 in the formal financial system—including expansion of savings accounts 
in the banks extending systemic exposure nevertheless328—by converting widely 
distributed consumer risk into a concentrated systemic risk, the system presents an 
important vulnerability329 to the Kenyan economy, given the value of the ‘float’330 in 
transit on ‘deposit’,331, through ‘trustee accounts’.332  The Central Bank does not 
exclusively provide these payments, but as a prudential regulator it should do so, as a 
means of mitigating risk. The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to these debates 
and to promote well balanced regulatory approaches, as scholars do not always clearly 
understand international standards. Ill-designed and overly rigid (AML/CFT) regulatory 
frameworks create conditions that favour informal financial channels, which undermine 
the very objectives of AML/CFT efforts and hamper the progress of financial inclusion. 
                                                 
324 Borio and Van den Bergh (1994) Supra...p22. 
325 Chapter 2 described the proliferation and success of M-PESA in Kenya.   
326 As in Chapter 2, ‘unintended’ here reflects the fact that mobile payments through M-PESA were 
introduced with a micro-financial aim and the shift from its originally intended use to a major payment 
system has become financially inclusive.   
327 This public involvement refers to the large population of the unbanked as described in Chapter 2, into 
the financial realm.  
328 The ‘intermediaries’ here are the commercial banks and financial institutions. Banks,, building societies 
credit unions, financial advisers or brokers insurance companies’ collective investment schemes, pension 
funds. 
329 GSMA, ‘Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix’ (2010) <http://mobile-financial.com/blog/mobile-
financial-services-risk-matrix> accessed 3 September 2014. 
329 Ibid. 
330 The balance of e-money or physical cash or money in a bank account that an agent can immediately 
access to meet customer demands to purchase cash in or sell cash out electronic money.  
331 Deposit in the context of mobile payment transactions is defined as cashing in at the mobile payments 
agents.  
332 The trustee account is the bank that holds the mobile money and payments in trust. Rasheda Sultana, 
'Mobile Banking: Overview of Regulatory Framework in Emerging Markets' (2009) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1554160> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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The most vulnerable stakeholders are exposed to risks they may not recognise, either 
through perceived risks or risks to retail payments.  Risks that affect consumers are not 
readily addressed even in the form of guidelines that spell out the nature and types of 
risks involved. 333  
In conclusion, while mobile financial services in general, and mobile payments in 
particular, have been very inclusive, consumers who are the most vulnerable segment of 
the mobile payment system need to be protected through the examination of the gaps in 
the  legal and  regulatory framework that have left consumers vulnerable. Chapter 4 will 
discuss the legal and regulatory challenges in regulating mobile payments. The reliance of 
a financial system for its stability on the soundness of institutions, the stability of markets, 
the absence of shocks334 and minimal volatility has been pointed out, along with the 
difficulty of achieving these through individual private actions and unfettered market 
forces alone. In addition the chapter has pointed to the public sector’s role in fostering 
financial stability as opposed to private collective action, making way for the private sector 
to achieve an optimum result on its own to take a proactive role necessary to achieve the 
full private and social benefits of finance. 
To create the required regulatory framework requires a discussion of the 
preconditions to a safe and sound payment system. This should occur either through the 
examination of macroprudential or microprudential requirements. A further examination 
of who safeguards the payment system should be enhanced, which this thesis will attempt 
to highlight in Chapter 4 through the analysis of the role of the financial regulator. Despite 
the fact that the improvements in payment methods and payment innovations have 
                                                 
333 Maria C Stephens, 'Promoting Responsible Financial Inclusion: A Risk-Based Approach To Supporting 
Mobile Financial Services Expansion' (2012) 27 Banking and Finance Law Review 329. 
334 Garry J Schinasi, 'Defining Financial Stability And Establishing A Framework To Safeguard It' (2011) 
15 Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series. International Monetary Fund 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04187.pdf> accessed 22 September 2014). 
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contributed to more efficient trade and economic specialisation, both at national and 
international levels, bringing about financial inclusion, I have argued that regulators need 
to have complementary policy objectives that strike a balance between strict KYC 
controls and lax regulation. Given the lack of compromise between financial inclusion 
and financial integrity, payment systems such as mobile payments have a significant role 
in enhancing systemic risk, as they have become a significant component of the national 
payment system of Kenya, and therefore have the potential to generate and transmit 
systemic disturbances to the financial sector.335 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
335 Ryan Hahn, ‘Payment Systems and Systemic Risk’ (2008) The World Bank 
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/payment-systems-and-systemic-risk> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES IN THE CURRENT 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Regulation is a phenomenon that is, according to Karen Yeung, ‘notoriously 
difficult to define with clarity and precision because it’s meaning and the scope of its 
inquiry are unsettled and contested.’1 As a result, there has been a lot of discomfort 
amongst regulators2 attached to mobile financial services and how best to regulate mobile 
payments.3  Financial regulators have the mandate to preserve the stability of the financial 
system,4 to ensure financial integrity5 and resilience,6 while encouraging innovation and 
financial inclusion.7 These functions exist in tension with each other as sustaining 
financial stability requires bearing down on risks,8 which can limit innovation. As a result, 
there has been a lot of discomfort amongst regulators9 attached to mobile financial 
                                                 
1 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) 3.  
2 Vivienne Lawack-Davids, ‘The Legal and Regulatory Framework of Mobile Payments in South Africa: a 
Trade-off?: Analyses’ (2012) 24 SA Mercantile Law Journal= SA Tydskrif vir Handelsreg 77. 
3 Neil McEvoy, ‘Capabilities of Mobile Operators from the Perspective of a Financial Regulator’ in GSMA 
‘Mobile Money for the Unbanked’ (Annual Report, July 2009); see also Paul Makin and Consult Hyperion, 
‘Regulatory Issues Around Mobile Banking’ (2010) The Development Dimension ICTs for Development 
Improving Policy Coherence: Improving Policy Coherence 139; Paul Tucker, ‘The Debate on Financial 
System Resilience: Macroprudential Instruments’ 22 (Barclays annual lecture, London, 22 October 2009). 
4 See Chapter 3: Financial Stability and Integrity after Financial Inclusion the Mobile Payment Risks.  
5 Ibid.  
6Andreas Dombret, ‘Resilient Banks – Essential Building Blocks of a Stable Financial System’ (2013) 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r130925b.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014; financial resilience has been 
stressed as the ability for a financial system to overcome shocks to its system. This is especially after the 
Global Financial Crisis. See, Jean-Claude Trichet, ‘Financial System Resilience’ Systemic Risk: The 
Dynamics of Modern Financial Systems' (2011) 101; See also Kartik Anand et al, ‘A Network Model of 
Financial System Resilience’ (2013 85 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 219. 
7 See Chapter 2 Section 2.6 the ‘mass market’ in most developing countries is comprised of low-income, 
unbanked people who make up the majority of the population;  see, Claudia McKay and Mark Pickens, 
‘Branchless Banking Pricing Analysis’ (2010) <http://www.slideshare.net/CGAP/branchless-banking-
pricing-analysis-2010> accessed 3 September 2014; See Chapter 2 Section 2.5. Title Success of Mobile 
Payment: Financial Inclusion. Page 60. 
8 See Chapter 3 Section Titled Inherent Risks to the Payment System.  
9 Vivienne Lawack-Davids, ‘The Legal and Regulatory Framework of Mobile Payments in South Africa: a 
Trade-off?: Analyses’ (2012) 24 SA Mercantile Law Journal= SA Tydskrif vir Handelsreg 77. 
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services and how best to regulate mobile payments.10  In Kenya, the convergence11 of 
telecommunications and financial services has caused a convergence in policies amongst 
regulatory authorities12 who have different objectives,13 which has led to regulatory and 
legal challenges. Furthermore, the lack of a specific payments systems law14 that addresses 
mobile payments specifically, coupled with the fragmentation15 of the consumer 
protection laws, where the Consumer Protection Act 2012, does not have specific 
provisions for financial service consumers and was enacted six years after the introduction 
of mobile payments.  This further highlights the complexities of regulation and 
innovation and also highlights the fact that new products have been a catalyst for the 
adoption of new laws in Kenya. This has impeded the development of appropriate 
regulation that would address the needs of consumers in mobile financial services16 (a 
problem that goes beyond mobile payments). Regulators have prioritised innovation over 
                                                 
10 Neil McEvoy, ‘Capabilities of Mobile Operators from the Perspective of a Financial Regulator’ in GSMA 
‘Mobile Money for the Unbanked’ (Annual Report, July 2009); see also Paul Makin and Consult Hyperion, 
‘Regulatory Issues Around Mobile Banking’ (2010) The Development Dimension ICTs for Development 
Improving Policy Coherence: Improving Policy Coherence 139; Paul Tucker, ‘The Debate on Financial 
System Resilience: Macroprudential Instruments’ 22 (Barclays annual lecture, London, 22 October 2009). 
11 Jeremmy Okonjo, Nature and Impact of Mobile Financial Services on Regulation of Mobile Telecoms in Kenya (2014) 
Chapter 1, where convergence has been described as the amalgam of different regulatory authorities with 
the mobile financial services ecosystem, where the telecommunications industry and the financial services 
industry are converged to provide mobile payments. See, Colin R Blackman, ‘Convergence Between 
Telecommunications and other Media. How should Regulation Adapt?’ (1998) 22 Telecommunications 
Policy 163. 
12 I discuss the regulatory authorities under Section 4.2.2.Regulatory Authorities.  
13 The objectives of the CCK are different from Central Bank objectives. Communications Authority of 
Kenya, ‘Strategic Plan’ 
<http://www.cck.go.ke/resc/publications/strategic_plan/CCK_3rd_Strategic_Plan_2013_26_11_13.pdf
> accessed 3 September 2014; Central Bank of Kenya, 
<http://www.cck.go.ke/regulations/downloads/ICT_policy_guidelines_July_2013_FV3_-
_5th_July_2013.pdf>  accessed 3 September 2014.  
14 At the time of writing this chapter, the National Payments Systems Act had not been enacted. However 
it has now as of 2014 been enacted though not enforced.  National Payments System Act 2011. 
15The fragmentation of consumer protection, where fragmentation suggests that there is no consolidation 
in the approach to consumer protection for financial services. See, Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther 
Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: the Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 
25(4) Mich J Int'l L 999. 
16Agencies that exclusively cater to consumers in the financial system. The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) is an independent agency of the United States government responsible for consumer 
protection in the financial sector. <http://www.consumerfinance.gov/> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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regulation. Further, regulatory overlap,17 inertia18 and arbitrage19 have obstructed the 
efficiencies of these authorities and led to duplicative and conflicting regulation, which is 
inefficient and unduly burdensome for regulators.20 This in turn inhibits more rational 
regulation and contributes to random selection of regulatory priorities as well as 
inconsistencies in regulatory authorities’ approach.21 
 Still, these challenges have not overtly piqued the interests of prudential 
authorities in Kenya who should be concerned with the potential of mobile financial 
services in general which have come to bypass Central Banks and governments in the 
issuing of money and the control of payments systems.22 The very indication of funds, be 
it electronic or otherwise,  being taken by an entity financial or otherwise,  immediately 
raises ‘deposit-taking’23 This term deposit taking has always been the determining factor 
or identifier of what a bank this terms that could prompt some prudential oversight or 
                                                 
17 See Title Regulatory Overlap on page 56. 
18 See Title Regulatory Inertia on page 65.  
19 See Title Regulatory Arbitrage on page 59. 
20 Todd S Aagaard, ‘Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory Discontinuities’ (2011) 
29 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 237. 
21 Stephen G Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (Harvard University Press 
1993).  
22 The BIS, for example, published five reports on e-money between 1996 and 2001, the ECB (and its 
predecessor, the European Monetary Institute (EMI)), operating between 1994 and 1997) published two 
reports (1994 and 1998) and a security framework for e-money issuers (2002). The German government 
amended the German banking law in 1997 requiring e-money issuers to become banks – from Malte 
Krueger, ‘Offshore e-Money Issuers and Monetary Policy’ (2001) 6 First Monday 10 
<http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/894/803> accessed 3 September 2014.  
23 E Gerald Corrigan, 'Are Banks Special?' (1983) Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 1982 
<http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1982a.cfm> accessed 3 September 2014: a discussion on 
deposit taking institutions should be specifically regarded as banks. 
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analogy with common law views of banks and deposits,24 which Kenyan regulation, or at 
least its approach to mobile payments regulation, has at present not addressed.25   
Clarification in statute for stored value payments26 has been lacking. The term 
‘deposit’, as well as the position of Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) (although they 
provide payments through stored value27) in relation to the ‘business of banking’ as 
defined by the Banking Act, Cap 488,28 are unclear in Kenyan law.29  Allowing MNOs to 
bypass laws applying to banks allows them to operate without clear legal accountability, 
which puts the payment system and the stakeholders at legal risk.30 Clarification would 
give the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), the main financial regulator in Kenya, the clear 
mandate it requires in the new converged environment.   
This chapter therefore advances the discourse on the need for stability integrity 
and inclusion described in Chapter 3, arguing that Kenyan regulators should focus on 
clarifying the law and reconceptualising the changing nature of today’s financial activities 
                                                 
24 Leon Perlman, ‘Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Mobile Financial Services’ (2012) 
<http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/13362/thesis_perlman_lj.pdf?sequence=4> accessed 3 
September 2014. Where Leon states that, ‘Any inapplicability of the deposit analogy to a large category of 
SVPs would mean that utilising bank-type deposit rules and principles for SVPs would be nugatory. 
Important in this consideration is the nature of the initial contract between the system operators and the 
user insofar as use of the funds handed over to the system operator or his agent, as well as the legal and 
prudential nature of the issuer.’ 
25 See Brian Muthiora, ‘Reinventing the Wheel: “Pass Through” Deposit Insurance Coverage for Mobile 
Money in Kenya’ (2014) <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/reinventing-the-wheel-pass-
through-deposit-insurance-coverage-for-mobile-money-in-kenya> accessed 3 September 2014. 
26 BIS (1996157. To use a helpful taxonomic analogy, the term stored value payments is used in this thesis 
to describe the ‘family’ of systems or devices that store value electronically. 
27 The CPSS defined ‘stored value’ products as: ‘... prepaid payment instruments in which a record of funds 
owned by or available to the consumer is stored on an electronic device in the consumer's possession, and 
the amount of stored “value” is increased or decreased, as appropriate, whenever the consumer uses the 
device to make a purchase or other transaction, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), 
‘Security of Electronic Money’ (1996) 3 <http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss18.htm> accessed 3 September 
2014. The user simply uses an appropriate device or system to obtain access to the value and associated 
payment facilities through computer and telecommunications links. 
28 Banking Act CAP 488 Laws of Kenya. 
29 See Section 4.5.3 Titled The Definition of Deposits Pg. 175 
30 Roger McCormick, Legal Risk in the Financial Markets (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010), where he 
discusses legal risk as the risk or loss to an institution which is primarily caused by: (a) a defective 
transaction; or (b) a claim (including a defence to a claim or a counterclaim) being made or some other 
event occurring which results in a liability for the institution or other loss (for example, as a result of the 
termination of a contract); or (c) failing to take appropriate measures to protect assets (for example, 
intellectual property) owned by the institution; or (d) change in law.  
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in Kenya. I envision a role for both the CBK and the industry regulator, Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK), and regulatory capabilities and capacities31  for the effective 
regulation of mobile payments for each. The approaches to regulation prioritise the 
interests of consumers, the most vulnerable stakeholders.32  
The arguments are structured in three parts. The first part will analyse the 
regulatory framework in place before the National Payments System Act of 2011 (NPSA), 
which is still in the process of implementation, examining the functions and roles of the 
regulatory authorities and the CBK as a regulator of all retail payments systems under the 
law.33  The legal and regulatory challenges of applying the provisions of the Banking Act 
CAP (488)34 to a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) provide a rationale for special 
provisions under the NPSA for mobile payments. As I will show, the gaps between the 
theory and the practice of financial regulation in regards to mobile payments create a 
special regulatory arbitrage that affects its application and prescription to the mobile 
payment system.35 Part two assesses how the current legal framework affects the 
regulatory authorities’ roles and functions in the payments system.  Part three discusses 
how these challenges impact consumers and the inadequacy of the current regulation in 
relation to their oversight and protection. Part four discusses the normative regulatory 
approach36 the CBK has taken in relation to mobile payments; it also assesses its adequacy 
                                                 
31 See Section 4.6.3, Regulatory Capacity.  
32 Stakeholders in the payment system, everyone that has an interest in the payment system as was stated in 
Kenya Payment System, Framework and Strategy (2004) <http://www.docin.com/p-433903551.html> 
accessed 3 September 2014. 
33 Section Regulation of Mobile Payments Prior to the National Payment Systems Act 2011. 
34 Banking Act, CAP 488 Laws of Kenya. 
35 See Section 4.6.3., Regulatory Arbitrage.pg,195.  
36 This alludes to a an ideal standard or base model of regulation; J. Luis Guasch and Pablo Spiller,  ‘The 
Challenge of Designing and  Implementing Effective Regulation: A  Normative Approach and an Empirical  
Evaluation’ (2012) The World Bank <http://www 
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/07/17/000386194_2012071
7015947/Rendered/PDF/710190WP0Publi0ing0and0implementing.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. 
See, generally, Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge 
University Press 2007); Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: the Rise of the Post Regulatory State 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2004). 
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and appropriateness to regulate mobile payments based on regulatory strategies it might 
apply, and particularly its appropriateness to protect consumers.37  
 
 
 
PART I 
4.2. An Examination of the Current Regulatory Framework for Mobile Payments 
Systems 
 
In Kenya, financial services regulation is characterised by fragmented or 
multiplicity of regulatory authorities that oversee different subsectors of the financial 
system,38 in a system with regulatory gaps, overlaps, inconsistency of regulations, and 
differences in operational standards.39 Since mobile payments exist in a converged 
regulatory space between the telecommunications industry, which provides the platform 
for the operation of the technology, and the central banks, which regulate financial 
services functions, mobile financial services readily fall through regulatory gaps.40 
                                                 
37 The idea of fragmentation generally comes from the idea of a lack of normative or institutional hierarchy 
that addresses the regulatory concerns in a structured way; instead, there exists a lack of consolidation of 
the regulatory instruments which leads to inconsistencies in their application. See, Radha Upadhyaya, 
‘Analyzing the Sources and Impact of Segmentation in the Banking Sector: a Case Study of Kenya’ (PhD, 
University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies, 2011), where she addresses rather elaborately 
the state of fragmentation in Kenya’s financial services sector regulation. Also fragmentation exists in other  
areas of law such as in international law as was discussed in Martti Koskenniemi et al, ‘Fragmentation of 
International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 553. 
38 Nzomo Mutuku, ‘Case for Consolidated Financial Sector Regulation in Kenya’ (2008) Retirement 
Benefits Authority <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1837354> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Section 4.2. The current regulatory framework looks at Kenya’s legal institutional arrangements as a 
precursor to mobile payments’ inception and the regulatory environment through which mobile payments 
operated.  
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Because the NPSA has only recently taken effect,41 the Banking Act of 1989 (CAP 
488),42 the Banking Act of 1969, banking in Kenya was regulated under a piece of 
legislation from the colonial era, namely, the Banking Ordinance. The 1969 Act allowed 
the Minister of Finance to license banks and non-bank financial institutions. It also gave 
the CBK the responsibility of inspecting all financial institutions. The Banking 
(Amendment) Act, 1985 changed the licensing regime, such that the CBK did so with the 
Minister’s approval. A series of bank failures in Kenya led to the Deposit Protection Fund 
(DPF) in 1986. For a comparative and historical perspective on banking in East Africa 
the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, the Companies Act (Cap 486) of 1978, the Building 
Society Act (Cap 489) of 1989 and the Cheques Act of 1957 provide a relevant legal 
framework.43 Kenya has some 169 institutions in the formal banking sector. There are 
about 43 commercial banks,44  about 123 foreign exchange (hereafter forex) bureaus,45 
several but few mortgage finance companies, and six licensed deposit taking microfinance 
institutions.46 The Central Bank, holds the primary financial system regulator’s mandate, 
                                                 
41 Kenya enacted NPSA in 2011 but public consultations about it began in October 2013 and it became 
operational on 1 of August 2014, its implementation is still underway. 
42 Arnaldo Mauri, ‘The Currency Board and the Rise of Banking in East Africa’ University of Milan 
Economics, Business and Statistics Working Paper. The National Payment System Framework Strategy. 
2004. Financial services regulation in Kenya is characterised by fragmented or a multiplicity of regulatory 
authorities that oversee different subsectors of the financial system. I focus specifically on the current 
regulatory framework in which mobile payments have been operational in advancing my arguments.  
 
43 CBK, ‘Payment System in Kenya’ (2003) 1 
<http://www.centralbank.go.ke/downloads/nps/nps%20old/psk.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. Laws 
relating to the use of cheques are based on English law, primarily the Cheques Act of 1957 and the Bills of 
Exchange Act 1882. 
44 Schedule 1, Central Bank of Kenya Act of 1966, Cap 491 Laws of Kenya; Central Bank of Kenya, 
‘Introduction to Financial System’ <http://www.centralbank.go.ke/financial 
system/banks/Introduction.aspx> accessed 3 September 2014: Out of the 44 banks, 31 are locally owned; 
13 are foreign owned. Out of the 31 local banks, three comprise banks with significant government state 
corporations shareholding (National Bank of Kenya is 70.6 per cent government owned; Consolidated 
Bank is 77 per cent government owned; Development Bank of Kenya is 100 per cent government owned); 
27 are commercial bank which include Equity Bank,  among the largest banks in East Africa.  
45 Retirement Benefits Authority, ‘Registered Schemes’ 
<http://www.rba.go.ke/media/docs/schemes/Registered-Schemes.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
46 Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Deposit Taking Microfinance Institutions’ 
<https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/bank-supervision/microfinance-institutions/14-bank-
supervision/83-list-of-licensed-deposit-taking> accessed 3 September 2014: these are Faulu Kenya DTM 
Ltd; Kenya Women Finance Trust DTM Ltd; Remu DTM Ltd; SMEP DTM Ltd; UWEZO DTM Ltd; 
Rafiki DTM – with a total of 54 branches nationwide between them. Ndung’u (2009) op cit note 2. In 2007, 
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which includes the regulation of banking, payments and financial services, as prescribed 
under the Central Bank Act (Cap 481) 1966.47 Section 4 of the Act states that the CBK’s, 
core mandate is to  
‘‘formulate and implement monetary policy directed at achieving and maintaining 
stability in the general level of prices,  by fostering the liquidity, solvency and 
proper functioning of a stable market-based financial system, and will support the 
economic policy of the Government, including its objectives for growth and 
employment.’’48 
Before the drafting of the National Payment Systems Draft Bill, there were two 
divisions charged with the regulatory oversight of payments systems,49 the National 
Payment System Division and the Banking Supervision Department (herein BSD) which 
oversaw banking activities until 2011. The BSD oversaw commercial banks as well as 
non-bank financial institutions, mortgage finance companies, building societies, foreign 
exchange bureaus, deposit-taking microfinance institutions and credit reference bureaus.50  
The BSD licensed financial institutions under the Banks Act, and had a broad mandate 
in policy and surveillance.51 Along with the National Payment System Division, it dealt 
with the development of legal and regulatory frameworks and effectively ensured the 
stability and efficiency of accessing financial services through supervision of their 
                                                 
an estimated 19 per cent of the adult population had access to formal financial services through banks, with 
8 per cent served by MFIs and SACCOs. See CGAP (2010b) op cit note 2. 
47 The CBK was established in 1966 under the Central Bank Act (Cap 481) 1966. Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK),  
‘Central Bank of Kenya: Background Information’ (2011) <http://goo.gl/FnLsy> accessed 3 September 
2014. 
48 CBK, ‘CBK Mandate’ (2009) <https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/cbk-objectives> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
49 Njuguna Ndung’u, ‘Mobile and Agency Banking in Kenya’, Address by Prof Njuguna Ndung’u, Governor 
of the Central Bank of Kenya, at the Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries Programme on 
‘Mobile and Agency Banking in  Kenya’ (2013) Kenya School of Monetary Studies 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r130515c.pdf?frames=0> accessed 3 September 2014.  
50 CBK, ‘Oversight of Payment System in Kenya: Policy Framework’ (2009) <http://goo.gl/OIu0D> 
accessed 3 September 2014.  
51 CBK (2009) op cit note 43.  
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financial conditions, either through institutions or through examining their compliance. 
They regulated payments systems.52 Mobile payments had no specific industry regulatory 
oversight;53 however, mobile payment systems were generally regulated through ad hoc 
supervision by both the CCK and the CBK.   
4.2.1. The Regulatory Authorities  
 
As previously stated, there is very little analysis or attention paid to the role of the 
CCK in regulating mobile payments. While the CBK certainly has primary authority, the 
Kenya Information and Communications Act 1998 classifies mobile payment systems 
such as M-Pesa as Value Added Services (VAS) in the context of telecommunications.54 
In addition, mobile financial services including mobile payments systems are modelled 
into essentially electronic transactions regulated by the CCK.55 
 
4.2.1.1. The Central Bank of Kenya  
 
Article 231 of the Constitution of Kenya 201056 and Section 3 of the Central Bank 
Act57 establish the CBK. The CBK’s mandate calls for formulating monetary policy, 
promoting price stability, issuing currency, and formulating and employing policies to 
promote stability and the establishment, regulation, and supervision of efficient and 
                                                 
52 Leon Perlman in his PhD thesis (n 25) provides the term regulatory lacuna as the gaps in regulatory 
frameworks that present a regulatory dilemma and deems them problematic in the regulation of mobile 
financial services. 
53 This was actually an enabling environment, See Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4.pg 46. 
54 Jeremmy Okonjo, ‘Chapter 2: the Impact of Convergence of Mobile Telecoms and Financial Services on 
Regulation of Mobile Telecommunications’ (2014) <http://www.slideshare.net/JeremmyOkonjo/2-
chapter-two-impact-of-convergence-of-mobile-financial-services-on-regulation-of-mobile-telecoms-in-
kenya> accessed 3 September 2014. 
55 Provisions are made for the recognition of electronic transactions in Kenya as part of the Kenya 
Information and Communications Act, Part VIA.  
56 The Constitution of Kenya 2010,  
<http://www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010> accessed 3 September 
2014.  
57 The Central Bank of Kenya Act 1966, amended 2010. 
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effective payment and settlement systems. The CBK licenses, regulates, and supervises 
banking and microfinance businesses and regulates and supervises payment systems and 
payment service providers.58 Therefore the CBK has core regulatory oversight of mobile 
payments.  
Kenya’s Central Bank is typical in that it has three monetary policy imperatives,59 
and has a natural monopoly over issuing legal tender. Some scholars, however, believe 
that monetary policy and the Central Bank monopoly is trite and artificial, that money is 
a commodity and that therefore ‘no institution is required to regulate the supply of money 
on a free market’. The premise is based, however, more on the use of gold as the standard 
of determining a currency’s unit of account. However, mobile money and electronic 
money generally deplete this monopoly. While some national or supra-national60 
governments give their Central Banks general monopoly rights too many fiscal systems, 
the CBK has monopoly rights to interest rates, the creation of policies for money supply, 
legal tender issuance, banknotes, and the oversight of the integrity of national payments 
systems.61 Several developing countries have recognised the importance of payment 
systems and have made amendments to their legislation to extend their central bank’s 
powers to verse the systems, a model the CBK might follow.62 The Bank of International 
Settlement (BIS) also concurs that payment systems are of great importance.63 The 
                                                 
58 Jeremmy Okonjo, (n 55). It is unclear whether payment services providers in the context of mobile 
payments includes electronic money. However there is a clear distinction in my view of the two. 
59 Leon J Perlman (2012) (n 25); see, John B Taylor, ‘The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: an Empirical 
Framework’ (1995) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 11460–11478; and see, François Gianviti, Current 
Legal Aspects of Monetary Sovereignty (2004) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/gianvi.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
60 Such as the European Union government.  
61 Ibid at 65. 
62 The Federal Reserve of the US has updated its legislation to include mobile payments under regulation 
Z that ensures financial integrity and Nigeria has updated their Payments Systems Law, The Regulatory 
Framework for Mobile Payments in Nigeria, <http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/01/Regulatory-
Framework-for-Mobile-Payment-Systems-in-Nigeria.pdf> accessed 22 September 2014.  
63 Committee on Payment Systems, ‘Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems’ Bank of 
International Settlements 2001. See also David Sawyer and John Trundle, ‘Core Principles for Systemically 
Important Payment Systems’ (2001) 8 Financial Stability Review 
<http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d43.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
155 
 
Central Bank of Kenya also controls the National Payments System (hereafter NPS) 
through the reduction of systemic risk as discussed in Chapter 3.64 The CBK examines 
risks within Kenya’s banks to ensure against panic among participants or within the 
banking and payments system by examining deposits.65 The Central Bank also has 
oversight over payment mechanisms,66 facilitating the interchange of payments in 
settlement of debt between banks, and by extension, others engaged in payment 
services.67 Thus national payment systems are at the core of the modern Central Bank’s 
role, with the Central Bank acting to supply money for settlement of payments.68  
 
4.2.1.2. The Communications Commission of Kenya 
 CCK69 is the independent regulatory authority for Kenya’s communications 
industry. It licenses and regulates telecommunications, including radio communication, 
postal and courier services. It also issues licenses to internet service providers and other 
industries; its purview extends beyond unlicensed frequencies. Its role extends to the 
development and coordination of policies and strategies for the development and 
operation of telecommunications services in Kenya. Its establishment in 1999, was 
                                                 
64 See Chapter 3  
65 The payment services component allows transportation of value along a payment system. 
66 The BIS sees this oversight as promoting the smooth functioning of payment systems and to protect the 
financial system from possible ‘domino effects’ which may occur when one or more participants in the 
payment system incurs credit or liquidity problems. The oversight of payment systems is aimed at a given 
system (e.g. a funds transfer system) rather than at individual participants. See CPSS, ‘Payment and 
Settlement Systems in selected Countries’ (2003) <http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss54.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014; Fraser (1994)  
67 Leon J Perlman (2012) (n 25).  Historically, this monopoly oversight and involvement evolved because 
of disparate mechanisms of payment that led to market inefficiencies and weaknesses in payment, and the 
need for an efficient mechanism of payments. 
68 In 1998, the US Federal Reserve stepped in to preserve the financial markets when it filled a payment 
void left by the multibillion dollar failure of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund. See Kevin 
Dowd, ‘Too Big to Fail?: Long- Term Capital Management and the Federal Reserve’ (1999) Cato Briefing 
Paper No 52 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp52.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
69 Although at the time of writing this chapter the Regulatory Authority for Communications was the CCK, 
this title has changed to the Communications Authority of Kenya. However, this chapter shall continue to 
refer to the Authority as the CCK rather than the CAK for fluidity. 
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welcomed after the Kenya Post and Telecommunication Corporation (KP&TC), was 
divided into CCK, the Postal Corporation of Kenya (PCK) and Telkom Kenya.70  
The Kenya Communications Act No. 2 of 1998 established the CCK, which came 
into existence in 1999. The Act unbundled the Kenya Postal and Telecommunications 
Corporation (KP&TC) into five separate entities: the Communications Commission of 
Kenya (CCK), which is the regulator; the National Communications Secretariat (NCS), 
which serves as the policy advisory arm of the government on all matters pertaining to 
the information and communications sector; the fixed-line operator, Telkom; the Postal 
Corporation of Kenya (POSTA); and a Communications Appeals Tribunal.71 In 
recognition of the rapid changes and developments in technology which have blurred the 
traditional distinctions between telecommunications, information technology (IT) and 
broadcasting, the Kenya Communications (Amendment) Act 2009 improved the 
regulatory space and jurisdiction of CCK, and successfully transformed it to a converged 
regulator. 
The CCK regulates all MNOs, the oldest of which is Safaricom Limited, which 
was established in 1997 as a fully-owned department of the KP&TC.72 Forty per cent of 
Safaricom shares were transferred to Vodafone Kenya Limited, which sold 25 per cent 
of its own shareholding while 10 per cent of Safaricom’s shares – to Mobitelea Ventures 
Limited, a company resident in Guernsey in the United Kingdom. The CCK took over 
the KP&TC’s 60 per cent of shares.73 
                                                 
70 Africog, ‘Cause for Public Concern on the Telkom Privatization and Safaricom IPO’ 
<http://www.africog.org/reports/Cause%20for%20Public%20Concern%20over%20safaricom%20IPO.
pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
71 Alice Munyua  and Muriuki Mureithi, ‘Kenya’ (2007) Global Information Society Watch (GISW) 2007 
Report http://www.globaliswatch.org/en/node/500 accessed 3 September 2014.                    
72Africog, ‘Cause for Public Concern on the Telkom Privatization and Safaricom IPO’ 
<http://www.africog.org/reports/Cause%20for%20Public%20Concern%20over%20safaricom%20IPO.
pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
73 Ibid.  
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4.3. Functions, Roles and Powers of the Central Bank of Kenya in 
Regulating Mobile Payments 
 
The central bank has the responsibility of overseeing the payment systems in the 
country.74 The CBK, as the financial regulator,75 has taken the lead to shape and 
implement the regulatory framework for mobile payments systems.76 Since mobile 
financial services have developed and evolved, and continue to do so,77 the role of the 
central bank has to be re-examined in order to strike a balance between protecting the 
interests of the public78 (the consumers) and over burdening the central bank to the 
exclusion of its main roles.79  The CBK has recognised that it must regulate new mobile 
financial services80 but has not provided specific regulation for stored value payments, on 
the logic that a rigorous regulatory framework would stifle innovation and impede the 
development of new technologies in the delivery of financial services, and therefore 
frustrate efforts to include the unbanked and under banked.81 I argue that this failure 
leaves the mobile payment system vulnerable to risks.82  
                                                 
74 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, ‘Policy Issues for Central Banks in Retail Payments’ 
(2003) Bank for International Settlements 1–3.   
75 The Central Bank is the financial sector regulator.  
76 Through its National Payments Systems Division, though initially very reluctantly. See Section titled Lack 
of Political Will to Regulate Leading to Regulatory Inertia  
77 The development of mobile financial services in general have morphed to include various financial 
products, such as M-Kopo, M-Kesho.  
78 See generally Michael E Levine and Jennifer L Forrence, ‘Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the 
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis’ (1990) Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 167; Joseph E 
Stiglitz, The Role of the State in Financial Markets, vol 21 (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica 1993). 
79 Oliver James, ‘Regulation Inside Government: Public Interest Justifications and Regulatory Failures’ 
(2000) 78 Public Administration 327. 
80 In fact, for those in Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, South Africa and Nigeria, African countries modernising 
their payments systems to include mobile financial services due to its efficiency and inclusiveness. See. The 
Africa Competitiveness Report (2013) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Report/africa-
competitiveness-report-2013-main-report-web.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
81 Central Bank Governor, Njoroge Ndung’u interviewed by Simon Di Castri on the Test and Learn 
Approach to banking the unbanked. Simone di Castri, ‘A Conversation with Professor Njuguna Ndung’u, 
Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, on the critical policy issues around mobile money’ (2013)  
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/a-conversation-with-professor-njuguna-
ndungu-governor-of-the-central-bank-of-kenya-on-the-critical-policy-issues-around-mobile-
money> accessed 3 September 2014.  
82 At the time of writing this thesis the law was enacted but was not enforced and was not in effect. 
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The mobile payment system has equipped non-financial institutions and non-
banks to provide financial products and services that are not under the purview of the 
financial regulatory authority, the CBK. This has complicated the regulation of MNOs; I 
argue this definition as a payment system provider has been problematic and that the 
CBK needs to extend its reach in its regulatory roles and functions.83 The need to protect 
the public from risk without over-regulating imposes a regulatory challenge.84 Baldwin et 
al.85 discuss the four-fold challenge central banks face in developing countries:86 limited 
capacity, limited commitment, limited accountability, and limited fiscal efficiency. Limited 
capacity refers to the state’s structural and resource limitations in the face of well-
resourced private interests; limited commitment refers to the frequent failure of 
governments of developing countries to fulfil their promises; limited accountability refers 
to the lack of expectation of transparency; and limited fiscal efficiency refers to the general 
poverty of such governments, and therefore their limited capacity to pay for infrastructure 
services.87 Such governments are vulnerable to capture88 as well as arbitrary or biased 
decision-making. 
These challenges make reform all the more necessary; and further the regulatory 
framework, which should be applicable to exclusive provision of mobile payments, 
should permeate different ministries89 within the Kenyan government. The development 
of mobile payments has made it imperative that the CCK and the CBK have clearly 
                                                 
83 See Part II, Overall Regulatory Challenges for the Regulatory Authorities in Regulating Mobile Payments.  
Regulatory Capacity.  
84 This overregulation would create a rigid market, stifling flexibility of operation and development.  
85 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice 
(Oxford University Press 2011) 415. 
86 Antonio Estache and Liam Wren-Lewis, ‘Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: 
Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead’ (2009) Journal of Economic Literature 729; Jean-Jacques Laffont, 
Regulation and Development (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
87 Ibid at 84, one of the key aspects is how to deal with populations that are unlikely or unwilling to pay for 
services rendered especially in electricity. 
88 See Levine and Forrence (n 80); Ernesto Dal Bó, ‘Regulatory Capture: a Review’ (2006) 22 Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 203. 
89 The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Information Communication and Technology,  
<www.govermentofkenya.com> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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defined roles.90 Kenya at present does not have a single regulator for its non-financial 
institutions that perform financial functions.91 This calls for a clear definition of the two 
entities’ roles and functions under separate legislation as a necessary precursor to 
enforcement. Relevant regulatory authorities would have to ensure a workable 
relationship and prevent regulatory overlaps and conflicts, and that the regulatory 
functions protect consumers.  
Section 4 A (i)d of the Central Bank of Kenya Act requires the CBK to formulate 
and implement policies to promote the establishment, regulation, and supervision of 
efficient, effective payment, clearing, and settlement systems.92  It also calls on the CBK 
to ensure smooth implementation and transmission of monetary policy objectives and 
public confidence in the domestic financial system.93 The CBK already has the specific 
mandate to establish a clearing house in order to facilitate the clearing of cheques and 
other credit or payment instruments for the banking institutions and other financial 
institutions,94  and the NPSA strengthens the CBK’s role with respect to mobile payment 
systems.95 The CBK however has no wide powers that cover the regulation of non-
financial institutions, as Kenya lacks a consolidated financial sector regulator.96 This then 
calls for regulatory oversight of non-financial institutions in the payment systems arena 
by the CBK and not just the industry regulator the CCK.  
                                                 
90 See, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems Secretariat, ‘The Contribution of Payments Systems 
to Financial Stability’ (2000) Bank for International Settlements. 
91 Ibid at n 39,  Mutuku (2008)  
92 Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Role of National Payment Systems’ < 
http://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/role-of-national-payment-systems> accessed 3 September 
2014. The Central Bank’s overall objective as provided under Section 4 A (i)d of the Central Bank of Kenya 
Act is to formulate and implement such policies as to best promote the establishment, regulation and 
supervision of efficient, effective payment, clearing and settlement systems. Available at Central Bank of 
Kenya, <www.cbk.co.ke> accessed 3 September 2014.   
93 Central Bank of Kenya Act 1966.  
94 ‘National Payment Systems in Kenya’ (2003) published by the Central Bank of Kenya. 
95 The National Payment Systems Division was created for these purposes. 
96 See Mutuku (2008) (n 39); Francis Mwega, ‘The Competitiveness and Efficiency of the Financial Services 
Sector in Africa: A Case Study of Kenya’ (2011) 23 African Development Review 44.; Simon P Nkeri, ‘The 
Case For Consolidated Regulation Of Financial Conglomerates In Kenya’ (2014)  
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 The CBK must examine its resources which would include adequate personnel 
to be responsible for various regulatory tasks or the overall microprudential oversight. 
Their involvement would not only include monitoring the provider of the retail payment 
services, but also in gathering and analysing the information on the payment instruments, 
including issues related to the market and development of mobile payments products. 
and the concerns of a rigid regulatory framework for an evolving payment system to 
assess whether it can realistically take on this regulatory role.97 The CBK would have to 
discern the various risks that might arise and assess how these risks can be properly 
managed.98 This would include oversight over the acceptable degree of risks.99 The 
systemic nature of the payments system has to be examined, as the failure of one 
participant may have systemic implications.100 This would mean that various risks such as 
integrity risks and reputational risk would have to be considered in order to restore 
confidence amongst consumers and the financial stability of the payment system as 
whole.101 
For the CBK to accommodate all these issues, it has to expand its ambit and reach 
into what it monitors. As mobile payments grow, they increasingly affect the stability of 
the financial system.102 The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the BIS 
has made comprehensive reviews of retail payments. Previously concentration was placed 
on the payment instruments themselves and how they were settled, but recently focus has 
shifted to the implications of retail payments, especially innovative ones that have proven 
                                                 
97 ‘Implications for Central Banks of the Development of Electronic Money’ Bank for International 
Settlements See, ‘Innovations in Retail Payments and the BIS Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems’ 
(2008) IFC Bulletin 31. 
98 Ibid, Marc Hollanders 
99 Ibid. This acceptability of risks means that not all risks can be prevented or mitigated as all payment 
systems are inherently risky. See Chapter 3, Inherent Risks In the Payment System. 
100 See Chapter 3. 
101 See Chapter 3. 
102 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5, Success of Mobile Payments: Financial Inclusion. Tommaso Paedoa-
Schioppa, ‘Policy Issues for Central Banks in Retail Payments (2003) Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (n 58). I also discuss extensively the relationship between financial stability and the 
payment system.  
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financially inclusive on central banks. Therefore, to fulfil its regulatory role, the CBK has 
to keep abreast of the development of new and innovative retail payments systems. New 
alternatives for payment will likely continue to develop, and the CBK’s role in protecting 
consumers is crucial.103 
 To date, the CBK has allowed mobile payment systems to develop without its 
oversight; it particularly allows MNOs to act independently.104 Consumers, ill-equipped 
by scant knowledge and understanding of payment systems, do not understand the risks 
and the CBK’s neglect leaves them vulnerable.105 The introduction of M-Pesa106 has 
brought about an explosion in mobile payments; the CBK should give significant 
attention to the design and operation of and oversight of payment systems, 
acknowledging its contribution to the stability of the financial system.107 The development 
of the financial system and its concurrent technological demands should recognise the 
ensuing regulatory challenges, as the monitoring and the operation of the payment system 
will affect the smooth implementation of monetary policy and stability of the financial 
system.108  
The CBK would therefore have to examine all these schemes, but it may not have 
the appropriate resources.109  This are identified as the regulatory capacities, since as a 
developing country Kenya may not have all the necessary expertise on issues related to 
                                                 
103 Harry Leinonen, ‘Developments in Retail Payment Systems’ (2001) Bank for International Settlements 
Information Press & Library Services CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland 61. 
104 Regulatory strategies, see, Anthony Ogus, ‘Rethinking Self-regulation’ (1995) 15(1) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 97. 
105 The CPPS recommends an efficient and mature market for the industry to be able to develop retail 
payments systems on its own accord. See Paedoa-Schioppa (2003) (n58) 13–15.  However, MNOs cannot 
be assessed as mature markets, since their introduction into the Kenyan telecommunications market and 
their efficiency is debatable. See Chapter 3, Section on Operational Risks. 
106 Ibid  
107 See Chapter 3.  
108 Objectives of the CBK under Section 4 of the Central Bank Act 1966. 
109 See Chapter 4 on Section Regulatory Capacity. See also Rosa M Lastra, Central Banking and Banking 
Regulation (Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics and Political Science 1996) where the 
argument was put forth that the central banks in developing countries are frequently the only organisations 
that can be referred to due to a lack of an independent financial services regulator such as the PRA in the 
UK.  
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mobile money, especially where the Central Bank is relied upon for the safety and 
soundness of its payment systems.The NPSA has not provided a comprehensive 
regulatory framework.110 Further, externalities of a comprehensive regulatory framework 
may discourage innovation due to the compliance costs and the rigidity of the regulation 
instituted.111 Arguably, mobile payments should rely on market discipline112 to shape their 
regulation. However, I argue the CBK should offer guidance to the industries for the 
complete development of mobile payments and mobile financial systems due to their 
significance in the Kenyan retail payment system.  
The CBK has been very enabling and flexible to date. It has been lax in installing 
the regulatory framework and has adopted a ‘test and learn’113 approach to regulate mobile 
payments. Both market needs and consumer needs should drive the legal and regulatory 
framework on mobile payments; active participation by user groups to incorporate their 
specific requirements and circumstances, including consumer finance groups,114 through 
public consultations should guide the CBK’s actions. Public consultation should become 
a norm for legal and regulatory changes affecting mobile payment systems.  
As discussed in Chapter 2,115 the CBK has taken a piecemeal approach to 
regulating mobile payments. Various issues related to the implementation and the 
dichotomy and clarification of the status of MNOs and agents were left and continue to 
be unresolved. While the enactment of the NPSA does not necessarily indicate such 
                                                 
110 Section Part III the Challenges In The Enforcement of National Payment Systems Act 2011. 
111 Julian R Franks, Stephen M Schaefer and Michael D Staunton, ‘The Direct and Compliance Costs of 
Financial Regulation’ (1997) 21 Journal of Banking & Finance 1547. 
112 See Section on the theoretical considerations in regulating mobile payments, titled Market Discipline 
page ; Anthony I Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, vol 152 (Clarendon Press 1994); See also, 
Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2011) (n 87).  
113 This term was used by Njuguna Ndungu the Central Bank Governor, in his interview with Simone Di 
Castri (2013) (n 83).  
114 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in the US provides an appropriate regime in which public 
and private mechanisms for accountability can be sought by consumers, unlike the Consumer Protection 
Act 2012 in Kenya that does not assess the right of consumers who use financial services. 
115 See Chapter 2, Section Enabling Environment of Mobile Payments, Lack of a Regulatory Framework, 
page, 47.  
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deficiencies, currently, without better public consultations116 and with the liberal 
framework of mobile money the regulatory framework may become haphazard.117 
The regulatory capacity of the CBK is an important aspect to assess. Developing118 
countries often embrace legal transplantation,119 shaping their legislation by adapting the 
legal frameworks of developed120 countries, either through the continuation of post-
colonial legal frameworks or through transplantation from elsewhere.121 However, such 
transplantation must reflect the CBK’s regulatory capacity with respect to mobile 
payments.122 
 It is important to note that there is a hierarchy in the formation of laws in Kenya. 
The Constitution123  is the supreme law, and any law or custom in conﬂict with it is null 
and void to the extent of its inconsistency.124 The second tier of the hierarchy is statute 
law or Acts of Parliament, which are published in the Ofﬁcial Gazette. Laws transplanted 
                                                 
116 The first such public consultation was called on 18 October 2013, seven years after the inception of 
mobile payments.  
117 Without transparency, a haphazard regulatory framework may be instituted. 
118 There is no established convention for the designation of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries or areas 
in the United Nations system. United Nations, ‘Composition of Macro Geographical (Continental) Region’ 
(2013) <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#ftnc> accessed 3 September 2014. 
The designations ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ are intended for statistical convenience and do not 
necessarily express a judgment about the stage reached by a particular country or area in the development 
process  also see, United Nations, ‘United Nations Statistics Division: Standard Country and Area Codes 
Classifications (M49)’ (2012)  <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49.htm> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
119  The term ‘legal transplant’ was coined by scholar Alan Watson to indicate the moving of a rule or a 
system of law from one country to another as maintained by Watson, transplantation is the most fertile 
source of legal development. Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (University of 
Georgia Press 1974); Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2nd edn, University of 
Georgia Press 1993).    
120 Investment climate advisory services of the World Bank Group, ‘Better Regulation For Growth 
Governance Frameworks And Tools For Effective Regulatory Reform Regulatory Capacity Review Of 
Kenya’ (2010) <https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/uploads/Kenya.pdf> accessed 3 September 
2014.  
121 Eugene Cotran, ‘The Development and Reform of the Law in Kenya’ (1983) 27 Journal of African Law 
42, 42–61.  
122 Holger Spamann, ‘Contemporary Legal Transplants – Legal Families and The Diffusion of (Corporate) 
Law’ (2009) Brigham Young University Law Review 6, 1813  
123 The current constitution was adopted in 1963 and amended in 1999. Kenya has been involved in a 
constitutional review  process for the last three years, the population having rejected  the latest amendments 
in a referendum in 2007 
124 Article 3 of the Constitution of Kenya.  
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from the UK or India make up the third tier. The fourth source is decree law.125 The ﬁfth 
is case law, comprising judgments from the Court of Appeal and the High Court, which 
serve as precedents for lower courts. The ﬁfth source of law is customary law.126 The sixth 
source is Islamic customary law. Finally, international treaties and conventions are a 
source of domestic law as long as they have been ratiﬁed by Parliament.127 
The CBK does not grant MNOs operating licences that allow for the provision of 
mobile payments; the CCK has this power. So regulation should begin by clarifying the 
distinction between the CCK and the CBK.  A consensus has not yet been reached over 
the best way to address this interconnection and convergence of the telecommunication 
service and the financial service they offer128 and the varying institutional and capacity 
constraints will have to be reframed for Kenya.129 The scope of formal financial systems 
is severely limited, and poses an even greater set of conceptual and practical challenges, 
which shall be discussed.130 
The regulatory measures currently adopted and under consideration form part of 
the CBK’s regulatory capacity.  While Kenya seeks to ensure financial regulators’ political 
independence, it also avoids overregulation generally. Instituting effective regulatory 
                                                 
125  Decrees may be issued under the name of the President, but have to be submitted to Parliament for 
ratiﬁcation at its next session. 
126 Richard L Abel, ‘Customary Laws of Wrongs in Kenya: An Essay in Research Method’ (1969) The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 573. 
127 Yash Ghai, ‘Law, Development And African Scholarship’ (1987) 50 The Modern Law Review 750. 
128 Niall Hayes and Chris Westrup, ‘Context and the Processes of ICT for Development’ (2012) 22 
Information and Organization 23; Alliance for Financial Inclusion, ‘Enabling Mobile Money Transfer: The 
Central Bank of Kenya’s Treatment of M-PESA’ (2010) <http://www.afi-global.org/en/phoca-
publications-case-studies> accessed 3 September 2014. At the inception of M-PESA in Kenya in 2007, 
Safaricom lobbied the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) and the Communications Commission of Kenya 
(CCK) for authorisation to provide mobile money transfer services, without a regulatory framework. The 
CCK’s reluctance to step in as a primary regulator was probably due to its unfamiliarity with the new 
converged product. The CBK has hinged on its macroprudential regulatory mandate under Section 3 of 
the Central Bank of Kenya Act, to issue negative authorisation to the provision of mobile financial services 
by MNOs. This is by way of issuance of letters of No Objection. 
129 These capacity constraints include the lack of unified financial regulation and the fragmentation of the 
legislation as articulated by Mutuku (2008) (n 39). 
130 Financial Sector Regulation and Reforms in Emerging Markets  Hayes and Westrup. Hayes, N. and C. 
Westrup (2012), ‘Context and the Processes of ICT for Development’, Information and Organization.  
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structures in developing countries does not only include the technical design of the most 
appropriate regulatory instruments, it is also concerned with the quality of supporting 
regulatory institutions and their capacities.131 Therefore, this part will briefly show how 
regulation has evolved over time, from simply adopting foreign or international models 
and legal transplantation, towards creating models unique to local circumstances to 
accommodate mobile payments and the challenges they bring.132  
Regulatory capacity is an important aspect in a discussion of Kenya’s legal 
development in efforts to reconcile innovation and regulation133 to offer an enabling 
regulatory environment.134 Examining Kenya’s regulatory capacity requires considerable 
attention to be paid to regulatory design and operations regarding the creation of 
particular institutional devices or making resources available to allow strengthened 
regulatory capacity.135 Therefore, regulatory reform in infrastructure industries such as 
telecommunications is at the heart of changing doctrines of development. 136  
The CBK’s powers should prescribe and define the best practices and guidelines 
under which mobile payments should operate.  For instance, I argue in favour of limiting 
the funds that are stored in mobile accounts and on the amount they can spend for 
transactions per transaction and per day. The CBK should require KYC (Know Your 
                                                 
131 Jillian Hossein, Colin Kirkpatrick and David Parker, ‘Creating the Conditions for International Business 
Expansion: The Impact of Regulation on Economic Growth in Developing Countries - A Cross-Country 
Analysis’ (2003) <http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/30554> accessed 3 September 2014.  
132 Bede C Opata, ‘Transplantation and Evolution of Legal Regulation of Interconnection Arrangements 
in the Nigeria Telecommunications Sector’ (2011) 14 Int'l J Comm L & Pol'y 1, also this phenomenon shall 
further be discussed in Chapter 5:  Mobile Payments Regulation an Appropriate Approach.  
133 This dichotomy between ‘innovations versus regulation’ has been previously discussed in Chapter 1; it 
is also described as the Regulatory Dilemma by Leon Perlman in Legal Aspects of Mobile Financial  
134 See Chapter 2.The enabling regulatory environment has been used in various literature on mobile 
payments to describe the conducive conditions that have allowed mobile payments in Kenya to prosper, 
those have not been restrictive. This is also discussed in the first chapter as an altogether enabling 
environment which has contributed to mobile payment success in Kenya.  
135 Antonio Estache and Liam Wren Lewis, Toward A Theory Of Regulation For Developing Countries 
(American Economic Association 2009). 
136 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2011) (n 87). 
166 
 
Customer) regulations to apply when subscribers register for the service.137 It should also 
require MNOs to address security issues and possibly to pay interest on mobile accounts. 
Enforcement would require regular reports from the MNOs in order to assess and detect 
anomalies. The CBK should impose the management of float accounts through a 
guarantee of deposits which backs the float with real money in the bank.138 This offers 
protection against the misuse of customer money, and protection to customers in the 
event of an MNO bankruptcy. The CBK should conduct regular and unscheduled audits 
to ensure MNOs follow the regulations.139 The CBK should also be able to process the 
data collected from the various MNOs to perform studies on the local economy.  
 
4.4. Functions, Roles and Powers of the Communications Commission 
of Kenya in Mobile Payments 
 
The Kenya Communications Act, the Kenya Communications (Amendment) Act 
1 of 2009,140 and the Kenya Communications Regulations141 govern telecommunications 
in Kenya. The Communications Commission of Kenya, telecommunications regulator 
alongside the National Communications Secretariat, is housed in the Ministry of 
Information Communication.142 The Communications Act gives the CCK the right to 
issue regulations143 guided by the provisions of the relevant statutes. Its regulatory 
                                                 
137 Ismael Levergne, ‘Mobile Payment Regulation – the Regulator’s Role’ (2012) <https://www.gfg-
group.com/mobile-payments/2012/08/mobile-payment-regulation-the-regulators-role/> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
138 Ibid.  
139 Safaricom has to send audit reports to the CBK on a monthly basis.  
140 The Kenya Communications Act 2 of 1998, Kenya Gazette Supplement No 64, 9 November  1998 at 219–
220, available at <http://goo.gl/98dpL> accessed 3 September 2014. For a critical analysis of the Act, see 
Rebecca Wanjiku, ‘Kenya Communications Amendment Act (2009): Progressive or Retrogressive?’ (2009) 
<http://www.apc.org/en/system/files/CICEWAKenya20090908_EN.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
141 Kenya Communications (Amendment) Act 1 of 2009 <http://www.cck.go.ke/> accessed 3 September 
2014.  The Kenya Communications Act 2 of 1998 is now known as the Kenya Information and 
Communications Act 2 of 1998. 
142 Perlman, (2012) although the Ministries were renamed after the 2013 General Election in 2013. 
143 Ibid.  
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mandate encompasses telecommunications, broadcasting, and information technology.144 
The terms and conditions allow for licensees to set up telecommunications systems and 
provide telecommunications services to third parties.145 Their Unified Licensing 
Framework is technology and service neutral. It is structured as follows: 
(i) Network Facilities Provider,  
(ii) Application Service Provider, and  
(iii) Content Service Provider. An entity may be issued with multiple commercial 
licences, provided that it maintains separate accounts for each licence. With 
respect to content, licensees under this category provide ‘contents services 
material, information services and data processing services’.146 
Licensing, a form of regulatory power, especially applied to the 
telecommunications sector has legal, economic, and social foundations.  This power has 
the main objective of balancing public and private interests by controlling the benefits 
and disadvantages of a telecommunications market.147 In Kenya, mobile telephony and 
related services has fundamental for social, financial inclusion.148 The CCK selects 
applicants to provide telecommunications services, imposes conditions on licensees, and 
has the power to withdraw licences.149 Specific objectives of authorisation and licensing 
                                                 
144 Ibid at 99. 
145 Ibid at 144 
146 Ibid at 144, See also, Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK), ‘Market Structure – 
Telecommunications: Unified Licensing Framework’ (2011) 
<http://www.cck.go.ke/licensing/telecoms/market.html> accessed 3 September 2014. 
147 Jeremmy Okonjo, ‘Impact of Convergence of Mobile Financial Services on regulation of Mobile 
Telecoms in Kenya’ (2014) <http://www.slideshare.net/JeremmyOkonjo/2-chapter-two-impact-of-
convergence-of-mobile-financial-services-on-regulation-of-mobile-telecoms-in-kenya> accessed 3 
September 2014; Monica Kerrets, ‘ICT Regulation and Policy at a Crossroads: a Case Study of the Licensing 
Process in Kenya’ (2004.The Courts have also appreciated the nature of telecommunications services as 
public goods. For example, in Observer Publications Limited v Campbell Mickey Mathew and Others (2001) 10 
BHRC 252, a case from the Commonwealth Caribbean, which dealt with constitutional provisions relating 
to freedom of expression similar to those of the Constitution of Kenya of 1969, the Privy Council held that 
‘The airwaves are public property whose use has to be regulated and rationed in the general interest.’ 
148 Jenny C Aker and Isaac M Mbiti, ‘Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa’ (2010) Working 
Paper 211 <http://www.cgdev.org/files/1424175_file_Aker_Mobile_wp211_FINAL.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
149 Licensing powers are vested and operationalised by Sections 5 and 25 of the Kenyan Information and 
Communications Act, Cap 411A, Laws of Kenya. 
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include revenue collection,150 regulation of market liberalisation, market entry, public 
notification through transparency requirements, quality of service control, and regulatory 
enforcement.151 Other objectives include allocation of scarce resources152 and vesting of 
proprietary rights,153 and licensing as a form of competition regulation that allows market 
entry 154  
 Through this liberalisation, MNOs have entered mobile payments with minimal 
oversight, expecting to recoup investment in a sub-optimal market.155 The CCK initially 
restricted the telecommunications market to a duopoly; the two main MNOs, Safaricom 
and Airtel, invested their profits into infrastructure services such as M-Pesa,156 developing 
mobile payments players.157  
The CCK also regulates competition within the telecommunications services, 
although the Competition Act 2012 covers this in part. Section 23(2) (b) of the Kenya 
Information and Communications Act158  extends to mobile financial services, which have 
thoroughly integrated into the voice and data service provision. As James Bilodeaeau,  
                                                 
150 CCK’s total estimated income for the year 2012/2013 is Kshs. 6.22 billion. See Communications 
Commission of Kenya, ‘Annual Report Financial Year 2011/12’ (2013) 
<http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/documents/documents/11776/> accessed 3 September 2014.  
151 Leon Perlman, ‘Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Mobile Financial Services’ (2012) 
<http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/13362/thesis_perlman_lj.pdf?sequence=4> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
152 Ismael Lavergne, ‘Mobile Payment Regulation, The Regulators Role’ <https://www.gfg-
group.com/mobile-payments/2012/08/> accessed 3 September 2014. 
153 Ben Sihanya, ‘Infotainment and Cyber Law in Africa: regulatory benchmarks for the third Millennium’ 
(2000) Bernard Sihanya (2000) “Infotainment and Cyber law in Africa: Regulatory Benchmarks for the 
Third Millennium,” 10 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 583- 640 suggests that 
licensing allocation should be based on an applicant’s ability to deliver services. 
154 Statutory frameworks for competition, especially by way of licensing, are integral to the realisation of 
the freedoms of speech, expression and the media, under Articles 33 and 34 of the Constitution.  
155 Jeremy Okonjo (2014) (supra note 154); Ivan Mortimer-Schutts, ‘The Regulatory Implications of Mobile 
and Financial Services Convergence’ (2007) in ‘The Transformational Potential of M-Transactions: Moving 
the Debate Forward’ (2007) The Policy paper Series No. 6 
<http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodafone/about/public_policy/policy_papers/public_polic
y_series_6.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
156 Market restriction regulatory policies as an impediment to freedoms of speech, are considered.   
157 See James Bilodeaeau, William Hoffman, and Sjoerd Nikkelen, ‘Findings from the Mobile Financial 
Services Development Report’ (2011) the Capco Institute Journal of Financial Transformation.  
158 Section 23(2)(b) of the Kenya Information and Communications Act provides that the Commission 
shall ‘maintain and promote effective competition between persons engaged in commercial activities 
connected with Telecommunication services in Kenya in order to ensure efficiency and economy in the 
provision of such services and to promote research and development in relation thereto’. 
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contend, however, competitiveness does not necessarily guarantee high adoption rates.159  
In fact, Kenya, Tanzania, and Ghana, all of which have high mobile financial service 
adoption levels, lack highly competitive markets.160 With the opening up of the market to 
two additional players, Telkom Kenya161 and Essar,162 the market dynamics have changed. 
This has driven Safaricom, the dominant MNO, to be more careful in its infrastructure 
investments, as its market shrinks.163 Hence the CCK must carefully wield its licensing 
powers to promote competition, while also guaranteeing the growth of the telecom 
sector.164  
In summation, it is inevitable and imperative that in the mobile financial services 
environment, regulators should begin to rely on the market for self-discipline to an 
acceptable extent, since markets develop faster than the regulators can regulate. The 
correction of information asymmetry is a central role of regulators.165 In adherence with 
Systemically Important Payments Systems (SIPS), the CBK has to issue regulations 
related to the management of credit and liquidity risks by MNOs. The failure of the CBK 
to issue regulations and to identify certain polices pertaining to various matters on mobile 
payments in conjunction with the enforcement of NPSA poses the question of whether 
the CBK is ready to formulate a comprehensive regulatory framework for the service, as 
at present, the NPSA is not being applied.  
                                                 
159 Ibid   
160 James Bilodeaeau, William Hoffman, and Sjoerd Nikkelen, ‘Findings from the Mobile Financial 
Services Development Report’ (2011) the Capco Institute Journal of Financial Transformation. 
161 Communications Commission of Kenya, ‘Annual Report Financial Year 2008/09’ (2010) 
<http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/documents/documents/11776/> accessed 3 September 2014. 
162 Ibid.  
163 PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘Telecoms in Africa: Innovative and Inspiring’ (2012) 17(1) Communications 
Review 100  
164 Mike Nxele and Thankom Arun, ‘Regulatory Impact on the Development of the Telecommunications 
Sector in East Africa: a Case Study of Kenya’ (2005) Working Paper Series No 99 
<http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:idpmcr:30598> accessed 3 September 2014.  
165 Andrew Crockett, ‘Market Discipline and Financial Stability’ 26 Journal of Banking & Finance 977. See 
the balance of market discipline in bank regulation ‘In International Seminar- the Breakdown of Public 
&Private Law Dichotomy in Commercial and Financial Law (n208)81.103-105. 
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4.5. An Examination of the Legal and Regulatory Challenges in the 
Current Regulatory Framework  
 
Kenya’s Financial Institutions Supervision Department is responsible for the 
prudential regulation of banks and deposit-taking microfinance institutions. The 
Department’s primary concern is whether the MNOs such as Safaricom are stretching or 
even breaking the rules of the business of banking.166 However, the National Payment 
System (NPS) Division of the Central Bank and NPS Department, which emphasises the 
integrity, effectiveness, efficiency, and security of the payment system, views the MNOs 
as payment service providers.167   
While the NPS Division appeared more willing than the Financial Institutions 
Supervision Department to permit experimentation with mobile payments,168 due to the 
lack of a payment systems law at inception, the NPS Division has lacked the necessary 
tools, such as the specific regulations, to supervise the payment system.169 I offer some 
pertinent legal and regulatory aspects that present challenges in the effective regulation 
of mobile payments—specifically, challenges that exist in the statutes and the statutory 
instruments that defines the regulatory space170 in which they have been operating.  
 
 
                                                 
166 Notes on Regulation of Branchless Banking in Kenya – GSMA 2007 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/kenyanotesonregulation
branchlessbanking2007.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid 169. In its August 2004 strategy paper on the Kenya payment system, the CBK stated that it ‘is 
encouraging the population to move to non-cash payment instruments such as payment cards and 
electronic money.’ Kenya Payment System (Framework and Strategy) (2004) (n 23). Vii, which further 
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169 CGAP, ‘Notes on Regulation of Branchless Banking’ (2012) 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/kenyanotesonregulation
branchlessbanking2007.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
170 Broadly speaking the space in which mobile payments operate. Colin Scott, ‘Analysing regulatory space: 
fragmented resources and institutional design’ (2001) in Maurice Sunkin (ed), Public Law (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 2014) 329–353. 
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4.5.1. The Banking Act (CAP 488)  
 
The Banking Act of 1969171 regulated banks in Kenya, until the passage of the 
1989 Banking Act replaced it,172 while the 2006 Microfinance Act regulates microfinance 
institutions. The Banking Act of 1989, like many laws around the world, requires banks 
to have a valid licence from the CBK,173 and defines banks as companies that carry on, or 
propose to carry on, banking business in Kenya, including taking deposits from the 
public.174  
Section 2(1) defines a ‘banking business’ as: 
‘(a) the acceptance from members of the public of money on deposit repayable 
on demand or at the expiry of a fixed period or after notice; 
(b) the acceptance from members of the public of money on current account175 
and payment on and acceptance of cheques; and 
(c) the employment  of money held on deposit or on current account, or any part 
of the money, by lending …’                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
Further, a ‘financial business’ is defined as:176 
                                                 
171 The Banking Act 1989 (Cap 488). 
172 Prior to the Banking Act of 1969, banking in Kenya was regulated under a piece of legislation from the 
colonial era, namely, the Banking Ordinance. The 1969 Act allowed the Minister of Finance to license banks 
and non-bank financial institutions. It also gave the CBK the responsibility of inspecting all financial 
institutions. The Banking (Amendment) Act 1985 changed the licensing regime, such that the CBK did so 
with the Minister’s approval. A series of bank failures in Kenya led to the Deposit Protection Fund (DPF) 
in 1986. For a comparative and historical perspective on banking in East Africa, see Arnaldo Mauri, ‘The 
Currency Board and the Rise of Banking in East Africa’ (2007) Working Paper No 10 
<http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/milwpdepa/2007-10.htm> accessed 3 September 2014.  
173 Perlman (2012) (n 25). 
174 Banking Act, Section 2 – Kenya Law Resource Centre, ‘Statutory definitions of a bank’ 
<http://www.kenyalawresourcecenter.org/2011/07/statutory-definitions-of-bank.htm> accessed 3 
September 2014. 
175 Current account means an account maintained by a bank for, and in the name of, or in a name designated 
by, a customer of the bank into which money is paid by or for the benefit of such customer and on which 
cheques and other bills of exchange may be drawn by, and transfers and other banking transactions made 
on the instructions of, the customer. Banking Act, Section 2. 
176 Ibid. 
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‘(a) the acceptance from members of the public of money on deposit repayable 
on demand or at the expiry of a fixed period or after notice; and 
(b) the employing of money held on deposit or any part of the money, by lending, 
investment or in any other manner for the account and at the risk of the person 
so employing the money …’ 
 
A ‘financial institution’ in turn is defined in Section 2 as: 
‘A company, other than a bank, which carries on, or proposes to carry on, 
financial business and includes any other company which the Minister may, by 
notice in the Gazette, declare to be a financial institution for the purposes of the 
Act.’ 
 
Section 3 restricts the carrying on of ‘banking business’177 in that no one shall: 
 
‘(a) transact any banking business or financial business or the business of a 
mortgage finance company unless it is an institution which holds a valid licence; 
(b) unless it is a bank and has obtained the consent of the Central Bank, use the 
word “bank” or any of its derivatives or any other word indicating the transaction 
of banking business, or the equivalent of the foregoing in any other language, in 
the name, description or title under which it transacts business in Kenya or make 
any representation whatsoever that it transacts banking business; 
(c) unless it is a financial institution or mortgage finance company and has 
obtained the consent of the Central Bank, use the word “finance” or any of its 
derivatives or any other word indicating the transaction of financial business or 
                                                 
177 Banking Act 1989, Section 3. 
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the business of a mortgage finance company, or the equivalent of the foregoing 
in any other language, in the name, description or title under which it transacts 
business in Kenya or make any representation whatsoever that it transacts 
financial business.’ 
4.5.1.1. Challenges in the Application of the Current Regulatory Framework for 
Mobile Payments Systems 
 
The definitions in the Banking Act 1989 are problematic in relation to the specific 
regulatory needs of mobile payments, as they seem to create a gap in which MNOs can 
carry out ‘banking business’, without the preconditions and  prerequisites that banks in 
Kenya need.178 Although non-bank financial institutions may provide financial services—
local currency and payment services—without carrying out banking business as 
defined,179 the regulatory framework does not clarify what MNOs are in so far as they are 
defined as telecommunications companies that accept funds from the public. The only 
reference to such institutions is as ‘payment service providers’.180 There should be a 
compulsion to adequately define these institutions. To avoid MNOs taking advantage of 
these regulatory gaps, regulators’ understanding of the scope and concept of banking 
business as the Act defines it has changed and may continue to change as a result of 
innovation in the financial services industry.  
In fact, the concept of banking business has changed dramatically since the 17th 
century when the precursor to the modern banking system appeared as money deposited 
with goldsmiths.181 Historically, banking business has included the exchange of goods for 
                                                 
178 Ragnar Gudmundsson, Kethi Ngoka-Kisinguh and Maureen T Odongo, ‘The Role of Capital 
Requirements on Bank Competition and Stability: The Case of the Kenyan Banking Industry’ (2013) 
<http://www.kba.co.ke/workingpaperseries/img/pdf/Working_Paper_WPS_05_12[2].pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
179 ‘CGAP Annual Report 2007’ (2007) <http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Annual-Report-
Dec-2007.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
180 National Payment Systems Bill at the time in 2009.  
181 Rhys Bollen, ‘Recent Developments in Mobile Banking and Payments’ (2009) Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation 454; Alan L Tyree, Banking Law in Australia (Butterworths 1998). 
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economic advantage through providing a ‘deposit’,182 as well as the provision of loans to 
third parties based on the depositors, and the safekeeping of the goods.183 What would 
be regarded as modern banking emerged from the activities of organisations that collected 
savings from the general public in Europe during the mid-1800s, when large limited 
liability commercial banks were established in many countries.184 
Deposit taking activities have increased gradually into account transfer-based 
payments, slowly replacing currency and coin, since the mid-1800s.185 Banks today 
encompass a wide range of financial institutions and activities that provide services 
beyond payments, deposit taking and loan activities.186 Primarily as intermediaries 
between depositors and borrowers. In that sense they manage assets and liabilities 
between customers. This channelling of funds between borrowers and savers is known 
as financial intermediation. In some contexts intermediation may also be taken to mean 
the taking of loans from one party and loaning the values out fractionally to others at a 
higher interest rate. This may rather be described as bank intermediation. The process of 
creating a new asset (a loan) from liabilities (deposits) with different characteristics is 
called asset transformation. Financial intermediation could also be a synonym for 
payment intermediation, where the bank acts as a means to allow one person to pay 
another. Usually, though, this is simply known as ‘payment’ rather than intermediation as 
the latter term has a lending and credit connotation. Although banks have always asserted 
responsibility over providing credit, and handling deposits as well as cash and cheques, 
                                                 
182 In the 17th Century when merchants turned to goldsmiths to provide – or ‘deposit’ – their valuables for 
safekeeping and for pecuniary advantage, Henry D Macleod, The Theory and Practice of Banking, vol 1 
(Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer 1866 2012) 
<http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Theory_and_Practice_of_Banking.html?id=JKkyAQAA
MAAJ> accessed 3 September 2014.  
183 The law merchant’ (lex mercatoria). 
184 Ibid. 
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186 See Shelagh Heffernan, Modern Banking in Theory and Practice (John Wiley and Sons 2003) at 15; Richard 
Apostolik, Christopher Donohue and Peter Went, Foundations of Banking Risk: An Overview of Banking, 
Banking Risks, and Risk-Based Banking Regulation (Wiley Finance 2009) at 5. 
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through technology, banks have now entered into increasingly profitable, albeit risky 
territories.187 These risky territories are now becoming increasingly complex and the 
boundaries of their business are becoming unclear. 
 Furthermore, these territories may include niche markets and generalist banks 
that offer anything from bespoke payment, deposit, and lending services, to real estate 
services, stock brokering, derivative trading, life insurance, and even telecommunications 
and mobile products.188 The definition of what activities constitute banking has been 
problematic, due to the different existing business models. These models encompassed 
merchant banks, clearing banks, cooperative banks, mutual banks, and building societies 
as policy imperatives. In the context of mobile payments systems it creates, as Leon 
Perlman states, a lacuna between banking law and banking practice.189 
These variants beg the question of whether an entity whose main venture is not 
banking can be classed as a ‘bank’ engaged in the ‘business of banking’. Despite the fact 
that common law definitions of what constitutes a bank usually fill any statutory gap, this 
definition remains elusive.190 Still, as transformational technological advances such as 
mobile payments bring traditional banking services into the home, the local store, or the 
mobile handset, previously held notions of a physical bank with branches dealing with 
customers physically to provide core retail banking services are out of date.191  This should 
give rise to a reconceptualization of the traditional form of banking, vis-á-vis modern ways 
of advancing financial inclusion.  Consumers who use mobile payments for functions 
                                                 
187 Claudio E Borio and Renato Filosa, ‘The Changing Borders of Banking: Trends and Implications’ (1994) 
BIS Working Paper No 23 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=868431> accessed 3 
September 2014.  
188 See FNB Connect, a division of FNB Bank that offers fixed and mobile services to anyone, not only to 
bank customers.  
189 Perlman suggests that just as in Salmon J in Woods v Martins Bank [1959] 1 QB 55 at 56 said: ‘[T]he limits 
of a banker’s business cannot be laid down as a matter of law. The nature of such business must in case be 
a matter of fact, and, accordingly cannot be treated as if it were a matter of pure law. What may have been 
true of the Bank of Montreal in 1918 is not necessarily true of Martins Bank in 1958.’  
190 Joan Wadsley and Graham Penn, Law Relating to Domestic Banking (2nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2000) 91. 
191 Ibid at 89.  
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other than person to person payments perceive their mobile payments as accounts, just 
as bank customers perceive banks.192  
Nevertheless this examination of the meaning of ‘bank’ and the activities that 
constitute banking is an important one. Adequate regulation of MNOs requires clarifying 
their activities and their status in law. The customer–bank relationship creates a fiduciary 
duty to ensure the safety of customer funds through deposit guarantees. Banks’ 
important place in the financial system and unique privileges, which are both legal and 
practical,193 especially at the prudential level, justify their being the most regulated and 
supervised of economic sectors. Regulation ensures the safety and soundness of the 
financial system as a whole.  
On the other hand, definitions embedded in statutory instruments may not always 
provide accurate answers. New financial models challenge the views of what constitutes 
a bank, as an institution, and what constitutes banking business, especially in the context 
of mobile payments. As MNOs engage in a plethora of pseudo banking activities, 
reconceptualization of what banks are is necessary.  
 Around the world, the understanding of bank and bank activities continues to 
change.194 At the same time, different countries define these terms differently195 and an 
                                                 
192 Cynthia Merritt, ‘Mobile Money Transfer Services: The Next Phase in the Evolution of Person-to-
Person Payments’ (2011) 5 Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems 143; See also Maria Stephens and Lisa 
Dawson, ‘A Risk- Based Approach to Regulatory Policy and Mobile Financial Services’ (2011) Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Americas Center <http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/> 
accessed 3 September 2014.  
193 Ibid Cynthia Merritt, ‘Mobile Money Transfer Services: The Next Phase in the Evolution of Person-to-
Person Payments’ (2011) 5 Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems 143; 
194 The relationships that are created beyond the traditional core activities of intermediation, such as 
investment advice and safe storage of value, can be described as sui generis.  
195  See, for example, the Australian case Commissioners of the State Savings Bank of Victoria v Permewan Wright 
and Co Ltd  (1914) 19 CLR 457 (hereafter Permewan) where on the issue of the ‘business of banking’, Issacs 
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upon, and the utilisation of the money so collected by lending it again  in such sums as are required.’  
  As Tyree points out, this ‘reservoir’ definition does not require current accounts or payment facilities. 
Further, the purported ‘bank’ was not acting as a ‘banker’ since it neither allowed funds to be drawn upon 
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entity’s reputation may influence its determination as a bank.196 Common law views of 
banking as they stand provide some insight, but I emphasise that MNOs ingeniously 
escaped being classified as banks through the regulatory gap affixed to the statutory 
interpretation of the Banking Act. My inquiry will examine what and how institutions 
that provide financial services remain outside of the full application of the Banking Act 
in the Kenyan context.  
The examination of banking as a construct of law has been fairly recent. Its 
evolution originates from English law which has been both transplanted197 and 
incorporated into Kenyan law over time.198 The tapestry of laws and precedent that 
comprises a common law view of banking includes municipal banking legislation, while 
secondary law—such as banking law and precedents in other, similar jurisdictions—is 
used by Kenyan jurists to elucidate Kenyan law where it may be unclear, underdeveloped, 
or not developed at all on certain points.199 
Legal transplantation from English law to Kenyan law has shown the overarching 
influence of English law in the development of commercial and private law aspects as a 
result of the post-colonial transition.200 However, since English law has no all-
encompassing definition of banking for financial intermediation201 or clarification of what 
                                                 
by cheque nor did it collect cheques. See Alan Tyree, ‘The Business of Banking’ 
<http://austlii.edu.au/~alan/business-of-banking.html> accessed 3 September 2014.  
196 EP Ellinger, E Lomnicka and RJA Hooley, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2011) 69 
197 Ibid at 62. 
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‘Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy’ (2001) 39(4) Journal 
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201 Financial intermediation, See, Ross Levine, Norman Loayza and Thorsten Beck, ‘Financial 
Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes’ (2000) 46 Journal of Monetary Economics 31. 
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constitutes ‘business of banking’, 202 neither does Kenyan law.  Therefore, as RST Chorley 
acknowledged 40 years ago, with respect to British law ‘to construct a definition which 
would embrace the whole of it is manifestly impossible’.203 Therefore Kenya has to take 
a practical approach to defining the core ‘business of banking’,204 and it has done so by 
categorising characteristics that constitute banking business.205  
While the law has generally held that ‘deposits’ are part of the ‘business of 
banking’, whether stored value payments are deposits remains unclear, a question that 
leaves the lines between traditional bank participants and non-banks such as MNOs 
blurred.206 The fact that MNOs’ activities involve services from a pool of user funds 
complicates the question.  Primarily around transactional services sourced from a pool of 
user funds which may be conducted by non-bank entities, even though some of their 
activities and relationships with customers may resemble those of licensed banks. 
 
 
4.5.2. The Definition of ‘Deposits’  
 
Deposit taking by banks is subject to an interventionist and regulatory regime,207 
and jurisdictions around the world use deposit taking as a decisive indication of the 
                                                 
202 See, William S Holdsworth,  A History of English Law, vol 1 (Methuen 1922); Maximilian J Hall, Banking 
Regulation and Supervision: A Comparative Study of the UK, USA and Japan (E. Elgar 1993). 
203  Robert Chorley, Law of Banking (6th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 1974) at 23. 
204 Others indicate that core services which banks are said traditionally to provide are deposit collection, 
payment services and loan underwriting. See Richard Apostolik, Christopher Donohue and Peter Went, 
Foundations of Banking Risk: An Overview of Banking, Banking Risks, and Risk-Based Banking Regulation, vol 507 
(Wiley 2009).See also Rhys Bollen, ‘What is a Deposit (And Why Does It Matter)’ (2006) 13 eLaw J.  
205  While statutory definitions may buttress the common law definitions, the common law definition has 
been criticised as being overly restrictive when it hones in on precise mechanisms; see Eliahu Ellinger, Eva 
Lomnicka and Richard Hooley, ‘Ellinger’s Modern Banking’ (Oxford University Press 2006) at 73. 
206 Borio and Filosa (1994) (n 195). 
207 Alan Tyree, ‘The Business of Banking’ (2008) <http://austlii.edu.au/~alan/business-of-banking.html> 
accessed 3 September 2014; Benjamin Geva, ‘Bank Collections and Payment Transactions: A Comparative 
Legal Analysis’ (Oxford University Press 2001).  
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‘business of banking’, a definition that extends outside of banks—a deposit taking entity 
need not be a bank.208 If MNOs are taking deposits, the law requires them to apply deposit 
protection regimes, which has consequences for customers and MNOs alike.  Further, 
there is no de minimus209 measure of deposits; even small amounts deposited or paid into 
an account of sorts may trigger deposit analogies, even if an entity’s main business—
based on aggregate transactions and profit—is not financial intermediation. MNOs’ 
primary business is telecommunications services, but common law has not held that this 
disqualifies it from providing banking services or being regulated as such. In a general 
context and statute have determined the understanding of ‘bank’, ‘banker’, and the 
‘business of banking’. The common law and primary statutory definitions of banking in 
domestic law are ‘complementary’; where the common law proclaims that a ‘bank’ is an 
entity engaged in the ‘business of banking’, a statute may provide the important detail by 
defining exactly what the ‘business of banking’ entails.210 
Section 16(1) of the Banking Act of 1989 requires a valid licence to invite or accept 
deposits; Section 16(2) defines a ‘deposit’ as: 
‘[A] sum of money paid on terms under which it will be repaid, with or without 
interest or a premium, and either on demand or at a time or in circumstances 
agreed by or on behalf of the person making the payment and the person receiving 
it; and which are not referable to the provision of property or services or the 
giving of security.’211 
                                                 
208 Ibid 
209 Ana Carvajal et al, The Perimeter of Financial Regulation (International Monetary Fund 2009). See also 
AAMC Task Force on Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research, ‘Protecting Subjects, Preserving 
Trust, Promoting Progress II: Principles and Recommendations for Oversight of an Institution's Financial 
Interests in Human Subjects Research’ 78 Academic Medicine 237 Also, Louis De Koker, ‘Identifying and 
Managing Low Money Laundering Risk: Perspectives on FATF's Risk-based Guidance’ (2009) 16 Journal 
of Financial Crime 334. 
210 See similarly in relation to the effect of e-money on the business of banking and the traditional core 
activities WG Schulze, ‘Smart Cards and e-Money: New Developments Bring New Problems’ (2004) 16(4) 
SA Mercantile Law Journal at 712.  
211 Section 16(3) says that for the purposes of Section 16(2) money is paid on terms which are able to be 
referred  to the provision of property or services or to the giving of security if, and only if, it is paid by way 
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A business is a deposit taking business if:212 
‘(a) in the course of the business money received by way of deposit is lent to 
others; or 
(b) any other activity of the business is financed, wholly or to any material extent, 
out of the capital of or the interest on money received by way of deposit.’213 
 
The law further specifies that an entity that does not accept deposits on a day-to-
day basis, but only accepts them on particular occasions, is not a deposit taking business, 
whether or not it sells debentures or other securities.214 Additionally, to qualify as ‘banking 
business’, an entity must accept money on current accounts215 and cheques from members 
of the public, and employ the money or any part of the money held on deposit or on 
current account by lending. These criteria suggest that an entity must not only take 
deposits but must also lend funds in order to be captured by the statute. Another 
provision states that a deposit taking business must: 
 (a) receive money by way of deposit in that business which is lent to others via 
‘intermediation’,216 or 
                                                 
of advance or part payment under a contract for the sale, hire or other provisions of property or services, 
and is repayable only in the event that the property is, or services are not, in fact sold, hired or otherwise 
provided; if it is paid by way of security for the performance of a contract or by way of security in respect 
of loss which may result from the non-performance of a contract; or it is paid by way of security for the 
delivery up or return of any property whether in a particular state of repair or otherwise. In terms of Section 
16(4), a ‘deposit’ does not include a sum paid by the Central Bank or by an institution or the persons 
mentioned in Section 54; or a sum which is paid by a person to an associate of that person. 
212 According to the Banking Act 1969 Amended (2009). 
213 To determine whether deposits are accepted only on particular occasions, the CBK looks at the 
frequency of those occasions and to any characteristics distinguishing them from each other; Section 16(8) 
Banking Act. 
214 Section 16(6) of the Banking Act 1989. 
215 Banking Act 1989, Section 2 – Interpretation ‘Current Account’.  
216 Intermediation is a term used by the CBK to describe this process. See, for example, Gerald Nyaoma, 
'Mobile Payments regulatory Framework Perspectives in Kenya' (2010) <http://www.efina.org.ng/media-
centre/events/workshops/mobile-payments-regulatory-framework-dissemination-
workshop/forcedownload/91> accessed 3 September 2014; Gerald Nyaoma, 'Regulating Mobile Money: 
the Case of M-PESA' (2009) <http://www.afi-
global.org/sites/default/files/publications/GPF_Gerald_Nyaoma.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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(b) finance activities of the business, to a material extent, out of the capital of or 
the interest on money received by way of deposit.217 
 Hence, if  
(a) customer funds received are not loaned to others, and 
 (b) any interest received from those user deposits or the capital itself is somehow 
used to finance the business, the business may not qualify as a deposit taking entity. 
The CBK’s in-house counsel investigated218 M-Pesa and concluded it was not 
engaging in banking business. M-Pesa accepts repayable funds from the public, but, CBK 
concluded, Safaricom structured its services in such a way that it effectively fell outside 
the definitions of ‘banking business’, ‘financial business’ and ‘deposit’. As a ‘transaction’ 
and ‘financial business’, M-Pesa:  
 ‘(a) accepted from members of the public money on deposit repayable on 
demand or at the expiry of a fixed period or after notice; and also  
(b) employed this money held on deposit or any part of the money, by lending, 
investment or in any other manner for the account and at the risk of the person so 
employing the money’. 219 
The CBK concluded that agents’ practice of depositing their float into an M-Pesa 
account in a commercial bank mitigated any solvency risk, as required by section (b). 
According to CBK’s legal opinion, holding the (deposited) funds in a pooled trust account 
at a commercial bank that it could not access to fund its business via the capital and/or 
                                                 
217 To determine whether deposits are accepted only on particular occasions, the CBK looks at the 
frequency of those occasions and to any characteristics distinguishing them from each other; see Section 
16(8) of the Banking Act. 
218 AFI’s Mobile Financial Services Working Group, ‘Mobile Financial Services: Mobile-enabled Cross-
border Payments’ (2008) Alliance for Financial Inclusion. See also Mark Pickens, David Porteous and Sarah 
Rotman, ‘Banking the Poor via G2P payments’ (2007) 58 Focus Note; Ananda Fanon and Ismail Ateya, ‘A 
Preliminary M-Payment Model for M-Commerce in Kenya’ (2008) 
<http://www.strathmore.edu/pdf/ictc-08/m-payment.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
219 Kenya Law Resource Centre, ‘Statutory Definitions of a Bank’ 
<http://www.kenyalawresourcecenter.org/2011/07/statutory-definitions-of-bank.htm> accessed 3 
September 2014. 
182 
 
the interest, , meant that Safaricom avoided engaging in a ‘banking business’.220 MNOs 
often place consumer funds used to prefund the value in mobile money in pooled 
accounts (also called master or reservoir accounts) with prudentially supervised banks, 
where the trust which is set up for safety and soundness holds accounts. The commercial 
bank holds the value and remains distinct from the MNO, although both entities monitor 
the value increments or decrements. 
 Safaricom engaged the CBK from the pilot stage to avoid designation as a deposit 
taking entity; the then-Acting Governor of the CBK issued a letter of ‘No Objection’ to 
the commercial launch of the service in February 2007.221 The letter indicated that if M-
Pesa began to operate bank accounts222 its status might change. It required Safaricom to, 
‘put appropriate measures in place to safeguard the integrity of the system and protect 
customers against fraud, loss of money, and loss of privacy,’ to implement measures to 
protect the quality of service,’ to guard against money laundering, to keep proper records 
and supply them to regulatory authorities in formats as may be required from time to 
time, and to observe all existing laws governing its relationship with its agents and 
customers.’223  
These requirements related to operational risk, AML/KYC, systemic risk, 
consumer protection, agency risks224 and avoiding insolvency. 
                                                 
220 To determine whether deposits are accepted only on particular occasions, the CBK looks at the 
frequency of those occasions and to any characteristics distinguishing them from each other; see Section 
16(8) of the Banking Act 
221 AFI (2010a) op cit note 2 at 4 ; see also Mark Pickens, David Porteous and Sarah Rotman (2007) (n 
222); Fanon and Ateya (2008) (n 222).  
222 Safaricom (2011a).  
223 See criteria by CBK in Nyaoma (2010) (n 220). 
224 Risks brought on due to the exposure from mobile payments agents as discussed in Chapter 3Multi-
layered  Analysis of the Risks at Every Level of the Mobile Payments Ecosystems 
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At M-Pesa’s inception, the funds paid in were in specie,225 that is, at CBK’s 
insistence226  M-Pesa placed them in a special trust company, the not-for-profit M-Pesa 
Trust Company Limited.227 The Commercial Bank of Africa held the pooled account, 
from which228 any interest pooled accrues to the trust company, rather than to Safaricom 
or its users. Safaricom would cover any claims from fault by the trust company or by 
Safaricom,229 and through a fractional reserve model would offer a justification for 
instituting a deposit protection scheme, while M-Pesa (and its agents) earn revenue on 
fees for withdrawals, deposits and transfers.230 Over time, Safaricom has begun to use 
trust accounts231 with two commercial banks that pool client funds;232 it uses interest 
earned on these accounts as part of its corporate social responsibility programme, and 
thereby avoids taxes on the interest.233 There has always been a lack of clarity about where 
mobile money actually resides, who controls it and who can profit from the idle funds or 
float while they are sitting in the trust account. 
                                                 
225 Hugh Rockoff, ‘The Free Banking Era: A Reexamination’ (1974) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
141 
226 Protecting Customer Funds in Transformational Branchless Banking, CGAP (2007) (supra note 186) op 
cit note 2 at 5. 
227 It is not clear whether the funds from this trust company are invested by banks, however all interests 
earned are used as part of Safaricom’s Corporate Social Responsibility.  
228 A commercial bank in Kenya that holds the mobile payments funds from M-Pesa operations.  
229 Ignacio Mas and Amolo Ng'weno, ‘Three Keys to M-PESA’s Success: Branding, Channel Management 
and Pricing’ (2010) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1593387> accessed 3 
September 2014,  
230 It did, however, recently open up the opportunity to earn interest using a conventional bank account in 
an agreement with Equity Bank. Their M-Kesho scheme is a full savings account issued by Equity Bank, 
but marketed as an ‘M-Pesa Equity account’. M-Kesho accounts pay interest, but they do not have a limit 
on account balances and are linked to limited emergency credit and insurance facilities. Unlike its regular 
equity account holders who can only transact at the bank’s 140 branches, Equity’s M-Kesho customers will 
be able to transact at any of the 17,000 retail outlets that accept M-Pesa. ‘M-KESHO in Kenya: A New 
Step for M-PESA and Mobile Banking’ <http://www.financialaccess.org/blog/2010/05/m-kesho-kenya-
new-step-m-pesa-and-mobile-banking> accessed 28 September  2014 
231 CGAP, ‘Update on Regulation of Branchless Banking in Kenya’ (2010) 
<https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Regulation-of-Branchless-Banking-in-Kenya-Jan-
2010.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014; see also, Eliahu P Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and Christopher Hare, 
Ellinger's Modern Banking Law (Oxford University Press 2011).  
232 Ibid, Commercial Bank of Africa and Kenya Commercial Bank.  
233 CGAP, ‘Notes on Regulation of Branchless Banking in Kenya’ (2012) CGAP Focus Note 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/kenyanotesonregulation
branchlessbanking2007.pdf > accessed 3 September 2014.  
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As such, M-Pesa is not designed as a savings mechanism earning interest. 
Furthermore, since M-Pesa is not regulated as a bank, the NPSA has not yet come into 
effect,234 M-Pesa acted as a payments system, with users able to make payments and 
money transfers from their balance. The CBK’s decision to allow, enable235 and support 
M-Pesa at the time precipitated furious lobbying by the licensed banks to the Kenyan 
Ministry of Finance on the basis that M-Pesa was an ‘unlicensed bank’ and should be shut 
down.236 The CBK’s January 2009 audit of M-Pesa declared it safe237 on the basis that the 
average balance on M-Pesa accounts at around US $3 could not pose any systemic risk to 
the financial system; as stated in Chapter 3, this is a questionable finding.238 
4.5.3.1. Challenges in Its Application to the Current Regulatory Framework of 
Mobile Payments 
 
From an economic point of view, a deposit is an entitlement to receive the credit 
standing to a customer’s account.239 In common law, Foley v. Hill240 (hereafter Foley) 
established the legal view of a deposit, as it was found that an entity taking deposits is to 
be the debtor of the person making the deposit.241 Central banks seek to assist banks and 
provide stability before they reach crisis point through mandatory monitoring and 
                                                 
234 At the time of writing this chapter, there was no payment systems act.  
235 The CBK says that an enabling approach requires purposeful and continued engagement to understand 
and facilitate innovations that can improve financial inclusion. See Nyaoma (2010) (n 220). 
236 Daily Nation, ‘Michuki: Probe Cash Transfer’ (2008) < http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-
/1056/500454/-/u0kd67/-/index.html> accessed 3 September 2014.  
237 Ignacio Mas and Amolo Ng’weno (2010) (n 233) 
238 Ibid. Although this figure has increased exponentially as the metamorphosis of M-Pesa has advanced to 
encompass various needs the average transaction continues to increase and the figures should not be seen 
as minimal.  
239 Geva (2001) (n 211) 61; S v Kearney 1964 (2) SA 495 (A) at 503. 
240 Foley v Hill [1848] 2 HL C 28 at 45 (hereafter Foley). 
241 As per Lord Cottenham LC. In Scotland the relationship was described by MacKay L in Royal Bank of 
Scotland v Skinner 1931 SLT 382 at 384, OH as such: ‘After some fluctuation of opinion, it is now well 
settled that the relationship of customer and banker is neither a relation of principal and agent nor a relation 
of a fiduciary nature, trust, or the like, but a simple relation – it may be one-sided, or it may be two-sided – 
of creditor–debtor. The banker is not, in the general case, the custodian of money. When money is paid in, 
despite the popular belief, it is simply consumed by the banker, who gives an obligation of equivalent 
amount.’ 
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mandatory periodic reporting requirements.242 This ensuring of systemic soundness 
ultimately provides consumer protection.243 
Therefore, deposits in a banking context usually imply intermediation, where the 
deposit taking entity will lend out the value received at a higher rate of interest than it 
pays to the depositor. However Tyree asks the question, whether a business which accepts 
deposits but does not make any loans (or a business that provides loans but does not 
accept deposits), is carrying on ‘banking business’?244 He argues that taking funds and 
lending are not necessarily siren indications of deposit taking and intermediation leading 
to the ‘business of banking’, especially where it may relate to a closed, private entity of 
participants. As Safaricom only accepts funds from its subscribers, Tyree’s view suggests 
it should not be subject to regulation as a bank, although Ellinger245 takes a different view, 
indicating parallels between banks and mobile financial services systems.  These scholars 
suggest the existence of room for the reconceptualising of the concept of a ‘deposit’, 
which would facilitate the rethinking of the nature of deposits and their role in Kenya’s 
mobile payments system.  
       In a mobile payments context, the stored value payment, or float, is taken from 
the public and converted into a stored value account. The value received and exchanged 
for the ‘store of value’ could amount to a deposit and therefore trigger a prudential 
deposit regime or the alternative law precepts of deposit and banking.246 Because Kenyan 
law refers obliquely only to customers and banks, what constitutes a bank and the 
‘business of a bank’ are couched in functional descriptions of the activities of an entity. 
                                                 
242 Ibid at note 230. 
243 Consumer protection issues will be discussed in Part III of this chapter. 
244 Alan L Tyree, Banking Law in Australia (Butterworths 1990); Tyree (2008) (n 205) 17. In the Australian 
case of Australian Independent Distributors Ltd v Winter (1964) 112 CLR 443 (for example, the court held that 
the society was not carrying on the business of banking when it lent to its members for the purpose of 
acquiring land or buildings. In fact, none of the society’s money was used for making loans. 
245 Eliahu P Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and Christopher Hare, Ellinger's Modern Banking Law (Oxford University 
Press 2011). 
246 Ibid. 
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For example, whether the entity takes in monies in a process that can amount to its being 
legally described as a deposit, and if the associated activity can be seen as the licence-
requiring activity of ‘deposit taking’, remains unclear.  
Given the multitude of prospective service providers involved in taking funds 
from the public as in mobile financial services, the bespoke legal and commercial 
categorisations of companies by their core financial business are becoming blurred.247 
Service providers in mobile financial services may take redeemable and non-redeemable 
funds and may ultimately be classed as ‘banks’.   
Further complicating MNOs’ position, the ‘usual characteristics of a bank are not 
its sole characteristics’.248 A deposit is not a payment; a deposit of funds gives the 
depository the right to use the depositor’s money until it is called for by the depositor or 
another authorised person, while a payment occurs when a debtor transfers funds to a 
creditor to extinguish an existing debt.  
              MNOs’ focus on taking user funds not for intermediation purposes, but 
primarily and narrowly for payments, speaks to the broader issue of defining, or in this 
context redefining, the traditional concepts of the ‘business of banking’ and the ‘deposit’. 
Establishing appropriate regulation therefore remains complicated; the question arises, 
do mobile payments or any other mobile financial service schemes amount to deposit 
taking, and, if so, is this deposit taking carrying out the business of banking, and does it 
therefore give rise to the normal incidences of the bank–customer relationship? The fact 
that the primary business of the entity is to provide telecommunications becomes 
irrelevant.  
                                                 
247 Borio and Filosa (1994) (supra note 195). 
248 Denning J in UDT  
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As a ‘deposit’ becomes a transient source for the primary use of making  
payments, the ‘business of banking’ is becoming so stratified that continuing to consider 
the ‘deposit’ as we  know it as a crucial signal of the ‘business of banking’ may become 
irrelevant.  It is also unclear how mobile money is to be secured, should there be a run 
on the commercial bank that holds the trust account, or should an MNO become 
insolvent.249 Kenyan law should address these questions. Just as the CBK dictates the 
amount of capital reserves banks that hold other people’s money must maintain if they 
use those funds to make profit, and the legal terms of those accounts, it should address 
the legal question, as to whether giving value to someone else through a mobile device 
can be seen as a public good.250 Ultimately, taking redeemable money from the public 
resembles public deposits very closely;251 strict prudential requirements should protect 
such funds. Adequate supervision, systemic stability and deposit protection usually apply 
to electronic value issued by banks in exchange for deposited funds, and exempting 
MNOs from such prudential regulation raises concerns about the adequate protection of 
the prepaid money that is in essence customer funds. 252  
There is no global definition of mobile money and electronic money (e-money) 
suitable for use.253 Kenya has not defined mobile money or stored value in relation to 
mobile payments, and this poses a legal challenge.254 Mobile money provides a storage 
                                                 
249 Brad Pasanek and Simone Polillo, Beyond Liquidity: The Metaphor of Money in Financial Crisis (Routledge 
2013) 117. 
250 Julia Elyachar, ‘Next Practices: Knowledge, Infrastructure, and Public Goods at the Bottom of the 
Pyramid’ (2010) 24 Public Culture 109. Where the question was raised as to whether payments 
infrastructure should be treated as a ‘bien commun’ public good.  
251 Catia Batista, Felix Simione and Pedro C Vicente, ‘International Experiences of Mobile Banking 
Regulation’ (2012)  
252 Ibid. 
253 Mobile Money Association of India (MMAI) and GSMA Submission to the Reserve  Bank of India’s 
(RBI) Committee on Comprehensive Financial Services for Small  Businesses and Low-Income 
Households. MMAI/GSMA, ‘Mobile Money: the Opposition for India’ (2013) 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/MMAI-GSMA-on-
Mobile-Money-in-India-for-RBI-Financial-Inclusion-Committee_Dec13.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
254 See the proposed ruling made by the US Department of the Treasury’s FinCEN indicating that they 
wish to rename ‘stored value’ as ‘prepaid access’ and define that term, in order to address regulatory gaps 
that they say have resulted from the proliferation of prepaid innovations since the original Federal Reserve 
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facility for electronic value in the form of an account that offers a mechanism for 
transactions to take place electronically; for many customers, this represents their first 
‘account’. While existing banking regulation in Kenya does not clearly define whether the 
issuing of mobile money constitutes retail deposit taking and whether this type of business 
can be undertaken by anyone except for a licensed and regulated financial institution, 
authorities have allowed the MNOs to exist in an ambiguous regulatory framework.255  
The CBK should have consultations to remove the legal uncertainty to avoid 
sudden market-jeopardizing changes in its regulatory treatment of MNOs.256 Regulatory 
uncertainty deprives consumers of a public mechanism for redress or legal accountability 
for wrongdoing by Safaricom; consumers may not be fully aware of the private 
mechanisms for seeking redress when a crisis arises.257 This highlights the lack of 
coordination between the CBK and MNOs in attaining appropriate regulation, as CBK 
is not a conduct-of-business regulator and would therefore not have the resources to deal 
with consumer complaints.  
    Ownership of the funds does not mean that the beneficiaries have a customer–
banker relationship with the banks that hold the trust funds; therefore they have no 
                                                 
Board rules were formulated, because if these gaps are not addressed, they believe there is increased risk 
for the use of prepaid access as a means to further ML. For the proposed rules and their rationale, see also 
William Jack, Tavneet Suri and Robert Townsend, ‘Monetary Theory and Electronic Money: Reflections 
on the Kenyan Experience’ (2010) 96(1) Economic Quarterly at 84, available from 
<http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2010/q1/pdf/townsend.pdf
> accessed 3 September 2014. This effective parallel currency has triggered concerns amongst national 
governments and central bankers that these new paradigms may inter alia provide loopholes that may 
frustrate global efforts to combat ML and TF. 
255, As in South Africa, agency-related risks are not regulated separately. Common law principles of agency 
make any bank or non-bank using retail agents liable for their agents’ actions. Rules on AML/CFT don’t 
apply because existing provisions have a loophole—they apply only to banks. 
256  In the meantime, the risks presented by Safaricom’s M-Pesa mobile payments  service are, at least from 
a practical perspective, significantly mitigated by the involvement of the United Kingdom’s Department 
for International Development, which co-financed the initiative’s pilot phase. 
257 Rosa M Lastra and Heba Shams, ‘Public Accountability in the Financial Sector’, in Eilis Ferran and 
Charles AE Goodhart (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21st Century (Hart Publishing, 2001) 
165–188, at 170–71. 
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entitlement to a protected deposit by the bank.258  Brian Muthiora claims that without 
intermediation or interest, and as the funds are ring fenced259 and not available for 
operations,260 customer funds protection is unnecessary. He further argues that a ‘pass-
through’ deposit insurance coverage for mobile money, which Kenya has borrowed in its 
newly enacted but not yet operationalised, Kenya Deposit Insurance Act 2012,261 for 
omnibus custodial accounts holding pooled funds underlying stored value cards, 
represents sufficient protection.262  
4.5.4. The Definition and Placement of Agents 
 
MNOs and banks have extended their reach and their services through agents263 
as the point of sale.264 The agents are commonly known as ‘outlets’,265  ‘correspondents’ 
(particularly in Brazil), and ‘retail partners ’or ‘cash merchants’.266 This chapter will use 
‘agents’, the colloquial term which MNOs267 use, which highlights the fact that as a 
commercial term, agent may not necessarily be an accurate legal descriptor.268 Agents take 
cash funds from the public, often in a non-‘bricks and mortar’269 setting, and convert 
them into an electronic store of value mobile money.270 Agents do not always transact 
                                                 
258 Brian Muthiora, ‘Reinventing the Wheel: “Pass Through” Deposit Insurance coverage for Mobile Money 
in Kenya’ (2014) <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/reinventing-the-wheel-pass-through-
deposit-insurance-coverage-for-mobile-money-in-kenya> accessed 3 September 2014.   
259 Ibid. 
260 These funds are reportedly not reinvested by the banks, however this remains unclear.  
261 Kenya Deposit Insurance Act 2012.  
262 Ibid, 257. 
263 As explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4. Page. 34.  
264 Timothy Lyman, Gautam Ivatury and Stefan Staschen, ‘Use of Agents in Branchless Banking for the 
Poor: Rewards, Risks, and Regulation’ (2006) 38 Focus Note [page?]. 
265 Ibid at 189.  
266 Ibid. 
267 Safaricom <http://www.safaricom.co.ke/> accessed 3 September 2014.  
268 Which therefore poses a legal challenge in its regulation as agents are often confused with agency banking 
or third party outsourcing as Leon Perlman suggests, See, Leon Perlman, ‘Legal and Regulatory Aspects of 
Mobile Financial Services’ (PhD, University of South Africa 2012).   
269 A traditional ‘street-side’ business that deals with its customers face to face in an office or store that the 
business owns or rents. The local grocery store and the corner bank are examples of ‘brick and mortar’ 
institutions. Brick and mortar businesses can find it difficult to compete with web-based businesses because 
the latter usually have lower operating costs and greater flexibility. 
270  This will also be referred to as ‘float’.  
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business in person. In many areas agents may primarily be chemists, airtime sellers or 
grocers.271 These are financial institutions that provide services to illiterate customers who 
require assistance and are likely to benefit from repeat business. However, the agent may 
not always act in the best interests of the consumer, for example, insisting that a moderate 
sum of money must be sent in one or two tranches, each of which costs the same set 
commission. 
Section 8(1) of the Banking Act 1989 requires CBK272 approval for any opening 
or relocating of bank branches—any premises, other than their head offices, at which an 
institution transacts business inside or outside.273 No regulations explicitly govern 
outsourcing of functions by banks,274 but this requirement would potentially change 
MNOs’ business a good deal if the CBK deemed them a bank and considered agents and 
super-agents bank branches.275  
In April 2010, the CBK issued new agent banking guidelines276 that allowed banks 
to engage a wide range of retail outlets for transaction handling (cash-in and cash-out) 
and product promotion (receiving account applications, though applications must be 
approved by a bank staff member).277 This enabled banks to start utilising the M-Pesa 
                                                 
271 ‘Mobile Banking: Agents as Mediators’ | CGAP <http://www.cgap.org/blog/mobile-banking-agents-
mediators? accessed 28 September  2014.  
272 Section 8(1) of Banking Act Cap 488. 
273 The Banking Act 1995 <https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Kenya_Banking%20Act%201995.pdf> 
accessed 3 September 2014. Banking Act, Section 2 – Interpretation. This may affect the functioning of 
agents. 
274 CGAP (2007) (supra note 186) op cit note 2 at 7.  
275 Ibid. 
276 Specifically through the, ‘Guideline On Agent Banking’ (2000) 
<http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/01/Guideline-on-Agent-Banking-CBKPG15.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2014. See also African Development Bank Group, ‘Fostering Financial Inclusion with Mobile 
Banking’ (2013) <http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/fostering-financial-inclusion-with-
mobile-banking-12125/> accessed 3 September 2014.  
277 CGAP, ‘M-KESHO in Kenya’ (2010) <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/m-kesho-in-
kenya> accessed 3 September 2014; Central Bank of Kenya, ‘CBK/PG/15: Guidelines on Agent Banking’ 
(2010) <http://www.bb.org.bd/aboutus/regulationguideline/psd/agentbanking_banks_v13.pdf> 
accessed 3 September 2014. The guidelines define an agent as ‘an entity that has been contracted by an 
institution and approved by the Central Bank to provide the services of the institution on behalf of the 
institution in the manner specified in this Guideline’. It also defines an ‘outlet’ as being ‘an agent’s place of 
business directly responsible to the Head Office, used for carrying out a commercial activity of the agent 
but does not include a mobile unit’. See, ‘Guideline on the Appointment and Operations of Third Party 
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platform and associated network of M-Pesa outlets as a channel to access new customers. 
M-Pesa was encroaching on banking business,278 and Safaricom’s non-bank status and 
consequent free hand in creating an agent network, proved useful for banks. As of August 
2011, M-Pesa had 23,000 agents279 to facilitate customer registration and so-called cash-
in/cash-out facilities;280 by 2014 it had 43,000.281 The CBK only approves outsourcing by 
banks to agents on a case-by-case basis;282 permitting them to have agents that are not 
their physical branches as required by Section 8(1) of the Banking Act 1989 has changed 
the landscape.283  Provisions that relate inter alia to AML/KYC and consumer protection 
do not necessarily apply to these agents.284  
The lack of registration of M-Pesa agents by the CBK  highlights the gaps through 
which these guidelines are to be prescribed and applied to mobile payments as such action 
requires approval by the CBK itself.  Customers have discovered a legal workaround by 
using M-Kesho285 accounts alongside M-Pesa accounts; customers cannot use M-Pesa 
agents to deposit funds directly into M-Kesho accounts, even though the interface is the 
same as that for M-Pesa, and therefore most deposit separate funds into their M-Kesho 
account. This offers a clear example of regulatory arbitrage as any customer with dual M-
Pesa and M-Kesho accounts will deposit funds into his M-Pesa account via an M-Pesa 
                                                 
Agents’ <http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/01/Deposit-Taking-Microfinance-Circular-No.-1-
Guideline-on-the-Appointment-and-Operations-of-Third-Party-Agents-by-DTMs-consumer-protection-
related.pdf> accessed 28 September 2014. 
278 Ibid. See Chapter 2, The Enabling Environment for Mobile Payments. Page46  
279 Safaricom (2011) figures as provided in 2011 from the Safaricom website <www.safaricom.co.ke> 
accessed 2 November 2011.  Cash agents get incentives for registering customers and a share of commission 
on remittances so as to compensate them for being bypassed for the purchase of airtime voucher recharges 
by subscribers  
280 Safaricom list the following as the duties of an agent: register M-Pesa customers; deposit cash into 
registered customers’ M-Pesa accounts; process cash withdrawals for registered M-Pesa customers; process 
cash withdrawals for non-registered M-Pesa customers; Customer Education Compliance with Safaricom 
AML & KYC Policy; compliance with Safaricom business practices; branding of their outlets as per 
provided guideline. 
281 Safaricom, <www.safaricom.co.ke> accessed 3 September 2014. 
282 CGAP (2007) (supra note 186).  
283 CBK (2010) (supra note 134).  
284 Section 2 of the Banking Act 1989 as amended. 
285  This includes interest-bearing accounts. 
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agent, and then transfer funds to the M-Kesho account following confirmation via SMS 
that the deposited funds are available.286 
4.5.4.1. Challenges in Applying the Current Regulatory Framework to Mobile 
Payments 
 
Financial service providers’ liability for the acts of their agents is a fundamental 
principle of regulation.287 The CBK has not held MNOs accountable for agents’ actions, 
which complicates its task of protecting customers. Relying on the CBK to monitor 
agents directly imposes significant supervisory costs; leaving it to consumers will have 
social costs, and low income customers will bear the brunt.288 Avoiding this situation need 
not impose unreasonable burdens on MNOs by creating unlimited liability or require a 
new regulatory framework; appropriate regulation should require MNOs to apply 
effective risk management systems, and ensure redress for consumers when agents do 
them harm.  
However, Safaricom, as a principal, claims to be liable for the acts of their agents 
and have claimed they have taken appropriate steps to ensure that they comply with the 
law at all times including due diligence and operational compliance. In this regard they 
carry out appropriate vetting of agents at the recruitment stage.289  They are also engaged 
in ongoing training programmes that cover AML and operational compliance, which 
incorporate periodic checks and sanctions for non-compliance which can entail 
                                                 
286 Banks that could not have the same type of loose affiliation as banking agents such as those used in MFS 
are now able to do so within the parameters of the CBK ‘Agent Guidelines’ issued in 2010 in terms of the 
Banking Act. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Denise Dias and Kate McKee, ‘Protecting Branchless Banking Consumers’ (2010) 
<http://www.cgap.org/publications/protecting-branchless-banking-consumers> accessed 3 September 
2014.   
289 Joy Malala, Interview with Mercy Buku, 'An Interview With Senior Manager Money Laundering 
Reporting At Safaricom' (2014). 
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termination.290 While this may be possible for Safaricom due to its resources, the same 
cannot be guaranteed for all other MNOs.  
 While some policy-makers have proposed that the mobile payment system 
industry is too new to create market conduct rules, I argue that the CBK should set 
minimum business practice standards and establish providers’ liability for agents’ 
compliance with regulation that should cut across all MNOs as compliance requirements. 
Appropriate regulation should also account for mechanisms for consumer protection to 
include fostering a level playing field that enables competition and sound market 
development. Jurisdictions such as the Reserve Bank of India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines have created rules for e-money issued by non-banks that have focused on 
specific regulation for agents who process mobile money, and thereby addressed a 
regulatory vacuum; Kenya should follow suit.291  
In Mexico, regulation gave express powers to the banking supervisor over agency 
schemes set up by banks, allowing the direct inspection of agents if necessary.292 In 
contrast, Kenya has not established a legal authority that regulates mobile payments. Due 
to this, overlapping or unclear authority has created opportunities for undesirable 
business practices and reduced the effectiveness of supervision; agents can question the 
jurisdiction of either the CCK or the CBK in relation to one another,293 a problem that 
coordination and cooperation might address.  
Agents provide the network through which mobile payments are executed—the 
bridge to cash and channels for financial inclusion. Given the reliance on agents by 
                                                 
290 Ibid.  
291 BIS, ‘Financial Sector Regulation for Growth, Equity and Stability’ (2012) BIS Papers No 62 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap62.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.   
292 Ibid. 
293 The Communications Commission of Kenya, for example, recently issued substantial consumer 
protection regulations with implications for mobile payment services (Kenya Gazette, 23 April 2010). 
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customers, MNOs require regulation, but their legal status poses a challenge; without legal 
accountability294 for agents, customers and agents themselves become vulnerable.295  It 
also facilitates circumvention of conduct-of-business rules and laws governing finance.  
While agents and MNOs use service level agreements,296  these agreements do not create 
an agent–principal relationship in the true legal sense. Regulation should require MNOs 
to address consumer claims in instances where agents have contravened the law, including 
fraudulent circumstances.297  
MNOs and banks pay agents by the transaction. Agents offer front line customer 
services and intermediate bank transactions, through banks’ balance sheets, by 
transforming the cash in the till into money in the bank, and vice versa. This requires 
them to go to a bank from time to time to rebalance their cash in the till versus money in 
collateral or trust bank account.298 Liquidity is a key factor for their functioning; agents 
must have enough cash in hand to provide consistent cash-out facilities, as failing to pay 
a customer at any one time can create a negative feeling in a community and threaten the 
adoption of mobile financial services, including mobile payments.299  
Profiting by giving mobile payments thus suggests agents should be accountable 
but also makes them vulnerable. Some models include a hierarchy of agents; for example, 
in the hybrid MNO-bank model, the MNO is the agent of a bank, and its airtime kiosks 
(that provide cash-in/-out services) may be sub-agents authorised to open accounts 
(although their contracts may not name them as such). This interconnectedness creates 
                                                 
294 Bill Maurer, Taylor C Nelms and Stephen C Rea, ‘‘Bridges to Cash’: Channelling Agency in Mobile 
Money’ (2013) 19 Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 52. 
295 The principle of accountability is explored in Chapter 5.  
296 Safaricom Ltd has one with M-Pesa agents.  
297 For instance it should not evade or avoid responsibility in instances where agents access customers’ 
information and withdrawals are made from these accounts.   
298 CGAP, Focus Note, ‘Banking through Networks of Retail Agent’ (2008) 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/fn47_d_24.pdf> 
accessed 3 September 2014. This may trigger liquidity risks as is assessed in Chapter 3.  
299 An agent business can be set up so that neither the customer nor the bank needs to incur settlement 
risk. 
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systemic risks and therefore offers a justification for a clear definition of the mobile 
payments agent in law and through an appropriate regulatory framework. Moreover, 
some super-agents provide (cash) liquidity to agents in the street, and these super-agents 
are primarily banks who outsource their services to reach a wider market.300 The 
proliferation of agents puts cash in transit at risk and provides opportunity for fraud and 
theft, against which MNOs do not provide insurance to consumers as a bank would.301 
Many agents enter the mobile payments system with experience selling prepaid 
airtime vouchers, which gives them the technical proficiency and financial literacy the 
position requires. Current regulations also impose a vetting process for AML purposes 
on them.302 However, MNOs have designed this process, and it has lower standards than 
a prudential authority would provide. Although appropriate technology, supported by an 
agreement between the agent and its MNO that specifies how the technology is to be 
used,303 ensures some trust, a contract based on the MNO’s liability for agents’ actions 
would provide greater protection. A series of interrelated contracts—MNO–agent, 
agent–super-agent, MNO–super-agent, MNO–bank, customer–MNO, customer–
bank—would provide superior protection.304 However, this would clearly create 
burdensome compliance costs, inconsistencies, and further barriers to entry for new 
MNOs or agents.  
Part I of this chapter has assessed the main arguments in statute for the clear 
definition and codification of the various terms used in the regulation of payments 
                                                 
300 Most Kenyan banks now provide liquidity as super agents.  
301 See Chapter 3. 
302 This vetting process is done through the special arrangement and agreement they have with their 
respective MNOs. For instance Safaricom has AML M-Pesa Agent Requirements. Safaricom, ‘M-PESA 
Agent Requirements’ (2010) 
<http://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Resources_Downloads/m-
pesa_agent_requirements_-_for_external_use.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014. 
303 This agreement is called the service level agreement.  
304 For a general overview of the agent ecosystem, see also Mark Pickens, ‘Understanding What Drives 
Profits for Agents: M-pesa’ (2009) <http://www.experientia.com/blog/understanding-what-drives-
profits-for-agents-m-pesa/>[22 September 2014. 
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systems and the challenges they present in its application to mobile payments, especially 
in their practical application. Part II will assess the overall regulatory challenges authorities 
face in relation to mobile payments.  
PART II 
 
4.6. Overall Regulatory Challenges for the Regulatory Authorities in Regulating 
Mobile Payments  
 
The regulatory agencies’ main objective in regulating MNOs should be to protect 
consumers from operators reducing output to increase prices on low quality services.305   
They should also protect the unbanked and under banked and ensure that the money 
pooled in the mobile money system does not introduce systemic risk. The convergence 
of industries involved in mobile payment systems complicates regulation, and regulatory 
agencies should prioritise their objectives to address challenges such as regulatory overlap, 
conflict, inertia, and arbitrage.  
4.6.1. The Inconsistencies in Regulation That Result From Multiple Regulatory 
Authorities  
 
Kenya’s government supported a telecommunications monopoly for years; the 
industry now has oligopolies.306 As change continues, regulatory reform is necessary. 
Distinct markets now have coalesced across their old boundaries with investments from 
private sector participants,307 resulting in nascent markets and stakeholders, and 
continued legal and regulatory challenges.  
                                                 
305 Colin Blackman (1998) (n11) 170. 
306 Raymond U Akwule, ‘Telecommunications in Kenya: Development and policy issues’ (1992) 16(7) 
Telecommunications policy 603–611. 
307 PwC, ‘Telecommunications Industry: Overview of the Sector in Kenya’ (2009) 
<http://www.pwc.com/ke/en/industries/telecommunications.jhtml%3E> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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The liberalisation of the markets has changed telecommunications in Kenya a 
good deal, including the successful partial privatisation of Telkom Kenya Ltd,308 the 
Kenyan government’s 25% stake in Safaricom Ltd through a public listing309, and the 
launch of fourth mobile operator Econet Wireless Kenya,310 which also resulted in the 
introduction of international telecommunications companies such as Vodafone, France 
Telecoms and Essar Communications through their investments in Safaricom Limited, 
Telkom Kenya Limited and Econet Limited respectively. MNOs such as Safaricom have 
focused on network expansion and nationwide coverage; Safaricom’s reach and stability 
exceeds that of the Kenyan government. The Kenyan government has found little reason 
to regulate quality or prices in this highly competitive telecommunications sector.  
Traditionally, the CBK regulates financial services and the CCK regulates 
telecommunications; these two industries have traditionally been separated, and therefore 
the two regulating authorities have had minimal overlapping functions. The risks to 
consumers, MNOs, and banks clearly require the need for a re-examination of the 
preconditions to safety and soundness for a payment system in this new converged 
space.311 Industry players want predictable regulation; the diffuse or uncertain regulatory 
authority constitutes a risk to their business. But the interdependence of the agencies and 
operators who potentially have authority to regulate mobile payment systems complicates 
the picture, as does the perception that they are subject to political pressures. 312 
                                                 
308 Telkom Kenya, ‘History of Telkom Kenya’ (2011) 
<http://www.telkom.co.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=95> 
accessed 3 September 2014.  
309 Ibid, this listing was done in May 2008.  
310 Ibid, which was also achieved in November 2008.  
311 See Chapter 3, 3.3. The Need for an Appropriate Regulatory Approach through the Examination of the 
Pre-Conditions to a Safe And Sound Payment System page. 87 
312 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2011) (n 90) also, the importance of Safaricom to the general economy creates 
a regulatory challenge in that it creates amongst regulators and industry stakeholders the need to remove 
regulatory barriers that facilitates gains for all involved. See also, Tony Prosser, Nationalised Industries and 
Public Control: Legal, Constitutional and Political Issues (Blackwell 1986) where Tony Prosser analyses the links 
between public law and the study of politics and administration. 
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4.6.2. Regulatory Overlaps 
Regulatory overlap has two dimensions. On the one hand, two regulatory 
authorities can offer a check and balance on one another. If one fails to regulate an 
important area, the other may do so.313  Regulatory overlap occurs where, for example, 
the CCK and the CBK exercise licensing regulatory jurisdiction over the mobile financial 
service aspect of MNOs. This overlap results in regulatory conflict, where, for example, 
each regulator provides conflicting licensing guidelines, one for the operation of financial 
services and the other for the telecommunications platform that facilitates financial 
services.314 This is manifest in the existence of both the CCK and CBK, a result of the 
liberalisation of the telecoms industry.315 
While the CBK has been more proactive in taking regulatory responsibility over 
mobile financial services, including authorisation of MNOs,316 the CCK has taken a 
passive role in the face of possible regulatory overlap.317 Regrettably, the financial sector 
and the telecommunication sector both lack provisions for dealing with regulatory 
overlap.318 This calls for the coordination between the two regulators through a possible 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)319 that would address regulatory overlaps. The 
Constitution of Kenya 2010, through Article 10, requires state structures such as 
                                                 
313 Jeffrey Carmichael and Michael Pomerleano, The Development and Regulation of Non-bank Financial 
Institutions (World Bank Publications 2002); Clive Briault, ‘The Rationale for a Single National Financial 
Services Regulator’ (2000) Co-sponsored by the European Commission and the World Bank (A European 
Borrowers Network Initiative) 211. 
314 Central Bank of Kenya licensing guidelines are informed by very different legislative and policy 
considerations, as compared to Communications Commission of Kenya guidelines. See Chapter 3 for an 
in depth discussion of the regulatory philosophies of the two regulators. 
315 The WTO’s instruments such as Articles II and III of the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
and the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property and Services (TRIPS) emphasise that cyberspace 
and infotainment business ought to be liberalized. 
316 Alliance for Financial Inclusion (2010) (supra note 134).  
317 International Telecommunications Union, ‘11th Global Symposium for Regulators: Armenia City, 
Columbia: Chairman’s report’ (2011) <http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/treg/Events/Seminars/GSR/GSR11/pdf/GSR11_Chairmanreport_en.pdf> accessed 3 September 
2014.  
318 Instances of regulatory overlap are dealt with administratively and politically, at Cabinet level, 
consultations, rather than through legal structures. 
319 This coordination of functions shall be explained in Chapter 5 in the discussion of the themes around 
the regulatory approach to mobile payments.  
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regulators to refer to such documents, prior to applying their regulatory functions.320 
Regulatory overlap is not conducive to promoting innovation and investments, due to 
the costs of regulatory compliance and the fear of multiple penalties from multiple 
regulators.321  A real risk of coordination failure arises due to the different regulators such 
as bank supervisor, payment regulator, telecommunications regulator and perhaps 
competition regulator.  
4.6.3. Regulatory Arbitrage 
 
The traditional regulatory structure defines regulator jurisdiction by institutional 
groups. Thus for example, a banking regulator regulates banks, but not quasi-banking 
products provided by microfinance institutions, such as lines of credit and loans. This 
permits regulatory arbitrage wherein a financial institution can choose among different 
regulators by altering its corporate form or its institutional label, to seek the regulator that 
imposes the smallest regulatory burden.322 A new, unregulated institution that avoids or 
minimises regulation can put the stability of the whole financial system at risk.  
When regulation does not yet exist for interconnected services or in 
conglomerates that could fall under the supervision of more than one regulator, 
regulatory arbitrage323 raises problems.324 Regulatory arbitrage is a challenge when 
regulation is not in place, particularly for services offered under the supervision of more 
than one regulator. Choosing the best regulator or the one that has the least regulation 
                                                 
320 The Supreme Court in Re The Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission [2011] 
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Application No. 2 (unreported) underscored the importance of independent State organs to cooperate with 
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321 Nzomo Mutuku (2008) (supra note 40)  
322 Ibid. 
323 Martha Garcia-Murillo and Ian MacInnes, ‘The Impact of Technological Convergence on the Regulation 
of ICT Industries’ (2002) 5(1) International Journal on Media Management 57–67.  
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Introduction’ (2005) The World Bank 
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may not be the best option for the industry as a whole.325 Market players have encouraged 
mobile payments to capitalise on regulatory loopholes by circumventing unfavourable 
regulations. While regulatory arbitrage is a form of market innovation,326 it should only 
be encouraged to the extent that it helps industry respond appropriately to the inherent 
risk of unregulated markets, as discussed in Chapter 3. This gap in the regulatory 
framework allows particular business initiatives, and allocates various rights and 
responsibilities in their operations, without attracting investments commensurate with the 
opportunities mobile payment schemes provide.327  
Licensing the hybridised institutions and unregulated private sectors could close 
these loopholes. Innovation is a challenge for regulation as this fragmentation undermines 
consumer protection; it may also be characterised as a risk to the market. Then Minister 
for Finance, Hon. John Michuki, ordered a brisk audit of M-Pesa in 2009 in response to 
this risk,328 stating that he ‘did not think M-Pesa . . ., if left unregulated would end well.’329 
The contribution in regulation through the CCK and its licensing mandate over MNOs 
as service providers, brings forth misunderstanding through the absence of regulatory 
coordination between the two regulatory authorities, which enhances the need for their 
coordination and further contributes to the arbitrage.  
 
 
 
                                                 
325 Ibid.  
326 Atul K Shah, ‘Regulatory Arbitrage Through Financial Innovation’ (1997) 10(1) Accounting, Auditing 
& Accountability Journal 85–104. The author refers to regulatory arbitrage as ‘creative compliance’. He 
notes that while creative compliance may not be illegal, it undermines the spirit of regulation, and makes 
the regulatory framework appear weak and ineffective. 
327 See Jeremmy Okonjo (2014) (supra note 56). 
328 Ibid.  
329 Ibid.  
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4.6.4. Regulatory Inertia 
 
In regulatory inertia, a regulator with inferior power, such as the CCK in relation 
to the CBK, is reluctant or unwilling to impose any regulation on a particular industry.330  
This inertia may in turn precipitate regulatory arbitrage, which did occur as M-Pesa sought 
regulation by the CCK to avoid the more intrusive CBK, although neither had much idea 
how to regulate M-Pesa,331 though both rightly hesitated to impose barriers that impede 
innovation in financial services.332 Further, the state’s partial ownership of Safaricom 
encouraged flexibility.333 This inertia has manifested itself in the development of measures 
to address competition issues in mobile payments such as interoperability in Kenya.334  
4.6.5. The Political Interference with the Collective Will To Regulate 
 
Political considerations can compromise the promotion of the public interest 
through beneficial regulation;335 government incentives in the private sector in Kenya 
potentially make the government reluctant to intervene in the regulation of private 
companies. Mobile payments have faced intense scrutiny from other financial institutions, 
but the government had in the beginning little will to regulate the systems.336 Although 
making MNO supervision immune to interference by government in order to foster faster 
                                                 
330 See Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, ‘Notes on Regulation of Branchless Banking in Kenya’ 
(2007) <http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.1480/> accessed 3 September 2014. 
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331 International Telecommunications Union (2011) (n 323). See also, Alliance for Financial Inclusion. (2010 
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332 Ibid.  
333 Loretta Michaels, ‘Better than Cash: Kenya Mobile Money Market Assessment’ (2011) USAID 
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Political Will’ (2011) Working Paper 
<http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/research/documents/AdmatiHellwigGoodReg021412
.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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uptake of mobile payments and increase and enable innovation for the purposes of 
financial inclusion has some advantages, the interests of the public require the 
involvement of governments in case MNOs run into difficulties.337 
In summary, there exist regulatory inadequacies for a regulatory framework for 
mobile payments. This discussion has made it clear that an appropriate regulatory 
framework that focuses on consumer protection has a strong justification.  The Kenya 
Information and Communications Act 2013 does not expressly provide for mobile 
payments.  The CCK has surrendered the regulatory mandate of mobile payments to the 
CBK, as it is clear that Kenyan telecoms regulations have not addressed the regulatory 
issues adequately. However some telecoms aspects must remain under the purview of 
telecoms regulators. There needs to be a coordination of functions through a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the CCK and the CBK. Part III analyses the 
impact of these challenges on consumers.  
PART III 
4.7. THE IMPACT OF THE REGULATORY CHALLENGES ON 
CONSUMERS  
 
The Global Financial Crisis338 revealed the importance of financial consumer 
protection.339  Difficulties determining the amount of client monies an entity holds in a 
pooled account, and who should receive money from that pool, precipitated the Global 
Financial Crisis in relation to Lehman Brothers International Europe (LBIE).340 While the 
cause of potential  confusion certainly differs—Safaricom’s size may not resemble 
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338 Global Financial Crises of 2007–2008. 
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LBIE’s, which was one of the largest investment banks operating in the United States,  
prior to its collapse—but the case suggests the urgency of regulation to protect Kenya’s 
financial stability, given that MNOs’ trust accounts could be subject to the same 
confusion. 
 Low income customers with low levels of financial literacy were particularly 
vulnerable to misconduct,341 making consumer protection a key objective of all financial 
regulators,342 requiring an effective and standardised regulatory framework.  Low income 
groups who gain access to financial services through mobile phones are the most 
vulnerable to financial shocks, and an indication of a post-financial inclusion, as they are 
at a higher risk of losing their savings whenever a bank fails or if the MNO fails.343 
Consumer protection will increase consumer confidence in the financial system, which in 
turn mitigates risks to the financial system, and builds trust and confidence in the 
adoption of inclusive services, thereby broadening and diversifying banks’ deposit 
reserve.  I therefore argue that regulatory agencies must protect these groups post-
financial inclusion. 
The concept of a weaker party is usually used in legal literature to refer to 
consumers as a justification for their protection.  Disparities in the consumer–supplier 
relationship in mobile payments systems leave consumers ‘weaker’ than their contracting 
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partners, the professionals, and unable to protect their interests due to inferior bargaining 
power.344  Legislation has already recognised the concept of vulnerability.  
As Peter Cartwright asserts, we know that vulnerable consumers exist, even if we 
may disagree in terms of how to identify them, and about how their interests might best 
be addressed.345  Consumers have few options and this forms a theory for the protection 
of consumers, as they have few purchases and contract on terms set by increasingly large 
and powerful companies such as Safaricom Ltd.346 Second, companies are able to exploit 
significant information and sophistication disparities in their favour.347 However, 
economists no longer regard exploitation theory as valid,348 because it fails to account for 
competition between companies, and the resulting limits on companies’ bargaining 
power.349 Rather, economists argue for consumer protection because consumers know 
less about products and contracts than professionals do,350 an asymmetry that applies to 
mobile payments. While they contend that free markets protect consumers, they posit a 
restrictive role for regulation.351 Law should ensure that the markets function as freely as 
                                                 
344 Giesela Ruhl, 'Consumer Protection in Choice of Law' (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal. 
<http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Ruhl-final.pdf> accessed 28 September 2014; 
Hugh Beale, Inequality Of Bargaining Power (Jstor 1986), (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 123; John 
Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State 213–220 1971); Friedrich Kessler, ‘Contracts Of Adhesion: 
Some Thoughts about Freedom Of Contact’ (1943) 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632, 640–641 (1943); 
Spencer N Thal, ‘The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The Problem Of Defining Contractual 
Unfairness’ 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 
345 Peter Cartwright, ‘The Vulnerable Consumer Of Financial Services: Law Policy And Regulation’ [2011] 
Research Paper – Nottingham University of Business School.; T Wilhelmsson, ‘The Informed Consumer 
v the Vulnerable Consumer in European Unfair Commercial  Practices Law – A Comment’ in G Howells, 
A Nordhausen, D Parry and C Twigg-Flesner (eds), Yearbook of  Consumer Law  (Ashgate 2007) 211 at  213. 
346 Ibid (n 350). 
347  Giesela Ruhl, ‘Consumer Protection in Choice of Law’ (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 569 
<http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Ruhl-final.pdf> 
348 Schaffer Haupt, and Alan Schwartz, ‘Legal Implications of Imperfect Information in Consumer 
Markets’, (1995) 151 Journal of Institutional & Theoretical Economics 31, 35–36 (1995) (F.R.G?.); 
Fernando Gomez Pomar and Nuna Garupa, Max Weber Lecture: ‘The Economic Approach to European 
Consumer Protection Law’ (21 November 2007). 
349 Ibid, at 260. 
350 Ibid 
351 Peter Cartwright, ‘Law, Theory, and Policy in the UK, 
<UK http://bilder.buecher.de/zusatz/23/23331/23331195_inha_1.pdf> accessed 28 August 2014. 
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possible. In imperfect markets, the law should intercede to address the imperfections or 
failures, although the distinction between market and social goals are not always clear. 352 
 In the context of mobile payments, consumers are people who use communication 
services or products offered by a licensee including telecommunications and mobile 
financial services. Through improved efficiency, regulation offers transparency, 
competition, and access to retail financial markets.353  Consumer protection is of particular 
importance in Kenya, where financial education levels are generally low and information 
flows constrained.354 Since mobile payments provide one of the largest mass-market 
service provisions—as of May 2013 there were 10.5 million active mobile payment users 
in Kenya355—regulations offer the most beneficial strategy for safeguarding financial 
consumer protection in Kenya. The CBK, the Insurance Regulatory Authority,356 or the 
Ministry of Finance might lead regulatory reforms to the current regulations, by 
improving financial consumer protection.   
The CBK has been watchful, but has, however, seemingly offer a piecemeal approach 
in its oversight and guidance since the inception of mobile payments.357  However, this 
oversight and guidance has not been as exhaustive and extensive as it ought to be. The 
CBK and Safaricom358 have addressed emerging challenges in the introduction of mobile 
                                                 
352 Ibid.  
353 ‘Global Survey On Consumer Protection And Financial Literacy’ < 
http://responsiblefinance.worldbank.org/~/media/GIAWB/FL/Documents/Publications/Global-
Consumer-Protection-and-Financial-Literacy-results-brief.pdf>30 September 2014 Alliance for Financial 
Inclusion (2010), ‘The 2010 AFI Survey Report on Financial Inclusion Policy in  Developing Countries’  
354 A situation in which one party in a transaction, has more or superior information compared to another. 
In this situation, Safaricom or any other MNO is considered to have more information than its consumers 
due to it not being a public entity, but a private company with its strict non-disclosure practices. 
355 Annual Report from Safaricom. <www.safaricom.co.ke>. accessed 12 July 2014  
356 IRA (Insurance Regulatory Authority). The Insurance Regulatory Authority of Kenya is the sole 
authority charged with regulation and supervision of the insurance industry. It ensures compliance by 
insurance/reinsurance companies, protects consumers and promotes a high degree of security for 
policyholders. 
357 Consumer Protection Diagnostic Study, FSD Kenya, <http://www.fsdkenya.org/pdf_documents/11-
02-22_Consumer_diagnostic_study.pdf>. Accessed 30th July 2015. See also, Bankable Frontier Associates 
LLC (2010), ‘Enabling Mobile Money Transfer – The Central Bank of Kenya’s Treatment of M-PESA’, 
Alliance for Financial Inclusion. 
358 The market-leading MNO. 
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payments, but these consumer protection measures that exist are as yet not codified in 
law. MNOs359 have the responsibility to inform their consumers, and in turn consumers 
have a responsibility to inform themselves. This would be similar to the caveat emptor 
principle, where the purchaser assumes the risk that the product might be either defective 
or unsuitable to his or her needs. This rule is not designed to shield sellers who engage in 
fraud or bad faith dealing by making false or misleading representations about the quality 
or condition of a particular product. It merely summarises the concept that a purchaser 
must examine, judge, and test a product considered for purchase themselves. 
 However, this can be difficult for low-income customers due to limited awareness, 
knowledge, and skills to assess products’ appropriateness, costs, and risks. Policy-makers 
and regulators should therefore ensure that consumer protection measures meet the 
needs of the poor or inexperienced consumers.360  
The most informed consumers are able to protect themselves from risks.361  This 
increases the transparency of the credit risk assumed by the financial system and lowers 
monitoring costs for financial supervisors.362 Consumer protection addresses the 
imbalance of power information and resources between consumers and their financial 
                                                 
359 Here the term ‘providers’ will also be used to mean MNOs as is used in the legislation.  
360 ‘Consumer Protection Regulation in Low-Access Environment Opportunities to promote Responsible 
Finance’ <http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-Consumer-Protection-
Regulation-in-Low-Access-Environments-Opportunities-to-Promote-Responsible-Finance-Feb-
2010.pdf> accessed 28 September 2014; Laura Brix and Katharine McKee, ‘Consumer Protection 
Regulation in Low-access Environments: Opportunities to Promote Responsible Finance’ 60 Focus Note 
< 
http://www.ruralfinance.org/fileadmin/templates/rflc/documents/74560_Focus_Note_60_en.pdf>acce
ssed  14 March 2014. 
361 Sue Rutledge, ‘Improving Protection in Financial Services for Russian Consumers’ (2009) 
<http://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol27/iss1/29> accessed June 2013,  Shalini Chandra, Shirish C Srivastava 
and Yin-Leng Theng, ‘Evaluating the Role of Trust in Consumer Adoption of Mobile Payment Systems: 
An Empirical Analysis’ 27 Communications of the Association for Information 
Systems<http://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol27/iss1/29> accessed June 2013. 
 
362 Sue Rutledge, ‘Improving Protection in Financial Services for Russian Consumers’ (2009) 
<http://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol27/iss1/29> accessed June 2013. 
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service providers, which highlights a typical market failure.363 The information asymmetry 
may prove costly for customers who seek more information on financial products. 
Moreover, complex financial services or products may not always be easily understood, 
even when MNOs have disclosed and shared all the information necessary.364 Thirdly they 
promote efficiency and transparency of retail financial markets. This empowerment, a 
necessary source of market discipline, would eventually sway the MNOS to offer better 
products and services, rather than take advantage of poorly informed consumers. 365 
The current regulatory framework leaves Kenyan consumers to find out for 
themselves what protections apply to each competing new payments system.366 The new 
integration of mobile telecommunications companies and the financial industry provides 
Kenya with an opportunity to harmonise367 and extend consumer protections for mobile 
payments. However, two things should occur immediately; firstly, the CCK should 
publicly commit to including consumer protection in their mandate. Secondly, MNOs 
should include in their contracts with agents the consumer rights the law already 
guarantees for debit and credit cards. The CBK should ensure to the extent possible that 
existing consumer protections are applied to new payment methods, by reforming its 
legislation to extend the Consumer Protection Act 2012, to financial services and 
products. 368   
                                                 
363 Susan Rutledge,‘Consumer Protection and Financial Literacy: Lessons from Nine Country Studies’. 
(2010) < http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CROATIAEXTN/Resources/301244 
1272903536699/Importance_vol1.pdf> accessed 28 September 2014. 
364 Ibid.  
365Geraint G Howells and Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 2005).  
366 Connie Prater, ‘Going Mobile? Link Payments To Credit Cards For Best Protection’ 2012, 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2011/04/21/going-mobile-link-payments-credit-cards-
best-protection/> accessed 28 September 2014.   
367 Harmonisation here refers to the need for a consolidation of legislation due to the fragmentation that 
existed before the Consumer Protection Act .Clive Briault, The Rationale For A Single National Financial Services 
Regulator, vol 2 (Financial Services Authority 1999).  
368 Mark MacCarthy and Gail Hillebrand, ‘Mobile Payments Need Strong Consumer Protections’ American 
Banker Tuesday, 10 August 2010 <http://defendyourdollars.org/posts/211 
mobile_payments_need_strong_consumer_protections> accessed 28 September 2014.  
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Consumer protection can reduce information asymmetries to protect end-users’ 
interests with respect to financial services.369  It can contribute to improved efficiency, 
transparency, competition, and access to retail financial markets.370  Consumer financial 
protection can contribute to an increase in consumer education, ensuring that 
transparency is maintained. 371  
In addition to regulatory policy focusing on the structure of the market and its 
infrastructure, payment instruments require adequate protection of users. In particular, 
and in addition to transparency requirements, Know Your Customer guidelines, and 
observance of AML regulation, the protection of users’ funds and their traceability are a 
must, as well as protection from any risk arising from the use of electronic means and the 
intermediation of non-financial agents. Indeed, regulating service providers to level the 
playing field will guarantee competition and competitiveness, and provide a general 
understanding of consumer protection and an adequate consideration of the role of 
agents.372 Regulators in Kenya, however, have adopted a watch and learn regulatory 
approach regarding the electronic money industry and non-banks providing these 
services.  
Protecting consumers from fraud or exploitation by providers with significant 
market power ensures minimum disclosure and quality standards for consumers who 
expect confidence in the financial system. Other measures include instituting Conduct of 
                                                 
369 Information asymmetry creates an imbalance of power in transactions which can sometimes cause a 
market failure resulting from moral hazard, and information monopoly. Most commonly, information 
asymmetries are studied in the context of principal–agent problems. John O Ledyard, ‘market failure’" The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd edn, 2008). 
370 Ibid supra note John O Ledyard. 
371 Maria Chirati, Mulaguti, ‘Access To Finance, Retail Payments And An Enabling Legal Environment’  
(2013) <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/microfinance-2013/16 
01/MC_Malaguti_January_16.pdf> accessed 28 September 2014.  
372 Biagio Bossone and Massimo Cirasino, ‘The Oversight of the Payments Systems: a Framework for the 
Development and Governance of Payment Systems in Emerging Economies’ July 2001, The World Bank 
and CEMLA. 
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Business rules,373 competition policies, ombudsman schemes, minimum disclosure and 
contracting standards, consumer education surveillance, and enforcement measurements.  
The achievement of mobile financial services facilities’ access to payment and banking 
transactions, especially for areas without established physical bank branches, is important. 
It may also involve certain risks. The inability of consumers to assess their own risks, such 
as the loss of their funds, may impair these objectives. Standardisation can enhance 
transparency and consumers’ ability to compare offers and enforce minimum levels of 
quality. These contingency arrangements should be in place in the case of a technical or 
operational failure of the mobile payment service.   
4.7.1. Lack of a Cohesive Consumer Protection Regulation 
  
Mobile payments existed before there was a cohesive policy and regulatory 
framework that had a market-wide consumer protection law or authority. There is 
currently no specific consumer protection law in Kenya that deals specifically with 
financial services.374  Instead, a number of fragmented provisions,375 guidelines376 and 
acts377 address mobile financial services issues directly and indirectly. In the absence of 
the above law, transactions disputes are handled according to the contracts between 
MNOs and their parties, primarily their agents.  An amalgam of indirect, but not easily 
applicable or effective provisions of telecommunications law relating to 
telecommunications billing, and CBK rules relating to agents guide these issues.378   
While the Banking Act 1969 gave authority to the CBK to regulate banking 
activities, including safeguarding the ‘interest of consumers’, it did not define the specific 
                                                 
373 Similar to the Financial Conduct Authorities, Conduct of Business rules.  
374 Although the Consumer Protection Act 2012 does not address the needs of users of financial services.  
375 Section 3 of the Communications Act 2012, allows the CCK to resolve disputes between a consumer 
and a service provider; a service provider and another service provider; or any other persons as may be 
prescribed under the Act. This may ostensibly bring M-Pesa under the jurisdiction of the CCK if there is 
any dispute as to charges, billing or general loss of value in the prepaid stored value account. 
376 CBK Agent Guidelines.  
377 Ibid at 383 and the Competition Act 2012.  
378 Ibid.  
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mandate for consumer protection. Subsequent law has clarified some issues, such as when 
the Banking Regulations of 2006 prescribed procedures such as the increase of banking 
and other fees.379 However, the law leaves preventing unlawful, misleading, and 
comparative advertising and implementing remedy mechanisms to individual banks. The 
CBK should offer microprudential regulation for mobile payments to address these 
issues.  
The CBK’s 2010 ‘Agent Guidelines’380 provide direct consumer protection 
provisions, although these relate more to formalities in the transaction process than any 
dispute resolution facilities. For example, s9.2 of the ‘Agent Guidelines’ provides the 
following minimum requirements: 
‘i) Institutions shall establish mechanisms that will enable their customers or users 
to appropriately identify their agents and the services provided through such agents. 
ii) Agents shall issue receipts for all transactions undertaken through them. 
Institutions shall provide their agents with equipment that generates receipts or 
acknowledgements for transactions carried out through agents. In this regard, electronic 
receipts or acknowledgements are permissible. 
iii) Where an agent acts as a receiver and deliverer of documents, an 
acknowledgement shall be provided for all documents received or delivered by the agent 
to or from the customer. 
iv) A channel for communication of customer complaints to the institution shall 
be provided. Institutions shall provide dedicated customer care telephone lines for 
lodging complaints by their customers. The customers can also use this telephone line to 
                                                 
379David Asher, ‘Kenya Financial Consumer Protection – Slidshare’ 
http://www.slideshare.net/Daniel_Asher/kenya-financial-consumer-protection accessed 12 September 
2014.  
380 CBK (2010) <http://www.bu.edu/bucflp/files/2012/01/Guideline-on-Agent-Banking-
CBKPG15.pdf> accessed 28 September 2014. 
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verify with the institution, the authenticity and identity of the agent, its physical location 
and the validity of its agent banking business. 
v) Institutions shall establish a complaints mechanism and shall ensure proper 
communication of this mechanism to their customers. 
vi)  All customer complaints shall be addressed within a reasonable time and in 
any case not later than thirty days from the date of reporting or lodging the complaint 
with the institution. Institutions shall keep record of all customer complaints and how 
such complaints are redressed. 
vii) An agent shall have signs that are clearly visible to the public indicating that 
it is a provider of services of the institution with which it has an agency contract. The 
agent shall not however represent to the public that it is an institution. 
viii) In the provision of agent banking services, institutions shall use secure 
systems that ensure customer information confidentiality. 
ix) The customer should be made aware of the fact that he is not supposed to 
carelessly store his PIN and other critical information or share such information with 
other parties including agents. 
x) An institution may establish contact centres to facilitate easy communication 
between a customer and the institution.’381 
 
Therefore, Kenya’s inherent problem is a lack of coherence in consumer 
protection and market oversight, related to the split in responsibility between the CCK 
and the CBK. Having two regulatory regimes for what most consumers perceive as a 
single product or service can result in different rights, and a divergence in protection for 
                                                 
381 The Reserve Bank of Fiji has adapted these guidelines in their prescription of Agency Guidelines 
<http://www.reservebank.gov.fj/docs2/Banking%20Supervision%20Policy%20Statement%20No%201
8-Agent%20Banking%20Guidelines%201.pdf> accessed 24th June 2014 
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personal and small business consumers.382 Mobile payment users may not fully 
understand which regulations apply to a payment transaction and how these differ, 
depending on the payment method and platform used, the parties involved in the 
payment transaction, and the nature of the product purchased.  Banks, MNOs and agents 
not only operate under different regulatory bodies but also operate under different sets 
of regulations. This creates confusion over consumers’ redress rights and which entity to 
turn for a payment-related problem.  
Further, consumer protection regulation practices do not match the written 
guidelines, partly because no law establishes the regulations or the authority to regulate 
the sector. The CBK and the MNOs have operated by asserting that the regulatory 
structure shall be clarified in time, through the operationalization of a payments systems 
law.383 This lack of formality has implications for consumers, who have no regulatory 
body to which to appeal. As consumers continue to use mobile payments for uses other 
than for person to person payments, and increasingly in the way a bank customer would 
use a current account, supporting service providers in the mobile payment system are 
building and deploying new services based on the mobile payments platform.384 Banks, 
for example, link physical bank accounts with mobile accounts, with some even enabling 
providers to link subscribers’ funds to their bank accounts; this innovation serves 
customers but also makes them vulnerable.   
 
                                                 
382 The government’s latest thinking on consumer credit 
reform http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/33932/the-governments-latest-
thinking-on-consumer-credit-reform accessed 25th June 2014. 
383 ‘Consumer Protection Diagnostic Study’, Kenya (2011)  
<http://www.fsdkenya.org/pdf_documents/11-02-22_Consumer_diagnostic_study.pdf>. At the time of 
writing this chapter, this clarification was not forecasted. 
384 Examples include KOPOKOPO LTD, a service that provides a low-cost software service for mobile 
money repayment mechanisms for small and medium sized enterprises.  
213 
 
4.7.2. Protection of Consumer Funds  
 
Due to their wide and existing customer base, MNOs are well placed to reach 
customers with affordable financial services. The MNOs’ existing customer base, 
marketing capabilities, physical distribution and infrastructure, and experience with high 
volume/low value transactions makes this possible. While the usual categorisation of 
payment values defined by a national prudential regulator is high value and low value and 
which then results in the requisite regulatory focus, a  third category, micro-payments, 
can be added to the broad canvas of payment values, lest its growing importance be 
quenched in the broad ‘low value’ definition.  When MNOs receive funds from the public, 
even for payments, rather than for saving, this arguably represents accepting public 
deposits.385 Strict prudential requirements and supervision protect deposits in banks,386 
and the loss of funds in the absence of such requirements will create distrust in the 
payment system, causing serious consequences for public confidence in financial 
systems.387  I argue the regulatory agencies should treat MNOs and the funds they receive 
from the public through mobile payments as deposits, subject to the same oversight as 
bank deposits,388 and the same implicit guarantee by governments.389 
The regulatory gaps allow MNOs to bypass the full range of prudential oversight 
afforded to banks.  Customers increasingly use the money collected by MNOs as a short-
term savings mechanism, and MNOs deposited the funds in joint trust accounts at several 
                                                 
385 As discussed, which is an activity almost always reserved for prudentially regulated financial institutions, 
such as commercial banks.  ‘CGAP Nonbank E-Money Issuers’ 
http://www.cgap.org/publications/nonbank-e-money-issuers%3E. accessed 30th July 2014. 
386 The term ‘bank’ as used in this chapter refers to any supervised and prudentially regulated financial 
services institution that is commonly, but not always, a bank.  
387 Denise Dias Katherine Mckees, ‘Protecting Branchless Banking Consumers: Policy Objectives and 
Regulatory Options’ 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/PReadingProtectingBranchless
.pdf> No 64 September 2010. 
388 ‘Consumer Protection Diagnostic Study: Kenya, Financial Sector Deepening’. January 2011 Simone di 
Castri and others, 'Consumer Protection Diagnostic Study: Financial Consumer Protection in Kenya' SSRN 
Journal. 
389 Ibid. 
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commercial banks for the benefit of the customers. However, in the event of insolvency 
customers have no means to claim trust assets;390 they have no recourse when and if the 
bank or an MNO becomes insolvent. Not considering electronically stored value bank to 
be deposits creates these complexities.391 The mobile payment system must clarify the 
status of electronically stored value; regulations require banks to maintain liquid assets as 
accounts with a prudentially regulated bank, and MNOs have been maintaining them as 
other ‘safe assets’, such as government securities, which are not always liquid.392  This 
leaves client assets unsecured. While either a safety net or a deposit insurance scheme 
might offer some protection,393 I posit that a deposit insurance scheme, where the 
government implicitly guarantees the protection of consumer funds in accordance with 
the current regulatory structure, despite the fact it has no legal responsibility, would best 
serve consumers.  
 Protecting consumer funds implies ensuring that funds are available to meet 
customer demands for cashing out electronic value. Such measures typically include 
restrictions on the use of such funds.394 There should be a diversification of floats across 
several financial institutions.395 Regulators might require MNOs to offer guarantees by 
                                                 
390 Geoffrey Irungu, January 2014, Business Daily, The Daily Nation Kenya, ‘Banks Raise Alarm over 
Mobile Cash Deposit Insurance – Money’ <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/mobile-cash-deposit-
insurance/-/539552/2157770/-/dgm4ojz/-/index.html%3E> accessed 28 September 2014.  
391 Ibid.  
392 ‘International Experiences of Mobile Banking Regulation – IGC’ 
http://www.theigc.org/sites/default/files/Batista%20and%20Vicenter.  Safe assets ‘deposit’ provide 
challenges in the regulation of mobile payments because of their legal ambiguity definitions and their 
ambiguity.  
393 This assessment would be after a proper definition of what the electronically stored value is and what 
banks would consider it to be, thus making it easier to offer the same protection as they would other legally 
defined ‘deposits’. 
394 Requirements that such funds be placed in their entirety in bank accounts or government debt. 
395 Mobile Financial Services: Basic Terminology (2013) 
http://www.afiglobal.org/sites/default/files/publications/mfswg_gl_1_basic_terminology_finalnewnew
_pdf.. Michael Tarazi and Paul Breloff, ‘Nonbank E-Money Issuers: Regulatory Approaches to Protecting 
Customer Funds’ 63 Focus Note <http://www.cgap.org/gm/ document-1.9.45715/FN_63_Rev.pdf> 
accessed 13 September 2013.  
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way of liquid assets to match the electronic funds available. 396  They might require assets 
to be isolated and held in a bank account.  Kenya’s regulators should ensure that funds   
deposited are done so in prudentially regulated banks, which further ensures that they are 
safeguarded.397 These requirements may be more stringent than those imposed on deposit 
taking financial institutions, which typically must only keep a small portion of total 
deposits in liquid assets.398 Regulation should require that trust accounts be safeguarded 
from institutional risks, though not discussed here. These may involve claims from 
creditors when bankruptcy occurs. It is suggested that a trust account will be resold and 
offer safeguards, especially through the fiduciary agreement instituted.399 
If Safaricom, for example, were to become insolvent, these failings could lead to 
complications and delay in distribution, and place consumer funds at risk of set-off and 
consequential diminution. This is because the CBK treats Safaricom not as a monopoly, 
but rather as an entity with multiple dominant positions. Market dominance, which is a 
stricter concept than market power, is typically defined by two conditions, a relatively 
high market share, which Safaricom has, and significant barrier to entry into the relevant 
markets occupied by the dominant firm.  The first condition holds in all markets where 
Safaricom is active. The second may hold in the agent market, but not in the mobile 
telephony market, due to the Communications Commission of Kenya’s action. 
                                                 
 396Simon di Castri, ‘Mobile Money: Enabling Regulatory Solutions’ [2013] GSMA London United 
Kingdom  <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/MMU-
Enabling-Regulatory-Solutions-di-Castri-2013.pdf> accessed 28 September 2014.  
397 ‘Ring-fencing and Safeguard of Customer Money’ 
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/programmes/mobile-money-for-the-
unbanked/safeguard-of-customer-money. Slightly different approaches have been taken by regulators 
which, rather than requiring the entire e-money float to be held in a bank, have allowed it to be invested in 
low-risk securities such as government bonds. 
398 Tarazi and Breloff Simone Di Castri, ‘Mobile Money: Enabling Regulatory Solutions’ GSMA, London, 
United Kingdom <http://www gsma com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/MMU-Enabling-Regulatory-Solutions-di-Castri-2013 pdf> ‘Customer funds 
are usually pooled and held by the bank(s) in the name of the issuer’. 
399  Trust is a common law concept, in Congo mechanisms are put in place to for consumers to recover 
their funds in the event of a provider failure.  
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Additionally, MNOs who may be operating on a regional scale, or international 
scale, may become increasingly interconnected and possibly cause disruptions if they 
experience problems, in the wider financial markets. The channels of risk distribution 
may be less visible in the mobile money value chain than in traditional banks, which raises 
the risk. Further, mobile payments have turned into a ‘shadow’ banking system,400 
undermining government supervision and the comprehensive regulation of traditional 
banking.  Regulation should ensure that in protecting consumer funds, MNOs maintain 
liquid assets equivalent to the total value of the customer funds collected.401   
The MNOs’ use of a pooled trust account has created the presumption that the 
MNO is the legal owner of the funds, which makes customer funds vulnerable to 
creditors. The Deposit Protection Fund Board402 states that it ‘only protects deposits in 
current accounts savings accounts and fixed deposit accounts.’403 However, funds held in 
trust are treated ‘as distinct from individually owned accounts, and therefore insured 
separately.’404 This however does not offer clarity over whether mobile money is covered 
under the deposit protection fund board, as regulators have been reluctant to clarify and 
define these perimeters.  
Regulation of banking activities sometimes includes caps are on interest rates, 
restrictions on product cross-subsidisation, and regulation of pricing policies. Contracting 
standards, such as a requirement that agents validate the authenticity of documents or 
                                                 
400 This phrase has been used on several occasions to define the parallel, informal banking system that 
mobile payments have afforded.  
401 Supra note,  Batista, Simione and Vicente, ‘International Experiences of Mobile Banking Regulation – 
IGC’. That is the total value of electronic value issued and outstanding, also known as the ‘e-float’. 
402 DPFB is a corporation established under Section 36 of the Banking Act, Chapter 488 of the Laws of 
Kenya as a deposit insurance scheme to provide cover for depositors and act as a liquidator of failed 
member institutions <https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/deposit-protection-fund> accessed 28 
September 2014. 
403 Ibid.  
404 Deposit Protection Fund – Central Bank of Kenya <http://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/deposit-
protection-fund> 
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signatures, might also apply to mobile payment schemes.405 However, these kinds of 
measures can easily inhibit innovation.  Operators and regulators together need to review 
limitations that may pose unnecessary constraints.   
Apart from the insolvency of the MNO or the bank in which the MNO deposited 
customer funds, illiquidity of either entity threatens consumer funds. Further, technical 
difficulties such as a lack of connection or a system outage, fraudulent agents, unexpected 
or unauthorised agents not clearly disclosed to the customers, all threaten mobile payment 
users.  Customers whose Personal Identification Numbers have been stolen, wrongfully 
accessed, shared, or used to conduct unauthorised transactions or for commercial 
purposes may not be able to use mobile payment systems under the current lack of 
regulation. The case calls for alternative and complementary measures to protect 
consumer funds.  
MNOs should be compelled by the regulators to protect consumer funds by 
demanding that they maintain the equivalent of the outstanding electronic value issued in 
a bank account. This ensures that the funds are maintained on a low risk category. They 
also should require that MNOs use the funds for purposes other than withdrawals and 
transfers, cash-in/cash-out services.406 The same should be required for trust account 
holders.407 Liquid assets might be accounts held with prudentially regulated banks, though 
‘safe assets’, such as government securities, although they may not always be as liquid as 
bank accounts, would also serve.   
Although this is a more stringent requirement than deposit taking financial 
institutions function under, it reflects a fundamental difference among banks, MNOs and 
                                                 
405 ‘The Transformational Potential of M – Transactions’ 
http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodafone/about/public_policy/policy_papers/public_policy_
series_6.pdf. Moving the debate forward The Policy Paper Series, Number 6, July 2007 
406 Ibid at Dias and McKee (n 300). 
407  The float, being the total value of electronic value issued and possibly outstanding.  
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their respective business models.408 This is since banks normally are able to intermediate 
capital, loaning funds out, which is something that non-banks such as MNOs do not do. 
However, aside from their telecommunications services, they obtain revenue from 
transaction charges and distribution of airtime.409    
The lack of clarification over who owns the funds MNOs hold in trust accounts 
should lead to increased scrutiny. Since the definition of the deposits is equally unclear, 
the uncertainty over whether the funds are owned by the customers forming individual 
accounts, or whether the pooled trust account is held for benefit of the customers as a 
whole, would result in the prohibition of MNOs from guaranteeing the funds as a security 
or offering protection against creditors in the case of the MNO’s insolvency. The EU E-
Money Directive (2009), for instance, requires contracts to state clearly and prominently 
the conditions of redemption, including any fees, and limits charges on redemption to a 
few specific circumstances. This would mean ensuring a deposit protection scheme, or in 
this case a stored value protection scheme.410 
 Deposit protection schemes play an important role in protecting consumers by 
providing compensation should an entity such as the agents or MNOs fail to meet its 
obligations to them.411 Arguably, consumer protection was the main motivation behind 
the creation of the original deposit protection scheme. The importance of safeguarding 
deposits cannot be overstated, as the US model suggests. In the United States, all funds 
placed in an insured depository institution are considered insured.412  The US model 
employs a ‘pass-through’ protection scheme for each customer, up to the insurance 
                                                 
408 Michael Tarazi and Paul Breloff, ‘Nonbank E-Money Issuers:  Regulatory Approaches to Protecting 
Customer Funds’ (2010). 63 Focus Note <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/fn63rev.pdf> accessed 28 September 2014.  
 
409 Ibid. 
410 Dias and McKee 2010. 
411 ‘Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in the CPSS Countries’ 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss105.pdf> accessed 20 October 2013. 
412 Di Castri 2013.  
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limit.413 Developed countries typically have deposit protection; the United States for 
instance has characterised stored value funds as deposits and therefore clarifies their 
position in law which requires that deposit insurance covers such deposits.414 Prudential 
requirements aim to maintain the integrity of the institution’s capital and a certain level 
of liquidity. They are intended to mitigate credit and liquidity risks and might include 
minimum capital ratios, capital adequacy measurement systems, reserve requirements, or 
other measures intended to preserve the liquidity of the provider are at the core of deposit 
protection.  
 Deposit protection through insurance might be a viable solution, but such a 
system requires that some entity involved pay premiums, which might ultimately increase 
the fees customers pay for mobile money services, which may ultimately cause undue 
burden on the goals of financial inclusion.   
 Further, the value of pooled accounts might exceed the applicable deposit 
insurance coverage limits.415 As mobile value offerings grow in volume and popularity, 
and as evidence mounts that customers increasingly use e-money schemes as savings 
vehicles,416 extending deposit insurance protection at the level of individual customer 
mobile money balances, or alternatively, raising the cap for pooled accounts, may be 
necessary. On the other hand, deposit insurance is usually funded by premiums paid by 
participating financial institutions, which typically pass these costs along to their 
customers. Thus, inclusion of e-money issuers in a deposit insurance system may make 
their services slightly more expensive. 
                                                 
413 Ibid. 
414 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is a United States government corporation 
operating as an independent agency created by the Banking Act of 1933.    
415 Batista, Simione and Vicente 2012 Supra note. 
416 In the Philippines, an estimated 10 per cent of unbanked users save an average of US$31 (one-quarter 
of their family savings) in the form of e-money (Pickens 2009). In addition, nearly a third of banked 
customers in Kibera, Kenya, keep a balance in their M-PESA. See Morawczynski and Pickens (2009). 
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MNOs in Kenya currently use this mechanism; the Central Bank of Congo’s e-
money regulation references the concept as a mechanism to ensure that the mobile 
payment user can recover their funds in the event of the MNO failure.417 The risk that 
mobile money customers will lose the money they have stored in the system is mitigated 
by the fact that if MNOs do not use the funds,418 and funds isolation happens, the MNOs 
funds then become protected from claims by their creditors,419 but additional regulation 
is needed. 
4.7.3. Lack of Public and Private Mechanisms for Legal Remedies for Consumers  
 
The lack of public mechanisms for customers to pursue claims against MNOs 
contributes to the challenges that oversight over mobile payments presents. In instances 
where the payments malfunction and mobile payments users experience the risks 
discussed in Chapter 3,420 the CCK currently forwards any complaints received from 
subscribers to the MNO or bank and to the CBK.421  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, system malfunctions cause operational risk.422 This in 
turn calls for MNOs to offer private recourse for customers in their use of mobile 
payments services.423 The Banking Act CAP 488 allows the CBK to restrict increases in 
bank charges, and mobile payments may be subject to these restrictions, but the CBK has 
no enforceable direct oversight over MNOs, and the CCK regulates the pricing of 
telecommunications voice and data charges, which may or may not apply to mobile 
                                                 
417 Banque Centrale du Congo, Instruction n.24/2011. 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT 000000821047&dateTexte=. 
418 Financial intermediation is business conducted or services offered by a financial intermediary (typically 
a bank, but also a non-bank financial institution) that accepts money from individuals or entities with capital 
surpluses and then lends it (directly through loans or indirectly through capital markets) to individuals or 
entities with capital deficits to earn a profit.  
419 Through ‘Pass through’ guarantee offered in the US model that the Kenyan regulators may adopt.   
420 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Mobile Money for Business Development in 
the East African Community: a comparative study of existing platforms and regulations’ (2012) 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtlstict2012d2_en.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
421 Ibid. 
422 See Chapter 3 3.4.1.4. Operational Risk 104. 
423 UNCTAD (2012) (supra note 350).  
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payments. The CBK only requires providers to have procedures and capacities to handle 
and resolve complaints promptly, with reports.424 The Kenya Information and 
Communications (Dispute Resolution) Regulations 2010425 set out the scope of and the 
guidelines for any disputes426 between a licence holder and a consumer. However, this 
piece of legislation appears fragmented.  
The Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act of 1989 is the 
most comprehensive legislation related to competition in Kenya. Although the Act does 
not empower consumer advocacy organisations to lodge a complaint, nor contain 
provisions on consumer welfare, the Public Complaints Commission does provide third-
party recourse for consumers of public sector services. There are still gaps in mechanisms 
for consumers, which private actors in the industry can employ without government 
involvement. Institutions offering mobile payments services operating within a 
jurisdiction where regulators cannot or prefer not to be involved make these remedies 
particularly useful.  In conclusion, this part has highlighted the challenges Kenya’s current 
approach to regulating mobile payments poses for consumers.  
 
4.8. Conclusion 
 
Mobile payments bring multifaceted regulatory challenges. Addressing these 
challenges requires coordination, and, at best, dialogue between the various industry 
players in both the public and private sector. The introduction of mobile payments has 
                                                 
424 Gerald Nyaoma, 'Mobile Payments regulatory Framework Perspectives in Kenya' (2010) 
<http://www.efina.org.ng/media-centre/events/workshops/mobile-payments-regulatory-framework-
dissemination-workshop/forcedownload/91> accessed 3 September 2014. 
425 Kenya Information and Communication Dispute Resolution Regulations (2010) 
<http://www.cck.go.ke/regulations/downloads/Kenya_Information_and_Communication_Dispute_Re
solution_Regulations_2010.pdf > accessed 3 September 2014.  
426 Section 2 of the Kenya Information and Communications (Dispute Resolution) Regulations defines 
‘dispute’ as any matter that is in contention between a licensee and another, a consumer and a licensee, 
where one or both parties is aggrieved by the conduct of the other and the parties have failed to reach an 
amicable resolution after due effort has been made.  
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called into question the strength of regulatory reforms in Kenya, and the speed with which 
the Kenyan government has considered, reviewed, and adopted regulation. The Kenyan 
government’s attempts to open dialogue with the private sector through consultations427 
seek to ensure that MNOs receive the necessary support from government and also 
evaluate possible new financial services products that affect the integrity of the financial 
system. Regulatory reform of the payments systems in Kenya will strengthen the 
operation of mobile payments through enhancing the central administration coordinating 
and regulating capacity. How to regulate and establish an appropriate regulatory 
framework remains the most important challenge.  This chapter has also examined the 
regulatory powers of the regulatory authorities and tried to expose their inadequacies due 
to their institutional structures and their approach. Chapter 6 will discuss how these 
regulatory bodies should coordinate in order to establish an appropriate regulatory 
framework for mobile payments.  
In summation,  this chapter has demonstrated that the Kenya Information and 
Communications Act 1998, by failing to expressly provide for converged mobile and 
financial services, or any other type of intrasectoral converged services, leaves a regulatory 
inadequacy not remedied by the regulation of Value Added Services under the Kenya 
Information and Communications Regulations. The telecom regulatory framework is 
inadequate to address mobile financial services. While the CCK has surrendered the 
regulatory mandate of the converged services to the CBK, the NPSA does not provide 
adequate provisions for mobile payments. Under the current law, CBK will have to 
                                                 
427 The Central Bank of Kenya began consultations for its draft regulation for the National Payment 
Systems Bill.  Consultation is an essential part of regulatory accountability. Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Public 
Consultations: National Payment Systems Draft Regulation’ (2012) 
<https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/public-consultations> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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coordinate with CCK has to ensure that the policies on mobile payments are consistent 
as it develops the regulatory framework.428 
This need for more regulation in no way diminishes the success of M-Pesa in 
Kenya.  It is the bellwether of transformational innovation and regulatory latitude by a 
progressive prudential regulator. The rapidity of its evaluation and growth even in the 
regulatory vacuum left by the lack of a national payments law at the time of its inception 
demonstrates the need for non-bank participation in the primary provision of payment 
services. Kenya’s mobile payment system provided a rapid enabling of financial inclusion 
as well as immediate and manifest downstream benefits, with more than 40,000 agent 
outlets, enhancement of competition in financial services, and a web of interconnected 
business users whose difficulty getting paid in the past, M-Pesa has remedied.  
 Users’ dependence on M-Pesa as a savings service, although its creators did not 
conceive it as such, and users at least partially recognise the risks involved, suggests a 
strong need for a safe store of value. The M-Kesho hybrid system that complements M-
Pesa’s pure payments regime points to a second generation of usage and users, which in 
turn extends and enhances access for unbanked people to the formal financial 
framework.429 M-Kesho was launched in May 2010. It allows M-Pesa users to transfer 
their funds into an interest bearing equity bank account and they therefore have access to 
loans and lines of credit. By August 2010, 455,000 customers had opened accounts, and 
718,000 by April 2011. Although activity on these accounts is reportedly low, however 
more and more banks begin to offer such services through hybrid business models with 
MNO-bank led services. The CBK will face continuing challenges, not only in developing 
the regulatory framework for mobile payments, but also in enforcing and implementing 
the provisions under the NPSA.  
                                                 
428 Since the CCK regulates the institutions that provide mobile payments, MNOs, and the financial 
institutions regulated by the CBK. 
429. See Mas and Radcliffe (2010)   
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Policy-makers and scholars continue to debate how regulation should look. Other 
developing countries have taken a variety of approaches in their regulation, but Kenya 
has the opportunity to serve as a benchmark for such regulation, despite the fact that it 
has been ambiguous and lax to date. While mature and developed markets allow 
regulators to react to information promptly and to accept market participants’ strong role 
in regulatory matters, mobile payments present a special circumstance, particularly in 
Kenya, where they have developed faster and more expansively than any other 
deployment in Africa,430 and here all other payment systems are immature. Market 
discipline requires a mature and liberal market, which combats information asymmetry, a 
great obstacle to market discipline in less mature markets. Therefore CBK has to ensure 
that the regulatory framework for mobile payments is flexible, transparent, stable, and 
promotes competition. Although CBK has the challenge of establishing its role as the 
main regulatory authority for mobile payments, as a developing country, Kenya often 
needs to fulfil other developmental tasks and fulfil other objectives, including the 
development of efficient payment systems. It is important that regulation avoids pitting 
these objectives against each other to prioritise the interests of the public. 
Thus far, Kenya’s main legal contribution the regulatory discussions for mobile 
payments or mobile financial services in general is the lacuna in the definition of a 
‘deposit’. The efficiency with which MNOs have exploited this loophole indicates inter 
alia just how critical contextualised legal drafting is, in relation to banking and payments 
law. While this exploitation in my view, has had demonstrable public policy benefits, 
through enabling financial inclusion, however conversely it may have caused adverse 
effects on the Kenyan economy or on the sub-region in the event of systemic failure of 
the banks or the MNO. 
                                                 
430 Efforts to scale up mobile payments in other countries such as Tanzania have not enjoyed similar 
success.  
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 In the future, Kenya may undertake a policy and regulatory legal discourse about 
implementing mobile payments, introducing mobile payments alongside the 
establishment of safety and soundness provisions to safeguard user funds, and thereby 
make a larger contribution to the international body of regulatory approaches to mobile 
payments.431  Regular reporting432 by MNOs on their financial health to the CBK and 
placement of funds in trust accounts at commercial banks demonstrates that adequate 
planning, a progressive regulator, alongside technical innovation ensures that there is no 
systemic impact on the financial system or harm to consumers.  
Effective regulation will require coordination and at best dialogue between the 
various industries players in both the public and private sector. This chapter has aimed to 
show that the introduction of mobile payments has called into question the strength of 
the CBK as the financial regulator, its regulatory power, and its regulatory capacity.433 It 
has also brought into question the speed with which regulation is adopted, which is 
troublingly slow. The Kenyan government has made attempts to open dialogue with the 
private sector through consultations,434 however these consultations have not yet yielded 
adequate approaches.  
Open dialogue should ensure that ‘providers receive the necessary support from 
government and also evaluate possible repercussions of new products to the integrity of 
the financial system.’435  Regulatory reforms of the payments systems in Kenya would 
strengthen the operation of mobile payments through enhancing the central 
                                                 
431 A discussion explained in this chapter and offered as a risk in Chapter 3.  
432 Financial Reporting Centre  in Kenya, MNOs are required to report all incidences of fraud as was 
articulated during the interview with Mercy Buku, Joy Malala, Interview with Mercy Buku, 'An Interview 
with Senior Manager Money Laundering Reporting at Safaricom' (2014). 
433 Regulatory capacity has been discussed in Part II of this chapter.  
434 The Central Bank of Kenya began consultations for its draft regulation for the National Payment 
Systems Bill.  Consultation is an essential part of regulatory accountability. CBK (2012)  
435 Mwangi Kimenyi and Njuguna Ndung’u, ‘Expanding the Financial Services Frontier: Lessons from 
Mobile Phone Banking in Kenya’ (2009) 
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2009/1016_mobile_phone_kenya_kimenyi/101
6_mobile_phone_kenya_kimenyi.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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administration’s coordinating and regulating capacity. Finding the regulatory approach to 
mobile payments is a challenge that regulators need to address. Various regulatory 
instruments exist that seek to resolve some of these challenges; they have not been 
adequate in their approach.  Chapter 5 will therefore discuss how these regulatory bodies 
should coordinate in order to establish an appropriate regulatory framework for mobile 
payments.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THEMES AROUND THE APPROPRIATE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
FOR   MOBILE PAYMENTS SYSTEMS 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Mobile payments deserve special regulation because of their specific system 
design and because, like other emerging payments systems,1 mobile payments have shown 
the potential to be systemically important.2 This systemic importance is manifested within 
its system, which affects the MNOs’ institutional structure, the stakeholders involved, 
including the agents and the financial services they provide. Chapter 4 demonstrated that 
the challenge of regulating rapidly changing technologies and environments is that 
regulations are not enforced as fast as technological innovations are introduced, which 
creates a regulatory dilemma where regulators have to balance the need to enable 
innovation, while at the same time guarantee the safety and soundness of the financial 
system.  
 Thus where unregulated services such as mobile payments are introduced, the 
concern that they may stifle innovation persists.3  Consequently, establishing an 
appropriate regulatory framework for mobile payments by regulators should be at the 
crux of any payment system reform, especially one that is financial inclusive. Not simply 
because a regulatory framework would clarify the regulators’ objectives in this converged 
                                                 
1 Such as electronic payments and peer to peer payments such as Bitcoin. See Satoshi Nakamoto, ‘Bitcoin: 
A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ (2008) 28 <http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 26 
September 2014.  
2 Systemically important institution has been discussed in Chapter 3: The Mobile Payment Risks.  
3 James E Prieger, 'Regulation, Innovation, And the Introduction of New Telecommunications Services' 
(2002) 84 Review of Economics and Statistics Working Papers 00-8 
<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/003465302760556512> accessed 26 September 
2014.  
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environment, but also because, post-financial inclusion, mobile payments have brought 
forth regulatory challenges that have not been addressed by regulation.  
The preceding chapters have discussed the overarching legal and regulatory 
challenges that mobile payments present.4 They have done so by discussing and 
highlighting the regulatory environment that enabled mobile payments to succeed while 
at the same time the challenges post-financial inclusion that these new payments have 
presented. Through the examination of the post-financial inclusion issues, the challenges 
that have not piqued the interest of regulators and the literature at large has drawn the 
attention to the fragmented regulatory framework within the financial services sector in 
Kenya, and the lack of adequate financial consumer protection mechanisms due to the 
fact that, consumer risk has now been distributed to the now ‘banked’ population.  Thus, 
how best to approach the regulation of mobile payments, following the risks and 
challenges discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 remains a pertinent question, especially in the 
‘post’-financial inclusion era in Kenya.   
Mobile payments have provided a unique chance to reconsider existing regulatory 
structures in order to develop an appropriate regulatory strategy, in the hope of effecting 
a regulatory framework that would ensure an adequate safety net for mobile payments 
users.5  This chapter proposes an appropriate regulatory approach for mobile payments 
by discussing the regulatory themes that would best suit the approach that should be 
adopted and the issues that regulators should be mindful of when enforcing and 
implementing this regulation.  This chapter also answers the final research question6 about 
what reforms should be implemented in the current regulatory framework to adequately 
                                                 
4 Chapters 3 and 4 have discussed the post-financial inclusion regulatory challenges surrounding mobile 
payments systems.  
5 Mondato, ‘Mobile Payment Regulation’ (2014) <http://mondato.com/about/expertise/mobile-
payment-regulation/> accessed 26 September 2014. 
6 See Chapter 1 Secondary Questions. 
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oversee mobile payments. This would draw its conclusions about how an appropriate 
regulatory framework should address the challenges in the current regulatory framework, 
while at the same time building an enabling environment that allows the growth of 
innovation in the payments systems and is at the same time sensitive to financial inclusion. 
This further suggests that the Kenyan regulatory framework would have to balance the 
competing interests of the mobile financial services stakeholders, whose main objectives 
would be to increase their profits through new financial services products. They would 
also have to consider adopting a balanced approach that addresses the industry 
development through driving national and global development and consequently 
increasing financial inclusion. 
5.2. The Considerations in Prescribing the Appropriate Financial Services 
Regulation for Mobile Payments 
 
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, assigning appropriate regulation 
has been revisited7 since previous models had failed to work and the need for improved 
regulation was necessary. What was highlighted at least from a systemic point of view was 
that the interconnection across sectors, products and regions contributed to the financial 
crisis and these cannot be ignored. Furthermore regulatory reform has been a ‘response 
to widespread perceptions of inadequacy of existing systems’ and the weak application 
and implementation of the sound regulatory frameworks.8 All this was in light with 
finding the ultimate regulatory environment that would prevent market abuse, while 
maintaining financial sector soundness. The regulatory reforms were aimed at limiting 
                                                 
7 Literature following the GFC  is extensive. See, John Raymond LaBrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and 
Dalvinder Singh, Financial Crisis Containment and government Guarantees (Edward Elgar 2013); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, ‘Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis’ (2009) 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 561–62 (quoting 
Steven L Schwarcz, ‘Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown’ (2008) 
93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 406) 
8 Stavros B Thomadakis, ‘What Makes Good Regulation?’ (2007) IFAC Council Seminar 
<http://www.ifac.org/sites/default/files/downloads/30th_anniversary_Thomadakis_Pres_Nov_07.pdf
>  accessed 26 September 2014. 
230 
 
moral hazard and the concept of ‘too big to fail’ that guaranteed insolvent financial 
institutions that ‘Lenders of Last Resort’ would be insured. This assignment is quite 
similar, in the examination of an appropriate regulatory framework for mobile payments. 
Additionally, an examination of a macroprudential approach to mobile payments is 
suggested, since it has been argued that the causes of the GFC were due to a weak 
application of microprudential approaches to regulation.9 
Mobile payments and their success in Kenya have precipitated an environment in 
which MNOs may be considered institutions that are too big to fail and their collapse or 
insolvency may have systemic effects for the payments system.10 It has been reiterated 
that post-financial inclusion this could have catastrophic effects if such a case were to 
happen. Hence, the assessment of an appropriate regulatory framework for mobile 
payments requires an evaluation of certain benchmarks in deciding whether the regulation 
is good, acceptable or in need of reform.11  
These benchmarks are described as ‘principles of good regulation’,12 where 
Baldwin13 asserts that there should be key tests that should be performed before reaching 
an evaluation on what good regulation should be, or is appropriate in a particular case, as 
the quest for ‘good’ regulation varies from country to country.14  This study has 
throughout prescribed ‘appropriate’ regulation deliberately, as developing countries merit a 
different approach to their regulatory processes, or rather in the prescription of their 
                                                 
9 Samuel G Hanson, Anil K Kashyap and Jeremy C Stein, 'A Macroprudential Approach to Financial 
Regulation' (2011) Journal of Economic Perspectives 169. 
10 This is because there is an interconnectivity between the services they provide and the role they play in 
the payments system.  
11 Robert Baldwin and Christopher McCrudden, Regulation and Public Law (London Oxford 1987); Jon.Stern, 
‘The Evaluation of Regulatory Agencies’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook Of Regulation (Oxford University Press 2010). 
12 Better Regulation Task Force, Principles of Good Regulation (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 2003), where the 
principles were described as Proportionality, Accountability, Consistency, Transparency and Targeting.  
13 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice 
(Oxford University Press 2011) 25. 
14 The evaluation of good regulation is relative. Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF), Principles of Good 
Regulation (BRTF 2003).  
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regulation. This is because previous regulatory strategies and supervision measures are 
becoming outdated and new approaches and techniques now need urgent consideration. 
Although the rationale for and principles of financial regulation are not fundamentally 
different in developing countries, it led Baldwin to ask whether developing countries were 
‘special’?15  
Relevant to this discussion are the institutional components that are regarded as 
problematic when regulating in developing countries.16 These components include, 
limited capacity17 where the state structure as well as the internal resources of the state 
are often regarded as being too limited to stand up to well-resourced private interests, in 
this case Safaricom,  the most successful firm deploying M-Pesa.  Also to be included are 
limited commitment or, as discussed in Chapter 4, lack of political will to regulate18 and 
the fact that there needs to be a limiting of the discretion in regulatory and political 
decision-making, and finally limited accountability, where governments face limited 
demands for transparency, which means that  their decisions are relatively free from 
challenge.19 
 Therefore the examination of appropriate regulation requires the discussion of 
the regulatory principles.20 This section will assess the regulatory principles in the 
regulation of mobile payments.  This study identifies the principles as they were used by 
                                                 
15 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge. Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice 
(Oxford University Press 2012) 410. 
16 Jean J Laffont, Regulation and Development (Cambridge University Press 2005); Antonio Estache and Liam 
Wren-Lewis, ‘On the Theory of Evidence on Regulation of Network Industries in Developing Countries’ 
(2010) Oxford Handbook of Regulation 376-378 
17 Regulatory capacity as discussed in Chapter 4. 
18 Chapter 4, Section: Lack of Political Will To Regulate. Anat R Admati and Martin Hellwig, ‘Good 
Banking Regulation Needs Clear Focus, Sensible Tools, and Political Will.’ (2011)  
<http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/research/documents/AdmatiHellwigGoodReg021412
.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014. 
19 Antonio Estache and Liam Wren-Lewis, ‘Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: 
Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead’ (2009) Journal of Economic Literature 729–770. 
20 These principles are internationally recognised as the benchmark for ‘good regulation’, See, Andrew 
Crockett et al, ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation’ (2009) Geneva Reports on the World 
Economy 11. 
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the Better Regulations Task Force 2005,21 and then includes the specific principles that 
are unique to both developing country perspectives and, more importantly, to mobile 
payments. These principles are: proportionality, accountability, transparency and 
consistency.  I include the examination of state objectives such as consumer and investor 
protection, the promotion of competition, financial stability, regulation and supervision 
and finally the unique design of the regulated entity based mainly  on the legal status of 
the entity, in this case the MNO: whether it is an institution-based approach, or on the 
activities it performs, a functional-based approach and the governance structure of the 
oversight function,  as additional and distinctive criteria for appropriate regulation in 
Kenya’s context. Consequently, an appropriate regulatory framework should be one that 
enables mobile money, and creates an open and level playing field that nurtures 
competition and innovation, influences the value schemes of both banks and MNOs. 
This environment should also enable and enhance investments, and lets providers focus 
on refining operations and promoting customer adoption.22  
 
5.2.1. Proportionality  
 
Proportionality requires that the legal and regulatory framework should not be 
excessively restrictive and arduous in relation to the possible issues it is designed to tackle. 
Proportionality also suggests that any such inconsistencies are recognised and resolved in 
a way that is in accordance with a country’s overall priorities, which should achieve an 
appropriate balance.23  However, public policy objectives may not always accommodate 
the need for a proportionate regulatory approach. This is because developing countries’ 
                                                 
21 Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF), Principles of Good Regulation (BRTF 2003).  
22 GSMA, ‘Mobile Money’ (2013) 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/MMU-Enabling-
Regulatory-Solutions-di-Castri-2013.pdf > accessed 26 September 2014. 
23 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the World Bank 2007.  
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objective of encouraging inclusion may override the need for stability and safety and 
soundness of the financial system.  
    Consequently, regulatory proportionality includes laws and regulations which 
enable the viable development of financial services through mobile phones and which 
balance the cost of regulation both to the institutions and the regulator with its benefits.24  
Furthermore, there should be an assurance that any burden or constraint that is imposed 
should be proportionate to the benefits.25 A consideration of the costs to firms and 
consumers is usually an indication of how proportionate an imposition of a regulation 
would be. Cost benefit analysis would be necessary for the proposed regulatory 
requirement and regulators should only intervene when necessary. In the case of mobile 
payments, the risks as outlined in Chapter 3 present a justification for intervention and 
the compliance costs would be passed on to the MNOs.  These risks, in particular integrity 
risks, fraud and loss of funds, far outweigh the cost of compliance by MNOs and the 
enforcement regimes should be proportionate to the risks posed.  
 Thus the establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework for mobile 
payments should provide a balance between technological innovations on the one hand, 
and safeguard against the unique risks of the ever evolving mobile money ecosystem on 
the other. Since MNOs are not regulated by financial regulators, but rather the telecoms 
regulator, the CCK, the proportionality of mobile payments regulation as related to the 
associated unique risks should also be considered. A good regulatory approach should on 
the one hand balance the need for stability and safety and soundness of the payments 
system and the financial system as whole, and on the other hand be flexible, technology 
                                                 
24 James Bilodeau, William Hoffman, Sjoerd Nikkelen, ‘The Seven Pillars of Mobile Financial Services 
Development’ (2012) Ch 1.1 <http://reports.weforum.org/mobile-financial-services-development-
2011/content/pdf/01-part-1/wef-mfsd-chapter-1-1.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014. 
25 This additionally finds that proportionate regulation should seek to find out why there is restricted access 
for people to financial services.  
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neutral and accommodate various ways for the stakeholders to meet compliance 
requirements.26 This brings into focus how regulatory objectives by the regulator should 
be advanced, as proportionality also hinges on the careful balance of any policy objectives 
the state may have, such as financial inclusion. Proportionality requires balance when 
regulatory objectives clash, as can be expected where previously autonomous regulatory 
domains converge. For instance, where the objective of private firms is profit, that of the 
telecoms regulator, the CCK, is to issue industry standards, these may often be at odds 
with the regulatory objectives of the government of Kenya, for instance in the provision 
of an enabling environment for mobile payments to reduce cash dominance in the 
economy and its associated risks, thereby further advancing financial inclusion.   
  In so doing, regulatory proportionality would require that regulators issue 
regulation that fosters, rather than inhibits, innovation in association with regulated 
activities, such as by allowing scope for different means of compliance, so that market 
participants are not unduly restricted from launching new financial products and services.  
5.2.2. Transparency  
 
As a prerequisite for good governance and sound financial regulation27  transparency 
offers information about existing conditions so decisions and actions are made accessible, 
viable and understandable.28  The allocation of resources is enabled through transparency, 
as it ensures that market players have adequate resources to identify risks and to 
distinguish one firm or one country’s circumstances from another.29 Transparency helps 
                                                 
26  James Bilodeau, William Hoffman, Sjoerd Nikkelen, ‘The Seven Pillars of Mobile Financial Services 
Development’ (2012) 
27 Ibid. 
28 See BIS, ‘Report of the Working Group on Transparency and Accountability’ (1998) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/othp01b.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014.  
29 Ibid. Information is the essence of a perfect market. See for example Joseph Stiglitz and Amar 
Bhattacharya, ‘Underpinning for a Stable and Equitable Global Financial System: From Old Debates to a 
New Paradigm’ (1999) 11th Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics on 28–30 April 1999 
<http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/2000_Underpinnings_of_a_Stable_and_Eq
uitable.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014.  
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to inform markets of accurate information, thereby helping to stabilise markets during 
times of uncertainty and also contributing to the effectiveness of announced policies.30 
Better policy options are encouraged through transparency, which aids the reduction of 
the incidence of arbitrary decisions in regulatory implementation.31 The importance of 
transparency to the regulatory policy agenda emanates from the many causes of regulatory 
failures.32 These failures include regulatory capture and bias towards focussed benefits, 
‘inadequate information in the public sector, rigidity, market uncertainty and inability to 
understand policy risk and a lack of accountability.’33  
Transparency would allow market participants to garner sufficient information to 
enable them to make sound judgments.34 It also requires that the CBK, as the main 
regulatory authority for mobile payments, should inform the public that regulatory 
choices have been taken to encourage administrative discretion and deter corruption.35  
The CBK as the main regulatory authority for mobile payments should gather 
information and documents and disseminate to all parties concerned. This central body 
disseminating the relevant information must ensure timely and accurate distribution. The 
CBK should be able to exercise its discretion as to which information to disseminate.36 
To encourage the use of mobile payments by market participants and consumers the 
                                                 
30 Gil Mehrez and Daniel Kaufmann, ‘Transparency, Liberalization, and Financial Crisis’ (2000) World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2286 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=258976> accessed 26 September 2014.  
31 Jin-Guk Kim, Tae-Yun Kim and Junsok Yang, 'Regulatory Transparency: What We Learned In Korea’ 
(2010) <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN014177.pdf> 
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32 Ibid.  
33 Scott H Jacobs, ‘The Second Generation of Regulatory Reforms’ (1999) OECD Public Management 
Service <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/jacobs.htm> accessed 26 
September 2014; OECD, ‘First Workshop Of The APEC-OECD Co-Operative Initiative’ (2001) 
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relationship between relevant authorities has to be transparent. Policies announced by the 
CBK and the CCK can reduce uncertainties about policy intentions.37  
They will also restrain the authorities from misleading the public and consumers. Public 
consultations are key to regulatory tools employed to improve transparency. The CBK, 
in their efforts to formulate and operationalise the NPSA, only called for one public 
consultation.38 It may be debatable as to whether citizens or the industry at large where 
informed, as it was only possible for industry experts to comment, which highlights a 
slight flaw in the efforts for transparency and calls into question the efficacy of the NPSA 
2011. It is important that consultation should take place before the proposals are 
developed so that stakeholders’ views and expertise are taken into account. The regulated 
should be aware of their obligations, while being given the opportunity to comply.  
Trade, competition and investment are also encouraged through transparency of the 
regulatory system as undue influences by special interests.39 It reinforces the legitimacy 
and fairness of regulatory process, but it is not easy to establish in practice, especially in 
the framework of developing countries such as Kenya. Transparency involves a wide 
range of practices, including standardised processes. These would include consultations 
with the public in clear language when drafting publication codification. It should also be 
easy to find and understand the implementation and appeal processes, which should be 
predictable and consistent—something the CBK failed to do, perhaps due to both 
internal and external pressure in a ‘rush to regulate’ mobile payments.40 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38  Central Bank of Kenya, ‘Call for Public Consultations on the National Payments Draft Regulations’ 
(2013) <https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/2012-09-21-11-44-41/public-consultations> accessed 
26 September 2014.  
39 Financial System Inquiry Final Report (Wallis Report), ‘Philosophy of Financial Regulation’ (1997) 
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   All guarantees should be made clear through transparency, and all stakeholders 
of financial products and services, should be made fully aware of their responsibilities. 
This certainly may be a difficult criteria to fulfil, which further adds to the complexities 
that financial regulation in developing countries face, especially post-financial inclusion.41 
Hence, the CBK in establishing an appropriate regulation for mobile payments should 
clarify their position and communicate these clarifications to interested parties, in this 
case MNOs, agents and consumers.  Transparency is also closely linked to the need for 
accountability, which the next section discusses.42  Providing the public with adequate 
information ensures that all stakeholders are provided with the opportunity to comment 
or contribute to the best quality regulation that emerges. This ensures that the resulting 
regulation should be the best possible.43 Too big to fail institutions that create a moral 
hazard as a result of public perception and the imprimatur of the government, would 
hamper the quest for transparency and that all guarantees are made explicit. Transparency 
is the key instrument in preventing market abuse, including insider dealing,44 and market 
manipulation,45 money laundering, terrorism financing and corruption.46  
Transparency also ensures that the regulatory strategy of disclosure is effected 
and enforced. Disclosure rules usually prohibit the supply of false or misleading 
information, and so decrease information asymmetry and offer some protection to 
consumers as they allows consumers to make decisions on the acceptability of the 
processes involved in the production of goods and the services they are offered. This 
                                                 
41 Ibid 
42 Stavros B Thomadakis, ‘What Makes Good Regulation’ (2007) IFAC Council Seminar 
<http://www.ifac.org/sites/default/files/downloads/30th_anniversary_Thomadakis_Pres_Nov_07.pdf
> accessed 26 September 2014. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Capital Markets Act Cap 485A. 
45 Ibid.  
46 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘United Nations Convention against Corruption’ (2003) 
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf> 
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strategy provides a mode of regulation that is not heavily interventionist.47  A mandatory 
disclosure may occur whereby MNOs must reveal certain important information, such as 
pricing or quality of services to the public. Disclosure regulation may also involve the 
supply of information to the public directly through the CBK the assigned regulator or 
the CCK, the specific telecoms regulator. 48  
 Disclosure through transparency increases publicly available information; it 
enables market actors to make informed investment decisions and thus improves market 
efficiency. However, the customer profiles of mobile payment users, who have been 
described as low income earners, previously unbanked and financially illiterate, may not 
always use the information properly or may merely fail to understand this information. 
This would require Kenyan regulators to adequately and precisely ensure that all 
information is disseminated in a manner that is accessible to all segments of the 
population. Transparency is also applied in the enforcement of the regulatory 
framework,49 as it is normally considered paramount in order to indicate to the regulatory 
community that regulation is implemented consistently and proportionally.50 
5.2.3. Accountability  
 
An appropriate regulatory framework would have to ensure accountability as one 
of its key components. Accountability is closely linked to the concept of transparency. 
Furthermore, the quest to find the core of accountability is likely to be plagued by the 
plurality of interests and ideas that surround this concept.51 Colin Scott defines regulatory 
                                                 
47 Karen Yeung, 'Government by Publicity Management: Sunlight or Spin?' (2005) Public Law 360. 
48Anat R Admati and Paul Pfleiderer, 'Forcing Firms To Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation And 
Externalities' (2000) 13 Review of Financial Studies 479.  
49 Andrew Haynes and Deborah Sabalot, ‘Butterworths Financial Services Law Guide (Butterworths 1997). 
50 Dalvinder Singh, 'Enforcement Methods and Sanctions in Banking Regulation and Supervision' (2002) 
4(4) International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 307–343.  
51 Martin Lodge and Lindsay Stirton, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin 
Cave, Martin Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press 2010) 353. 
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accountability as, ‘the duty to give account for one’s actions to some other person or 
body’.52 Accountability is often associated more with reporting duties, whereas 
transparency offers visibility, such as the publication of all intentions to regulate or for 
procurement contracts and what would be regarded as public discretion.53 A further 
definition of accountability is ‘a liability to reveal, to explain, and to justify what one does; 
how one discharges  responsibilities, financial or other, whose several origins may be 
political, constitutional, hierarchical or contractual’.54 This principle would compel the 
regulatory framework in Kenya to state who is accountable, for what and to whom: a 
question that is always asked when discussing accountability as a regulatory principle. In 
this instance, the question lingers within the mobile payments system framework, with 
different stakeholders and sectoral regulators, where the CBK as the financial regulator, 
and the CCK the industry regulator, have to be accountable for their actions and 
decisions. This is because accountability by regulators illustrates their power in two 
respects, they affect the outcomes for financial firms and they can have a significant 
impact on consumer welfare.55  
This precipitates the more accurate questions, ‘who regulates the regulators?’, or 
who regulators are accountable to and how this accountability is achieved.56 This forms 
an important aspect in determining and conceptualising an appropriate regulatory 
approach, because, as stated earlier, accountability is the need to justify and accept 
responsibility for the decisions taken with the objectives taken into consideration. 
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Therefore appropriate regulation should allocate responsibility that has to be upheld by 
either the CBK or the CCK as the regulators of mobile payments. This responsibility 
requires ex-post oversight of the actions of one institution by another institution.57 
Accountability also ensures that there is a certain discipline in ensuring that the authorities 
are answerable to the general public and market participants, such as agents and 
consumers, regarding the decision that they have made.58 A better-informed public will 
also strengthen the credibility and public understanding of the issues in question. 59  
For instance, as discussed in Chapter 4, holding agents liable for their actions and 
inactions provides an opportunity for accountability by the MNO and the CBK at large 
as the regulator. Accountability would manifest itself in how providers assume legal 
liability for the actions of agents, especially in their discharge of the agents’ agreement, 
between the MNOs and the agents.  Accountability requires that regulators should be 
able to justify their actions and decisions and be subject to public scrutiny.60  Draft 
regulations should be published and all those affected in the industry should be informed 
prior to decisions being made. This provides that regulators are required to establish clear 
standards and criteria against which they are accountable; these requirements include 
accessibility, fairness and the need for effective complaints and appeals procedures.   
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 This accountability is extended to public servants and government officials.61 
Regulatory authorities should be concerned about the applicability of the regulations they 
frame. All stakeholders should therefore be able to know who is accountable by 
recognising who is in authority. This may be complicated, particularly in converged 
industries such as mobile payments.62 This usually aids in the implementation of policies 
or regulation as they are then easily amended. In answering who is accountable, in this 
case the MNO as the regulated party, would be accountable to the CBK for mobile 
payments and to the CCK for telecommunications. However the CBK would need to be 
accountable to another institution for its regulatory approach. As each authority has its 
own specific roles and objectives to meet, there must be clear coordination among the 
authorities to clarify their roles. Only when the functions are clear can each authority be 
made accountable for its actions. Furthermore, central banks may have statutory 
independence, but do not have policy independence,63 which imposes limits on their 
accountability since they may have immunity over law suits from citizens.64 
Accountability also needs to be appropriate to the resources of the country, or 
the regulators more specifically, and to the effective pursuit of the regulatory objectives.65 
In this case the regulated party would be the MNO; as control is exercised by certain 
institutions, the competence of these institutions in speciality areas may also be called into 
question.66 Accountability would call for a clearly explained process as to how final 
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decisions are arrived at. This would ensure that criteria are maintained through which 
they can be judged. Since accountability is closely linked with transparency,67 
accountability would call for well publicised, accessible, fair and effective complaints and 
appeals procedures.  The aspect of accountability that asks, ‘accountable to who?’ means 
that regulators and possibly enforcers should have clear lines of accountability to the 
parliament as well as to the public.68 Where accountability imposes discipline on 
regulators, transparency on the other hand, enhances the quality of accountability by 
installing corporation amongst regulators and calling on them to justify their decisions.69 
Accountability is a duty that has to be upheld by each authority.70 As each 
authority has its own specific roles and objectives to meet, there must be clear 
coordination among the authorities to clarify their roles. Only when the functions are 
clear can each authority be made accountable for its actions. A better-informed public 
will also strengthen the credibility and public understanding of the issues in question.71 
Accountability in financial regulation also calls for regulatory agencies to operate 
independently of sectional interests.  This also calls for the CBK to implement a 
regulatory structure that is accountable to its stakeholders and subject to audit.72 
Although accountability attracts universal support due to its position in protecting 
the interests of the public, it may have certain limits.73 As  Lastra  states , ‘too much 
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independence may lead to the creation of a state within a state, while too much 
accountability threatens the effectiveness of independence and therefore an optimal 
trade-off between independence and accountability must be attained.’74  
5.2.4. Consistency  
 
Closing gaps and inconsistencies, as discussed in Chapter 4,75 should involve all 
areas, including policies, legal framework and approval and monitoring of mobile 
payments schemes in Kenya.  It is paramount to avoid gaps and inconsistencies in order 
to be free from ill effects and damaging uncertainties.76 Mobile payments as established 
as a retail payment instrument are continuously developing. The CBK may meet 
challenges in keeping up with the changing conditions, in particular the technical 
innovations and the changing profiles of market participation. If these changing 
circumstances are not recognised, the CBK may find gaps and inconsistencies in 
information in relation to the development of mobile payments.  
 Cooperation between the CBK and other authorities in the sharing of 
information may narrow the gaps and inconsistencies, thereby maintaining financial 
stability and certainty, which are important in also maintaining trust and integrity in the 
payments system. This avoidance is also necessary as it ensures that the CBK can identify 
the rights and responsibilities of all parties, such as the functions of the MNO holding 
the platform for mobile payments. It may be difficult to conceive a consistent regulatory 
framework, especially for a retail payment services framework. Regulation should 
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therefore be predictable in order to offer stability and certainty to those being regulated, 
which would call for a consistent application of regulation across the country.77  
 
 
5.2.5. Balancing the Objectives of the State  
 
Appropriate regulation should be able to balance the objectives of the state and 
the need for regulation where the objectives include the protection of consumers and the 
safeguard of the payments system. Since mobile payments have reflected the national 
conditions, the economic goals through the financial inclusion agenda and the different 
socio-economic and political circumstances as well as the level of infrastructure 
development of Kenya’s financial system, then all these factors should be considered in 
order to effect appropriate regulation. These considerations are paramount as they are 
the reason that mobile payments have only managed to be successful in Kenya, since the 
infrastructures and the enabling environment varies from country to country. As a result, 
solutions which have been effective to achieve national goals in one country may not 
always be so in another. Among these objectives is to resolve the market and maintain 
financial stability. 78 
The state should extend its mandate on the competitive concerns at the retail 
level. This approach ensures that competitive concerns such as interoperability amongst 
MNOs are adequately addressed, while also limiting ex-ante regulation to those areas 
where the benefits to consumers cannot be achieved using ex-post regulation.79 This 
further calls for periodical assessment of competitive conditions in the market place. Time 
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and resources would have to be allocated to reviewing and revising targeted ex-ante 
regulation80 to avoid stifling innovation and ensuring that a balance is met so that the 
interests of consumers and the long-term benefits of financial inclusion are met.81  
As reiterated, an enabling environment for mobile payments is optimal, especially 
in reducing cash dominance in the economy. The reduction of cash dominance is an 
objective of governments because of the risks involved.82 It should also include a 
specification of minimum technical and business requirements for various participants in 
the mobile payments system. 83  
 
5.2.6. The Design of the Non-Bank Payment Provider  
 
It is important that appropriate regulation for mobile payments should take into 
account the need to accommodate market innovation.84 This would require that the 
regulation should be neutral and should avoid favouring particular business models over 
any other as it is likely to distort the market’s competitive process. 85 Additionally, the 
design of the non-bank payment provider suggests that while the MNO requires technical 
expertise, regulators should aim to have technology neutral rules in order to maintain 
their longevity. This is evident in industries that, for instance, are over reliant on new 
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technologies. Although this presents a challenge due to the fact that technology, as has 
been demonstrated by mobile payments, post-dates regulation, an appropriate regulatory 
framework would ensure that new regulations instituted remain meaningful and useful 
for an extended period.  
Regimes are more likely to be sustainable where they are designed around the behaviour 
they are trying to manage and are as neutral as possible about the mechanisms and 
technologies involved.86 One commentator noted, ‘as nature abhors a vacuum, so do 
regulators’.87 In our view, the presence of a regulator with supervision and enforcement 
powers is an important part of any effective regulatory regime for payment services. We 
assume that for each of the regulatory models discussed in this and the following chapter, 
a regulatory agency of some sort would be involved. Regulatory regimes are not generally 
self-executing. They tend to need a regulator to supervise and enforce conduct of business 
rules. Relying on private citizens or competitors, who do not have sufficient expertise and 
incentive to take action, is unlikely to be a fully effective enforcement strategy. Law 
enforcement is a public good—it is likely to be undersupplied by private actors in a free 
market system. An efficiency or competition protection regime is generally accepted as 
justifiable and necessary for payment services. Product disclosure is discussed below. 
Minimum fair play rules are also needed. As discussed in sections 3.3 and 5.2 above, they 
include prohibitions on misleading, deceptive, unconscionable and harassing conduct.  
       Traditional regulation of financial institutions has been mainly based on the 
institutional capacity rather than the business undertaken.88 This has led to a gap in the 
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distinction between institutional and functional regulation. Hence the regulation of 
parties has ultimately indicated that their core business was also regulated.  These 
distinctions are apparent in regulating banks whose business is banking, however, due to 
the merging of industries due to technology, the institutional structure of supervision has 
thus become a major issue of policy debate.89 Nevertheless, a contrast between functional 
and institutional regulation and institutions based on objectives or market failure has the 
potential to be misguided as they serve different purposes. This is because usually, 
institutions, not functions, fail. However, with the advent of technology, functions are 
likely to fail, therefore on the one hand institutions should be regulated for safety and 
soundness, while functions would have to be periodically assessed for functionality and 
for the mitigation of operational risks. Furthermore, functional regulation involves 
regulating how institutions conduct the various aspects of their business (conduct of 
business) and how they behave within their industry.90  
In summation, what constitutes good regulation may be difficult to establish and 
is a matter that is inevitably subject to contention. Adapting regulations which effectively 
regulate services such as mobile payments is an important factor to consider. However 
before attempting to disseminate this, it is important to discuss the various modalities of 
regulation. An appreciation of the sphere of regulation is necessary, especially in the 
telecoms sector, as there needs to be consideration of the various regulatory actors and 
their tools or powers which were extensively discussed in Chapter 4. 
 The role of the CBK as the state actor and the role of non-state actors have to 
be considered in establishing regulatory frameworks. Several authors have contended that 
regulation is not merely the action of the state to set prescriptive rules backed by 
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sanctions, and have attempted a conceptual understanding of the spheres of regulatory 
influence. For example, Lessig and others, writing on privacy issues within the 
information industry, have contributed to this discourse by suggesting frameworks for 
classifying various sources of regulatory power.91 
5.3. The CBK’s Approach in Regulating Mobile Payments 
 
The CBK’s is said to have recently instituted a functional as opposed to an 
institutional approach to regulating mobile payments,92 since the development of 
technology has transcended national boundaries and exposed consumers to a myriad of 
providers. It is increasingly difficult for regulators to block out all unlicensed services 
providers and suggestions have been made that consumers should become better 
equipped to exert market discipline on MNOs. It is questionable whether regulators, 
particularly, central banks, are prepared to let market discipline be the main monitor of 
financial regulation.93 
The CBK’s ‘Test and Learn’ approach to regulation has been publicised by the 
Governor of the CBK, Njuguna Ndung’u.94 Njuguna has reiterated the government’s 
desire not to stifle innovation in the payments industry. This reaffirms the influence of 
political policy on regulation.95 In this approach, the governor states that regulators should 
‘think beyond the conventional brick and mortar delivery channels to enhance financial 
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92 ‘Mobile Money for the Unbanked’ GSMA, New Regulatory Framework for e-Money Issuers in Kenya 
http://www.technologybanker.com/regulations-compliance/new-regulatory-framework-for-e-money-
issuers-in-kenya accessed 29 September  2014. David Llewellyn (2006) (n 90). 
93 Maria J Nieto, 'Reflections on the Regulatory Approach to E-Finance' (2001) BIS Paper No 7 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap07j.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014.  
94 Simone di Castri, ‘A Conversation with Professor Njuguna Ndung’u, Governor of the Central Bank of 
Kenya, on the critical policy issues around mobile money’ (2013) GSMA 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/a-conversation-with-professor-njuguna-ndungu-
governor-of-the-central-bank-of-kenya-on-the-critical-policy-issues-around-mobile-money>  accessed 26 
September 2014.   
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inclusion.’96  This assertion has reinforced the CBK’s approach which has been to 
‘embrace technological innovations and provide a supportive policy environment to 
nurture the growth of mobile financial services in a safe manner.’97 Their risk assessment 
strategy was to carry out pilot tests before inception which would ‘curb the risks of 
failures’.98 He further highlighted the limits to a risk-based approach by stating that ‘it was 
important to avoid the fear of the unknown since an extreme risk-averse attitude can lead 
to corner solutions.’ However this approach may be seen as too lax, as a risk-based 
approach to regulating mobile payments would be appropriate.  
 The CBK also applied a regulatory approach that would aim to ‘balance 
innovation and stability.’ The governor acknowledges that a ‘proactive regulatory 
environment is critical in ensuring a balance between access and stability.’ He justifies 
this, as since regulatory processes post-date innovation, this delay stifles innovation, 
hence slowing the market dynamism which undermines access.99 This shows that the 
strategic policy choice that Kenya adopts is to allow technological innovations, albeit 
under prudential monitoring so as to ensure financial integrity. 100  This involves the 
discharge of its role in ensuring that innovations do not result in risks to the markets’ 
stability. Their approach also included enabling a competitive environment that would 
attract private sector investors into the mobile financial services sub-sectors and ensure 
that the market is open to competition. The CBK also aimed at eliminating barriers to 
entry and creating an enabling legal environment,101 as it recognized the potential for 
financial inclusion if a competitive supply of mobile financial services products are 
                                                 
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid. 
101 Where the lack of specific regulation inherently provided an enabling environment as stated in Chapter 
2, which would ultimately encourage increased domestic and foreign investments. 
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provided.102 The CBK also highlighted the need for ‘better regulation rather than more 
regulation’ in efforts to ensure that regulatory regimes do not stifle innovations.  The 
‘better’ regulatory framework would have the ability to readily identify weaknesses and 
emerging vulnerabilities, to analyze and price risks appropriately, to provide appropriate 
incentives and penalties to induce prudent behaviours in the market, and to encourage 
innovations while developing strong institutions. 
5.4. Themes Round the Regulation of Mobile Payments  
 
The themes and regulatory strategies103 that should be employed in the 
appropriate regulation of mobile payments have to encapsulate the specific interests, in 
my view, the safety and soundness of the payments system and of the financial systems 
as whole, paying special attention to the needs of consumers. There are various 
instruments that states can use to regulate directly.104 However, choosing the right strategy 
for regulation is important while considering Kenya’s regulatory capacity,105 it being a 
developing country,106 its resources and the influence it possesses.107 Kenya further needs 
to assess the right regulatory strategy in order to achieve its objectives, such as the safety 
and soundness of the payment system and the efficiency and stability of the financial 
system as a whole.108 
                                                 
102 Simone di Castri (2013) (n 94). 
103 Strategies are needed in the regulation of various aspects of a country. Either through self-regulation, or 
through state oversight or through delegation of third parties such as public  interest groups such as 
consumer protection advocates.  See Neil Gunningham, Peter N Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart 
Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, vol 514 (Clarendon Press, 1998). See also Neil Gunningham and 
Darren Sinclair, Designing Smart Regulation (1998) 
<http://www.oecd.org/environment/outreach/33947759.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014.  
104 Neil Gunningham, Peter N Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental 
Policy, vol 514 (Clarendon Press, 1998.  
105 The expression ‘regulatory capacity’, or ‘regulatory capability’, is used in the analysis of institutional 
endowment in less developed economies.  The World Bank Group and the continental Development 
Banks, as well as other development-related institutions, use the term ‘regulatory capacity’ in their projects. 
106 Jean J Laffont, ‘Enforcement Regulation Development’ (2003) 12(2) Journal of African Economics 193–
211. 
107 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation (1st edn, Oxford University 
Press 2012) 105. 
108 Section 4 of the Central Bank Act CAP 488 1989. 
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In Kenya, mobile payments have been very successful, as reiterated through the 
introduction of M-Pesa.109 There is no doubt that there needs to be an appropriate 
regulatory framework for mobile payments based on the risks discussed in Chapter 3 and 
the challenges examined in Parts I through III in Chapter 4. However, Kenya has chosen 
to develop its regulatory framework solely entrusting the Central Bank of Kenya with this 
task. Since mobile payments are relatively new to the payments system, the challenge 
however is in its enforcement and implementation. It is hence important to consider a 
number of regulatory theories to evaluate the normative basis of Kenya’s approach in the 
regulation of mobile payments. 
 It is extremely early to conclude whether the CBK has successfully implemented 
its regulatory oversight through the NSPA on mobile payments without jeopardising their 
further development, since the Act is not fully operational and moreover, whether the 
CBK has the committed intent to regulate since the lacuna in the current regulatory 
framework has been the main catalyst for its proliferation.110 It is also premature to 
consider whether, upon the actualisation of the Act by the CBK, the industry would 
change accordingly. It is necessary therefore to consider the rationales and implications 
that the regulatory policies may have in view of the theories of regulation and the expected 
outcomes 
5.4.1. Risk-Based Approach to the Regulation of Mobile Payments  
 
The call for risk-based regulation, in efforts to minimise both the inherent 
payment systems risks and the unique mobile payment system risks, appears to be an 
appropriate approach lauded amongst regulatory authorities.111 The core of risk-based 
                                                 
109 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5. Page 59. 
110 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3., the Success of Mobile Payments. 
111 Samuel G Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, and Jeremy C Stein, ‘A Macroprudential Approach to Financial 
Regulation’ (2011) Journal of Economic Perspectives 3–28. 
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regulation, as universally understood, is the prioritising of regulatory actions in 
accordance with an assessment of risks that parties will present to the regulatory body 
achieving its objectives.112  The normative rationale is that the risk-based approach hinges 
on the fact that attempts to minimise adverse governance outcomes to nil tend to be 
inefficient since they can be unduly costly to achieve, perversely create other risks such 
as political risk, or distract attention from more serious problems.113 This would seem to 
mean that regulators should target regulation where the most harm is expected.  
 Regulatory reforms have increasingly put forward risk-based strategies in efforts 
to manage their resources.114 Risk-based regulation ‘in its idealized form, offers an 
evidence-based means of targeting the use of resources and of prioritizing attention to 
the highest risks in accordance with a transparent, systematic, and defensible 
framework.’115 A further prompting to re-examine the implementation challenges of risk-
based regulation comes in the wake of the 2007–2009 credit crisis and stems from the 
widespread perception that risk-based regulation, at least in the UK, signally failed to 
protect consumers and the public from the catastrophic failure of the banking system.116 
                                                 
112 Julia Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk Based Regulation and The New Public Risk Management In The 
United Kingdom’ (2005) Public Law 512: Julia Black, ‘Risk Based Regulation: Choices Practices And 
Lessons being Learnt (2010) <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/risk-and-regulatory-
policy_5kmmx4x7ksnr.pdf;jsessionid=9i6cngkl507c3.x-oecd-live-
02?contentType=%2fns%2fOECDBook%2c%2fns%2fStatisticalPublication%2c%2fns%2fBook&itemId
=%2fcontent%2fbook%2f9789264082939-
en&mimeType=application%2fpdf&containerItemId=%2fcontent%2fserial%2f19900481&accessItemId
s> accessed 26 September 2014; Julia Black, ‘Role Of Risk In Regulatory Processes’ in Robert Baldwin, 
Martin Cave, Martin Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press 2010) 353. 
113 Robert J MacCoun, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Letting Juries Punish Corporations: Comment On 
Viscusi' (2000) 
<http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3096&context=facpubs> accessed 26 
September 2014. ‘Risk and the Limits of Governance: Exploring Varied Patterns  
<http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/geography/people/academic/rothstein/2013-Rothstein-
Borraz-Huber.pdf>accessed 29 September  2014. 
114 Henry Rothstein, Phil Irving, Terry Walden, and Roger Yearsley, ‘The Risks of Risk-Based Regulation: 
Insights from the Environmental Policy Domain’ (2006) 32(8) Environment International 1056–1065.; 
Julia Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk-based Regulation and the New Public Risk Management in the 
United Kingdom’ (2005) Public Law 512–548. 
115 LETR | Legal Education and Training Review, <http://letr.org.uk/the-report/chapter-3/the-
changing-regulatory-landscape/index.html> accessed 29 September 2014. 
116 Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71 The Modern Law Review The 
evidence is mixed regarding the culpabilities of risk-based regulation, as banks in Australia and Canada, 
whose regulators have well-developed systems of risk-based regulation, fared far better than those in other 
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A risk-based regulatory framework for mobile payments would ensure that the 
focus is on risks and not on rules. This focus compels the regulators, in this case the CBK, 
to focus on identifying the risks that they are seeking to manage and not the rules they 
have to enforce. In this case the unique mobile payment risks which this thesis identified 
in Chapter 3 would be of paramount concern to the regulators.  A risk-based approach 
would also require the CBK to explicitly select the frameworks of analysis through which 
they would be regulating.  
 
A risk-based regulatory approach would involve an assessment of the hazard or 
adverse event and the likelihood of it occurring. As discussed in Chapter 3, inherent risks 
arising from the nature of mobile payments would require an adoption of a risk-based 
approach to regulation. The CBK would have to regulate in a way that is responsive to 
the regulated firm’s behaviours, attitude and culture, which, as Julia Black states, are the 
optimal institutional environments that are required for a responsive risk-based approach, 
perhaps through the adoption of a nuanced risk-based regulatory approach.  This 
approach requires that strategies should use effective targeting of enforcement resources 
on the basis of assessments of the risks that regulated firms are exposed to. 117 
 In this study I have examined risk as a justification for regulation, not particularly 
governmental regulation, but by other sectorial regulators, such as the CCK.  Risk as 
examined in Chapter 3 was used to ‘determine the boundaries of the state’s legitimate 
intervention in society’ by solidifying the CBKs role to manage risk. A risk-based 
approach ensures that the state’s balance of objectives such as financial inclusion and 
                                                 
Western countries, suggesting that the causes of regulatory failure were more complex than are accounted 
for by the existence of a risk-based system of supervision 
117 ‘Risk-based regulation’ has a range of meanings. See Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (Oxford University 
Press 1997). 
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integrity centres on all AML/CFT considerations within the mobile payment system. 
Furthermore, a risk-based approach aligns itself with the proportionality principle, which 
means attaining ‘the right balance between risks and benefits by tailoring regulation to 
mitigate the risk of the product without imposing an undue regulatory burden that could 
stifle innovation.’ 118 A risk-based approach is seen as being critical for countries building 
inclusive formal financial systems and increasing financial access for the unbanked and 
under banked.119 This has also been articulated by the FATF, which stressed the need for 
the application of its guidance to new payment methods that would focus on the 
implementation of AML/CFT measures.120 These measures have additionally called for 
the application of a risk mitigation process which essentially underpins a risk-based 
approach, through the application of simplified CDD which would thus encourage 
financial inclusion.  
A risk-based approach to mobile payments would ensure that the implementation 
of AML/CFT measures is effective. 121  In Kenya the risk-based approach has been 
institutionally endorsed most emphatically after the advent of mobile payments.122 
Regulation is a form of risk management both within and beyond the state and is 
therefore becoming a benchmark for good governance for organisations.123 Risk provides 
an important role in regulation or at least the examination of risk as shown in Chapter 3.  
                                                 
118 FATF, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Prepaid Cards, Mobile Payments and Internet-Based 
Payment  Services’ (2013) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Guidance-RBA-NPPS.pdf> accessed 26 September 
2014. Also see G20 Principle 8 on Proportionality: Build a policy and regulatory framework that is 
proportionate with the risks and benefits involved in such innovative products and services and is based 
on an understanding of the gaps and barriers in existing regulation. 
119 Ibid.  
120 Ibid  . 
121 Central Banking Events, ‘AML & CFT: Implementing a Risk Based Framework’ (2014) 
<http://events.centralbanking.com/windsor/static/how-to-implement-a-risk-based-framework-for-aml-
and-cft> accessed 26 September 2014.  
122 Maria C Stephens, ‘Promoting Responsible Financial Inclusion: a Risk-based Approach to Supporting 
Mobile Financial Services Expansion’ (2011) 27 Banking and Finance Law Review 329. 
123 Michael Power, ‘Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management’ (2008) 
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accessed 26 September 2014.  
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It provides an object of regulation, it justifies regulation, it also constitutes and frames 
regulatory organisations and procedures through framing accountability relationships.124  
It is with this in mind that regulators are now adopting risk-based measures in efforts to 
maintain their reputations. 125 
 However, risk-based regulation, though appropriate in certain 
circumstances, may not be appropriate in determining the best way to approach the 
regulation of mobile payments.  Therefore what implications do these criticisms have in 
the regulation of mobile payments in Kenya?  Among the limits of risk-based regulation 
is that it is problem based and regulators should seek to anticipate problems and deal with 
them.126  A risk-based approach also requires that regulators identify the risk while trying 
to achieve its objectives.  This shows that regulators would have to focus on the risks 
they deem more important, leading to many other issues being missed. Another challenge, 
which is quite pertinent in this context, is the organisational difficulty for risk-based 
regulators when their regulatory powers are shared with other regulatory authorities, in 
this case the CBK and the CCK.127 It should therefore be seen as a control strategy that 
has to be combined with other control strategies for it to be effective.128 However, these 
difficulties are outweighed by the costs of regulatory failure for the mobile payments 
system.  
 
                                                 
124 Julia Black, ‘Role Of Risk In Regulatory Processes’ (2010) in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, Martin Lodge 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press 2010) 303.  
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 5.4.2. Self-Regulation and Enforced Regulation 
 
Self-regulation, also referred to as consensus, is a term used to incorporate a broad 
array of regulatory arrangements that may vary along the ‘degree of formality with which 
those arrangements are established and enforced, the extent to which the self-regulatory 
body exerts exclusive or monopoly control over the regulated activity and the level at 
which behaviour is regulated.’129 Self-regulation may be preferred over state regulation 
since MNOs would be able to use their expertise more widely, particularly in regulation 
of technical issues.130 Self-regulatory bodies provide regulation that is flexible and rapidly 
able to adapt to market conditions, such as technological or economic changes as 
opposed to state centric regulations. Kenya provides a classic example where state 
regulation may be an impediment to the development of an appropriate regulatory 
framework. The CCK’s regulations for instance, must be approved by parliamentary 
committees.131 Additionally, self-regulation ensures that the costs of state regulation are 
reduced as the regulatory burden is lowered.132 Similarly, state regulation, though costly, 
                                                 
129 Morgan and Yeung (2007) (n 58) 93. 
130 Jeremy Okanjo, ‘Chapter 3: Designing a Telecoms Regulatory Framework for Converged Mobile 
Financial Services in Kenya’ (2014) <http://www.slideshare.net/JeremmyOkonjo/3-chapter-three-
designing-a-telecoms-regulatory-framework-for-converged-mobile-financial-services-in-kenya> accessed 
26 September 2014. However, this is not always the result in establishing self-regulation. In the media 
industry in Kenya, for example, the media has been accused of ‘lacking the will, intellectual leadership and 
capacity to address the diversity of legal, policy and regulatory challenges facing them. Their desultory 
handling of media laws and regulation is indicative of its lack of commitment to address critical issues facing 
the sector radically and speedily.’  See Peter Oriare, Rosemary Okello-Orlale, Wilson Ugangu, ‘The Media 
We Want: the Kenya media vulnerabilities study’ (2008) <http://library.fes.de/pdf-
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131 Such as the Committee on Energy, Communication and Information, and the Committee on Delegated 
Legislation, Section 34(1) of the Interpretations and General Provisions Act, Cap 2, Laws of Kenya. 
132 The World Bank, ‘Doing Business in Kenya 2012’ (2012) 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Subnational-
Reports/DB12-Sub-Kenya.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014. The burden of regulatory compliance for 
Kenyan companies is particularly heavy, for example, in tax compliance. Globally, Kenya stands at 166 in 
the ranking of 183 economies on the ease of paying taxes. On average, Kenyan firms make 41 tax payments 
a year, spend 393 hours a year filing, preparing and paying taxes and pay total taxes amounting to 33.1per 
cent of profit. 
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may be reduced to accommodate appeals from the self-regulatory bodies, allowing MNOs 
to act without interference from the state.133 
Consequently, self-regulation provides a conducive environment for MNOs and 
their operation of mobile payments, especially due to the increase of new business models 
and technological advanced services.134 Julia Black, states that there are sources of 
confusion in the discussion of self-regulation.135 What is meant by ‘self’, what is meant by 
‘regulation’, and ‘what is the nature of the state’s involvement?’ She argues that the term 
‘self’ is used to mean two different things: self as in individual, and self as in collective.136  
Thus the term ‘self-regulation’, is used to describe the disciplining of one’s own 
conduct by oneself,137 regulation tailored to the circumstances of particular firms,138 and 
regulation by a collective group of the conduct of its members or others.139 The definition 
of regulation varies from the ‘command and control’ model of regulation, to regulation 
by the market,140 to voluntary decisions of each individual to control their own behaviour.  
Finally the term can be used to imply no relationship with the state at all, or to describe a 
                                                 
133 Fran Quigley, ‘Growing Political Will from the Grassroots: How Social Movement Principles Can 
Reverse the Dismal Legacy of Rule of Law Interventions’ (2009) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1748612> accessed 26 September 2014; Connie 
N Houghton, ‘Access to Justice and the Rule of law in Kenya’ (2006) 
<http://www.kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=1934> accessed 26 September 2014.  
134 Currently, there are no telecoms regulations specific to mobile financial services. Aside from the 
provisions of Section 83C of the Kenya Information and Communications Act, which touch on electronic 
transactions, the  Communications Commission of Kenya does not exercise a direct regulatory role. 
135 Julia Black, ‘Constitutionalising Self‐Regulation’ (2011) 59 The Modern Law Review 24. 
136 Simona Rodriquez, ‘Self-regulation as a Regulatory Strategy: The Italian Legal Framework’ (2007) 
<http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/index.php/ulr/article/download/URN%3ANBN%3ANL%3AUI%
3A10-1-101070/51> accessed 26 September 2014. 
137 A definition frequently used in financial services regulation by both regulators and regulated. 
138 Ayers and Braithwaite’s ‘enforced self-regulation’ is an example as is Ogus’s ‘consensual self-regulation’ 
(op cir n 7). An example in practice is the UK system of health and safety regulation. 
139 See for example, Alan Page, ‘Self-Regulation: The Constitutional Dimension’ (1986) 49 Modern Law 
Review 141.  
140 See, Market Discipline below. An example is Ogus’s first model of competitive self-regulation, 
unconstrained market competition (in which a firm adopts standards of product quality in response to 
consumer demand and which may incorporate industry wide practices) and some forms of his second 
model, independent agency-assisted competition, in which an agency accredits or certifies the quality of the 
product and accreditation is sought by the firm for competitive purposes (e.g. kitemarks). Competition may 
also develop between accrediting regimes. Ogus, 7.  
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particular, corporatist arrangement.141 Black argues that the essence of self-regulation is a 
process of collective government and that the term ‘self’ is used to describe a collective.   
‘Self-regulation’ designates parties acting together, performing a regulatory function in 
respect of themselves and others who accept their authority.142 As such it should be 
distinguished from what may be termed individualised regulation. The two may co-exist, 
but they are analytically distinct and raise significantly different public law issues. 
Individualised regulation is regulation which is tailored to the individual firm. Ayers and 
Braithwaite’s ‘enforced self-regulation’ is an example of such individualised regulation, as 
is Ogus’s ‘consensual’ self-regulation. Individualised regulation may exist within a self-
regulatory framework,143 or a statutory one.144  No particular relationship with the state is 
implied by the term ‘self-regulation’.  
 This interpretation contrasts with some of the corporatist or neo-corporatist 
approaches which see self-regulation as simply a species of the genus corporatism. 
Broadly, we can identify four types of possible relationship:  mandated self-regulation, in 
which a collective group, an industry or profession for example, is required or designated 
by the government to formulate and enforce norms within a framework defined by the 
government, usually in broad terms;’ sanctioned self-regulation, in which the collective 
group itself formulates the regulation, which is then subjected to government approval;145 
coerced self-regulation, in which the industry itself formulates and imposes regulation but 
in response to threats by the government that if it does not, the government will impose 
                                                 
141  Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C Schmitter, ‘Community, Market, State and Associations? The 
Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order’ (1985) 1(2) European Sociological 
Review 119; Patrick Birkinshaw,, Government by Moonlight: The  Hybrid Parts of the Stare (Routledge, 1990) 3; 
Cosmo Graham, ‘Self-Regulation’ in Genevra  Richardson and Hazel Genn, Administrative Law and 
Government Action (Oxford University Press, 1995) 
142 Simona Rodriquez (2007)  
143 Such as the Bank of International Settlements’ system for the regulation of risk exposure of international 
banking firms.  
144 Such as the UKs health and safety laws.  
145 Robert Baldwin and Christopher McCrudden, Regulation and Public Law (Weidenfeld and Nicholson 
1987). 
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statutory regulation;146 and voluntary self-regulation, where there is no active state 
involvement, direct or indirect, in promoting or mandating self- regulation.  
Further, self-regulation may vary not only in its relationship with the state but in 
the nature of its participants (which may be solely members of the collective or may be 
outsiders); its structure (there may be a separate agency or it may be a cartel); its 
enforcement (it may enforce its own norms or it may rely on individuals to enforce); and 
its rule type (its rules may be of legislative, contractual or no legal status, be general or 
specific, vague or precise, simple or complex).147 
Where a regulated activity requires technical expertise and knowledge, self-
regulation would be appropriate. This is because the industry would have superior 
informational capacities, rendering it more efficacious.148  For instance, the MNOs under 
the CCK should be able to self-regulate due to their highly specialised industry. This 
involves the regulated entities developing a system of rules that monitors and enforces 
against its own members.  Enforced self-regulation occurs when it is subject to a form of 
governmental structuring or oversight supervision.149 Consequently self-regulation pulls 
the state’s mandate in regulating institutions against the legal structure and interest of 
private firms. 150 
 
 
 
                                                 
146 Ibid. 
147 Julia Black, ’Which Arrow? Rule Type and Regulatory Policy' (1995) Public Law 94. 
148 Ibid. 
149 John Braithwaite, ‘Enforced Self-regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control’ (1982) 80(7) 
Michigan law review 1466; Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees, ‘Industry Self‐regulation: an Institutional 
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260 
 
5.4.3. Command and Control 
 
Baldwin et al151 assert that the essence of command and control regulation is the 
exercise of influence by imposing standards backed by criminal sanctions.152 Therefore in 
the telecommunications context, the CCK153 may bring criminal prosecutions against 
MNOs who breach telecommunications regulation. The force of law is used here to 
prohibit certain forms of conduct, to demand some positive actions or to lay down 
conditions for entry into a sector, for example through licensing.154 Regulations should 
be equipped with rule-making powers and standard setting by government departments 
through either primary or secondary legislation and then enforced by regulatory 
bureaucracies.155 Command and control involves licensing to process and screen entry 
into any activity,  to control not only the quality of service or the manner of production, 
but also the allocation of resources, products or commodities and prices charged to 
consumers or profits made by enterprises.156  
5.4.4. Incentive-Based Regimes 
 
This regulatory strategy works on the basis that the regulator imposes incentives 
or penalties to influence the behaviour of the industry players, the MNOs and the 
agents.157 Regulation by means of economic incentives might be thought to offer an 
                                                 
151 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2011) (n 14) 106. 
152 Regulatory strategies in general use, see Stephen G Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (Harvard University 
Press 2009) 8; Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darran Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing 
Environmental Policy (Oxford University Press 1998). Also see command and control alternatives, Robert 
Baldwin, Regulation after ‘command and control’65; Keith Hawkins, The Human Face of Law: Essays in 
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escape from highly restrictive command and control regimes.158 Baldwin states that 
according to the incentives approach, the potential mischief causer can be induced to 
behave in accordance with public interest by the state or a regulator imposing negative or 
positive taxes or deploying grants and subsidies from the public.159 The advantages of this 
have been argued to be the relatively low levels of regulatory discretion required because 
financial punishments or rewards operate automatically once they have been 
established.160 This strategy is also seen to be cheaper to administrate161 and to involve 
light burdens of information collection and compliance costs which may be appropriate 
for Kenya as a developing country. 
Furthermore, an incentive-based regulatory strategy is an important strategy as it 
enhances communication, while providing a regulated environment in which they can 
influence the way regulation is designed to operate in the marketplace.162 This ensures 
that the regulator would have to depend on the MNOs to provide it with the knowledge 
so as best to regulate the activities within its mandate. This process is especially utilised 
when ‘rules’ are being negotiated and forums and committees are set up to gather and 
disseminate best practice and provide mutually acceptable ‘rules’ to govern such activities. 
 Whilst such a relationship could raise the concern of regulatory capture163 
because of the bargaining power wielded by the regulated, the process provides an 
environment of mutual responsibility which can, in the majority of occasions, outweigh 
such concerns. The use of an incentive-based approach would, as Grabosky gives 
                                                 
158 Terence Daintith, ‘The Techniques of Government’  in Jeffrey Jowell and Dawn Oliver, The Changing 
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cautious encouragement to the use of incentives as they could reduce the burden of 
regulation.164 Incentives generally provide positive inducements to cooperate with the 
regulator rather than negative penalties, such as disqualification or market disclosure. For 
example, incentives range from grants and subsidies to favourable administrative 
considerations.165 Regulatory holidays are another incentive, whereby an organisation is 
relieved from inspections because of its ‘good track record’ in compliance with regulatory 
requirements. 
Incentive-based schemes compel parties to come clean with compliance failures 
which have been identified by the institution itself. This action maintains the trust 
relationship between the regulator, the CBK or the CCK and the regulated MNO. It also 
supports the view that most firms do accept regulation and supervision as a form of 
financial control where the reputation of the institution could be adversely affected if 
non-compliance is publicised. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of self-regulation 
in an environment where even the most compliant institutions can get it wrong. 
Ultimately disclosing non-compliance provides the regulated with the possibility of a 
lesser sanction or, in some cases, no punishment at all, because there is no evidence of 
complacency or dishonesty.  
 
5.4.5. Market Discipline and Direct Action 
 
Market discipline suggests the creation of an incentive structure that encourages 
the market to take safer and sounder actions.166 Market discipline is when part of the risk 
in a particular industry is allocated to the stakeholders in the market who monitor the 
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activities of the market.167 For instance, in the banking industry, the stakeholders sanction 
the banks by withdrawing investments or causing reputational loss when imprudent 
activities of the bank are detected, thus encouraging banks to manage prudently with 
sound investment decisions. In the case of mobile payments this would be directed 
towards either the Commission in its mandates over MNOs or to consumer protection. 
The regulator can also use their direct resources to achieve desired results by taking direct 
action.168  This is seen as plausible as direct action ensures that public money is used in 
the furtherance of democratically established objectives. This also mimics the deterrence-
based approach which is centred on the imposition of sanctions and retribution.169 
The deterrence-based approach is centred on the imposition of sanctions and 
retribution. In this light deterrence could be construed as a mechanism for ensuring 
compliance by negative means. This is in contrast to a compliance-based approach which 
may discourage non-compliance by placing attention on the threat of adverse 
consequences that can arise from a criminal prosecution or imposition of a punitive civil 
sanction. The deterrence-based approach is in this respect more reactive, as it assigns 
regulatory resources to detecting infringements of the law so that penalties can be 
successfully applied. According to Reiss, a regulatory strategy based on deterrence would 
consider the imposition of a penalty as a positive sign of success.170 The choice of sanction 
is also dependent upon the seriousness of the breach or offence. This suggests that a 
broad range of both non-punitive and punitive sanctions is needed to address the varying 
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degrees of culpability that can underpin non-compliance. Ayres and Braithwaite have set 
out the choice of sanctions in a pyramid with the most serious sanctions at the top.171  
 
5.4.6. Rights and Liabilities 
 
Instead of imposing certain rules or standards on the industry, legislation could allocate 
rights to the public to encourage socially desirable behaviour.172 When this is the case the 
industry that provides the product would be deterred from providing goods or services 
which are not based on the allocation of rights.  
 
5.4.7. Procedural Dimension of Regulation 
 
The procedural dimension of regulation permits the regulator to have a certain degree of 
discretion in line with the informal agreement of the stakeholders. This power would be 
provided on the basis that the regulator would undertake ad hoc problem solving. 
Regulation is policy oriented and follows the overall policy framework of the government. 
Along the procedural dimension, even if the country followed the principle that basic 
legal rules have to be established by legislation, administrative rules, decrees and informal 
guidance often prevail.173 In this situation, the industries have to adapt their business 
activities to a more discretionary law.174 Under the NPSA, the CBK has categorised 
mobile payments systems. Law cannot simply be transplanted175 without due 
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consideration for the relevant economic framework within which it operates.  The 
argument of the evolutionary approach is that it has been driven by new insights, in some 
cases by a veritable paradigm change or by the importation of outside, foreign rules and 
principles. 
The development of payment systems is an evolving process and there should be 
very little resistance or debate on whether to regulate mobile payments. The decision to 
regulate mobile payments, I argue, has been to protect consumers and that this financial 
service should not be left to freely develop by the market. I also question whether the 
CBK, in maintaining prudential oversight through the provision of conduct of business 
requirements, has the expertise, resources and capacity for such a task. With the 
government’s policy for financial inclusion, the CBK is in a strong position to adopt this 
policy.  
 
5.4.8. Competition Laws 
 
Competition laws offer a direct means through which regulation can be 
channelled. This ensures that the market provides adequate services to consumers and 
the public.176 Such laws can be used to control market behaviour so as to prevent anti-
competitive or unfair practices such as predatory pricing by dominant operators.177 This 
would be appropriate in consideration of Safaricom, the leading MNO’s market 
dominance in the provision of mobile payments in the telecommunications industry 
provides an example of competition law being used instead of classical command and 
control regulation. Kenya’s only sectoral regulator in the telecommunications industry is 
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the CCK, which has specific rules for its operation; however competition laws have not 
been clarified for the provision of mobile financial services, especially on pricing policies. 
At the time of M-Pesa’s inception, Kenya’s competition law178 did not contain 
explicit provisions on consumer protection. Although favoured by most stakeholders, the 
actual need for comprehensive consumer legislation was still the subject of debate. The 
debate was whether to combine competition policy and consumer protection into one 
authority. Obviously, the protection of consumers against deceptive and fraudulent 
behaviour by sellers has strong links to competition policy; consumers need protection 
from the exploitive tendencies of large corporations, as large enterprises abuse their 
dominant powers over consumers by selling at monopoly prices and by imposing 
unfavourable terms of trade. In fact, there are strong reasons for believing that less mature 
regional markets are often more vulnerable to anti-competitive practices.  
Although this thesis will not delve into issues on interoperability, as the concept 
is still developing within the industry,179  the Competition Authority of Kenya180 would 
be involved. Interconnection181 allows users of one MNO to communicate with users of 
another MNO to allow access to services provides by either MNOs.182 Interoperability is 
defined as,  
                                                 
178 The Competition Law Act 2012 was recently enacted. 
179 This may be subject to future research, as it provides a regulatory challenge in the mobile payment 
context that is worth exploring.  
180 Competition Authority of Kenya was instituted in 2012, Competition Authority of Kenya, ‘About Us’ 
<http://www.cak.go.ke/> accessed 26 September 2014.  
181 The physical and logical linking of telecommunication networks used by the same or different service 
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182 Section 2 of the Kenya Information and Communications (Interconnection and Provision of Fixed 
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‘the ability of communication systems, units or elements to provide services and 
to accept services from other systems, units or forces, and to use the services 
exchanged to enable them operate effectively together’.183   
Though interoperability may be a technological issue in this respect, this thesis highlights 
that it is a regulatory one. Interoperability allows for interconnection of various MNOs 
and offers great benefits for consumers.184 This is because various consumers can be 
reached through this method.185 Interoperability also enables problems to be captured 
and prevents inept placement of repetitive or insufficient networks.186  Due to the benefits 
of financial inclusion this presents an opportunity for both the CBK and the CCK to 
work in cohesion in developing a sustainable environment post-financial inclusion as 
developing a sound interoperability approach would greatly benefit the industry.  
Furthermore since interconnection promotes competition in the market,187  it would 
challenge dominant MNOs.188 Safaricom’s dominance is partly due to the lack of 
interoperability within the industry.189 This section has argued that interoperability poses 
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both a legal and a regulatory challenge that merits an examination. The CCK has the 
mandate to regulate interconnection and interoperability of mobile payments. This is 
because mobile payments fall outside the ambit of banking services which creates 
uncertainty in its regulation. These transactions could also fall within the jurisdiction of 
the CCK, as provided under Section 83C of the Kenya Information and Communications 
Act 2013.190 
5.5. Enforcement of the Appropriate Mobile Payments Regulation  
   
Enforcement is essential once the regulators have established their objectives.191 
Those objectives are then advanced through accomplishing  the five tasks Julia Black sets 
out: detecting undesirable or non-compliant behaviour; responding to that behaviour by 
developing tools and strategies;  enforcing those tools and strategies on the ground; 
assessing their success or failure, through an impact analysis and  modifying approaches 
accordingly 192 Formulation of a regulatory framework involves three stages: the 
enactment of enabling legislation; the creation of regulatory administrations and rules and 
imposing the rules on persons or institutions sought to be influenced and controlled; and 
enforcement.193 Incisive enforcement can resolve design defects in regulatory 
mechanisms and ill-enforcement can undermine the well-designed regulations.194 Proper 
enforcement of legislation to regulate mobile payment systems should require using 
discretion in applying the provisions to the legislation and being selective in order to solve 
the practical problems. However, failure to identify and deal with the breaches of the 
rules and regulations through excessive discretion can reduce the legislation and 
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regulatory framework to a paper exercise.195 While perfect compliance is neither likely196 
nor practical, bringing the matter of a violation to prosecution197 involves huge expenses, 
so imposing fines is the most reasonable approach to violations, nonetheless enforcement 
must not be so lax as to be useless. Therefore the proper enforcement of any appropriate 
regulatory approach for mobile payments depends on the successful harmonisation of 
the regulatory functions and powers of the two regulatory authorities.  
5.5.1. Harmonization between the CBK and the CCK 
 
The development of mobile payment and mobile financial services in general, and 
its rapid acceptance, has led to the creation of various financial products which employ 
the mobile phone as a means to reach potential customers.198 However this success as I 
reiterate should be managed so as to avoid catastrophic results as a consequence of its 
overreliance. As the previous chapters have examined, the regulatory framework for 
mobile payments in Kenya is set to become a relative structure based on the notion of 
state-led economic development and the need to increase economic growth through 
financial inclusion. While the application of greater market discipline in financial 
regulation in the future is highly likely, for the time being it seems that the policy of 
government-led mobile payment development indicates that the CBK as the main 
regulatory authority will take an active role in both the promotion and regulation of 
mobile money and payments. In ensuring the legitimacy of such broad regulation, the 
CBK’s functions and objectives should be clarified and agreed among all participants.  
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Harmonisation between the central bank and other regulatory authorities with 
interests in mobile payments is not new and has been recognised as vital.199 This study 
intentionally focuses on the harmonisation between the CBK and the CCK as the 
relationships with other authorities such as the Competition Authority of Kenya for 
instance would warrant an extensive exploration, which is beyond the scope of this study.  
Harmonisation would acknowledge the CCK as the telecoms regulatory authority to 
which the MNOs are accountable. Mobile financial services or the use of mobile-based 
technology to offer financial services will continue to develop and evolve.200 This 
harmonisation would involve the sharing of information based on regular liaison.  
The harmonisation of functions would involve the exchange of information and 
expertise, policy coordination, mutual assistance to facilitate and make forward-looking 
arrangements for further development.201 The areas of coordination would have to be 
around policies for mobile money. These policies would include the mechanisms on 
approval and monitoring, to broader issues such as the development of mobile money. 
At present policies on mobile money have not been assigned by either the CBK or the 
CCK and as such the CBK has to keep abreast with the policy development of the CCK. 
Since the CCK licenses the MNOs, policy harmonisation would become all the more vital 
since the CCK approves the entry of new MNOs. Since Kenya’s policy has not explicitly 
stated whether non-financial institutions can enter the market and develop mobile money 
schemes, coordination is required to create a level playing field among MNOs that 
provide mobile payments.  
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 Presently, there is a lack of coordination between the CCK and the CBK. However 
instituting a memorandum of understanding between the two regulatory authorities 
would clarify the regulatory challenges, such as regulatory overlaps, as a result of this new 
integrated environment. The development of retail payments systems, particularly mobile 
payments, is complicated and has consequently highlighted the inefficiencies of the 
current regulatory framework for adopting new payments systems. These inefficiencies 
are however not unique to Kenya, as even developed countries are struggling to grapple 
with the adoption of mobile payments.202  
These challenges have highlighted the fact that the laws of payment systems are complex, 
confusing and cause uncertainties.203  This is due to, as reiterated, the hybrid nature of 
mobile payments systems. Regulators therefore need to consider the fact that mobile 
payments and mobile financial services are still developing and the laws relating to them 
cannot be comprehensive and have to be enhanced with time, as was stated in SIPS, that 
although sound legal underpinnings are very important, absolute legal certainty is seldom 
achievable.204 However, this should not deter authorities from seeking to establish a sound 
legal basis for payment systems, but rather a more clear understanding of the laws and 
their applicability to mobile payments should be established. Therefore harmonisation 
between the CBK and the CCK should be encouraged.  
 
The developments of retail payments in general is complicated, and even more 
complicated for mobile payments especially in developing countries such as Kenya where 
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most consumers have been reliant on cash.205 The complication arises from the fact that 
MNOs and the users of retail payments have the impression that laws of payment systems 
are complex, confusing and often cause uncertainties due to their hybrid nature.206  
In order to provide clarity to all parties affected by the development of mobile 
payments, the substance of the legislation, enshrined in the National Payments Systems 
Act, has to be understood by all parties in the mobile payments ecosystem.  All parties 
have to appreciate that since the framework of mobile payments is still developing, the 
laws relating to them cannot be comprehensive and have to be enhanced with time. It 
has been stated in SIPS that although sound legal underpinnings are very important, 
absolute legal certainty is seldom achievable.207  
Central banks and their involvement in retail payments cannot be underestimated.208 
Financial stability relies on the efficiency and stability of a country’s retail payment 
systems.209 In recent years, many countries have been more explicit in their efforts to 
include payment systems as part of their agenda for the overall development of the 
financial market. Other countries for instance have established specific boards within 
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their regulatory framework to deal with payments.210 Canada for example has explicitly 
enacted specific legislation on payment systems. 211 
Many developed countries have also made efforts to establish cooperation among 
relevant government authorities, which have interests in payment issues. Formal 
cooperation between government authorities has been established to ensure the smooth 
and continuing development of payment systems.212 Kenya has followed suit and has 
made the development of payment systems a priority. The National Payment Systems Act 
recently enacted has been amended to include objectives of the CBK in defining its 
responsibility to ensure the efficiency of payment systems.  This has been seen as an effort 
by the CBK to ensure public confidence in the legal foundation built for payment systems. 
It is important that the CBK continues to monitor the policy related to mobile 
payments, as mobile money schemes will continue to develop, and it must ensure that the 
regulatory framework on mobile payments considers all other mobile money schemes.  
The enhancement of mobile payments systems has been recognised as important for the 
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whole development of payment systems and the CBK’s interest in ensuring the efficiency 
and development of retail payment instruments is not new. 
The CBK’s role as the main regulatory authority it has to ensure that cooperation 
exists among the parties that have interests in mobile payments or mobile money 
schemes. This is to ensure the continuing development of all mobile money products. 
The Central Bank’s objectives cannot be achieved if there is negligence on the part of the 
roles and functions of other authorities affecting mobile payment issues.  
The harmonisation between the CBK and CCK has to be formalised in order for 
it to be recognised by all parties concerned. Despite the fact that the CCK regulates the 
institution and the CBK the function, any new law should provide for clear separate 
powers, and clarity on the roles and functions has to be established and understood by 
each regulatory authority. Therefore the execution of the Memorandum of 
Understanding may promote harmonisation between the two regulators to enhance 
understanding. To ensure the continuing development of the regulatory framework as 
mobile payments progress, the roles and functions of the authorities involved have first 
to be defined. Further cooperation cannot be established if existing responsibilities are 
not first agreed upon.  
Moreover the execution of the MoUs will promote transparency, which assists 
MNOs and consumers to understand the roles and functions of the authorities involved, 
which will also lead to a better understanding on the existing regulatory framework of 
mobile payments in Kenya. This transparency will enhance consumer confidence, which 
would lead to greater financial inclusion, through having MoUs, which not only define 
the responsibilities of the authorities, but also the agreement to review and to provide 
solutions in the event of disputes, which may fulfil the consumer protection objective.   
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The MoU should be seen as the first step taken by the CBK in ensuring a 
workable regulatory framework for mobile payments, thus enhancing the acceptance and 
development of mobile money schemes. This would also ensure and enhance the 
commitment between the CBK and the CCK in performing their complementary 
regulatory functions.  It is unclear at present whether the proposed, National Payment 
System Act of 2011, provides the possibility of harmonisation of functions between the 
CBK and the CCK for mobile payments. Although CBK is the main regulator, the CCK’s 
functions cannot entirely be removed. The current fragmented framework has not been 
practical.  
5.5.2. Justification for Regulatory Harmonisation between the CBK and the CCK 
 
The harmonisation between the CBK and the CCK should be encouraged to 
attain the policy objectives previously discussed. It is recommended that for retail 
payments, the common goals that central banks and sectoral regulatory authorities should 
have are to address the legal and regulatory impediments to market development and 
innovation, to foster competitive market conditions and behaviours and to support the 
development of effective standards and infrastructure arrangement.213 This can be 
precipitated through different types of cooperation. Firstly through the cooperation 
between the CBK and the CCK and through the CBK and other non-regulatory 
authorities such as a Consumer Protection Agency which should be in line with the public 
interest. 
 
The cost to each party in the mobile payment system is a justification for the coordination 
of functions, since MNOs have large networks that involve a billing relationship with 
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their customers. At the same time traditional banking functions involve cash management 
risk controls as part of their core business. 214 
 
Information sharing is an important aspect of establishing an appropriate approach for 
regulating mobile payments.  This would involve the information sharing between the 
CBK and the CCK in reporting of any misconduct or market changes. This would 
enhance knowledge of the mobile payments schemes or any other mobile financial 
services in operation. Such knowledge would enable effective regulation.  Successful 
monitoring of the schemes would also depend on how comprehensively the regulatory 
authorities understand the structure of the scheme in operation—specifically, in a 
situation where there may be joint regulatory functions between the CBK and the CCK, 
such as in licensing, as effective implementation of regulatory functions under separate 
legislation, may only be achieved through information sharing.215 The information shared 
should not be limited to specific information for the purpose of regulating and 
monitoring the mobile payments themselves, but rather should include information on 
the organisational structure of each authority (both the CBK and the CCK) through an 
established and enhanced arrangement such as an MoU. This is because institutional 
structures change over time. Furthermore different types of information are needed based 
on the legal and regulatory regime and the specific objectives within which the authorities 
operate. For instance the CCK’s objectives are markedly different from those of the CBK.  
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Information sharing is important between CBK and CCK to enhance knowledge 
of the electronic money schemes in operation. Such knowledge would enable effective 
regulation and supervision of mobile payments. Successful monitoring of the schemes 
would also depend on how comprehensively the regulatory authorities understand the 
structure of the scheme in operation. Specifically, in a situation where there may be joint 
regulatory functions between the CBK and the CCK, effective implementation of 
regulatory functions under separate legislation may only be achieved through information 
sharing. Information shared among the authorities involved may not be limited to specific 
information for the purpose of regulating and monitoring retail payment products, but 
also to information on the organisational structure of each authority. The procedure of 
information sharing among the authorities involved has to be established. Information 
sharing arrangements should be in compliance with the legal foundation.216 Continuous 
enhancement of the arrangement is important because the structure of any of the 
authorities could be altered over time. There are several types of information needed in 
order to secure an effective regulatory framework for mobile payments, of whose 
objectives within which the authorities operate. Currently the MNOs have the widest 
range of information on mobile money, which the CBK does not, and effective regulation 
has been hampered by a lack of information sharing.  
Therefore the CBK needs to ensure that it has the widest range of information 
on mobile payments.  This is because the CBK as the main financial regulator would 
appreciate that all those involved in the sharing of information may have valuable insights 
or information. This information would need to be shared with MNOs and the CCK 
whose main mandate is the operation of MNOs.  The regulation of mobile payments in 
a multi-sector or often fragmented regulatory environment calls for a new overarching 
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and all-encompassing regulatory framework.  Coordination should thus be 
institutionalised where information is shared between the regulators.  
5.6. Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, the successful implementation of an appropriate regulatory 
framework needs legislation that carefully balances innovation, and financial stability, the 
protection of consumers and the integrity of the financial system.217 Kenya is lauded as 
the bellwether of the development of mobile payments and its eventual success provides 
an opportunity to serve as an adequate template for other developing countries 
attempting to adopt inclusive financial services. Mobile payments have brought into focus 
the re-examination of the importance of retail payments and their core role in each 
country’s overall financial stability.218 Since mobile payments regulation has developed 
differently in different jurisdictions, as a result of country specific factors,219 the regulatory 
approaches may not effectively be replicated in other countries.  Furthermore, each 
country adopting mobile payments or any mobile financial services, may not yield the 
same success that Kenya has had, since all countries are at a different stage of 
development.  
Furthermore, as has been demonstrated, national regulations may not always fit a 
global marketplace220 as legal transplantation in legal drafting that is common place in 
developing countries would not be fit for purpose. However, the harmonisation of 
                                                 
217 Ibid.  
218 BIS (2003) (n 202) 11. 
219 See ‘Chapter 2: On An Elaborate Discussion On The Enabling Environment Of Mobile Payments In 
Kenya’; Ignacio Mas and Dan Radcliffe, ‘Mobile Payments go Viral: M-PESA in Kenya’ (2010) 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/258643-1271798012256/M-
PESA_Kenya.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014; these factors include, existing regulations and 
constitutional frameworks, market competition and segmentation, political climate and stability, and 
international obligations.  
220 Each country has a different regulatory culture and different countries may have different developmental 
goals, and may not necessarily reflect the need for regulation or similar regulation.  
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standards221 for mobile payments, which are now globally being accepted, would 
encourage cross border remittances to be safe and secure.222 Simply importing another 
country’s regulatory system without modifying for the target country’s regulatory culture 
or environment as well as infrastructure banking and legal structures, business practices, 
culture and needs could lead to a suboptimal system.223 
Central Banks play an important role in the development of retail payment 
systems, especially in developing countries where their regulatory capacities may not 
always accommodate innovative services that post-date their current regulatory 
frameworks. 224  In recent years, many countries have been more explicit in their effort to 
include payment systems as part of their agendas. For the overall development of the 
financial market in Kenya, the involvement of mobile payments and its significance to 
the overall stability of the financial system has not been examined in the depth that it 
should be, partly because of its nascent nature and the regulatory environment that mobile 
payments have developed.  Other developed countries225 have made efforts to establish 
coordination among their regulatory authorities that oversee payment system issues where 
cooperation has been established to ensure the smooth and continuing development of 
payment systems, especially where non-banks are involved.  
 Kenya should therefore follow suit in making mobile payments a priority. The NPSA 
should be amended to include the objectives of the CBK in defining its responsibility in 
ensuring the efficiency of mobile payment systems. Through the establishment of the 
                                                 
221 IAIS, ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’ (2011) 
<http://www.iaisweb.org/index.cfm?pageID=39> accessed 26 September 2014.  
222 Which is also a phrase from the Better Regulation Task Force UK 2005.  
223 Robert H Keppler, ‘Transforming Payment Systems: The Building Blocks and the World Bank's Role’ 
(1999) World Bank/Federal Reserve of New York (FRBNY) Seminar 13–16 April 1999; Fernando Montes-
Negret and Robert Keppler, ‘Project Design for Payment Systems’ (1995) FPD Note No. 37 
<http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/155862/paymentsystems2003/pdf/Montes_Keppler.p
df> accessed 26 September 2014. 
224 http://www.wantinews.com/news-8162076-Central-Bank:-the-overall-stability-of-the-financial-
system-has-accumulated-some-industries-risk.htm  accessed 29 September 2014. 
225 Countries such as Tanzania, Uganda Malawi and South American countries.  
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NPSA, the CBK has made efforts to ensure public confidence in the legal foundation 
built for payment systems despite its deficiencies. Therefore it is necessary that the CBK 
should continue to monitor the policy related to mobile payments.  The CBK is best 
placed in its role as the main regulatory authority to ensure that cooperation exists 
between the mobile payment stakeholders, the MNO, consumers and agents. This is so 
that the continuing development of the product is ensured and the CBKs objectives are 
achieved. This is specifically important as the current regulatory framework for mobile 
payment in Kenya unintentionally already provides, a possible cross regulatory function 
between two separate authorities under different laws. It is the formalisation of this 
cooperation between the CBK and the CCK that should be fostered in order to establish 
an appropriate regulatory framework for all the stakeholders concerned. The 
fragmentation of the regulatory mandates and laws as discussed in Chapter 4 has proven 
challenging as the separate powers do not offer clarity in their roles and functions under 
both the CBK and the CCK.   
Therefore the placement of the MoU may promote a better understanding of these two 
separate regulatory authorities to foster better understanding of their mandates. This 
would further continuing development of the regulatory framework of mobile payments 
and enhance the roles and functions that would offer clarification to consumers and 
reduce information asymmetries and increase public confidence in the mobile payment 
system and foster better adoption and increase financial inclusion.  A MoU would 
establish a clear and well defined regulatory framework for mobile payments.  In order to 
augment the commitment between the CBK and CCK in performing their cross 
regulatory functions, the cooperation between the regulatory authorities may be 
established through legislation to replace the MoU. The CCK would have to consider the 
possibility of excluding its regulatory powers on mobile payments under the NPSA based 
on the CBK’s current extensive regulatory provisions. Even though the KPCA provides 
281 
 
wide powers to CCK, a fragmented regulatory framework may not be practical, especially 
for mobile payments which are still developing. For electronic money especially, which is 
still developing, a clear regulatory framework based on a single regulatory authority may 
be desirable.  
Whether a risk-based approach is used, it is true that no established regulatory 
approach is foolproof or encompasses the most effective form. It is further true that each 
accommodates certain aspects of the regulated entity, risk-based for risk, and principle-
based for the standards setting that would guide how institutions act.  It is extremely early 
to conclude whether the CBK has successfully implemented its regulatory oversight 
through the National Payment System Act 2011 which integrates the regulation of mobile 
payments. 
In the long run, the most effective regulatory framework that will promote mobile 
payments should be guided by risk management, and safeguarding of funds, and one that 
balances the needs to enhance stability and promote innovation. It should also 
incorporate policy objectives which should focus on consumer protection and the clear 
definition of stored value in order to lay an enabling regulatory framework for other 
innovative peer to peer payments systems such as Bitcoin which is slowly becoming 
prevalent in Kenya.226 Regulation of mobile payments should be participatory and should 
be effective. 227 
Two theories of regulation of industry are widely held: positive theories of 
regulation and normative theories of regulation.228 Positive theories of regulation examine 
                                                 
226 BitPesa, ‘Send Money to Kenya Cheaper and Faster with BitPesa, it’s Easy’ (2014) 
<https://www.bitpesa.co/> accessed 26 September 2014. 
227 Zorayda RB Andam and Christian GP Castillo, ‘Regulating Communications in a Converging 
Environment: Technology, Markets and Dilemmas (2004) 79 Philippine Law Journal 392. 
228 Robert W Hahn, ‘Theories of Regulation and Deregulation: A Critical Appraisal’ (2006) accessed 26 
September 2014; Public Utility Research Center, ‘Theories of Regulation’ (2011)  accessed 26 September 
2014; Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Government Failure vs Market Failure: Principles of Regulation’ (2009) 
2<http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedora_content/download/ac:126998/CONTEN
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why regulation occurs,229 while normative theories of regulation are based on a theory of 
market failure.230 Famed economist Stiglitz notes that regulation begins with a simple 
question: Why is regulation needed and followed, and why do markets by themselves not 
suffice? and then, if there is to be government  intervention, why does it take the form of 
regulations?231 Some would see the need for regulation232 as a response to market failure, 
others as the need to provide the groundwork for growth and consistency.  
M-Pesa’s success as reiterated in the previous chapters has shown that there needs 
to be an appropriate regulatory framework for mobile payments. In Kenya, mobile 
payments have been very successful, as discussed through the introduction of M-Pesa.233 
There is no doubt that there needs to be an appropriate regulatory framework for mobile 
payments based on the risks discussed in Chapter 3 and the challenges examined in  
Chapter 4. However, Kenya has chosen to develop its regulatory framework solely 
entrusting the CBK with this task in regulating mobile payments. Since mobile payments 
are relatively new to the payments system, the challenge however is in its enforcement 
and implementation. It is hence important to consider a number of regulatory theories to 
evaluate the normative basis of Kenya’s approach in the regulation of mobile payments.  
 The Act is not fully operational and moreover, it remains to be seen whether the 
CBK has the committed intent to regulate, since the lacuna in the current regulatory 
                                                 
T/JES.Govt.Failure.Mkt.Failure.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014; Johan den Hertog, ‘General Theories 
of Regulation’ (1999) <http://goo.gl/8QjYD> accessed 26 September 2014. 
229 Theories of Regulation <http://regulationbodyofknowledge.org/general-concepts/theories-of-
regulation/> accessed 29 September 2014. Public Utility Research Center (2011) 9; Johan den Hertog 
(1999) 9. 
230 Ibid.  
231 Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Government Failure vs Market Failure: Principles of Regulation’ (2009) 
2<http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedora_content/download/ac:126998/CONTEN
T/JES.Govt.Failure.Mkt.Failure.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014 
232 Regulation can be taken to mean the employment of legal instruments for the implementation of social-
economic policy objectives. See Johan den Hertog (1999) 9. 
233 See Chapter 2, Section 2.5, Page 59. Joy Malala, ‘’Consumer Protection For Mobile Payments In Kenya: 
An Examination Of The Fragmented Legislation And The Complexities It Presents For Mobile Payments’ 
(2014) Kenya Bankers Association, Centre For Research On Financial Markets And Policy Working Paper 
Series No 7  <http://www.kba.co.ke/workingpaperseries/img/pdf/Working%20Paper%20WPS-07-
13.pdf> accessed 3 September 2014.  
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framework has been the main catalyst for its proliferation.234 It is also premature to 
consider whether upon the implementation of the Act by CBK, the industry would 
change accordingly. It is necessary therefore to consider the rationales and implications 
that the regulatory policies may have in view of the theories and themes around regulation 
of mobile payments and the expected outcomes and consequently the appropriate 
regulatory framework which this chapter discusses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
234 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3, the Success of Mobile Payments, Page 38. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The motivation for the exploration of this study began in 2008, just at the advent 
of mobile money technology and the beginning of what has revolutionised not just the 
payment industry in Kenya, but the shift in the economic and financial development. This 
success developed with much admiration and applause, rightfully so, as the benefits that 
financially inclusive technology has and will continue to have has been heralded, not just 
in Kenya but in many developing countries. The reach and possibilities that mobile 
payments and other mobile financial services have to offer are anticipated with great 
promise and hope. The ability for mobile payments to develop in spite of a regulatory 
framework demonstrates the success of and the need for non-bank participation in the 
primary provision of payment services.  
 This is because mobile payments have managed to bring Kenyans, despite the 
lack of institutional, regulatory capacities and advanced infrastructures, into international 
focus as the model example for financial inclusion that circumvents the global digital 
divide. Nevertheless, the more mobile money developed and began to entrench itself in 
the Kenyan society, a shift emerged, where regulators, pundits, critics alike began to 
examine the costs against the benefits of mobile payments. This debate continues, and 
has not been the scope of this study.  What was evident however, was the lack of focus 
on the post-financial inclusion issues which comprised the unique risks introduced by 
mobile payments—the regulatory challenges in dealing with financially inclusive services 
and the design of an appropriate regulatory framework that safeguards the payment 
systems and the financial system as a whole.  What this study contributes is a foundational 
start to these themes: financial inclusion through innovative financial services and the 
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emergent regulatory issues post-financial inclusion, the approach that the regulators took 
in balancing its objectives while at the same time allowing a market-led environment for 
mobile financial services.  
6.2. Chapter Summaries 
 
Chapter 2 explored the research question on why an examination of Kenya’s 
mobile payments system in particular was important.  It contextualised mobile payments 
in Kenya by offering a historical context for the introduction of M-Pesa into Kenya’s 
National Payments System. It showed the success of M-Pesa as a key driver for lifting 
people out of poverty through its inclusive capacity, it also assessed the important 
placement in Kenya’s retail payments market.  It also showed that the Central Bank of 
Kenya had recognised the potential economic benefit of financial inclusion and, although 
it had initially not included it in its development agendas, had by default, created an 
enabling environment for its advancement through not having a regulatory framework to 
begin with for payments systems.  
This chapter also showed that an enabling environment is essential in scaling up 
financially inclusive financial products, especially in a developing country. These enabling 
factors were exclusively typical to Kenya and contributed to its success. It also highlighted 
the fact that while mobile payments initially started as a seed product, its success was in 
part due to the specific country profile discussed. Through this, emergent regulatory 
challenges post-financial inclusion arise such as ensuring the maintenance of financial 
stability from the introduction of new participants into the formal financial sphere.  The 
immeasurable benefits of financial inclusion through mobile payments were explored, 
such as the efficacy of transactions, savings and investments through the various financial 
service products developed.  
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Chapter 3 addressed the research question ‘what are the risks created by mobile 
payments to the financial system in Kenya and what are the specific risks to consumers 
as a result of a lack of an adequate regulatory framework?’ This assessment was made in 
the context of financial inclusion, which despite its benefits, has major costs to any 
financial system. The newly financially included, the new risks created and the institutions 
that operate in these newly expanded markets as a result of mobile financial services were 
highlighted through a multi-layered analysis of the risks at each level of the mobile 
payment system. These risks, which were not initially assessed by regulators, show that, 
just as in the recent Global Financial Crisis, policy-makers endorsed marketing to 
subprime borrowers as a means of financial inclusion, regulators cannot overlook the 
risks introduced through financial inclusion.  
The extensive growth1 of mobile payments in Kenya makes this imperative; with 
the unintended2 benefit of increasing the public’s involvement3 in the formal financial 
system, by including savings accounts in the banks and consequently extending systemic 
risk exposure,4 has converted widely distributed consumer risk into a concentrated 
systemic risk.5 These unique risks arise as a result of the unique design and placement of 
mobile payments where the involvement of non-bank institutions without the 
clarification necessary in the legal framework further spreads the risks. These 
uncertainties are sure to lead to incorrect perceptions of exposures to potential losses as 
a result of insufficient information or asymmetric information of the financially included. 
                                                 
1 Chapter 2 described the proliferation and success of M-PESA in Kenya.   
2 As in Chapter 2, ‘unintended’ here reflects the fact that mobile payments through M-PESA were 
introduced with a micro-financial aim and the shift from its originally intended use to a major payment 
system has become financially inclusive.   
3 This public involvement refers to the large population of the unbanked as described in Chapter 2, into 
the financial realm.  
4 The ‘intermediaries’ here are the commercial banks and financial institutions: banks, building societies 
credit unions financial advisers or brokers insurance companies’ collective investment schemes, pension 
funds. 
5 Mobile Financial Services Risk Matrix, <http://mobile-financial.com/blog/mobile-financial-services-
risk-matrix> accessed 26 September 2014. 
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The most vulnerable stakeholders are exposed to risks they may not recognise, either 
through perceived risks or risks to retail payments.  Risks that affect consumers are not 
readily addressed even in the form of guidelines that spell out the nature and types of 
risks involved.6  It also established that as mobile financial services continue to develop 
and begin to offer services that offer credit such as M-Kopo,7 this over-extension of credit 
has the potential to affect the quality of the credit portfolio of banks and financial 
institutions and could have instigated financial fragility and consequently instability.  This 
position may be further aggravated by regulatory or governmental forbearance which has 
the potential to impair the credit culture amongst the newly included. The weak 
enforcement of prudential regulations by the regulators may be as a result of political 
pressure on the regulatory authorities. 8  This offered a justification for special regulatory 
oversight for mobile payments as Kenya continues to become a cashless society that relies 
on mobile payments, which have become the centre of the settlement process.  It was 
also established that the stability of a financial system relies on the soundness of 
institutions, the stability of markets, the absence of turbulence,9 minimal volatility, and 
pointed out the difficulty of achieving these through individual private actions and 
unfettered market forces alone. In addition to the public sector’s role in fostering financial 
stability as opposed to private collective action, making way for the private sector to 
achieve an optimum result on its own to take a proactive role is necessary to achieve the 
full private and social benefits of finance. 
                                                 
6 Maria C Stephens, 'Promoting Responsible Financial Inclusion: A Risk-Based Approach To Supporting 
Mobile Financial Services Expansion' (2012) 27 Banking and Finance Law Review. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Patrick Honohan, Banking System Failures in Developing and Transition Countries (1st edn, Bank for 
International Settlements 1997), where Honohan describes forbearance as the Achilles heel of any 
regulatory system where regulatory forbearance may be attributed to regulatory capture or result from 
regulators’ fear that disclosure of distress in banks may have adverse effects on their reputations.  
9 Garry J Schinasi, 'Defining Financial Stability And Establishing A Framework To Safeguard It' (2011) 15 
Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series. International Monetary Fund 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04187.pdf> accessed 22 September 2014). 
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To create the required regulatory framework requires a discussion of the 
preconditions of a safe and sound payment system first, as such an assessment is 
paramount. This should occur either through the examination of macroprudential or 
microprudential requirements. Regulators need to have complementary policy objectives 
that strike a balance between strict KYC controls and lax regulation. Given the lack of 
compromise between financial inclusion and financial integrity, payment systems such as 
mobile payments have a significant role in enhancing systemic risk, as they have become 
a significant component of the national payment system of Kenya, and therefore have 
the potential to generate and transmit systemic disturbances to the financial sector.10 
Chapter 4 also highlights the inadequacies of legal drafting in Kenya which served 
as the main catalyst for the proliferation of mobile payments. It also highlighted the 
reluctance by the regulators to correct the gaps in the regulation due to a lack of industry 
understanding and weak application of the existing regulation.  As there exists multiple 
regulatory oversight, it also established that there should be dialogue and coordination 
between the various industry regulators and parties to ensure that the providers receive 
the necessary support from government and also to evaluate possible repercussions of 
new products to the integrity of the financial system. It also suggested that the telecom 
regulatory framework is inadequate to address mobile financial services. While the CCK 
has surrendered the regulatory mandate of the converged services to the CBK, the NPSA 
does not provide adequate provisions for mobile payments. Under the current law, the 
CBK will have to coordinate with the CCK to ensure that the policies on mobile payments 
are consistent whilst it implements a more fitting regulatory framework.11 This, as was 
stated, would strengthen the regulatory capacity for reforms within Kenya to act and 
                                                 
10 Ryan Hahn, ‘Payment Systems and Systemic Risk’ (2008) The World Bank 
<http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/payment-systems-and-systemic-risk> accessed 3 September 2014.  
11 Since the CCK regulates the institutions that provide mobile payments, MNOs, and the financial 
institutions regulated by the CBK. 
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respond to changes in the market, since how to regulate and establish and appropriate 
regulatory framework remains the most important challenge.  
Chapter 5 addressed the final research question, ‘what reforms should be 
implemented in the current regulatory framework to adequately oversee mobile 
payments?’ After the exploration of the regulatory challenges, this chapter discussed the 
themes around the regulatory approach to mobile payments, through proposing the need 
for reforms within the current framework. It establishes that the need for more regulation 
in no way diminishes the success of M-Pesa in Kenya, but rather, regulation should not 
always be seen as a stifling factor or a cost to the resources, since better regulation as was 
stressed by the CBK governor would be more appropriate. Regulation that takes into 
consideration the principles of ‘good’ regulation should provide an adequate framework 
for mobile payments. As Kenya demonstrated, the rapidity of and growth even in the 
regulatory vacuum left by the lack of a national payments law at the time of its inception 
shows the need for non-bank participation in the primary provision of payment services. 
Kenya’s mobile payment system provided a rapid enabling of financial inclusion as well 
as immediate and manifest downstream benefits, with more than 40,000 agent outlets, 
enhancement of competition in financial services, and a web of interconnected business 
users whose difficulty getting paid in the past M-Pesa has remedied. The CBK will face 
continuing challenges, not only in developing the regulatory framework for mobile 
payments, but also in enforcing and implementing the provisions under the NPSA.  
 
Policy-makers and scholars continue to debate how regulation should look. Other 
developing countries have taken a variety of approaches in their regulation, but Kenya 
has the opportunity to serve as a benchmark for such regulation despite the fact that it 
has been unclear in its approach. While mature and developed markets, allow regulators 
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to react to information promptly and to accept market participants’ strong role in 
regulatory matters, mobile payments present a special circumstance, particularly in Kenya, 
where the system has developed faster and more expansively than any other deployment 
in Africa,12 and here all other payment systems are immature.  Market discipline requires 
a mature and liberal market, which combats information asymmetry, a great obstacle to 
market discipline in less mature markets. Therefore the CBK has to ensure that the 
regulatory framework for mobile payments is flexible, transparent, stable, and promotes 
competition. Although the CBK has the challenge of establishing its roles as the main 
regulatory authority for mobile payments, as a developing country, Kenya often needs to 
fulfil other developmental tasks and fulfil other objectives such as increased economic 
growth, fulfilling its Millennium Development Goals, and financial inclusion. It is 
important that regulation avoids pitting these objectives against each other to prioritise 
the interests of the public. Thus far, Kenya’s only legal contribution to the body of 
regulation of mobile payments and mobile financial services in general is a seemingly 
visible lacuna in the definition of a deposit. The way in which the mobile payment industry 
has exploited this loophole indicates inter alia just how critical contextualised legal drafting 
is, in relation to these emerging financial services. This exploitation had demonstrable 
public policy benefits, but in another time or context could have caused adverse effects 
on the Kenyan economy or on the sub-region in the event of systemic failure of the banks 
or the MNO. 
Chapter 5 further examined the theories around the appropriate regulatory 
approach for mobile payments. Mobile payments have brought into focus the re-
examination of the importance of retail payments and their core role in each country’s 
overall financial stability.13  This highlighted the importance of the central banks in the 
                                                 
12 Efforts to scale up mobile payments in other countries such as Tanzania have not enjoyed similar success.  
13 See `Policy Issues for Central Banks in Retail Payments' 2003 (n 17) 11. 
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development of retail payment systems, especially in developing countries14 where their 
regulatory capacities may not always accommodate innovative services that post-date 
their current regulatory frameworks. In recent years, many countries have been more 
explicit in their effort to include payment systems as part of their agendas. For the overall 
development of the financial market in Kenya the involvement of mobile payments and 
its significance to the overall stability of the financial system has not been examined in 
the depth that it should be, partly because of its nascent nature and the regulatory 
environment that mobile payments have developed.  Other developed countries15 have 
made efforts to establish coordination among their regulatory authorities that oversee 
payment system issues, where the cooperation has been established to ensure the smooth 
and continuing development of payment systems especially, where non-banks are 
involved.  Kenya should therefore follow suit in making mobile payments a priority.  
Other countries can learn valuable lessons from the Kenyan experience; however 
each country must devise its own payment system. Simply importing another country’s 
system without adjusting for the target country’s geography, infrastructure, banking and 
legal structures, business practices, culture and needs could lead to a suboptimal system.16 
It also established that while no regulatory approach offers full proof guarantees, there 
should be adequate safeguards against risks and each should be carefully assessed.  In the 
long run, the most effective regulatory framework to promote mobile payments should 
be guided by risk management, and safeguarding of funds, and one that balances the 
needs to enhance stability and promote innovation. It should also incorporate policy 
objectives which should focus on consumer protection and the clear definition of stored 
                                                 
14 http://www.wantinews.com/news-8162076-Central-Bank:-the-overall-stability-of-the-financial-system-
has-accumulated-some-industries-risk.htm accessed 20th September 2014.  
15 Countries such as Tanzania, Uganda Malawi and South American countries.  
16 RH Keppler, 1999, ‘Transforming Payment Systems: The Building Blocks and the World Bank's Role, 
World Bank/Federal Reserve of New York’ (FRBNY). Seminar held at FRBNY 13-16 April 1999; F 
Montes-Negret and R Keppler, ‘Project Design for Payment Systems’, March 1995, Public Project for the 
Private Sector, FPD Note No 37, The World Bank. 
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value in order to lay an enabling regulatory framework for other innovative peer to peer 
payments systems, such as Bitcoin which is slowly becoming prevalent in Kenya.17 
 
6.3. Future Research  
 
As a possible foundational study in this field in Kenya, this work has touched partially on 
the law and financial inclusion, the financial regulation agenda, and the theoretical 
underpinnings to regulation in converged environments. There still remains other aspects 
that warrant an exploration which were beyond the scope of this study, for example, 
interoperability and the implementation framework of the National Payment System Act 
2011. A possible limitation of this thesis is that it is primarily a study of a single economy. 
The choice was consciously made with these facts in mind, motivated by the 
acknowledged need for financial sector deepening in Kenya, and in light of the fact that 
mobile financial services in Africa are still developing. This raises the valid argument that 
its findings may not necessarily be relevant to other jurisdictions. Furthermore, Kenya 
has appeared to be the standard and bellwether of mobile payments’ success and therefore 
any comparisons to other jurisdictions would not have yielded much results. Considering 
these limitations, this thesis does not argue that it encompasses all the relevant issues 
involved in mobile payments. The scarcity of research and literature on either the 
substantive content or the examination of the regulatory issues underlines the originality 
of this study.  
 
 
 
                                                 
17 https://www.bitpesa.co/ > accessed 29th September 2014. 
293 
 
6.3.1. Interoperability 
 
Interoperability, which this thesis did not delve into, as it may be subject to future 
research, provides a regulatory challenge in the mobile payment context. The 
Competition Authority of Kenya18 would be involved. Interconnection19 allows users of 
one MNO to communicate with users of another MNO to allow access to services 
provides by either MNOs.20  
Interoperability, on the other hand, allows ‘the ability of communication systems, 
units or elements to provide services and to accept services from other systems, units or 
forces, and to use the services exchanged to enable them operate effectively together’.21  
Though interoperability may be a technological issue in this respect, this thesis argues is 
it a regulatory one. This is because interoperability provides a consumer benefit22 by 
offering a better competitive network.23 Interoperability also allows externalities to be 
highlighted and the filtering of ineffective networks.24 This precipitates further 
examination as to who would have to oversee this and how would legislation on 
                                                 
18 Competition Authority of Kenya was instituted in 2012, Competition Authority of Kenya, ‘About Us’ 
<http://www.cak.go.ke/> accessed 26 September 2014.  
19 The physical and logical linking of telecommunication networks used by the same or different service 
licensees. 
20 Section 2 of the Kenya Information and Communications (Interconnection and Provision of Fixed Links, 
Access and Facilities) Regulations, 2010. For example, interconnection of mobile network operator 
infrastructure allows subscribers of Safaricom to call, text, and receive calls and texts from Airtel network 
subscribers. 
21 Jeremy Okonjo, ‘Convergence of Mobile and Financial Services Implications for Regulation of Mobile 
Telecoms in Kenya’ (2014) <http://www.slideshare.net/JeremmyOkonjo/convergence-of-mobile-and-
financial-services-implications-for-regulation-of-mobile-telecoms> accessed 26 September 2014. Section 2 
of the Kenya Information and Communications (Interconnection and Provision of Fixed Links, Access 
and Facilities) Regulations 2010. For example, interoperability of Safaricom’s and Airtel’s mobile financial 
service platforms would allow subscribers of M-Pesa to send and receive money from ZAP, respectively.  
22 John Buckley, Telecommunications Regulation (IET 2003). 
23 Chukwudiebube Bede Opata, 'Looking Towards Europe: Regulation Of Dominance In Nigerian 
Telecommunications' SSRN Journal. 
24 Ivan Mortimer-Schutts, ‘The Regulatory Implications of Mobile and Financial Services Convergence’ 
(2007) in The Transformational Potential of M-Transactions: moving the debate forward (2007) The Policy 
Paper Series 6 
<http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/vodafone/about/public_policy/policy_papers/public_polic
y_series_6.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014.  
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interconnection look.25 Interconnection promotes competition in the market.26 In market 
structures where there is one dominant MNO new subscribers tend to prefer that 
significant market player (SMP) over other lesser players. Safaricom, which boasts a 65 
per cent market share, has benefitted from this new subscriber pattern.27 This is because 
subscribers derive the benefit of connecting to a wider number of people at once.28 This 
is called the ‘network effect’, which subsequently breeds market monopolies.29 Hence 
competition is encouraged when a new entrant's customers can receive traffic from or 
originate traffic to any other user within a marketplace. Competition is also encouraged 
when a new entrant can supply network services to a wider population of customers than 
the limited number who are directly connected as its own customers.30 
6.3.2. Implementation of the National Payment Systems Act  
It is extremely early to conclude whether CBK has successfully implemented its 
regulatory oversight through the National Payment System Act 2011 which integrates the 
regulation of mobile payments. Implementation also provides an aspect on which future 
research would be based. In the future, Kenya may undertake a policy and regulatory legal 
discourse about implementing mobile payments, introducing mobile payments alongside 
                                                 
25 Joshua Goldstein, ‘Embracing “Open Access” in East Africa: A Common Internet Infrastructure Policy 
Agenda for Human Security and Economic Development’ (2008) Journal of Public and International 
Affairs Vol 19 139–150. The author noted that ‘governments and incumbent telecom companies in East 
Africa are unmotivated to change this status quo because they currently form a cartel that profits from the 
rent-seeking activities of limited competition and closed access’. See also, Mark Okuttah, ‘Telcos lock horns 
over sharing of infrastructure’ Business Daily (22 May 2013) <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Telcos-
lock-horns-over-sharing-of-infrastructure/-/1248928/1859780/-/2qxqnt/-/index.html> accessed 26 
September 2014.  
26 William H Melody, ‘Interconnection: Cornerstone of Competition’ in William Melody (ed), Telecom Reform: 
Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices (Technical University of Denmark 1997) 441–450. 
27 Communications Commission of Kenya, ‘Annual report financial year 2010/11’ (2012)  
<http://www.ca.go.ke/images//downloads/PUBLICATIONS/ANNUALREPORTS/Annual%20Repo
rt%20for%20the%20Financial%20Year%202010-2011.pdf> accessed 26 September 2014. 
28 Bede C Opata, ‘Transplantation and Evolution of Legal Regulation of Interconnection 
Arrangements in the Nigerian Telecommunications Sector’ (2011) 
<http://www.researchgate.net/publicliterature.PublicPublicationPromoRequestFulltext.signup.html?publ
icationUid=256033593&ev=su_pub_req> accessed 26 September 2014. The author notes that this might 
be beneficial to sector incumbents at the onset of liberalisation, as they have all existing subscribers, but 
prohibitive of new entry. 
29 Ivan Mortimer-Schutts (2007) 
30 Ibid. 
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the establishment of safety and soundness provisions to safeguard user funds, and thereby 
make a larger contribution to the international body of approaches to mobile payments.31  
Regular reporting32 by MNOs on their financial health to the CBK and placement of 
funds in trust accounts at commercial banks  demonstrates that adequate planning, a 
progressive regulator, alongside technical innovation ensures that there is no systemic 
impact on the financial system or harm to consumers.  
Due to the cutting edge nature of this study, which seemed to race against the 
country developments in its analysis, this would have to be done in assessing how the 
CBK would proscribe, enforce and implement the National Payments Systems Act 2011. 
Payments systems innovation has greatly influenced the country’s development ethic and 
as stated in Chapter 5 each country that is looking to adopt mobile payments as an 
inclusive tool is at a different development stage, and would therefore need to look at 
how it has worked in other countries before adopting mobile payments. Therefore inquiry 
into these dynamics would expand the standard of local knowledge on how mobile 
payments and national development unite. There is also a need to build a national baseline 
of empirical data on all aspects of the mobile payments system. Collaborative work 
between researchers and the CBK in Kenya would yield valuable information that would 
form a critical first-line database for more robust empirical studies. More importantly as 
it would inform policy-makers seeking to evaluate public policy choices and in their 
allocation of resources that would enhance beneficial objectives.  
 
 
                                                 
31 A discussion explained in this chapter and offered as a risk in Chapter 3.  
32 The  Financial Reporting Centre  www.fpc.co.ke MNOs are required to report all incidences of fraud as 
was articulated during the interview with Mercy Buku; Joy Malala, Interview with Mercy Buku, 'An 
Interview with Senior Manager Money Laundering Reporting at Safaricom' (2014). 
296 
 
6.4. Conclusion  
 
What this study has achieved is to create a baseline framework for future 
explorations of the multidimensional nature of mobile payments by offering a 
foundational perspective on the development of mobile payments from its inception to 
eventual regulation. Given that Kenya presents the most successful employment of 
mobile payments, it is particularly crucial that future work into the legal and institutional 
mechanics for the growth and development of inclusive financial services be employed 
with a retrospective approach. Therefore there needs to be a dedicated early stage 
financial inclusion programme for Kenya, especially one rooted in research and 
development. It also aims to correct and expose some assumptions about developing 
countries’ perspectives on inclusive technology by asserting that advanced models of 
establishing advanced financial systems do not have to use bricks and mortar models and 
that the orthodox views of development can now be challenged and bypassed through 
the use of technology, but only sustained through safe and sound frameworks, in this case 
appropriate regulatory frameworks.  This work has only considered one aspect of mobile 
payments, the regulatory challenges arising post-financial inclusion; other aspects that 
remain unexplored to complete the knowledge and ‘baseline’ for Kenya’s mobile financial 
services are interoperability and ensuring a level playing field within the MNOs to 
effectively sustain the upward trend of financial inclusion. It would also adequately 
complement future research to examine retrospectively the effects of any future 
legislation that would seek to remedy the challenges highlighted in this thesis. Therefore 
continuing on the basis that this is a foundational study on the regulatory issues 
surrounding mobile payments in Kenya, it seems fitting that the outcomes of this study’s 
evaluations be translated into a series of law and policy implications through the emergent 
issues surrounding inclusive financial services.  
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